I suppose the question left is a trick question because one cannot dismiss the link already established between philosophy and ideology and politics; there is indeed reality to be dealt with. The question behind philosophical learning has to do with if it has already been or is being dealt with by the historical discourse, if there is a progress of the human being itself, if the philosophical discourse is actually moving the individual human being to better ‘know thyself’, if a record of historical discourse allowing the human being a better purchase upon what it is to be a human being and what occurs in this process? Or, does conventional philosophy perpetually lure the human being away from itself? Or to be even more crass; Does the conventional route present a deception of itself, for itself, so that it can move upon a platform of substantial belief such that human beings are gaining some sort of solution? And then of course the pivotal issue of this forum: What is education?
The trick is seen inso much as such a question may be voiced from a valid position, because then the proof that would put philosophy in bed with politics and such, and thus deflate what otherwise would be a ‘good use’ for philosophy to a ‘well esteemed and well paid methods for engineering maintenance’ and would elevate the lowly conventionally methodological philosopher to have to drop his broom for a gun in the effort to defend that identity thus created by ideological faith — but this is reality. The trick in this discussing types or routes for learning is in so much as one sees that they are being deceived; a trick of mirrors; it is not that there is no mirror, but that the mirror into which philosophy most often looks shows its identical reflection, that is, the right hand in the reflection still is the right hand from the reference of the reflection; the left, the left…
The notice made by Negarestani (essay link in part A) might give rise to the construction of meaning that will show how the terms themselves allow only particular formations of concepts, that the structure of a given situation allows for and recalls to itself necessary arrangements of meaning and thus offers what might be called a ‘lexicontology’, amoung other transformations, a type of argument for determinism. Our situation thus asks into the excess, the ‘world’ that is the haphazard method of finding the necessary arrangements, what can be called the conventional bias. Notwithstanding this problem, his can be seen as further evidence of discourse coming to terms with itself, as the (engineering, of Negaresanti’s essay) discourse is seen as not arising from some unitive structure toward some systematic resolution (revolution), but rather that the structure is the object in correspondence with discourse at various functional junctures; a quite deconstructivist approach. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to see how such offer-recall of objects locates the imperative of faith to disjoin from the object and deny its recall (distance). Presently such an ontology is not part of the real discursive structure-function (it grants no reflection), but there again, the Significant Event suggests that in so much as we are already and always human, such an ontology would be merely another real scheme of faith, yet one which in respect of the position that would recognize such ontology would bring about a repetition of history, a reinstatement of beginning such that a much longer period of knowledge would have to be allowed to rebuild the subsequence of discourse to the point that such a repetition could be recognized. Of course, the usual arguments against determinism will always apply, for the significant feature of an effective ontology of determinism, one that functions as such, must relinquish the position that determinism proposes, which is also the relinquishing of its counter argument, contingency, which only happens in the conventional human reality; this is what is meant by, with Zizek for one, but others, forgetting, and its repercussions, a (re-)instatement of repetition (Kierkegaard), as well as the mistake denied of redundancy.
The purpose of any revolutionary discourse is to jolt the human being from its individual sleep of reactionary default. So, it may not be too far a stretch here to completely offend the reader by saying that the human being does not change through history, but reality does. The default linkage is that which informs the offense inherent to the rebuttal because the rejection stems from a particular direction, or vector, of linkage; the dismissal of such a statement comes from the individual that is invested in the state of reality determined by the term-object identity, where the subject is held against the object in a directional mode, subject-> object, as an imperative, the conventional method. For reality, where discourse is able to come about through the inversion of this relationship, there we have Harman’s Object Oriented Ontology, object->object, but where this is really a motion of object->subject, the situation implied of this essay, but ironically, of a determinism as determinism, the route that is always denied in effective reality despite its conventional appropriation. It is the Significant Event that allows for this effective determination.
