Tag Archives: Significant Event

Post-modernism’s Worth. 

When we are too close to an event, we talk about it as from a distance. That is, what we say is automatically distanced from the event, a maximum distance. The event is thus, by this occurrence, an object. As opposed to our psychotherapeutic model, the closer we are to an event, the more dishonest we are about its true bearings, that is, the truth of the matter, why it is that the (the wholeness of the) event has occurred the way it has. The impetus and the reaction can be come upon as an included item, a truth in-itself, only when we are distanced from the event. The truth of an object, as opposed to the True Object, can only be viewed in its truth from a distance. The equation is thus of inversion, of ratio.

Here then we may have a basis upon which to properly view foundational post-modern writers, namely, Derrida, Deleuze and Guittari, but others also.  To wit: Their descriptions were from a basis too close to the event, such that they attempted to quickly and finally establish a ground for the event; the event being thus so profound and significant, they were compelled to offer a reason.

They were not wrong, only rash. 

It is analogous to an explosion. We have now the data from the explosion, having encountered it ourselves, but also come across the initial first hand rationalization and fact crunching reports of the explosion itself – with that, subsequent explosions, and now the reports and experience of the aftermath(s) of explosions, we can now safely report upon the truth of the whole event. 

Repost: The Significant Event, part 1

[it appears that the most recent wordpress update has strung all the paragraph breaks together.  So its like one long run on paragraph now. But the *’s  do indicate a break.]

Significance. What we can call the Romance is based upon and or around what I call the significant experience, which falls well in line with Alain Badiou’s ‘Event’, what could then be called the significant event. The irony that surrounds this feature of being human concerns a confusion of the individual, between what arises of the pure multiple and such Event. This confusion is being worked out as we speak; its ways, immanent. Its formulation has been established by Badiou in the distinction pronounced by ‘void’ and ‘set’, but more particularly, more humanly, the pronunciation’s initial voice is heard through Francois Laruelle and non-philosophy, as this divergence, that which is signaled by irony, is located in the distinction that has found and described the motions of philosophy, what I feel is more correctly termed ‘conventional methodology’ or just ‘convention’. The distinctive move that has been signaled, as referenced here through philosophy, can be noticed lately in the works loosely coined as ‘existentialism’ and ‘post-modernism’, but most recently ‘speculative realism’; so appropriately begun in the real, taking reality ‘into’ its object for what it is and what possibility it holds, such speculation thus calls for its counterpart, as I frame, that is specifically not real, since it is this feature of and in response to the philosophical (sticking here with the non-philosophical designation) reality, that works to deny that which originates in the Event. The Romance is this evental feature of human experience by which we have the conventional historical designation of Romanticism or the Romantic Period or Era, and by which, so apropos to convention, we likewise have the real disclaimer that has reduced and conflated the period and human experience to one of mere caprice, of usual passionate undependability, fantasy and a specifically derogatory mode of irrationality that decries as it celebrates conventional methodology’s victory in placing the human so far from itself as the free individual for the purpose of maintaining the status quo of the teleo-ontological fortress of religio-ideological power. So compete in the assertion of itself, the conventional romantic designation flaunts its power through accentuating the discrepancy by calling what is Romantic ‘subjective’ diversity and uniqueness of individual creative and emotional freedom; though there may have been such an era, it was indeed because of the ubiquity of the true reality. We need not go into the exploitation and oppression that is the capitalization upon the discrepancy here, but suffice it to say that reality itself is romantic, whereas the Romance, a particular significant experience involving an actualization of relationship with the world, has been historically shanghaied into servitude and keelhauled under the dreadnought of historical progress — the now ‘fractalized’ Hagelian History the individualized romance of willful self determination upon the seas of manifest destiny. This is reality; it is not that people are or were having similar experiences — of the pure multiple they indeed do, and that within a particular universal horizon. It is more that such experience, by virtue of being human, may connote an individual of reality in the manner that is reducible in the same way that Badiou describes the situation of being and event, which is to say that the real individual misses the irony of Its existence for the sake of the True Object of its faith. This is not to disclaim in the effort to eject the human being from the helical oscillation upon which history makes its claim to progress, but rather to introduce to suggest that while progress is a situation of reality, the progress of reality is misconstrued in the conventional reckoning of history. * The significant event is singular, but the nature of its significance brings all subsequent experience under or within its scope; thus the attempt to explain what this experience is or was becomes not only an ironic experience but indeed irony, for the multiple by then necessarily falls into the originating experience and becomes a singular experience — though it ‘becomes’ only in as much as it is always becoming multiple and singular in the same move due to the originating experience informing all experience. So I