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My discussion about the experiential and knowledge-base of mental health has dropped.

Here is the link:

https://www.academia.edu/128620035/The_Argument_of_Mental_Health_Philosophyhttps://www.academia.edu/128620035/The_Argument_of_Mental_Health_Philosophy

And here is the text:

The Argument of Mental Health Philosophy 

Part One: Note on approach.

Mental health is an epistemological conjugation. It brings together that which is held apart for the purpose of socially navigating the real world. It is inclusive and expansive and by this attitude and manner what I call The Two Routes is pronounced. The Two Routes accounts for all things known, and thereby articulates mental health; if one must be proven this in argument, then there does the two routes present itself, if still it is not noticed, the two routes are thus proven, although perhaps not yet. Mental health is the condition of all things known and knowable, what I say is experience itself of what is sensed, felt, and thought about, and no matter how we define any of those; if a soul or a spirit, or any other item must encapsulate mental health, then there does the argument for proving again announce itself as the only way to know. Nonetheless, the definition is valid however subsequent as such, a product to be used. I say this in full confidence because we use the term ‘mental health’ to mean something before we start to critique and deconstruct it, before we start to insist that it is a result of scarce resources which compel one to prove to another by taking from them what they know. I say, if indeed we are using the term ‘mental health’ to mean anything that is consistent with the meaning we suppose by it, then, again, we have an articulation of two ways of knowing arising to be known.

The history of philosophy, likewise where ever it arises and has arisen, is constituted by The Two Routes, and these routes form the basis of all philosophical endeavor: the reconciling human and experience of things. Rene Descartes was but a marker of a moment, not a god of creation. Not much more can be said there without resorting to an attempt to put into precise definition the situation, and that effort I call ‘conventional’ because it is based within the philosophical problem that is come upon whenever we try to navigate our lives whether it be in the real world or true universe.

To make notice of this situation is sticky, if not precarious, because real sustenance strategies are based often enough in keeping things clearly smooth, slick, and safe, and most people are primarily concerned with the anxieties of living and their expression. Just so, many philosophers who have noticed this epistemological phenomenon of being human find themselves in a problem of aggravation. The relieving of this aggravation (existential anxiety) has been the task of most philosophers that we know of (in the West, at least, whoever they are, from Plato to Peterson – but not so much Socrates to Zizek) as they are involved with and by us in a particular way. This way I say is conventional, meaning inherently assumptive and automatically on the social involvement as the criterion against which all communicative expression must find address and meaning. The evidence of this philosophical route (as I say) is that there is inevitably more discussion about what is right and wrong about any philosophically communicative act (argumentative proposal); even as this note is being read, beyond doubt, corrective proof is being formulated. The inescapable (assumed) operation of the conventional route is proof through definitional convincing. Its method is critical and reductive, and toward the erecting and construction of social definition (identity), presumably for the purpose of instructing or convincing people that they must think or behave a certain manner to be correct or incorrect.

In short, conventional philosophy is unable, unsuited, unfit, to realize mental health beyond definition and this can be problematic, especially if we are putting all our health marbles in the bag of identity. So I say, mental health coincides while exceeding definition and articulates The Two Routes as disciplinary protocol in every proposal of intervention. Further I say that such definition presents the problem that mental health solves through the act that is knowing itself, and the solution (if there must be one) is nothing less than

Being before the real argument, much as one ‘stands before the people’, for example. Knowledge is Being constituted. Therefore, this argument is less an argument of proving or trying to convince anything to anyone; rather it is an argument of validation, as we well see in the following Argument for Mental Health Philosophy.

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Abstract.

This paper presents the epistemological context of mental health, arguing ‘mental health’ be used as the practical term as it accounts for and explains the functioning of psychology, psychiatry, neurology, and other disciplines that propose things about mental health and how to intervene in mental issue and disorder. Mental Health Philosophy accounts for the real functioning of people involved with mental health as phenomena, and as that which accounts for and explains functioning is the greatest sense is termed ‘true’. By this discernment, disciplinary activity is pronounced more accurately, and due to this greater accuracy, promotes a larger field for understanding of what is happening and enhances the potential effectiveness of treatment for mental issues. By grounding material efforts in this substantive philosophy, the realization of Mental Health Philosophy will allow practitioners to have much less doubt in their ability, its adoption

in pedagogical approaches to training (including its empirical scientific branches) will benefit the discipline of mental health overall, and the awareness it promotes will move the helping professions forward significantly.

Keywords – Epistemology of Mental Health, Mental Health Philosophy, Orientation and Disciplinary Knowledge, Phenomenology and Counseling, Psychological Disciplines

Part Two: Qualification and Discernment of what is Involved with Mental Health from what it is not is the Beginning of Mental Health as Sensible Discipline

1. We are dealing with mental health, in particular, the philosophical proposal that accounts for all things that can be said to be concerned or involved with mental health. Mental Health Philosophy grounds all things of this domain in a substantive practice that then grants possibility of a meaningful and more effective coordination of efforts.
2. Psychology is a logic of control. A psyche is an ideological form, and the logic of it is necessarily a materialistic endeavor.
3. Mental Health Philosophy is based in practical activity and has to do with the substance of things. Ideas come after the material of subjects, for a term, the practical world is the universal activity antecedent the phenomenal world. This helps everyone who questions themselves and the nature of reality because they are not essentially questioning their ideas than they are questioning how reality is involved with their ideas.
4. A mental health is one of activity; control is one part of activity.
   4.1. Disciplineisaboutapplyingunderstanding,whichthenholdsthepossibilityforcontrol.
   4.2. Isaytheattempttocontrolbeforeunderstandingistherootandsoiloftheexperientialaggravationthatis mental issue.
5. Nonetheless, due to the nature of reality, one must wade and sort through the materialist fog first, through the reaction that is the seemingly ubiquitous and automatic behavior of controlling. Everyone says (or implies by their activity and argument) they can see through the fog but no one offers any tangible evidence; they offer material manipulations through arguments of definitional proof, and work to control before they have understanding of just what they are attempting to control.

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5.1. Thereisadifferenceembeddedinargumentthatisnotregularlyadmittedbetweenargumentasproof, and argument of validation.

5.1.1. Validation of just what it is first we are working to control is required if indeed we are going to help to find an effective way to heal issues of growth or fix issues of dysfunction.

5.2. Ifourmainconcernisfreedom,inthisrespect,thenpsychologycontradictsitself,for,thatkindof freedom is freedom to be sick – which, of course, is not entirely off the table. We would then need simply to recognize that we are allowing for the freedom to be sick, which ironically, we do in mental health, as will become apparent.

5.2.1. If psychology claims to allow for the freedom to be sick, we could ask what they are classifying as disorder or sickness, for if the sick were free to be sick, there would be no criteria for sickness. Freedom would be automatically and definitionally healthy without the requirement or permission of psychology, sickness the valid form of the person enacting their freedom. (This is for a separate discussion).

5.3. If our main concern is authenticity, then, again, we must allow for the possibility that to be sick is to be authentic, and that disorder, problem, or what have you, is based in an illusion.

5.4. I agree with François Laruelle: there are no illusions.

6. We are to the point in modern knowledge where we have enough proof to understand what is happening.
   1. 6.1.  Thearguments,whilecontinuing,haveanopportunitytofindthemselvesasfunctionsgroundedinrealuniversal sensibility before (not in contrast to) intellectual subjective idealisms.
   2. 6.2.  Ofcourse,manyargumentswillargueagainstthis,andMentalHealthPhilosophyaccountsforandallows for such resistance and argument as an expression of freedom.
7. So we find the first point of Mental Health Philosophy:
   7.1. Thereisnomannertodispelthefog.Thefogisanintrinsicandinnatepartofbeinghuman.Anydispelling of the fog is a subjective proposal of ideological order, just as the fogginess is one functional part of being human.
8. This is where discipline is articulated, and specifically where the discipline of counseling enters the domain of reality.The Address of Imposter Syndrome as a Way Into Mental Health Philosophy
9. The cloudiness of intention, purpose, and understanding is the basis of Imposter Syndrome, not as much the cognitive, somatic, or semantic (or even social-systemic, political or what have you) rendering of the syndrome.
   9.1. The subjective experience of Imposter Syndrome is the symptom.9.1.1.This does not mean we do not approach through the symptom or that the symptom is not real, nor any other kind of ignorant, dismissive patronizing accusation. However, it does mean that two orders of knowledge are occurring, one real, one true.

10. The significance of seeing through the fog is the second point:
10.1. There are only two basic epistemological routes upon things, and these do not rejoin into

another unity.
10.2. These routes can be known.

10.2.1. The rejoining into unity is one of the routes, and plurality is not necessarily the other route, for then the plurality would be positing another unity, i.e., the unity that the meaning of plurality would be inscribing.

10.2.1.1. Any unity is ideological, that is, ethical, and always embodying a utopia of philosophical dimensions.

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10.2.1.2. The Two Routes are Nonphilosphical in the sense that Francois Laruelle described.

11. This is the beginning of disciplinary knowledge, and Mental Health Philosophy.
11.1. Plato described the material situation. What he showed but would not admit describes the

form and activity of reality.
11.1.1. Regarding The Allegory of the Cave:

11.1.1.1. Knowledge is inside and outside the cave at the same time, and the states are mutually exclusive, that is, they enjoin by a nullification of one or the other.