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Of the second type of student from Part A we mean to suggest that such humanity and the world is not questioned but is rather taken as a platform upon which to wonder and ask upon the objects of its view. Thus all discourses are merely information about objects, even as the object in question is the human being. Mythology and history offer stories of past humans and insights into the nature of humanity and what it means to be a human being. Scientific books tell of methods of analysis that were correct and incorrect, answers that were correct and incorrect and why they were so. The whole range of possible information grants this student a picture and a palette, and a canvas upon which she can create and add to the wondrous and vast compendium of personal, social, useful and not useful items of the human plate.
Tangental to such neutrality, the issue brought up in part A about the move students may make into gathering more discursive information indicates a particular priority of vector for knowledge. For the implication of such a movement does not necessitate any particular discourse to be revealing to the student, rather it presents the possible repercussions of the route. It is just as sensible, along these lines, that a person would venture into ‘spiritual’ discourses as well as strictly philosophical notions and begin to see the elements of those routes as truely true. For example; there are many many people who like to offer us a vision of ‘planes of existence’ where there is a ‘Godhead’ of consciousness, and this Godhead thus can be disseminated along certain logical lines to bring various states of Being that thus serve to explain the human participation in the universe. We might call this a type of New Age conflation of a further variety of philo-spiritual systems, one that arises from the ancient Hindu, Buddhist and or Kabalist ideas, but also modern theoretical physics. One could also read Alastair Crowley and describe the truth of how the universe disseminates along Magickal lines. Pagan or Wiccan cosmology offers a route as well to tell of the truth. Likewise, modern science offers its own meaning for its research in its own right, of non-locality and complexity and such, often removing from its discourse the spiritual voice but all the while telling us of this Truth of the universe and our true place in it. Philosophers, oddly enough, appear to be the most stubborn, for as soon as one brings of a term that has possibility to be unclear or is already attached to certain authorial matrices, such as ‘phenomenon’ and ‘discourse’ and ‘transcendence’, and ‘metaphysics’, these students will route the discussion to the potential of truth that such philosophical discourses hold, so when one speaks they must automatically resolve themselves by their speaking to ‘idealist’, ‘realist’, ‘materialist, etcetera… domains of truth that, as a part of the philosophical truth, are held in suspension for the discussion that arises simultaneously toward and upon the philosophical truth. But these are more than just speaking; somehow, for all such speakers, they appear to constitute The Actual Truth of the universe.
Here, though, we are addressing specifically philosophical truth, but through this discursive vehicle bringing into question all routes. But not that philosophy as a particular discursive arena thus amounts to The true reduction of all routes, but that any route, if viewed as a particular suspension of meaning as opposed to its being involved with terms that are understood as actually anchored of objective truth, may be reduced to any other route. This is the principle that all discourses are valid and hence contribute to the transformation of that principle; that individual discourses constitute the economy of discourses by which reality is manifested. Hence the query that brings the respective routes of the second and first student to the question of a particular vectorial move that conflates the two students to one route that then presents itself suspended (ironically) in particular assertions of truth: What is occurring that brings the student to assert a particular truth in opposition to another? And, what is that situation that is able to move through such anchored scaffolding to thus be able to make the correlation of all systems? Hence, the question that is brought by my sited essay above (by Negarestani): What is the function of the structure, and the structure of the function? This is not a suggestion to delve into subjective justification per say, but is rather addressing under what conditions does a unitary discourse of reality arise? What does such a unitary discourse as and in its unity suggest of reality?
I shall back up and elaborate, for the question of ideology has to do with that for which it does not account, or otherwise accounts for it by incorporating the (it’s) presented lack into its structure. From where, or how, does, the ideology of reality function as an incorporating structure?
This question involving the first student is: If the student were so interested in the question of existence and her presence on the scene and how the world might be or otherwise present itself, is the historical philosophical discourse necessary to her finding those things the traditional discourse ponders and proposes of questions and answers? This is to ask, is the conventional route the only route? To be more specific: Is it necessary to read Husserl to know about that of which phenomenology speaks? Of course, all those prideful philosophers will have a field day ripping apart this question so much that they will see such a question as hardly reflecting a knowledgable positions of the issue. They will bring such questions as “well, yes, because phenomenology was a system of thought coined by Husserl in which he said this and that and phrases things this and that way… so if anyone were to know about phenomenology, they would necessarily have to have read him or at least spoken to someone about his ideas”. And of course I would have to say that they completely used their over philosophical brain that processes given information to arrive at that answer, just like the second student I just mentioned.