repeat, this occurs in the explaining of the event, but not so much in the explaining what the event means or meant, again, because the explaining of the event cannot become dismissed, overcome or otherwise detach from what the event means as the event serves to give significance to the subsequent multiple that is real life or of lived experience, that falls back and or has fallen into singularity. Oddly, it is in the explaining of the meaning of the significant event that develops theory, rationalization (see below), as a proxy, as a way of distancing oneself from the Event because its significance as the Event, defies reality, and reality is where we all begin as an individual, our faith invested in reality. Hence we can speak of Soren Kierkegaard’s ‘sickness unto death’, ‘offense’ and ‘sin’. When one attempts to explain what the event means or from what it means or meant, then he becomes stuck in an eternal decision of how he might go about situating the meaning of what for real determinations is the eternal moment — a redundancy, a stalemate, where the ‘point of insertion’ into reality cannot be determined — that requires a type of break which will move the in-decision past its incubation into a specific topical discourse which then might become the identity of the individual. Yet the conventional methodologists will need no break for they are already invested by the break itself, that which is the offense in discrepancy, in the suture that is the effect of faith, which supplies the True Object and where discourse is about asserting proper meaning of that reality. Theirs has to do with the prevalent veto that is choice, in the particular presence that says ‘no’. That which requires a break is not the requirement for a ‘leap’ as Master Kierkegaard has termed, but rather its opposite; such a break relieves one of in-determination, necessity, which is to say, the relief is the contingency that is choice, whereas the leap is of necessity. By contrast, yet with consistency, what one could call a ‘pocket veto’ appears in the potential of the significant event to be able to make or be the qualifying break; the pocket veto appears as something one has available for choice, to use for the purpose of stopping the reduction that will bring meaning to the significance that is the eternal moment that thus necessitates the leap, and so be able to bring what is otherwise impossible into the discourse of reality despite it not being necessary. The conventional veto rallies against the Event, where as the pocket veto enacts the instrumentality of decision once the significant event has taken hold. For it is as if within the Romance of the significant event the person has ‘held out’ on it, as if carrying something in his pocket, that though the experience may be a motion of love, the question always remains: “Is this real?” But indeed, if this discourse is any indication, it is at least ironic, for the answer one finds reveals whether the veto was ever truly in the pocket or not. This then defines the paradigm of bad faith; that which was in good faith considering the other party was already compromised for what contingency may arise to change the stakes of the original deal. This essay concerns how the pocket veto allows for a way to describe the situation of the Event, as well as creating an opening to eventually describe the Romanitc Experience itself. For we have two situations of the event, but really three. One where no pocket veto is ever needed, having the tool of veto readily at hand, and one where a pocket veto may be applied. But these two situations then show that they still are dealing in reality with reality, as theory is the distancing of oneself from the experience. Yet this is not a necessary discounting. Being that there is a necessary principle at work, all elements of the universe must belong to that principle. What this principle is exactly is the discrepancy between contingent and necessary aspects as such, which is also the discrepancy between the object and the talk about it, as well as the relations of particular thoughts (see my earlier essays); Quentin Meillassoux, in his book, “After Finitude” does an excellent job at describing this situation, in particular as it has to do with the object itself. So in as much as these admitted operations indeed operate, it is no problem that two apparently distinct and even opposing routes based upon the same discursive substrate, the same ‘meaningful issue’, would co-operate in-dependently to reveal its object and even say different things from the same orientation. We have then the framework by which the dual nature of the discourse that has been called ‘philosophy’ may be apprehended. To bring in Alain Badiou’s formulations; on one hand, we have the philosophers of the multiple who are attempting to describe the One Reality of the True Object, so to speak, that I call ‘conventional methodologists’, and on the other we have the philosophers who are involved with the significant event. The conventionalists (Francois Laruelle’s philosophers, the ‘objectours’ of philosophy) we will leave to their ‘philosophy of…’ methods. For the philosophers (my use) of course, we need discover what might need a veto, and this concerns how irony might come about, and this concerns the significant event.  * What occurs in the significant romantic experience? A feeling of privilege and or secrecy upon intimate knowledge, one might even say a feeling toward a kind of esoteric mysticism; of being ‘let in’ to some profoundness; of being ‘allowed to make your acquaintance toward a loving relationship’. Now, when I say this, of what am I speaking? Am I not speaking of every possible experience? I am speaking of one particular experience, but in what way does it not speak of every experience? The profoundness of some ‘private’ experience, but also the common experience of the individual in reality; loving as an intimacy and loving as a basic position by which one ‘has’ an arena to act, whether one would call it ‘mystical’ is really a preference of the moment, yet in so much as we could say one ‘loves’ by virtue of the fact that there is a relationship that cannot be overturned, we can also say one has faith; in reality, here religion leads the way. So, In one move I have described the condition of the particular Event, while also describing all events, and as I attempt to put forth the unique situation the move presents the common situation, the humble and the willful. But what happens in this romance ? The sense of love remains but the feeling goes away, and then comes back, and then goes away. In the Romance it is called repetition; in reality it is called a number of things, a mundane repetition, psychological self fulfilling prophecy, incorrect appraisal of the situation, spiritual motion, karma, magic, physical resonance, coincidence; I could go on. What is occurring? Significance. The meaning of the event in reality. On one hand, the ‘setting’ of a pure multiple within the context of the pure multiple, sets of sets. A ‘cordoning off’ of meaning to sets of meaning allows for one event to have more or less significance than another, and thus have significance. One the other hand, the event of the significant romantic experience is being ‘found’ at particular moments of the multiple, which is to say, in reality. Reality can thereby be understood as a sequence or as the arena where significance occurs, but by this designation also as the ordination of fidelitous subsequence, or that which must be not real. For the conventional philosophers of the One Reality there are True Objects and the role of these philosophers is to be able to discern what the true nature of the ‘grand’ object called reality is. It does not matter if they suggest multiple realities or multiple universes or how they situate terms; their faith begins and ends in the True Object, in the absolutely particularized pure multiple that begins, progresses and culminates in real truth. These philosophers see theory as coming from or being about the true reality. Significance comes at moments of proper arrangement of objects, of particular situations of meaning, such as reading and studying and then coming upon an ‘ah ha!’ moment, and these significances as a matter of course are then coordinated into what is called theory, a willful assertion of appropriated facts about objects. Hence the philosophers of the significant event thus far deal in irony, but the issue overall has been the confusion that arises in the development of theory. To wit; the former philosophers are dealing with the true object and the latter are dealing with the significant experience. It is only now that the division that is just due is taking shape. Yet, as was just mentioned above and consistent with non-philosophy, the confusion has arisen because the philosophy of the true object is the ‘greater’ vehicle, it is the discourse of power, the discourse that stems from the One Reality, that is the designation of the ‘proper’ meaning of terms. This is historical, traditional, ideological and political as it has to do with a specific ontological and ethical horizon. Non-philosophy is a blatant announcement of the division and brings into relief what the post-modernists (Deluze, Derrida, Foucault, to name three biggies) could not bring to sway; to wit, their move was inherently conventional, that is, not so concerned with the Event itself as they were its meaning. They were still attempting to account for the significant event in the One reality, as the philosophy of the true object was not seen for its stature and unrelenting power; or, they capitulated to its power because they were already invested in it for human identity, they still thought reality could be changed into something less dishonest and more human, an offering and a withholding – which is to say now of something withheld, something not real – and at that because they were inspired; they could not introduce the significant event because the One reality demands that the significant event must fall under the domain of the pure multiple, and thus be not so significant — but at least it could be a type of psychological ‘malady’ or maybe ‘form’ if it were not posed with strategy, in tactical guise of particular manipulations of terms, in short, if it were not posed in theory. So we are lead to ask how it might be that someone so disturbed or ‘not living in reality’ came to have such an effect on real discourse? That such a person could have developed such a good theory? Hence, its significance. It is exactly this theory that does not hold water, for their theoretical position occurs only in conventional reality. Theory is supposed to be an argument, a proof for a proposal of truth, as the proposal is merely a part of coming to the truth of the True Object through negotiation; it is supposed to be a surmising of the facts in a proposal for their unitary meaning to be critiqued accorded to the relative information allotted to each critically thinking individual who are also involved in the common universal effort for the ‘whole’. Theory is not supposed to be a ‘costume’. So irony describes the situation of belonging instead of including by exclusion and confounds conventional reality. So it is that which is most honest is thus taken by convention with a pinch of salt, a skeptical eye suspecting bluff, and at times called out for its dishonesty, if not plain nonsense. if much of post-modernist theory is any indication – check out the post-modern generator website (if it still exists) – one can easily tell that conventional philosophers really had no clue what was being told. The meaning of ‘original’ post-modern/existentialist writers was taken most seriously in its capacity to hold an object for its truth, and soon enough the ‘theory’ that was being produced by the adherents of the proper method (Laruelle’s ‘philosophers’) based upon the significance that rides through conventional reality despite itself resounded with utter nonsense. This can be said to be due to the fact that there is indeed a discrepancy between what is real from what is true, that reality’s pure multiples are ‘really set’ upon a