11.1.1.2. Plato inadvertently described the Nonphilosophical case and the behaviors of real people given the true situation.

11.1.1.2.1. The people in the fire-lit cave kill (the physical body of) the person who returns from the sunlight day;

11.1.1.2.1.1. they reject the truth automatically, e.g., like Cognitive Behavioral Therapy’s ‘automatic thoughts’, and axiomatically, e.g., Existentially, they ‘revolt from freedom’.

11.1.1.2.1.2. Every theory of intervention reiterates Plato’s Allegory. 11.1.1.2.2. The person returning nullifies (kills the ideas of) the values of the cave-

dwellers.
11.1.1.2.3. The person returning seeing the actual situation nonetheless has come

upon veritable knowledge in the sense that accounts for, explains, and describes the whole situation, per our analogy of Plato’s example, which includes the cave experience, whereas the cave dwelling offers an explanation that excludes what is outside the cave.

11.1.1.2.3.1. The problem here is not in what is true or the inevitable conflict that ensues because of their meeting, rather, as Alain Badiou might agree, the issue is the way the delivery of the news is dispensed.

11.1.1.2.4. This ontological quality allows for an opening of how interventions are involved with real people-clients.

12. This is the third point:
12.1. In order for therapy to work, to function effectively, distinction, discernment, and

discipline occur.
12.1.1. This is what is happening always-already despite any argument:

12.1.1.1. This is the articulation of what phenomenalism is as what it does, i.e. it argues its position in reality as reality.

13. The working of therapy is toward The Object of the Subject.
13.1. Once the nature of phenomenalism is understood, Mental Health Philosophy articulates

an epistemologically sound and philosophically stable division of labor.

14. The issues that frame mental health are defined by what is able to be known and pronounce orientation and discipline. Mental health does not assert and pronounce order, but rather articulates the manner that such order may be achieved, not as another authoritarian demand of propriety, but by the sensible obviousness of things and the unfolding of coming upon it; that is, the process of therapy and intervention based in growth and healing.
15. The issues that frame psychology, psychiatry, and neurology are of its own making: the mental disorders. Psychology (et.al. going forward) is the lassoing of symptoms in the attempt to bring order to the foggy chaos. The attempt is key, because it indicates a process, not an identity.

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15.1. Yet psychology is asserted and promoted upon identities. So it is that psychology, by its very nature, is the name of a process that is the making of epistemological mistakes in semantic protocol, implementing them as procedure and dismissing the faults of them by writ; for example, ‘all valid results arise against contradiction’ is a definitional standard of thinking, not an absolute ontological reflection that thinking reflects.

15.2. This is what Jacques Lacan was attempting to solidify, but as we might know, he achieved only showing (1) to the logicians that his systematizing of psychoanalysis, while based in a most complete phenomenological reduction nonetheless upheld the gaping flaw that was/ is still neatly denied, and (2) to most others that his system made no sense, and had little more success than any other theory.

15.3. What happened was, for a phrase, the tremendous irony contained by the dense theoretical obscurity of his system and protocols of application promoted the general dissatisfaction on one hand and ridiculousness and contradiction on the other of trying to apply it, since the accuracy of its epistemological bases prevent a coordinated, universal practical application.

15.3.1. In defensive posture, its flaw provided the psychological impetus and justification to protect its vulnerability. Only the doctors are/were supposed to know how to treat patients, then subsequently, the power to ‘prove’ a coordination, as their mere institutional presence is presumed to be enough to ‘cure’.

15.3.2. (The truth is, many psychological efforts had already done and continue to do this, but Lacan really tied the knot.)

15.4. Or, in other words, in order to stay a viable center of power as well as support the new budding career of the ‘mind/brain scientist’ the act and its failure exposed in two ways (logically and experientially) required psychology to loosen its assertive grip on mental things.

15.4.1. It thus gave and gives permission to empirical psychology to allow any argumentative theory that seems sensible, reasonable, and passes certain tests to have validity and credence for the conceptualization and treatment of mental issue.

15.5. In short, he christened the modern world of mental health that we live in today.

16. Empiricism has become a system of belief in ideas that no longer enjoins or encounters actual things themselves (if it ever did).
16.1. The functional effect of idealism and empiricism (as defined terms) has flipped, the

polemic itself relegated to a system of pure reasonable meaning that we call phenomenology, such

that idealism is itself another kind of empirical category,
16.1.1. i.e., Psychology is asserted to be presumed the criterion of mental health.

16.2. It presents a view of things through a lens of ideas, ideas that are now fixed in front of things (society, behavior, people, and so on) such that experience is missed, and observation clouded by psychological antecedence.

16.2.1. The nature that this lens grants to viewing is called modern reality.
16.3. This kind of view, and the method it recruits, helps, however, in our journey of progress

for mental health in the caring for actual people, by giving us a present and on-the-ground example of how ideology functions, by addressing belief, to thus grant a way to view what is actually happening in reality.

17. Mental Health Philosophy identifies the empirical mistake to explain the function of psychology in reality, to thus to correct the epistemological order of operations (not psychological methods or results) given the ethical imperative to help actual people who admit their own suffering and the evidence that empirical-idealism is, at best, merely advocating status quo.

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18. Thus the fourth point of Mental Health Philosophy:
18.1.1. All systems of interventions (theories of intervention) are valid given the interaction and

sorting action of the modern empirical involvement of counselors.

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Part Three: The Object of Mental Health Exemplified by the Case of the Phenomenon of Imposter Syndrome

Imposter Syndrome in Counseling as a Means to Understand Mental Health Philosophy–

20. Counselors often experience Imposter Syndrome through doubts about their effectiveness and the pressure of engaging in a helpful way with the mental health of others. They doubt their intellectual and practical ability and proceed to enact various behaviors in an effort to mitigate the feeling-thought (experience).

20.1. The ‘why’ of the problem of Imposter Syndrome is answered in the Two Routes:

1. 20.1.1.  Reality – which deals with ideological function and faith (ideology)
2. 20.1.2.  Truth – which deals in the operation of knowledge (thoughts, feelings, sensations, and

every other aspect of experience that can be known and is known)
20.2. These ‘whys’ show that every counseling theory of intervention is able to conceptualize and

deal with Imposter Syndrome effectively, albeit, under the specific condition of the person client

herself and their amicability to the theoretical intervention applied by the counselor. 20.2.1. In this light, empirical methods thus are not as much measuring the effectiveness of

intervention to ailment, but rather saying something about the discernment of real modern

subjects, e.g., theories and living human beings.
20.3. Psychology is the name of a discipline that reckons a particular common being, e.g.,

humans with a psyche, mind, consciousness, etcetera, to study.
20.3.1. It does not recognize the variety of human beings, nor does it realize difference, but

forecloses difference to conceptual control.
20.3.2. It is a phenomenological science that does not recognize itself as a phenomenon while it

perpetually creates, establishes, and maintains an exceptional and exclusionary

epistemological position in the universe, to which it refers ‘the real world’. 20.3.2.1. All modern subjects do this.

20.3.3. Psychology is unable (as an epistemological condition) to recognize the universe as it is. This is a psychological staple.

20.3.3.1. No psychology exists in an absolute vacuum where its postulations achieve true health for actual people.

20.3.3.2. Psychology achieves an ideal of health. 20.3.4. Psychology gives material to work with mental health.

20.3.4.1. Mental health contains psychology by virtue of what happens in reality, in truth. Psychology’s topic might have something to do with mental health, but its results are psychological.

20.3.4.1.1. It is semantically and logically nonsensical to suggest that the operations of psychology work toward mental health when even the meaning of mental health is constantly up for debate. To admit its odd kind of functioning to then describe it is merely to say that its subjectivity is redundant, it functions to perpetually iterate itself without being knowable in-itself. Or, as Graham Harman might say, it withdraws.

20.3.4.1.2. Mental health works with psychological material, likewise, for itself, that is to say, the health of the person. This obvious situation noticed and acknowledged

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thereby offers a discernment of discipline toward a more effective approach to

mental health overall.
20.3.4.1.3. The logically sensible order of epistemological operations reveals

orientation upon things.
20.3.4.1.4. Where rebuttal arises, there is a subject that positions itself outside of

phenomenology through the use of phenomenological means. To ignore this is to

conveniently refuse logic when it suits the subject.
20.3.4.1.4.1. The contours or patterning of the logical lacunae outline the

problem of the subject, mental issue, and the possible experience of feeling

like a fraud.
20.3.4.1.4.1.1. Psychology, a subject of means and meaning, at once solves and

creates the problem of the subject. The move is simultaneous and is

an operational non sequitur, what we know as contradiction. 20.3.4.1.4.1.1.1. The subject of psychology, by definition, is a function of

contradiction.
20.3.4.1.5. Modern psychological empiricism is the epistemological function that

works to systematize a representation of things, a.k.a., ideas, for the purpose of

social control.
20.3.4.1.5.1. The psychological health of the person is prone to being

subsumed in (controlled by) the ideas of social propriety. Thus, mental health is the state of dealing with psychological control, which from a psychological standpoint, is always an issue.

20.3.4.1.5.1.1. Mental health is not the issue;
20.3.4.1.5.1.1.1. the relationship of psychology and mental health presents

the issue.
20.3.4.1.5.1.1.2. Psychology is the representation of the problem.

