The question is no longer that of Being, for Heidegger has destroyed being, like a forensic analysis of material. Being was viable so long as there was a dialectic whereby reality could be based upon its one vision through the oscillating features held from one another, like a binary star. Hiedegger destroyed the dialectic (for conventional method), encompassing the description of how such an interaction takes place for reality, what the dialectic does, how it works, a description from a distance, in a nice neat package, defining the Trueness of the Object called Dasein, ready for distribution. Hence, the question anymore is not of being, but of truth. The issue with Graham Harman is that he stands upon the dialectic through setting aside the destruction of being, and thereby enacts a deception. He thereby may speak of other than human Daseins through the dialectical vehicle, all the while holding the dialectic out of sight, withdrawn as the Dasein by which other Daseins are possible is likewise set aside for the sake of proposing again a ‘new’ one reality where the dialectic is gone, and the subject likewise dead. He thereby may propose a new ontology of being: Object Ontology.
I must admit, as a read more of Harman I am becoming increasingly disillusioned and bored; I tend to see the rise of Speculative Realism and then it’s Fizzle to have ran along these same lines as I am experiencing and discovering. And I must say that it is because of what has occurred, what was enticed early on as a sort of promise has lead to merely another philosophical system; quite boring, but even more irritating was that it seemed like Harman might be one to be able to pull it off, but then he comes up with another system that proposes a more real version of reality. So conventional; so regular, run of the mill. So it is, the reason for this motion of his that lead to a positing a more real system is explained by the essay of the Significant Event, that such deceptions can no longer stay viable; that is, except in so much as the deception is working, and where it succeeds is exactly in that audience where denial is operative. The deception works because the conventional method is already submerged and distanced in a self imposed deception: the term-object identity.
The boredom of Dasein explained by Harman is symptomatic of the reversal and contrivance we see in Harman’s Ontology. Admitting the short reading, the boredom of Being Dasein in need of some danger is at the heart of why Harman’s seem so boring: because the danger of Object Ontology comes in response to the boredom of being that is, in itself, a preliminary mood, that is, a mood that has not been allowed its maturation, has not been let to risk, and so discusses subsequence. Like a lacuna, this mood that Harman seems to understand is the offense that is the Ontology in its Ontological functioning. Harman is required for his Dasein of many colors to describe as enactment the results of having True Objects as the basis of a reality that is ubiquitous as it is total in its assertion of a universe of only objects. This is to say that he is arguing his identity, an identity that has arisen due to his investment in the State of reality. Here multiple Daseins exist as the evidence of the description of how it’s being is not presence, like an oxymoron, defies and contradicts its own meaning. Beings may exist with a certain facticity of ‘being there’ as an environmental inclusive state, but the being of Dasein thereby includes the fact of other Daseins within its own ‘there being facticity’. The implication here is the point of contention between eternity and progress, between what Badiou calls ‘immortal’ and ‘victim’; Harman is enacting his victimization. The dangerous move apparently seen by Harman is gained by his view of his Dasein as a meaning of meaning, as a Being that is exempt from the situation that Heidegger presents to mean Dasein. The meaning of Dasein for Harman is already a meaning represented as a object of Harman’s presentation. Harman apparently already was viewing the significance of Heidegger’s work as a significance fundamentally different than what the meaning of Dasein would entail, which is to say, the corpus that is the explanation of Dasein was already in the format of meaning that represents as a presentation the True Object (meaning of meaning) as an objective reflection, over the meaning that the corpus presents. Harman already was was viewing the world as a whole constituency of True Objects, already was his faith unquestioned, already his faith not doubted, his naïveté a sham before it could be authentic. Rather than the danger which is the being bored as the boredom that is being, Harman’s risk, what is dangerous for Harman, is by his faith, that his deception might be uncovered.
But in one manner of speaking, he need not be worried, because his faith is vindicated in the power that establishes reality, as he is invested in this reality, as he has faith in this power, he is justified. His risk is entirely of his faith.
Nevertheless, the boredom or disappointment comes because while his categories seem to really get at something, he leaves us flat in a world of intellectual ‘weirdness’; but the weirdness is barely interesting — or maybe as interesting as watching someone solve a Rubic’s cube. I know now that every time he preludes an idea with weird, it’s not going to be weird at all but rather mundane and obvious; but somehow I am sure that it is weird to a certain type of type of reader and author, and this type is probably one who is oriented upon the True Object. For a while I thought Graham was really following the philosophical maxim of looking to oneself, but it’s seems his route for this is more conventionally methodological than it is novel or introspective.
Yet, I should say that we must give Graham the benefit of doubt; I am sure that Graham indeed feels that he is looking to himself and not being conventional (why else would he say that ideas might be ‘new’?). And this is exactly where the discourse of the Significant Event gains its footing; because Graham can not see beyond his faith. Faith makes true. The discursive posturing may appear quite the feat of meaning, but philosophically speaking, while impressive, it risks little.