situation undisclosed to the situation of infinite sets, which should show, for conscious experience, the fidelity to the true object of coordinated sets that are romantic in various significant situations that I call conventional reality, distinct from the true fidelity that marks the void in and by ordinate subsequence, or, the significant event that I have called the Romance — but distinct in a non-philosophical manner, which Francios Laruelle has termed as a unilateral duality, one which includes and one which belongs. The almost polemical move of ‘speculative realism’ from what could be called traditional philosophy, as well as traditional philosophy itself, both occur in reality, about real objects, whereas what is ironic, or as indicative of the counter-partial move of what is not real, is the dual move from reality. Due to the necessity of the motion of contingency in reality, the speculative and the ironic appear to reveal a necessary element or feature that is unknown or at least uncomfortable to conventional reality. Irony upsets the endeavor for the True Object, so it is not difficult to see how conventional methodology would tend away from its tellings; it holds a tentative truce with irony, setting it to a type of spiritual psychology it doesn’t enjoy, one that brings it to have to assert is power for ubiquity, urgently revealing as it does so its nervousness steeped in bad faith. Yet while Speculative Realism announces its divergence from traditional philosophy, its way is still conventional, it is still attempting to alleviate the risk of exposure of the Romance by its resorting to what is romantic; hence it is ‘speculative’. Yet it is close; its difference lay in the significant event, and may yet be an indication of where or how such a pocket veto may come into play. * Significance occurs in three, what I shall call, venues. In my essay “the description of irony”, I discuss these but I will elaborate more here. Events can be significant. Getting married, having children, graduating from school, meeting someone, avoiding an accident, etc… Any event may have significance. Real experience is segregated into meaningful situations, each with more or less significance. Reality is a pure multiple of attainable sets, where any set can be divided into an infinite amount of sets, and any series of sets can be a set. Infinity likewise becomes a multiple that can be placed into sets of various sorts. Like a divine lotus flower, reality unfolds, emerges, arises and falls, like an active chaotic Mandelbrot set of fractal imagery. Most people have experience and understanding that can be described and explained analogous to this type of significance, to significance that can be described with reference to such chaos and complexity, as such simple and straightforward explanation can comprise and account for reality. But the ‘incorrection’ of this type of patterning of significance is found – if I may stay consistent with the Eastern theme I have touched upon here – in the assertion of will; so much that this very statement reveals its conventionality in double, in the same way the notion of karma is seen as meaning purpose, but one that arises as one asserts oneself, ones desire for things in the very event that arose due to choices made within an essentially free universe. Hence the difference between the event(s) of the pure multiple and the Event from which the multiple may arise in fidelity is one of significance. * In ‘The Analysis of the Mysterium’, chapter 5 of his book “The Idea of the Holy”, Rudolf Otto describes the situation: “Representations of spirits and similar conceptions are rather one and all early modes of ‘rationalizing’ a precedent experience…They are attempts…to guess the riddle it propounds, and their effect is at the same time always to weaken or deaden the experience itself. They are the source from which springs, not religion, but the rationalization of religion, which often ends by construing such a massive structure of theory and such a plausible fabric of interpretation, that the mystery is frankly excluded.” His point is to get to how it is that we come to a category of ‘holy’, but my take I think he missed. Here, the ‘precedent experience’ can be similar to an event, any event of experience, but here let’s say the significant event, the Romantic experience. We approach from a certain manner for discussion here: What is it? Otto would say that it is of the mysterium, of awe-fullness. So what is it? I say: it is only what becomes of the discourse that surrounds it, which is to say, itself is nothing. But it has significance. The significance leaves itself to the discourse about it such that itself indeed has significance, and this is to say, the event itself is denied for the sake of the discourse about it so much that the event is the discourse about it. This linking, this suturing, is of faith, conventional faith. Faith allows for the romance to take place, for significant events to arise. But here this is only to suggest that significance motivates the will.   Differentiated from common significance of events is the significant event. Here, what is significant does not resort to individuated, multiple events and remain local or in proximity to them, such as with a first kiss or a coincidence, where discourse would speak specifically about each event and their significances. Here when a significant moment arises it refers to the singular Event, such that each significance is so of and refers to the originating event. This is to say that each significance in reality calls forth the Event so that each event refers to the Event for its significant meaning. The singular becomes multiple so the multiple remains singular. As opposed to real experience that resides in the pure multiple and ‘seeks what it finds’ by including the void in its coordination of sets, the significant experience stems from the void and ‘begins the count’, or establishes the vector, the ordination of subsequence, because such event belongs to the void, and as Alain Badiou might put it, occurs in the evental horizon. Thus