20.3.4.1.5.2. To notice this functioning opens knowledge itself unto ‘two routes’ upon things, which by logistical default, reveals the possibility of orientation upon things. (This proof is offered elsewhere).

The Nature of Counseling and Psychology –

21. Counseling requires an engagement with mental health in a way that psychology, as an empirical discipline, does not.
21.1. Psychology is unable to engage directly with mental health because of the very nature of its

efforts; it is based on an absolute exclusionary position that marks the end of knowledge: contradiction. By this ideological mandate (which incidentally recruits logic for a grand ontological proof in contrast to merely a tool for reasoning) and by its methodological fault (it ignores and rejects knowledge that does not comply with its ethical system), it becomes noticeable as a disciplinary definer of its involvement in mental health.

21.1.1. Psychological mental health is a definition of problem, i.e. not actually mental health but a proposal of ideological space. There is a difference between an empirical proposal (reductive, exclusionary theory) and actuality, and this difference is unilaterally dual in the sense of François Laruelle’s Nonphilosophy:

21.1.1.1. A unilateral duality is a relationship between two epistemological forms where one is exclusionary, and the other is inclusionary. Exclusionary knowledge excludes a true account of that which it includes by transforming all such knowledge to comply with the conditions of its exclusion, whereas inclusionary knowledge includes what is excluded itself, in itself, as itself.

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21.1.1.1.1. When exclusionary knowledge serves as the foundation for logical conceptual formation, a bilateral unity emerges as the form that reconciles or accounts for unilateral duality to thereby nullify or negate epistemological forms outside of its purview; a bilateral unity is exclusionary, its activity, control.

21.1.2. We thus come upon first epistemological theorem in the establishment for a proper order of operations:

21.1.2.1. Noticing or pointing something out is not an indication that it is wrong or incorrect, nor right or correct.

21.1.2.1.1. From this first theorem we discover the first epistemological basis of the meaning of all mental issue known as such:

21.1.2.1.1.1. The reaction from which an argument of what is correct or incorrect, right or wrong, proceeds unnoticed indicates a function that is axiomatic and reflexively excluded from experience, that is, because it is part of the experience.

21.1.2.2. As an analogy example of monetary accounting:
21.1.2.2.1. Paying for something is not wrong with reference to getting paid, nor vice

versa, but a person might view being in debt as a serious problem.
21.1.2.3. Because Mental Health Philosophy accounts for the activity of psychology does

not mean that psychology is incorrect, neither in its acceptance or affirmation for, nor

its rejection or argument against, Mental Health Philosophy.
21.1.2.3.1. The argument is moot by virtue of the manner by which psychology

operates to account for mental health; it does so by argument over evidence. 21.2. Mental Health Philosophy is the articulation or the discernment of disciplinary activity.

21.2.1. The mental issue, the problem, or the mistake, occurs in the haste that conflates information into an indiscernible gestalt called reality. (Soren Kierkegaard: where is everyone going so fast?)

21.2.1.1. One may be educated in psychological theories and methods, but they do not appear, or only appear sometimes, under certain conditions, or in therapy.

21.2.1.2. If they appear in therapy, then it is during education moments for the client, i.e., via the banking theory of education, supportive moments for the therapist to guide their own experience in efforts, for the regulation of the counselor’s emotion, and for a touchstone for thought.

21.2.1.3. This gets deeper into Mental Health Philosophy:
21.2.1.3.1. In order for psychology to appear when it is not being intentionally

provided, it would have to exist ‘somewhere in the background’, or ‘somewhere

else’ besides the actual interaction of the persons involved.
21.2.1.3.2. but the only time we notice when this ‘background theory’ might have

shown up is when we consider what happened theoretically, e.g., when we

specifically think about it for various reasons or purposes.
21.2.1.3.3. The theory could (possibly) be operating invisibly (when we are not

thinking about it), but then it is operating as a sort of automatic function, one that is not specifically noticeable (as a background function), which is to say transcendent (or its ideological counterpart immanent ) the therapy session.

21.2.1.3.4. If one poses or believes that indeed psychology is involved in session, then we are left with the task of figuring out just when, how, and why, two psychological aspects are interacting, which is in every comprehension theoretical.

21.2.1.3.4.1. At every turn of the psychological estimate, the client as well as the therapist and the interaction itself is missed:

21.2.1.3.4.2. In every instance of mental health, this is precisely the problem we are faced with psychologically:

21.2.1.3.4.2.1. There is a misconstruing of epistemological extension.

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21.2.1.3.5. To distinguish between the discipline of psychology, e.g., the titles, the social institutions and activities, the compendium of various theories, and so on, and the psychology that is supposed to be happening in the person, e.g., the person’s psychology or phenomenology even, the configuration of psychic aspects, and so on, we must rely upon an epistemological contradiction in terms. For as we begin to try to figure out just what is happening in the supposition of psychological presence (either one), we inevitably fall into the very problem we are trying to sort out, namely, the problem of psychology.

21.2.1.3.5.1. The reason for this is also twofold:
21.2.1.3.5.1.1. A psyche is never and has never been found but only assumed

(theoretical),
21.2.1.3.5.1.1.1. it is always a postulate and never achieves the level of

theorem.
21.2.1.3.5.1.2. The logic of a psyche therefore is based only in speculative,

transcendental logic (phenomenalism).
21.2.1.3.6. From here we begin to be able to speak of the relationship between

phenomenology and psychology, as I have covered thoroughly in other works;

namely, the Two Routes:
21.2.1.3.6.1. The necessity of epistemological functioning (truth), or orientation

upon knowledge known.
21.2.1.3.6.2. The sufficiency of real functioning (reality), or orientation upon

the content of knowledge.
21.2.1.3.7. This defines precisely why psychology, psychiatry, and neurology are all

real modern empirical sciences.
21.2.1.3.8. Mental Health Philosophy changes the semantic trajectory by reorienting

operations, to establish, for a term, the theorem of mental health by accounting for its psychological postulates.

Education and Epistemology –

22. The way counselors are trained influences how they perceive their own competence, which for our case brings notice to training with a focus on external validation rather than intrinsic knowledge, or, external validation as the means of internal validation.
22.1. This is the standard of our general educational system, at least in America; it is not

necessarily problematic systematically, but it is specifically problematic when it comes to mental

health.
22.1.1. The difference between external validation and intrinsic knowledge is already a

psychological problem.
22.1.1.1. Imposter Syndrome is one kind of encounter with this contradiction.

22.1.2. This contradiction places the solution exactly in the disciplinary domain, the problem in the phenomenological.

22.2. Counseling is able to address phenomenological issues because one is able to suspend irony, which is different than suspending the ethical.

22.2.1. Kierkegaard: Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical?
22.2.1.1. A suspension of the ethical pronounces Existentialism (according to Jean-Paul

Sartre), which is, in effect, the Apology of Phenomenology and the philosophical basis

of the modern state and subjectivity. 22.2.2. The suspension of irony articulates discipline.

22.2.2.1. This is the act of encountering a true phenomenology distinguished from psychological phenomenology:

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22.2.2.1.1. Sigmund Freud (and psychoanalysis in general) announced the beginning of the misconstruing of epistemological extension as real methodological procedure (psychological phenomenology).

22.2.2.1.2. Discernment follows more properly in line with Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological reduction as elaborated by

22.2.2.1.3. Martin Heidegger, in one instance: arguably ontological, but then we must consider ‘the work of art’, and

22.2.2.1.4. Carl Jung, on another instance: arguably processual, though subsequently he has been taken to be making ontological arguments.

22.2.2.1.5. Counseling is the specific discipline that stops the phenomenological reduction by recognizing that both functions (the reduction and the exceedance) constitute a single operation, valid, omnipresent, and salient (once noticed).

22.2.2.1.5.1. If there is no notice, then there is no ontological argument, only a single ontology, access to which is argued over.

22.3. Logistics
22.3.1. Michel Foucault’s ‘Discipline and Punish’ outlines a course of disciplinary discernment of

phenomenological process.
22.3.1.1. The argument is moot: it describes an internal material subject.

22.3.1.1.1. Only the self-regulation of discipline is the issue.
22.3.1.1.1.1. Psychology is playing its role as the model representation that is

self-policing. Yet the problem of psychology is ironic, since it poses itself as beyond or above the domain that it pronounces, to thus position itself outside of the ethical sphere: it fails articulation.

22.3.1.1.1.1.1. It thus does not and indeed is not required to, by its own ontological proclamation, police itself.

22.3.1.1.1.1.2. It understands itself and its relationship to the world as sovereign, having no need for discipline since it is, again, by it own ontological posture, the basis from which discipline exists. It is thus only a discipline in meaning, which it navigates and negotiates constantly to put itself over and above.

22.3.1.1.1.1.3. It thus denies true discipline by eschewing the need to justify itself by its actions:

22.3.1.1.1.1.3.1. it makes meaningful arguments about itself while asserting that it is identical to its arguments in every epistemological condition that can exist.

22.3.1.1.2. This places psychology as the exemplar having to do with the phenomenological problem of self-discipline, the role of discursive-linguistic process in how to get people to control themselves, for a term, to live in civilization.

22.3.2. To resort to a further polemic of internal and external validation, i.e., reductive critical method, is to miss the significance of disciplinary knowledge, and specifically our issue of Imposter Syndrome for counselors.

22.3.3. ItistoreifythattheCounseloroughttobebetteratfixingpeoplebecausetheyaretheir psychological problem only, that is exclusively.