So I shall reiterate: Is it necessary to have read Hesserl to come to a notion (very, very generally speaking) that all phenomena of the world arise in the subject? And again I can just hear it: “the only way one would know there was a subject in which phenomena arises in is to have knowledge of philosophical rhetoric”.
Am I making any head way here?
Again: If a person were so interested, could they come upon the meaning of Husserl’s founding premise without having to have read about it? And I am not asking if they could know that Husserl said this. Along this line, can a student understand Husserl without a primer, without the usual historical and academic philosophical contextual introduction? We suggest, contrary to the conventional assumption, that perhaps Husserl’s idea is not an idea that came about due to Husserl, but that such an idea is innate to the human experience given that one is motivated to plainly look.
Likewise; Is Kant’s notion that knowledge reflects of itself, an idea that can only be gained by knowledge of Kant?
Likewise; Is Fauerbach’s idea of an economy of human knowledge dependent upon Kant’s idea? Is any proposal of authors dependent upon the previous statements of other authors?
Likewise; Is Harman’s idea of Objects (Object Oriented Ontology) due to his pronouncing the idea, or is such an idea innate to reflective human experience? Is Miellassoux’s idea of an object that exists antecedent to the thought about it an idea that he and only he came up with? Was his idea dependent upon other authors’ proposals? Nevermind that if we say ‘yes’ we are setting aside the very method by which we insist upon questioning what the author is really saying.
So; If such ideas do indeed depend upon and are allowed to be generated because of previous authors’ proposals, then we have a proposal of a particular type of human reality. We have the conflation, but conventional discernment, of philosophy as a conspiratorial agent of political and ideological investment.
If not, then we have a completely different situation.
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Part of the problem of the point of contention is that if we can say that authors are drawing upon ideas that are innate to the human being, then we can say that it is possible to point to specific notions of respective discourses, certain subsequent conclusions put forth by various authors based upon the innate factor or element, that do not reside innately to human reflection, that is, to all humans who may reflect, proposals that are particular to that author’s presence in the world or experience in knowledge and or their particular method of disseminating the innate experience of knowledge, articles that must be learned through the banking model. We can say that humans are capable of understanding the subsequent moves, but we are also saying that the subsequent moves are sufficient to the necessary premise, that if the premise is innate, we can thereby understand why or how the author might draw such subsequent conclusions, even we might see them as incorrect. It is by this maxim, this discrepancy that is the evidence supporting argument, i.e. I know what you mean here/ I don’t know what you mean there, or, I know what you mean, but the consequence is mis-drawn, is an indication of problem and elicits from this situation the aspect of the discourse on the Significant Event that we have called opacity, where the distinction put out upon the reality implied by discourse reveals faith and its operative mode of the veto, but specifically to those authors who appear to recognize the discrepancy, the pocket veto. Hence also, we set aside the question of conventional reality and its authors, for its method assumes and relies upon such opacity (argument; choice; veto), the space wherein arises impetus for real progress, and instead we address particular philosophical discourses that evidence opacity (the pocket veto) within itself as its presentation reveals opacity between what is innate or necessary, and what is hypothetical or contingent; for what is innate appears through all discourses in one way or another, through various shades and veils, screens and partitions, despite how ‘Pure Reason’ may be located in Kant to be a conventional Western philosophy property. Such propriety is entirely hypothetical and practical.