one can say that moments of significance should not have ‘more’ significance, but have the ‘same’ significance, each real significant event recalling the originating significance. Hence also, reality does ordain significant events such as birthdays and great holiday vacations, but such significance can be said to be relative to the Event as one knows which has the greater significance and what actually motivates, where the cardinal value arises as a denial of such relation through relative knowledge that we have called ‘correlationalism’, or what is constituted by the pure multiple of the real possibility of coordinated sets. Consistent with real transcendence, the cardinal indicates how value is situated and meaning finds form, and with a nod to Quentin Meillassoux, how reason itself relies and substantiates upon a stable yet undisclosed substrate, which I say is demanding of faith because it is the philosophical object, its objective, the ‘philosopher’s stone’ of reason, and which he says is the ‘necessitarian inference of probabilistic reasoning’ [QM; pg 97]. Again the irony resounds. The question has to do with this latter area of significance. We are talking about meaning. Significance concerns meaning. When we say that there is continuing significance as opposed to ‘another’ significant event, we are speaking to the meaning that continues through the various occasions, the various significant events. It is the same meaning in different contexts, showing itself, the same meaning, through different lenses. But usually the Event is not seen in this way; the ‘lenses’, the objects, are not seen as occasions of the Event, but rather as occasions that are ‘filling in’ the object, indicating a progress of knowledge that has to do with a greater knowledge of objects, which is to say, of reality. Recall the transcendent and empirical elements of reality; this latter viewing occurs in oscillating fashion, to the effect of significant revelatory experiences that are leading one along some purpose which is the simultaneous progress of the knowledge of the True Object and the individual of reality. The True Object and the individual are defined and specific elements of reality; they are identities in contrast (ala Martin Heidegger) to what is the same. They are ‘cordoned off’ in meaning to have real identity. In the same way, significance occurs. Such identities arise from effectively segregational meaning. In reality we build things and take them apart and find how they work and put them back together in different ways to find out what each identity is, and this process is cumulative and culminating such that typically, even when the significance continues through the multiple events, the Event is viewed as a segregate identity, that is, as above (Otto), the precedent experience is kept segregate by the virtue of the faith that is invested in the ability of the term to identify its object. This is why the Event becomes denied in reality; this accounts for why the Romance stays romantic, in the either/or condition, ala Soren Kierkegaard, instead of moving into the Romance that is marriage. It is the continuing significance that defines how reality is situated in truth, for now we are dealing with the individual for whom events have significance because of the originating Event. This corresponds the individual in reality who comes across the romantic experience. He draws from the mystery into a relationship that would destroy reality; this relationship (for now in speaking) is the Romance. In this real situation the individual is appraising the situation in real terms such that the Romance is such by virtue of an identity with which or whom the individual has a relationship with, but which he also seeks as to its reality. The first question is always, “Is this real?” But because of the initial investment in reality that every individual has, the question of truth is not distinct; the question of truth is a precipitate of the next question playing out in the activity that is real life, which is “what should I do?”, but then as the significance of the Event passes into the terms of reality that seek to bring the meaning of the Event into reality as purpose, again as Otto above, “the mystery is frankly excluded” and the significance of the experience itself falls away, or rather becomes real. It is then sought after and is found again as progress is the investment in objective identity. If the question “what should I do”, which connotes the meaning of the experience as purpose, is answered, then reality is saved, faith in the True Object is upheld in that the ‘mysterium’ has been solved as purpose. The significant event is set in context as ‘inspiration’, or for a probably better colloquialism, ‘spiritual experience’, but even if the inspiration denies the experience as spiritual, here inspiration itself saves reality. It is when no performable act is conveyed, and no purpose is able to be termed, that reality falters. Doubt is the operative mechanism here, for the present is only presented as ‘path’ in a retrospection that cannot project it out upon the future as ‘a path’ of inspiration; reality is changed. Hence, what I understand of the ‘pocket veto’ rings a particularly interesting note. The playing out of the question of reality brings the question of truth and grants thereby in relief the significance of the pocket veto. For we are not talking about the veto as it is held in the pocket; this is indeed the Romance in reality. We are now talking about the veto once it needs be played and if it can be or not. If it can be, then the mystery that has been frankly excluded is conveyed into reality intact as a real item for negotiation, as a proposal, a hypothesis, a theory, that moves reality in its progress as a significant object to be considered. Yet if the veto cannot be played – and this evidences a particular showing of a true polemic of power – then the mystery that is frankly excluded is indeed excluded in reality, which is to say, it is destroyed. And this mystery is exactly the transcendent. *

 END Part 1.