22.3.3.1. This is to say: The problem of Imposter Syndrome in Counselors arises in experience of the contradiction where they are free to be themselves (existentially) but are in the role of enforcing ideological constraints (ideologically). Freud’s triune psyche resonates here, but only in a very loose sense; as discussed above, it is his (and psychology in general) extension that creates the issue for mental health.

22.3.3.2. The problem is in the misconstruing of epistemological extension, of what is happening, of not being clear about their position in the universe, so to speak.

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22.3.3.2.1. Orientation upon things is logistical: ‘Along what route do I know things?’, is not a semantic question.

22.3.3.2.1.1. Semantics adhere to logistical routing.
22.3.3.2.1.1.1. Cognitive Therapy could refer to this as a ‘Core Belief’, but it is

not simply a belief, hence why C.B.T. did and does not amount to the

‘cure-all’ treatment its empirical popularity supposes.
22.3.3.2.1.1.2. Ignorance of logistics is a pedagogical failure.
22.3.3.2.1.1.3. A person can have personal beliefs within either epistemological

vector. The difference relates to confidence in one’s ability for

existential discernment.
22.3.3.2.1.1.4. Psychology represents one logistical route, not dissimilar to what

Laruelle calls “The One”. Its job is to control people which it enacts through protocols the purpose of which is, though social force, to develop the person’s ability to have experiential discipline, or to otherwise effectively (and comfortably, in general) comply with the socially ideological norms, but, by itself, it is logistically unable to bring to fruition without creating more problems.

The Role of Psychological Theories –

23. Many counselors rely on specific modalities or psychological theories to give them confidence, but this reliance can be limiting.
23.1. The problem lay at this limit, and the coming upon the problem is the coming upon the

phenomenal limit.
23.1.1. This is existential anxiety.
23.1.2. The question posed therein is of orientation:

23.1.2.1. Do I lean into the anxiety because it is the signal of the truth, use psychology as the indicator of where I am growing because that is the edge where the client (Other) is also growing?

23.1.2.1.1. This is this edge that therapy works. All theories of intervention function at this edge despite their individual theoretical ontological arguments (correlational phrasings of the psychological problem).

23.1.2.2. Or, do I revolt from it and seek the solace of faith in psychology and its theories, refuse ‘authentic’ growth or only grow in the ‘ethical’ way of the theoretical (social) human being, hiding myself in the safe harbor of psychology, and repose the problem onto the client (an act of repetition)?

23.1.2.2.1. These logistical options are not ontological arguments and do not suggest that every human being functions in this way or that the universe is manifested, somehow, in this way.

23.1.2.2.1.1. This concerns the discernment of mental health in disciplinary knowledge.

23.1.2.2.2. Psychology comprehends no epistemological edge and so automatically revolts from the experience of the edge, by recognizing (re-cognition) it as an ontological argument, the encounter with the edge as ideological –and thus world- ending – collapse.

23.1.2.2.2.1. This translates into a nullification of the psyche, which it functions to avoid, and actively defends against.

23.1.2.3. The answer is both are valid.
23.1.2.3.1. This is the ‘machine’ of life (24.1.2.1).
23.1.2.3.2. The first explains, accounts for, and opens unto what is actually happening

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23.1.2.3.3. The second shows the obstacles but closes life into them, as though they are essential, inescapable, absolute limits, i.e., that they actually convey and bestow life and death.

23.1.3. Existentialism/ Philosophy:
23.1.3.1. When the existential dimensions and limitations are revealed in their form as

knowledge, then Kierkegaard’s proposals are seen as backward or upside down, reflecting only internal, ideological repetitions, i.e., the essential existential parameters (modern reality).

23.1.3.1.1. Repetition thus is indeed a continual reengaging with life, but in this way relied upon yields only the ideological limitation reinforced to be systemized. 23.1.3.1.1.1. (The jist of Husserl’s phenomenology is that Kant’s shift and

Hegel’s ‘world’ can be exploited justifiably. The list philosophers that have contributed and continues into this ‘practical approach’, though, can quickly launch things into ideal space; hence where Mental Health Philosophy steps in to recoup the actual knowing-living-life of people from dogmatic speculation to ground idealism in practicality again.)

23.1.3.1.1.2. Repetition is the growth that brings one to the leap that can never be made, or, the decision that cannot be made. But in itself, repetition is real limit.

23.1.3.2. So it is that recollection is the finding of one’s Self, the culmination of the repetition, the exceedance of ideological dimensions in a Nonphilosphical manner (Laruelle) by which logic thus becomes asymmetrical to itself (Emmanuel Levinas), revealing unto itself a sort of ‘perfect symmetry’ in that the existing ideology remains as it is, (The Other) as the role that is providing for the Self in its overcoming of the limit that is its psychological incarnation. i.e., revealing the ‘truth’.

23.1.3.2.1. Kierkegaard’s recollection is upside down because he did not have access to ideology as a known thing, as Sartre rightly noticed but likewise could only formulate the ‘something else’ as nothingness (which Kierkegaard references as Christ or God for his own philosophical activity). Indeed, we hear resonances not only of ‘God is dead’ in this existential maxim but also of how ‘angst’, ‘dread’, or ‘anxiety’ function to contain ideological space.

23.1.3.2.1.1. I say this formulation evidences ideological limit, the formulations of which, such as faith, are turned upside down when this limit is not only noticed but then realized as knowable.

23.1.3.2.1.1.1. In the context of how mental health allows or presents itself for viable interventions to function, the ‘something else’ is thus no longer ‘nothing or God’, but the very knowable substance upon which psychological reality is formed to thus offer a solution to mental issue.

23.1.3.2.1.1.1.1. Of course, the subjective semantics at work in the operation of people’s mental health are not in question here. Again, Mental Health Philosophy is not making grand statements of what is ‘actually’ real, is not pathologizing or negating any specific thing or belief, for example, it is not suggesting that God, Goddess, Devil, Satan, spirits, gods or goddesses do not exist, nor in the course of treatment intervention that a person’s appeal to a ‘spiritual consciousness’ is but another psychological apparition, that ‘machine-elves’ or ‘totem spirits’ are some sort of ‘functional delusion’, or what have you. Mental Health Philosophy makes no claims on such aspects of experience but rather includes them in the possibly of health.

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23.1.3.2.1.1.1.2. Mental Health Philosophy is a logistics of disciplinary discernment, and not an ontological argument.

23.1.4. This ‘perfect symmetry’ is the ironic ‘of course’, which is the recollection that the repetition has happened before, that is, as the experience of knowledge in existence, and its acceptance now specifically in the broader range of the feeling to thinking.

23.1.4.1. It shows the course the human being is taking to live. It thus affirms and completes the ongoing experience of existence as such, what in the mental health field we might call intentional experiential engagement.

23.1.4.2. Psychology presents the obstacle and ways to remain a real subject struggling, trapped in its struggle, with no perceivable or conceivable exit of the correlational, psychological phenomenology.

23.1.4.2.1. This is easier to comprehend when we think of psychological matters that seem obviously hindering, such as mania, psychosis, anxiety and depression, but other examples of this might be counter-intuitive.

23.1.4.2.1.1. For example, psychological studies might tell us that human beings are more likely to have a less stressful time in making decisions from less options. In practical truth, its comments do not have any bearing on things outside of the particular instance of psychological assertion, that is, unless someone finds use for them. In this very practical and evidential light, it is not actually saying anything much more significant about human beings than that there indeed is a subject of psychology.

23.1.4.2.1.2. Yet the information it provides indeed draws people into thinking and considering in a particular manner for how to think about things, which may or may not be helpful for mental health.

23.1.4.3. Mental Health Philosophy tells us what is actually happening and thereby provides the explanation of how to proceed given the subject of psychology.

23.1.4.3.1. The explanations are the theoretical subjects of intervention. 23.1.4.3.2. The healing is the ‘phenomenological reduction’ exceeding itself in ‘the

work of art’, so to speak, ‘of The Other’. Or, the moving back out of the binding form into which the reduction has brought the person, to renegotiate, so to speak, their relationship with reality, whether it be in thinking, feeling, or what have you.

23.1.4.3.3. The interventions are subjective juxtapositions (closed discursive systems) cooperating in cybernetic activity.

23.1.4.3.4. The result is the Object of the Subject, or in our context, one’s Self. 23.1.4.3.5. In every permutation of mental health treatment, the healing of oneself is

the revealing unto and the acceptance of one’s Self in reality, as such acceptance is

nothing less than the effective alleviation of mental issue.
23.1.4.3.5.1. There is much more to be said about this elsewhere, since the

‘result’ is, at once, already happened as, ongoing with, and the end of a

process.
23.1.4.3.5.2. Upon this solution, the argument of psychology is moot, even

while it still functions as an interesting subject involved with mental health. The Double-Bind of Faith in Psychology –

24. Counselors are often caught between trusting psychological theories and recognizing their limited application in practice.
24.1. It is through recognizing ideological limitations that the subject encounters the possibility

of knowing knowledge itself.

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24.1.1. Knowing knowledge as knowledge begins the engagement with the truth of things, because it is by this limit that one knows the possibility of everything that is able to exist.

24.1.2. This does not mean that new things cannot arise to knowing, but the event and activity is recognized as such that nothing arises that is new to knowing itself: there cannot be anything that is come across as new to the ability, capacity, activity, and event of knowing.