Now we can get to the clincher, the most offensive proposal of divergence, the caveat that would often buck the philosophical reader. We can also say that what is innate to the human being is only innate to those for whom it is innate. The problem is inherent to the proposal of divergence, for when this is mentioned within a treatise that is called philosophical, whatever the phrasing, the meaning will always be brought back to the conventional philosophical rhetoric, the meaning of meaning. One problem is in the use of the term ‘human being’, and this is used specifically to avoid the term ‘humanity’ for certain contexts. The individual, on the other hand, does refer specifically to the human being invested in reality. So it is that the distinction is commonly and en route seen to divide by which to implicate the whole, and, move for the whole by making distinctions by which the whole there comes. It is thereby (by this method) that divergence will not be understood, for when we speak of the human being we must be speaking of an individual, one that is a single member of a common whole, and a potential that thereby is available to the whole. In this case, if there is an idea that is innate of the human being, then we are also saying that any and every human being may have access to it. Yet, the question must be, if every human being has access to this innate idea, why do they not express as an idea innate to themselves that they apprehend this idea? But not only this; if there is an innate idea found merely through the looking at that which is innate to the human being, why do people require it being described by others for them to understand the innate idea? What is it about such innateness that is being aroused un-innately? Yet if such innateness is aroused by a sort of sympathy between (subject-)objects, such that perhaps a type of ‘resonance’ is occurring by which such latent idea thus is apprehended as innate, what is the situation where 1) only particular people are privy or have access to such discourses of the idea? And, 2) even if such discourses are available to people, most people do not or cannot apprehend them? And, 3) even if such discourses are supposed to be apprehended they are not viewed as have arisen innately, but rather comprehended as a unit of information that had not been there prior to the learning it, that is, the gaining of the piece of information that says it is innate amounts thus to it being innate as a price (distance; commodity) of definitional information?
The situation presented by these three instances, which occur at all times in nearly every place one can come across, thus must signal a divergent discourse, one that speaks of humanity but a specific humanity that apprehends the innate idea. We can no longer assume that any sort of revolutionary transformation can or will arise, (for the revolution has de facto already occurred) and neither, without a certain forlorn demeanor, can we settle to treat all production of discourse strictly like a work of art. The category of which we speak no longer compromises itself to a usurpation of multiple perceptions or interpretation of sets of sets, but even sets these conventional term-identities within a different categorical imperative. We thereby speak of divergence in its most full and true sense. This situation is similar, say, to people who know how to program computers. As an analogy; no one will suggest that the skills, language and let alone the perception upon computers that these people have automatically must be able to be reduced to the skills, language and perception of say the users of Microsoft Windows platform, that the programmers must reconcile their ‘computer programming world’, or the code or language they use and the perceptions of problems and solutions of computer programming, to the general user of Windows, the but neither must the Windows users be reconciled in their using to be automatically included in the programmers ‘world’. But this is exactly what is presumed of conventional philosophy for the category of philosophy as a single imperative within which all the -ism’s and -ologies arise. This is to say, that the significance of divergence does not reduce itself nor is required to reconcile itself to what is more real of reality, and, the discussion that considers these facets of knowledge of reality as an all inclusive meaning, while it may use the ‘results’ of such divergence for its varied purposes, likewise is incapable of addressing the divergent discourse beyond such addressing as being material of divergence (face to face).
The ramifications of discourse itself of attempting to describe and thus bring about such a reconciliation has a long history, indeed inscribes as it proscribes history, most significantly and poignantly in the rhetoric of revolution. But the fact remains that even the most recent conventional manifestations evidence the real attempt that still reifies and depends upon a discrepancy that is not being overcome. We propose that this is due to a confusion (mistake) that occurs in the effort to conflate what is inherently divided into a one reality, a confusion that persists due to the effort for reconciliation. The Significant Event thus describes how and why such an effort fails for reality, as well as describing how and why such real effort persists, and thereby exposes conventional philosophy as a play for importance of its namesake, for what could be better called, more legitimately, critical or political theory, cultural anthropology, critical psychology, or just plain ideological negotiation, or what might be for a more correctly identifying term, purely academic sets of conventional analytical methodology.
To put this in a conventional phrasing, “the revolution will not be televised”. The irony of divergence cannot be overestimated. Hence, for its weight in truth, we must discern such a divergent discourse that yet remains philosophical, as not real. There is no line being drawn here, the line is already drawn; reality will continue as it always does, conventionally.
The Veritable Counsel 
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