 I believe I should leave some bibliography, which will also do for part 2 and if there is a part 3; in fact it could probably serve as a seed biblio for what is to come. Martin Heidegger. Being and Time, and other essays of his. Alain Badiou. Being and Event. Quentin Meillassoux. Beyond Infinity Francios Laruelle. Principles of Non-Philosophy Rudolf Otto. The Idea of the Holy Soren Kierkegaard. The Sickness Unto Death, and, Fear and Trembling ** For a brief discussion about the Romantic Era – and as a bibliographic site: http://www.historyguide.org/intellect/lecture16a.html And thank you Dave at Inthesaltmine.com for our continuing interaction, and his coining of the idea of a ‘pocket veto’.

repost: Transformation and Conversion 

The Significant Event is to be distinguished from an event in reality. The Significant Event involves reality but never occurs in reality; it is the encountering of the point of contention. Significance itself may occur in reality as various events can begin a count of meaning in the arena of pure multiples (reality), from events such as stopping at a stop sign, to having a good workout, to screwing up a business contract, to receiving an award, texting “ball” instead of “call”, accidentally or purposefully injuring someone slightly or seriously, winning the state lottery, being injured, enacting some small altruistic kindness, or reading an essay. All such events may occur at times and have small or large, momentary or lasting impact. Yet to speak about the Significant Event becomes an ironic venture, bringing the proposal of said event to an end that speaks of the last thing it would seem to indicate and by this thereby becomes the first thing; at once included in a description of all events, as well describing how such events belong to what is truly significant, what occurs is that all things come to belong to the Significant Event. In reality, argument and discussion in general are seen to exclude the position from which its point is made, that is, the position is taken to be the argument. The real method presents the position and the argument as identical, or part of the same identity, and by this method, the Significant Event is never encountered for what it suggests in argument and occurs thereby ‘outside’ the argument; it occurs as a transcending operation of the argument. This is to say that conventional real discourse includes a transcendent clause. The irony of this proposal is that on one hand it can be said to be describing all events in reality under a rubric of potential, and on the other, eliciting from itself a truly exceptional situation. Thus it would seem contradictory to suggest that the Significant Event is not a moment of transformation; such a moment of transformation is to have enacted a pocket veto. Transformation implicates the transcendental clause of conventional faith such that some sort of progress must likewise have occurred, such as the motion that is evident in the expression “now, I understand”. The irony is that if such transformation has occurred, then no transformation was needed for it to occur. Irony evidences the containment of reality in a universal ontological horizon that cannot be and is never breached, that is, except in reality through the transcendental clause. Hence, ironically, to speak of divergence; and this is to say, that the pocket veto evidences a willingness, a choice of faith, to breach the real ontological horizon, or, the teleo-ontology of reality itself. (Aside: might we propose a contraction of teleo-ontology, if just for the sake of orthographic brevity, and offer the term ‘tontology’ ? Or would the irony of its homonymic similarity to ‘tautology’ be almost to much to bare?) The proposal of such a break, the discourse that issues from and or speaks around such a break as witnessed by various authors, spiritual or religious but specifically philosophical, thus can be a measure of the temporal progress of historicity, the fact or item that is history, unto its ontology (the scheme of meaning’s meaning). But of course, to be able to measure such a bias, we must be able to find a baseline by which the variables of discourse, the terms and phrases, may find their position in such an ontology, as well as what aspect of quality of such variables marks the bias. The degree or manner by which such discourse reifies or maintains the ontology we shall call ‘opacity‘, such that to the extent such discourse leads to and or finds a transparency of reality, and thereby argues what is more real — which is to say, a discourse that proposes to better describe the break as the experience compels one to inscribe its meaning into reality to argue what is more true of reality — there we might then find its opacity. * The common rejection ( from part 8) found in reality against the proposal that everyone appropriates reality through a transcendent, develops into an intellectualized rebuttal. Where the common rejection occurs as a sort of ‘thoughtlessness’ of casual reading, or ‘regular everyday’ experience (what is that?), the more thought full rejection is established upon a well organized and recognized rhetoric. Of course, there is the common real religious or spiritual rejection that rejects that there should even be a rejection, since it is a very common idea that humans may lead spiritual lives and have some sort of contact and or understanding of some effective transcendent element in their lives, and that