24.1.2.1. In the psychological reckoning, there is an attempt to name this by the positive capacities, such as self-esteem, self- confidence, flexibility, resilience, and so on, but there is risk to taking back their effectiveness when we make them to be identical to empirical definitions.

24.1.2.2. In this Knowing, the emotions do not sway one’s opinions of one’s Self, even as emotions could be challenging to one’s existence and difficult to navigate and even as cognitions might change. The changing of opinions of oneself are the permutations of one’s Self; this is an effect that does not necessarily require the person’s iteration of exact term definitions of the situation in any particular way.

24.1.2.2.1. For example, in learning emotional regulation skills, regardless of what intervention theory we are using (DBT, ACT, CBT, IFS, to name a few), the person still may have negative self-talk and challenges, yet, in the effort of regulating their emotions, they are in effect not allowing the emotions to sway opinions of themselves by the very fact that they are able to ‘get through it’, say. They are ‘accepting’ or ‘challenging’ the situation because the opinion they have of their Self is that they are, indeed, ‘applying skills’ in whatever way that is happening on their mental health journey; their Self is indeed in action regardless of the situation because they are actively engaged with their own situation. We also know of this as the process of differentiation, but also could be the process of individuization. Whether they think they are successful or not, they very fact that they might be able to reflect upon what happened shows that the ‘opinion upon one Self’ is not being swayed by the emotionally challenging situation, or, is only being swayed in the exact manner that is the involvement of the person with their challenges.

24.1.2.2.1.1. The subjective experience of all this reflects the state of the actual person-client in the process and the strict mental health philosophical application upon what is happening does not intrude upon that subjective experience except in as much as the person is involved with their mental health in a therapeutic way, albeit, often with the facilitation of the counselor. The ‘intrusion’ occurs through the particular theoretical model which supposes to be guiding or explaining the events in the ground.

24.1.2.2.2. One’s Self can be said to be the source of those psychological capacities, while an ‘ego’ is the source of the problem.

24.1.2.2.2.1. Without a psychological ego, there is no super-ego nor Id. Even without Freudian psychoanalytic categories, it is not difficult to understand this three-fold structure operating ‘behind the scenes’ of a modern psyche. Hence why a notion of a personal Ego is so ubiquitous in our day, if even as a colloquialism.

24.1.2.2.2.2. This is the ironic problem with psychology:
24.1.2.2.2.2.1. it cannot conceptualize a world without implying those structural

aspects, or if it does, then it merely uses different terms (the outcome of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s proposal). In any case, the solution it posits to mental issues arises in the ideal of ‘positive and negative’ epistemological attributes, such that the ‘cure-solution’ to the problem is removal or negation of the problem, by which posits mental disease as an essential and primary attribute to being human, required for its

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24.1.2.3.

functioning, while at the same time the threat of its (the human

being’s) dissolution.
24.1.2.2.2.2.2. Psychology thus exists within a functional imperative to assert its

own establishment through direct denial of its functioning; the positive and negative aspects themselves are effectively denied as a mechanism, and only the negative and positive aspects by themselves, each individual, understood as essential to psychology and thus to all things of the mind. It is this essence that constitutes the basis of argument which is never revealed itself (the argument is its basis, as mentioned above) because of the intersectional quality of ideological material.

24.1.2.2.2.2.2.1. The psychological misconstruing of epistemological extension in mental health reveals the occasion for a

discernment of orientation, and disciplinary articulation. 24.1.2.2.2.2.2.1.1. Psychology is recognized for its assertion of

exclusionary ontology to be used more effectively for what

it brings to the table.
Resilience and flexibility, in this way, is consistent with the goal of the Cognitive

Model, and Dialectical therapy (at least, but all the other theories as well). 24.1.2.3.1. From an Object-Oriented standpoint, thoughts and cognitions are

different things unto themselves, the Beings that they are.
24.1.2.3.2. Again, phenomenology is revealed to its limitations for understanding the

universe: it relies upon an integrated contradiction.
24.1.2.3.2.1. On one hand, it reduces thoughts and feelings to content of a

Being that is outside of to thus contain materiality, the reality 24.1.2.3.2.1.1. such that this ‘other’ external phenomenon (oddly) is the ‘more

Real’ aspect against which material is relegated to ‘nothing’, ‘phantoms’, or ‘illusions’, aspects of the ‘true’ Being that is able to choose.

24.1.2.3.2.1.1.1. This orientation repeats the Cartesian, phenomenological ontology.

24.1.2.3.2.1.2. The issue with the link between the knower and the known is the phenomenological issue and, I say, forms the basis of the problem that we call mental issue.

24.1.2.3.2.2. The issue for mental health arrives as much as the meaning of the phenomenal ideas contradict what they are supposing to communicate in as much as they, now being communicated as other meaningful subjects, on the other hand, come to be viewed and understood as more real material, and the person identifies themselves with the conglomerate of real material.

24.1.2.3.2.2.1. The issue of mental health here is the overdetermination and underdetermination of meaning, not meaning itself. This kind of identification is problematic with reference to the dynamic nature of the universe.

24.1.2.3.2.3. Harman refers this to ontological reckoning as overmining and undermining.

24.1.2.3.2.3.1. The problem arises in as much as the thing that is itself does not exactly recognize itself in reality; as I say for mental health, the person exists in a dilemma of ‘missing’ themselves.

24.1.2.3.2.3.1.1. An example for mental health could take the form of the person ‘undermining’ themselves in various negative self-talk, or the ‘overmining’ the power that the world has upon them, say, through social forces of inequality or inequity, biological

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physiology, brain chemistry, personal history, or family upbringing, and so on. This kind of misrecognition amounts to identifying oneself with the determination, as though the person is determined by those things as opposed to having self- determination, as though there is a force that they are being affected by without their consent. Indeed, this is the experience.

24.1.2.3.2.3.1.2. Many contemporary trauma therapies work to help the client to stop, or to interrupt, this kind of reiteration of identity (of missing themselves or ‘not being here’) which fixes the person in an emotional ‘post-traumatic stasis’.

24.1.2.3.2.3.1.2.1. Heightened startle response, intrusive thoughts, and so forth, are examples of forces that assert control

over the person without their consent, and the treatment for such PTSD often is to help the person to stop identifying with their experiences in that particular manner, that is, the manner of identification that is at root in the problem, whatever that is.

In order to recognize itself (literally to ‘know again’) a certain requirement to have flexibility in thinking as this connects understanding, and resilience in the challenging feelings that go along with not only a change in how reality is reckoned to experience but how it presently is experienced. The identification with experience is thus interrupted sufficiently to be renegotiated whether directly cognitive, for example, CPT, or not, such as supposed by EMDR, or distraction-type therapies.

24.1.2.3.2.3.1.3.

24.2. The context specific to the Imposter Syndrome:
24.2.1. If thoughts and emotions do not require a particular reciprocal dependency, particular

form of interrelation, or any specific correlation, then this can be taken all the way up and

down the epistemological, and thus experiential, domain.
24.2.2. The experience (of the person themselves) of investigating The Imposter Syndrome reveals

the existential issue (the general experience of reality) exactly where this basic issue (the thought-feeling/experience) no longer is needing to be addressed (the contradiction by which the phenomenon of Imposter Syndrome is known); the Syndrome begins where and when the investigation stops. At exactly that point the effective ideological faith is and has been addressed and repaired to uphold the correlation between psychological reality and reality itself.

24.2.2.1. If it works, then it does not need to be fixed.
24.2.2.1.1. Whatever the Syndrome was might have been over before it became a

Syndrome or even the fruited seed of disorder. Perhaps this was the experience of a person ‘just wondering’ if it was indeed a ‘problem’, or perhaps the problem was solved ‘automatically’ by some decision.

24.2.2.1.2. Yet neither does it ‘prove’ the effectiveness of the theory behind the intervention, rather, it proves it to psychology as a means to repair one’s faith.

24.2.2.1.3. If psychology is taken to say something about something other than psychology, such as health, there is the ideological faith creating the means for its apology.

24.2.2.1.4. The integrity of the correlation is upheld, and thus effective. This is not a correlation for ‘solving’ or ‘curing’ but describes the function of knowing; all interventions into mental health work from this function, of what it is to be effective.

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24.2.2.2. If it does not work, then something is incorrect in the reckoning of the problem, and the apology is revealed unto its apologetic effect (the feeling of its failure and the ideas that correlate).

24.2.3. One either continues to investigate, or one attempts to remove the ‘bad’ feeling by reestablishing the saliency of their faith.

24.2.3.1. Investigation does not always include an effort to remove the bad feeling, for sometimes the feeling is compelling the investigation for personal growth and not just to ‘feel better’, but both are valid directions to take the consideration of ‘what is the matter with me’ and ‘how do I fix this’.

24.2.3.2. To continue to look to psychology, however, as holding to sole possibility for the solution to the problem, places the person in a double bind, or in other words, oppressed in their subjectivity.

24.2.3.2.1. In the oppression, the feeling-knowing of ‘wrong’ persists, which is the issue for mental health.

24.2.3.2.1.1. Repression and suppression are terms which describe the feeling and experience of what is happening without direct knowledge of them: the psychological problem, where psychology is presumed to have the explanatory solution.

24.2.3.2.1.1.1. Psychological problem is the problem of being unaware or not understanding what is actually happening.

24.2.3.2.1.1.1.1. The person can be said to be oppressed psychologically when they behave in a manner unto themselves which represses or suppresses particular kind of experiences. They do so because they do not understand what is happening and behave toward those experiences as though ‘something is wrong’.

24.2.3.2.1.1.1.1.1. Again, this describes the mechanism of psychological existence while not prescribing a

particularly correlated theory of intervention; rather, it articulates why all interventions work. It accounts for the activity of all knowable psychology.

24.2.3.2.2.

24.2.3.2.2.1. It indicates what is actually happening, i.e., the presentation of knowledge known in its knowing (thoughts, emotions, feelings, sensations, behaviors, perception, opinions, and so on) to the possibility of experience.

24.2.3.2.2.1.1. The representation of the feeling is always subject to problem, 24.2.3.2.2.1.2. But mental health is not a problem because it is, in every

conception, every beginning, the effect of the understanding of what is

actually happening as it is able to be understood. 24.2.3.2.2.1.2.1. Every theoretical proposal, from pure ideas to pure

physicality, arises first as knowledge. Regardless of argument, in

order for something to be experienced it must be known. 24.2.3.2.2.1.2.2. What is happening can only be problematic after the fact. 24.2.3.2.2.1.2.3. Mental health is about epistemological order of

operations, not about whether people are doing anything in

particular, whether it be experiencing or talking about it. 24.2.3.2.2.1.2.3.1. Mental Health Philosophy explains what people

are doing within a knowable context that exceeds psychological explanations, to thus then contextualize all psychological proposals for activity.

This feeling is not wrong so much as it is true by virtue of what is possible to be known.

24.3.

is true by virtue of what worked for the person in the modern world.
24.2.4.1. Empirical method is ‘cognition comes first’, the basis of the modern reductive

method.
24.2.4.1.1. It an analysis about what was supposed to have happened and what should

happen, and by its semantic formulation admits a process that is being intentionally ignored or otherwise eliminated methodologically. However, when this is noticed, a bid for knowledge becomes salient, and orientation the most sensible opening for progress.

24.2.4.1.2. The issue for modern knowledge is found when we say ‘process’ as though that term announces what is being excluded, but in effect it is a term that promotes and maintains exclusion.

24.2.4.2. So it is psychology would agree in effect, that is, of having to now consider this new piece of information (of whatever happened either confirming or not confirming the theory), the theory would be adjusted in any variety of ways, would spawn more experimentation, and thus more theories.

24.2.4.2.1. This phenomenalist operation is what we know as cybernetic. 24.2.4.2.1.1. If faith makes true (if it is true by believing it is true) then it

denotes ideological confession or apology.
24.2.4.2.1.2. If truth makes faith (faith is a conventional term denoting belief)

then it connotes substantial agency.
Hence, from the standpoint of Mental Health Philosophy we have been shown that any

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24.2.3.2.2.1.3. This concerns orientation before interpretation, indicative of an order of operations.

24.2.3.2.3. The therapeutic route is to move into, or otherwise revive the feeling of living, to feel it without the intervening effect of cognitions; to move into the knowledge of the experience is to recognize the known knowledge of knowing.

24.2.3.2.3.1. Emotions elicit one type of cognitive labeling for feelings. 24.2.3.2.3.1.1. Emotions represent a particular narrowing of experience, while

feelings are a broader form. Both have their uses. 24.2.3.2.3.2. The experience is first. This explains the evolutionary

development of the ideal of cognitive-emotional survival apparatus (the

modern phenomenological correlation) taking over as the means to exist. 24.2.3.2.3.2.1. From the experience of things is derived the subject of the

modern world.
24.2.3.2.4. In every instance, in every semantic framing of mental health, every

theoretical organization of terms, whatever correlation of subject and predicate is

given, the same thing is happening, and the same thing is being addressed.
24.2.4. At every instance of mental health, whether psychology agrees or not, faith establishes what

and every intervention (theoretical subject) functions and accomplishes the same thing in mental

health with relevance to knowledge itself.
24.3.1. Orientation more accurately provides a basis for a more sensible and reasonable division of

labor:
24.3.1.1. Representation into a reestablishment of faith. 24.3.1.2. Presentation is the establishment of faith.

24.3.2. The articulation has been made.
24.3.2.1. What is left (for another work) is to

24.3.2.1.1. give proper attention to reactionary psychological rebuttals, and 24.3.2.1.2. pronounce the correlation between each psychological theory of

intervention and Mental Health Philosophy.
24.3.2.2. To avoid epistemological discernment is to reify the modern problem of the

double-bind as the means (meaning) to exist.

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The Problem of Equivalency in Therapy –

25. An assumption exists when all problems share a common structure, leading counselors to impose predefined frameworks rather than engaging with individual experiences to found practice.
25.1. Psychology is the assumption of the common structure, upon which all other problems are

assumed to take shape (the equivalency of the greatest category), but the platform is never

revealed, so mental health is never revealed psychologically without it being another problem. 25.1.1. Problems (of mental health) take place upon or within an assumed ‘static’ space, usually

called a psyche (but mind, consciousness, or what have you, as well).
25.1.1.1. If a psyche has a structure, then all mental problems have the same common

structure in that they must be originating from that psychic (static) substrate. 25.1.1.1.1. To counter that a psyche can be ‘a motion’ is to posit a ‘static ideal’ that

the argument of definition poses,
25.1.1.1.2. i.e. the definition is not defined by definition, which is contradictory on

one hand and ironic on the other. Hence orientation is the issue.
25.1.1.2. The correlation upon contradiction follows through all real material knowledge

similarly, but thereby does not further knowledge because they merely reiterate knowledge through different terms, called redundancy, as some analogies:

25.1.1.2.1. 25.1.1.2.2. 25.1.1.2.3.

plants originate from soil; therefore, they are plants (x:y=x)
buildings stand on bedrock; therefore they are properly built (x:y= z(x:y)) planets sit within space; therefore, the universe is the constituent space of

physical (physics) things, both abstract and concrete (x:y=fy(fz))
25.1.1.3. mental health issues arise from a psyche-mind-brain-body; therefore all mental

problems are psychological (et.al.) problems (x:y=fx(fxy)).
25.1.1.3.1. The psychological issue, though, is that the irony is not upheld by modern

science,
25.1.1.3.1.1. which is to say, psychology is formed upon phenomenalism.

25.1.1.3.1.1.1. In short, what is given to psychological knowledge is what is given to psychology, as though there is an independent ‘knowledge item’ (data?) that is given in particular to the instrument, such as psychology or the psychological instrument, such that the instrument is somehow coming across data that is not already acclimated to the instrument. The instrument is assumed to be able to ‘pick out’ from the pool of neutral data information relevant to psychology. The phenomenological coincidence and apparent contradiction in the methodological formulation is denied, specifically ignored, and automatically (by its methodological course) viewed as moot.

25.1.1.3.1.1.1.1. We have the reiteration of Phenomenalism in general, the basic context of everything that has been associated with it, argued about it and over it, e.g., transcendence, discourse, language, bracketing, and so on.

25.1.1.3.1.1.2. The assumption of method is couched in the maxim that what is knowable is not identical to knowledge but the known is always some ‘content’ of knowledge; therefore, we cannot know knowledge itself, but only real material for knowledge, and, psychological knowledge is the content of psychology. Again, this is redundancy in action.

25.1.1.3.2. So again, this is toward the articulation of discipline, not a rejection of science.

25.1.2. New Materialist and New Realist philosophies take this problem as an insurmountable problem (i.e., knowledge itself can only be known as its represented content) to then work

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within the real given material to pose end-run composites of actor-player subjects, reducing all things to material, e.g., concrete and abstract, to a field of interactivity and intersections, to then argue a solution that the universe is constituent only of such materials, to then work out the semantic repercussions.

25.1.3. We are left with the Existentialist maxim of having ‘no exit’, now framed in a more ‘positive’ attitude of opportunity for all things to exist.

25.1.3.1. The platform is assumed in the argument to be the real material activity (ideological redundancy).

25.1.4. So, it is the material universe that constitutes psychological problem, and thus 25.1.4.1. No non-problematic psychology is able to exist.

25.2. The revealing of the essential difference of a problem releases the counselor from the ideological repetition that takes the shape psychologically as Imposter Syndrome (a real occasion of existential anxiety),

25.2.1. by which the person is regularly and automatically moved to comprehension by seeking safe harbor in psychology (a truncated, theoretical experience) instead of finding recourse in themselves (everything that is experienced).

25.2.1.1. The person relies upon phenomenological difference (as an undifferentiated being) and lack epistemological discipline which articulates that difference (as phenomenalist Being ) which grants greater perspective.

25.2.1.1.1. Overwhelm can be said to be the (feeling) experience of the attempt by a person to conform everything to a (cognitive) theoretical truncation before everything is encountered as it is. The failure to organize what is happening in the given subjective categories often comes because the data is experienced a ‘coming to fast’, but the reason is patent.

25.2.1.2. They look for a reason in psychology and find a name for that particular occasion of anxiety, which then becomes the psychological material, to find they repeat the problem that they are facing in their own experience, which is the problem of equivalency, which is really the problem of the misconstruing of epistemological extension.

25.3.