transformative experiences may occur along these lines. Again, we need not go much further in addressing this feature of human reality than to say that reality holds its potential in such a transcendent clause; the issue follows the same course so far laid in this essay, and proceeds likewise. The skeptics have a real argument to be made with the believers, and vice versa, as they are both subject to the description of the Significant Event. Though both see their activity involved with coming to terms with reality, nevertheless, both are in a process of reality coming to terms with the avoidance of what is not real. Wait, the rejection might say, we have already delineated what can and might be meant by a transcendent. Foremost, we have elicited valid points to bring in at least an agnostic truth. Based upon the various manifestations of religious and cultural temperaments, the open and equal consideration of all such advocation of God or gods, spirits and such, the probability of the existence of any such God or gods, is equal to the probability that no such entities exist. What transcendent entity may exist tends toward the unknowable, and so we have only to judge upon social and cultural, and likewise materialist affects of such ideals. Likewise, transcendence falls into highly suspect forms; for one, the quality of transcendence as an experience falls often into forms of spirituality, as these tend to connote particular activities and discourses which likewise fall into the previous category. Such experiences, religious or otherwise, are common to humanity, yet are expressed and apprehended again against a common world of human activity wherein the criterion becomes the act, and the feeling of transcendence is a neurophysiological and psychological phenomenon that can be dealt with by science on one hand, and human psychological methods, such as occurs in the very human activity of camaraderie, understanding, consolation, sympathy, empathy and therapy. Even such experiential feelings can bring about drastic and strange events, the extreme examples found though motions of peace and violence, such as the trials and victories of Nelson Mandela, to religious fundamentalism, to that of the like of serial killer David Berkowitz, the ‘Son of Sam’, who said a dog told him to do it. Further, aside from all the subjective transcendent experiences, to say that something transcends various particular occasions, such as, the whole of humanity transcends the possibility of any human individual knowledge, or, adversity can be transcended, says nothing of any common human manner of appropriating the world except that the same forms of a term may be used to address various situations. Here we have a usual real defense of what is true and real and a reiteration of the proper methodology for coming to such reality. And this is what we don’t want to hear, because it points directly at the reader, at the experience of the human being. It is as if to offer such a proposal that argues that the authors addressed in this essay are staking their claim upon the ability to intuit problems and solutions from what they had read of other philosophers joined with their general education and experience in life, is not merely silly and obvious — a truism — but indeed useless and unneeded. Nevertheless, the sentiment against such a statement, as the reader holds its own possibility sacrosanct and rallies her or his resources to keep that universal perception of a common humanity intact, to maintain the privilege of the reading and production of a subject viable in its appropriation of the object — such an assertion of sentiment appears, as well, overkill, reacting to the obviousness of the statement as one would respond to a threat, overestimating the meaning of the statement because the reporting of such material is felt to be a private matter — a private yet universal matter, perhaps like the reaction to a dissection of a cadaver, or surgical operation, or even a discussion about particular personal gastro-intestinal issues, is to many people — the imposition incurred as an offense to one’s essential being. It is no wonder that we can locate a particular manner of objective reckoning as conventional, based in an offense, and that, of faith. The reader is confronted with what philosophy says (of True Objects) against what it means. When we attempt to find and tell what the meaning means (what is meant from what is said), such as may be involved with the basis of many critiques and rebuttals of works, but also even some editorial summaries of works, as opposed to mere description of what is taking place, we are thereby saying something about what has been said, and where this is taken as an identity, enact a redundancy that is denied to produce conventional theory. We enact a distance between ‘meanings’, one meaning that identifies the Object and the other that identifies the meaning of the Object, and by this distance what is said enacts transcendence as a ‘hidden’ meaning of what is said by frankly excluding the experience, as well as enacting a proposal of method for how one is to attain the experience, such transcendence, which is for all purposes, a real transformation. This is the conventional method. Yet what is meant can be described (removed from its quality of presentation as a True Object) without enacting a distance, and this venture is ironic; it is offensive to one’s identity, or in other words, the identity of