The Philosophical Nature of Imposter Syndrome –

26. Imposter Syndrome stems from an epistemological contradiction between subjective lived experience and imposed definitions of knowledge.
26.1. The very idea of an externally imposed problem is the basis of Imposter Syndrome in two

ways:
26.1.1. The imposition itself presses the person inward to question themselves instead of

questioning the source of the imposition; this, of course, does not feel good.
26.1.1.1. The feeling itself is rejected for various reasons, e.g., people have a right to feel

good, and the person searches for a cause that is not the experience itself but something

inside or outside.
26.1.1.1.1. Failure of the feeling to subside denotes a syndrome; namely, of feeling

like something is wrong attached to something that has not been dogmatically

systemized into a proper reason (justification, call for justice).
26.1.1.1.1.1. In this case, it is obvious there is a feeling that is attached to the

notion of being a fraud, that this notion is associated with a workplace (or other similar environments), personal aspirations for the future, and assumptions of propriety that are not being upheld in the encounter, and so

The failure of understanding and appreciation of the irony of existence is the basis for real empirical reductionary efforts for definition, and this is the basis of real materialist repetition.

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on, but this only constitutes a reason in the sense of a coordination of ideas at once correlated with a ‘bad feeling’ as well as being marshalled for the effort to make the feeling end.

26.1.1.1.1.1.1. This says nothing about what is ‘actually’ happening either internally or externally, and does not suggest that the feeling, cognition, or experience is wrong, even as it can be problematic.

26.1.1.1.1.1.1.1. The experience is real. 26.1.1.1.1.1.2. There is no ‘disease’, so it is a ‘syndrome’.

2. 26.1.2.  Searching for external causes leads the person back to the source of the discomfort,
3. 26.1.3.  the conundrum encountered by consistently seeking an answer along that (empirical,

phenomenal, Cartesian) route thus confirms a psychological problem, even as it has not been

systemized into a ‘proper disease’.
26.1.4. The recourse for searching motivated by discomfort to an answer that is foreign to the

discomfort is an act of feeling alienated from oneself: I am a fraud.
26.1.4.1. The ‘proof’ of this fraudulency is then blamed on something ‘outside’ (e.g.,

society), or inside (e.g., psychology).
26.1.4.1.1. The person is relieved from the responsibility for their own experiential

oppression by organizing existential definitions of reality, or, what they decide is

‘really’ going on, or what they are ‘told’ is true of what is going on.
26.1.4.1.1.1. The feeling of being a fraud ends when the feeling and thinking no longer mutually support each other to constitute ‘imposter’, ‘fraud’, or

other associated semantic experiences. (Badiou called this a ‘suture’, but there is more to be said on this topic of the epistemological wound of The Differend ).

26.1.4.1.1.2. The person has ‘decided’ what is true because what is true is what alleviates the discomfort, de facto: what is true is that the situation is no longer constituted in that correlated meaning. The meaning of the situation is ‘accepted’ because the meaning of the situation is no longer effective (to constitute the syndrome).

26.1.4.1.1.2.1. If the person is able to answer the call to action then the solution is effective.

26.1.4.1.1.2.1.1. If the discomfort is what is alleviating the discomfort, so to speak, e.g., depression is a solution, anxiety is the coping skill, feeling like a fraud is the adaptation, and so on, then we repeat the existential situation described here.

26.1.4.1.1.3. Truth, in this way, thus is removed from empirical standards (ethics), and this phenomenological action creates ethics (teleologically suspends Kierkegaard’s universal while constituting the ethical).

26.1.4.1.1.4. To use the word ‘truth’ consistent with its meaning, and then defer this meaning to a relative definition of truth, can degrade the possibility to know of the actuality of what is happening by creating a lived experience of contradiction between the known meaning of the word and the lived experience of the meaning.

26.1.4.1.1.4.1. While words do have meaning in a social context, and social involvement is inseparable from being a living human, knowledge itself informs whatever the support or influence the social environment has available.

26.1.4.1.1.4.2. In other words, further reduction of truth to a definition between the term and the social reflection of the meaning of the term expressed is a non sequitur in logic, and contradictory in experience,

Doi – 10.13140/RG.2.2.12028.04487 24

or, the way (critical, reductive) things are known to be experienced is

fraudulent.
26.1.4.1.1.4.3. The reconciliation of the contradictory discursive involvement

occurs in one of the two ways as noted (e.g., 25.3.1, i.e., The Two

Routes)
26.2. The difficulty here is only in the idea that it is supposed to be difficult, but by every form of

counseling knowledge we find that this is the case, simply.
26.2.1. Every intervention functions along this same logistical space:

26.2.1.1. using different term-definitions (identities) to bring about a pause, rupture, epoche, or what have you, between the juxtaposed subjects, i.e., the theory and the idea of the person, the logistical summary of the subject in the universe is revealed as such, or at least consistent with the logistics outlined in Mental Health Philosophy, such that the person struggling with the problem finds an opening which then amounts to them as a (possible) solution: the object.

26.3.

26.3.1. Psychology is the problem: it does not recognize its functional boundaries but purports a ubiquitously salient ontological argument as meaning.

26.3.2. Counseling deals with what is happening, practically, sensibly, with the aid of theory; it is not obligated nor bound to its definition postures. It does not impose argumentative ideologies, rather, at worst, it merely offers them.

Approaches to Overcoming Imposter Syndrome –

27. A shift toward Mental Health Philosophy as a grounding framework for counseling could reduce dependence on psychological models.

1. 27.1.  This is the incorrect conclusion.
2. 27.2.  There are no alternate approaches to psychological problem, as to our case, of overcoming

Imposter Syndrome, because all relevant interventions will be effective as they are 27.2.1.1. given empirical ideals of measurement and estimation, and 27.2.1.2. given appropriate semantic relationships.

The addressing of the issue is disciplinary and not as much psychological: how we know of things, not why it is the case.

27.2.1.2.1. Empirical psychology and applied counseling will do their parts to suggest appropriate interventions now with a more accurate notice of disciplinary sense responding to what is happening.

27.3.

27.3.1. Phenomenalism is being translated into phenomenology.
27.3.1.1. This is the same as psychology being translated into reality (a person’s identity in

the world i.e. self/other).
27.3.1.1.1. The experience is accounted for and described to its general attributes and

function (phenomenalism)
27.3.1.1.2. The phenomenon thus described is being made into an exclusive system

(psychology, modern subject)
27.3.1.1.3. The difference implicit human knowledge is being denied in experience as

experience.
27.3.1.2. This is what occurs as a modern human being living life at every level of knowledge

that is available presently, that is, when applying the empirical reductive method

honestly and rigorously to an instance of knowledge.
27.3.2. This occurrence known as such (the modern subject) presents the situation as an identified

limit, of particular parametric value.

Mental Health Philosophy provides the philosophical explanation for what is already happening in the domain of mental health:

Doi – 10.13140/RG.2.2.12028.04487 25

27.3.2.1. It thus enters the ideological world as an object, as every other object does to knowledge as it is knowable and known (feeling and cognition, a.k.a., experience).

27.3.2.2. See Alain Badiou Being and Event for the strict philosophical cross of analytical and continental philosophical approaches.

27.3.2.3. See François Laruelle’s Nonphilosophy for the strict ontological argument that accounts for the modern subject at its ends (Kantian analytical a priori)

27.3.2.4. See Harman’s Object Oriented Ontology for the strict functional operation of the ontological argument brought into the practical domain (Kantian synthetical a priori):

27.3.2.4.1. the modern subject, known and identified to its functioning as such, is an object. This reckoning then allows for arguably more accuracy for how things relate to each other, to show how they function as subjects, to how the universe actually operates.

27.3.2.4.2. Extension is thus more properly organized in this mindfully aware space (the universe), articulated at more correct junctures, pronounced to more correct logistics, accounting for the near random functions of free subjects.

27.3.2.5. See Karen Barad meeting halfway for the good example of how reality functions as material, and or how material functions to present reality.

27.3.2.6. These philosophical positions (and more) grant Mental Health Philosophy is substantive basis.

27.3.3. Psychology has no epistemological system that grounds its practice in actual universal situations – but that of Mental Health Philosophy.

27.3.3.1. Psychology has relied upon past phenomenological assumptions and took and takes conceptual phenomenalist (postmodern) liberties with philosophy to justify real applications.

27.3.3.2. Its epistemological basis is ultimately idealist/ materialist : Cartesian Polemics and Kantian Apologetics.

27.3.4. The material ideal thus presents one parameter of the actual universal situation of objects, where the modern human being is an example of an object being itself, like all objects do: being itself.

27.3.5. Mental health and counseling deals with this essential situation of the human being existing in reality: the object of the subject.

27.3.5.1. Psychology deals in the control of subjects: the subject of society and politics. 27.3.6. The pronunciation of a proper epistemological articulation announces a space where a

more effective division of labor arises to address the mental health the modern subject of the world.

The Psychological Wound and Epistemic Gaps –

28. Imposter Syndrome reflects a deeper epistemic gap between what is taught (theory) and what is experienced (practice).

1. 28.1.  An epistemic gap occurring at the level of experience is an existential wound.
2. 28.2.  The wound appears in a variety of ways. The two most significant ways it shows up is social

and personal.
28.2.1. The social wound has been noted in literature, social and political analysis, which we

typically call ideological, the usual manner of engagement is called critical theory.
28.2.1.1. It manifests in political and social problems.
28.2.1.2. I bring notice to the personal wound by Mental Health Philosophy. It is different

in significant ways from the social-political wound
28.2.1.2.1. because it is the basis of all knowledge, because it is the knowing

knowledge.

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28.2.1.2.2. However, because of the nature of this situation, as posed and described thus far, the significant issue for mental health is orientation, validation, and discipline, over proof, denial, and coercion.

28.2.1.2.3. Either/or, exclusionary reductionism is not the only way knowledge arises. Valid and knowable knowledge can arise that is not reductive.

28.2.1.2.4. While sorting knowledge is productive for living and problem-solving, for mental health it is often unproductive, exacerbate and prolonging of problem because the nature of the problem is knowing itself, and the confusion about what this means and what this is does not lend itself nicely and neatly to either/or reductive measures.

28.2.1.2.5. This is due to a poor application of order of operations: the object of the problem solving is being is being assumed in conventional, empirical, modern phenomenological method, and the results of the application are offering more and more data to be confused by the method, which is then exploited by modern capitalistic means, empiricism and capitalism being correlated to an assumed ubiquitous ontology of Being.

28.2.1.2.5.1. Psychology is based in the conventional method. This is not wrong even as it may be incorrect if not identified to its function for mental health.

28.2.1.2.5.2. The main issue is that counseling and therapy are already exemplifying Mental Health Philosophy where psychology does not.

28.2.1.2.5.2.1. The issue to be of orientation and discipline is due to the assumption of psychological primacy for the address and application of mental health.

28.3. How to approach Imposter Syndrome as a point of therapy?
28.3.1. Realize that the effectiveness of a theory is only partially determined by expertise in the

correlated ideological dimensions of the theory.
28.3.1.1. No matter how effectively empirical studies suggest a theory works for whatever

malady, always salient is the question of why, then, is not the problem fixed, and why is

there more people expressing mental issues than less.
28.3.1.1.1. If a treatment mode is statistically effective for an issue, then why does not

every client become well or at least have the problem sufficiently mitigated such that the theory and therapist have a 100% success rate? The subtle, personal, interactive minutia of the client and the therapist determine outcomes, but it is the client who ultimately holds all the criterion.

28.3.1.1.2. Nonetheless, whatever the answer, it is theoretical and subject to the same limitations of every empirical finding and proposing.

28.3.1.2. The purpose of therapy, and the role of the counselor, is not to mitigate risk. 28.3.1.2.1. Mitigating risk is part of effective and successful counseling, but not the

purpose of treatment.
28.3.1.2.1.1. Empirical theory (theories of intervention) is a report and

suggestion for action upon how to mitigate counselor (and other mental

health practitioners’) vulnerability.
28.3.1.2.1.2. For sure there is a valid component to this in therapy, but again,

this is not the purpose of counseling.
28.3.1.3. The purpose of therapy is to help the client, to facilitate their process in coming to

terms with, understanding, or alleviating the problematic aspect of their existence, or,

what they are coming to therapy for.
28.3.1.3.1. Every theoretical ideal for counseling supports this reckoning of mental

health, but perhaps not psychology.

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28.3.1.3.1.1. The ironic logical maxim of the non-zero sum of object ontology applied to mental health: once mental health is achieved, psychology disappears, or otherwise becomes merely an interesting facet of experience. This is logical, but not necessarily semantic and forms the basis of the question of mental issue;

28.3.1.3.1.1.1. this is to say, the difference between logic as a tool and logic as how a correct ontology is proven arrives at the heart of mental health, and the root of psychology. One basic dimension of mental health stem from whether psychology is an option of interesting dimensions or it is effective.

28.3.1.3.1.2. Mental Health Philosophy supports and accounts for why and how psychology would and would not support it. Hence at this level the issue is orientation, discernment of discipline, and division of labor, not the specific theoretical applications.

28.3.1.3.1.3. The most pertinent example of this is the notion that people clients are in their own process and the counselor’s psychological idea of what is happening for the client is, at best, an idea, a theory.

28.3.1.3.1.3.1. The healing of an issue can occur with an ‘incomplete’ treatment episode as with a ‘completed’ one, just as a completed episode often does not mean the client is healed or that their issue has been resolved.

28.3.1.3.1.3.2. The healing is not determined by the counselor.
28.3.2. Every intervention has the possibility of being effective under the conditions I have

mentioned.
28.3.2.1. Many studies have shown, the influence of theory is at best only a part of the

effectiveness of the therapy.
28.3.2.1.1. Studies have shown various percentages of the reason for therapeutic

effectiveness; I’ve seen 30%-60% of the therapeutic effect associated with theoretical application, depending on what the study organizes as specific items and relations, which begs the questions of what psychological studies are really telling us.

28.3.2.1.2. The statistics tell us particular things and depending on the orientation of the therapist organizing activity.

28.3.2.1.2.1. Even the most strictly iterated definitions require discipline if they are to be comprehended by someone outside of the orator, and at that, require a certain faith that other people are thinking and doing the same thing. There is always discrepancy even in the most rigorous disciplinary application.

28.3.2.1.2.1.1. The actual fact of therapy is too messy and indeterminate for any practitioner to practice absolute disciplinary precision outside of authoritarianism, which flies in the face of everything ethical by mental health standards. Even if strict protocol is enacted, the controls of the experiment are, at best, controlling for a small portion of the total variables and cannot measure the dispersion effect created by the artificial focus on particular controls, and at worst, only concerning the particular results given the conditions specific the experiment.

28.3.2.1.2.1.1.1. Imposter Syndrome can be said the be the feeling that no dispersion effect exists, coupled with the fear that any result is the result of the counselor not being smart enough, capable enough, and so on, to enact the correct protocol. In short, it is

Doi – 10.13140/RG.2.2.12028.04487 28

an overmining of the ability of the theory, and the undermining

of the ability of the counselor herself.
28.3.2.1.2.1.1.2. This is not a psychological issue but an issue easily

remedied with understanding of Mental Health Philosophy. 28.3.2.1.2.1.1.3. Orientation and discipline are centered in Mental Health

Philosophy; empirical protocol comes after.
28.3.2.1.2.2. Further, the statistics are almost incidental of you don’t know the

theory-intervention protocol, since there are hundreds if not thousands of theories about any particular mental issue, such as Imposter Syndrome, including further theories of those theories, and many more interventions: no counselor can be privy let alone knowledgeable about all of them, nor the ‘right one’.

28.3.2.1.2.3. For every advocate of a particular intervention and their reasons, there is another therapist standing by their own reasons and theories of reasons. For every intervention, there is another intervention. This is why we have ethical standards, so we can work in the spirit of cooperation.

28.3.2.1.2.3.1. For every intervention proscribed for Imposter Syndrome (or any mental issue), there are likely many others that the counselor has never even heard of. A counselor can never be sure why they have heard of any particular approach.

28.3.2.1.2.3.1.1. We can never know if a theory’s effectiveness is due to marketing, propaganda, or any number of other reasons;

28.3.2.1.2.3.1.1.1. statistical significance does not translate into transmission of knowledge by itself, and the fact that any

28.3.2.1.2.3.1.2.

intervention may have reached any particular clinician’s ears and interest in whatever form its does, at once says something about the pure social component of interventions as well as the pure random element. When we look at what statistics are showing, we find that

they are showing specific correlations, of specific ungeneralizable circumstances – even the generalization is a theory, subject to the same limits. We can never be sure of how or why whatever idea is deduced and promoted to meet our experience;

28.3.2.1.2.3.1.2.1. only through faith do we really think we know, not through any ‘pure obvious science’.

28.3.2.1.2.3.1.2.2. As a psychological model, it replicates capitalist ideals by creating a perfect exploitative market.

28.3.2.1.2.3.1.2.3. This does not invalidate the theory, its claims to effectiveness, nor suggests a proper ethics, but rather

more importantly repositions the counselor. 28.3.2.1.2.3.1.3. Whatever intervention a counselor uses, it probably has

much of the qualities of ‘evidenced based’ due to the fact of the

economy of the counseling world.
28.3.2.1.2.3.1.4. The very fact of a counselor’s training, education, ethics,

and intelligence is sufficient to get results because they are using such skill to decide upon how the intervention is being involved with the therapy, on one hand, and of course with reference to the person client’s involvement, in whatever way it is, and on the other, due to the fact we can never know just why any intervention works, which calls one to lean into the therapeutic relationship.

Doi – 10.13140/RG.2.2.12028.04487 29

28.3.2.1.2.3.1.5. Leaning to heavily into the theory can create more problem because it can become a prodding into the

epistemological wound, in being, de facto and, by logic, de jure. We do need to investigate and prod some, but we need not continue blindly once we have been given a light to see.

28.3.2.1.2.3.1.6. The question now is do we have the disciplinary will to be able to admit when we are methodologically doing more harm than good by our methods?

Confidence Through Orientation, Not Just Training –

29. Building true confidence in counselors comes more from understanding the philosophical grounding of their work, than simply worrying about acquiring and having more technical, theoretical expertise. Theories and methods are support for growth.
29.1. Where confidence in mental health is an issue, it is likely a philosophical gap in

understanding more than a psychological issue of a defective mind, poor theoretical grasp, or compromised capacity, even as psychological theory is indeed involved in the situation of understanding.

29.2. Any empirically tested intervention has equal chance to be effective for treatment and healing given the discernment of the educated counselor.

29.2.1. Whateverisleftconcernsone’sfaith.

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DOI.

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