the One. So long as here remains a potential hidden in the proposition, we have an opaque position of argument. So also it is in philosophical discourse that when a description is taken as what is being said of a True Object, as a meaning of the meaning of the Object, the description is taken as an argument instead of as a kind of forensic appraisal. The description is rebutted, and the argument that arises for a defense of the description to redress the rebuttal steps from its proper domain in the attempt to convince ‘its material’ of its veracity, which is quite noticeably silly if not plain non sequitur, but what occurs is no communication, or, the perpetuation of the real conventional methodology that posits transcendence as part of its route (en route). What occurs, or what should occur, is that the forensic description is left to its discipline describing the material, left not involved with the suggestion that the material is any different than what it is, which is the effort for meaning of the meaning of the True Object that is real. * The effort of the contemporary ‘realist turn’, of the most recently notable ‘Speculative Realism’ (if ever there was) is based in a foreclosing of previous historical discursive misappropriation to a present asserted truth. We have already begun to address this redundancy earlier. But to reiterate, the motion that concerns us is how this is done; it is very simple: It ignores the presence of the human being on the scene for the sake of a manifestation of discourse; that is, it assumes a common humanity as a categorical imperative. But for its sake it does not take mere discourse, but rather adiscourse that is presumed to have a static or universal ability to reflect the same thing; its method as the only imperative and the only method argues itself as a truism, a distinction within itself that is moot. This discourse that is presumed as all powerful, omniscient and ubiquitous in its potential, is a particular scheme of meaning that contains and pronounces upon all real things, and by this presumption ‘realism’ is permitted to have credence for what reality is through a potential transformation, a conversion of terms; i.e. If all there is is reality, then reality is constituted by real things, objects, but in fact, True Objects. Idealism, on the other hand, proposes that there is a (encompassing or bigger) reality over (regular) reality for which reality needs be reconciled, as if reality needs to dispel an illusion it has formatted of itself. Hence we can begin to see how realism and idealism merely dance around the point of contention regardless of their arguments. The partitions that are erected are called a ‘turn’ because some phrases of discourse will be left going ‘straight’ in meaning with the ‘previous reality’, but also because the human being on the scene is ignored and already accounted for by its (the propositional arenas located by the ‘turns’) discourse, and the difference that is proposed to be reconciled is reinstated in the course of the encompassing real-true method. To be fair; realism may address what is ‘really real’, but it gets nowhere further than that. Hence, this really real discourse is based in the offense of identity that cannot achieve its transcendental clause, the ‘grand’ transformation that is the posed culmination inherent of real discourse; realism thereby puts the fault not upon their human effort, not upon willingness itself, but upon the discourse, ‘The’ discourse, such that one merely needs to find the fault of the past to argue and thus produce the ‘now more real’ reality. Hence the conventional discourse achieves its Object, real transformation, through denial. There are repercussions of this type of move that will have to serve as a topic for a latter essay. We propose a partition that is indeed a boundary, and this is the hard correlational limit. The boundary is marked by the Significant Event and is viable by the pocket veto, whereby this mark reveals the opacity evidenced in various real discourses. The pocket veto is a signal of faith that identity is being challenged, so the iteration of this Event, the discourse that follows from it, can be registered as to the opacity that manifests due to the limit that such faith has inscribed as real or in reality; the discourse can be viewed upon its opacity as to what we might call its ‘saturation’ of meaning. A saturated discourse can be open, such as seen with Francois Laruelle and non-philosophy, or maybe even Levi Bryant and his ‘machine-object’ (but I tend to think Bryant is a ‘nonphilosopher’- qualified but thus ‘non-qualified’), where distinct principles are defined so as to relieve its dictates from such principality, or it can be closed, such as occurs with religious dogma. Other various discourses are opaque by their evidencing various internal vectors of meaning that are open, for example discussion that follows along in ‘proper’ understanding of the discourse, and others that are closed discussion that is moot due to objections that show misunderstanding. Nevertheless, opacity can be a measure or an indicator that something is being withheld as well as what is being withheld due to the offense of the Significant Event upon faith. In all cases, what is being withheld is the transcendent factor involved with the assertion for real solution. End part 10a.

Am I Beginning to Make Any Sense at All?

I agree with Malabou’s initial consideration. “Relinquishing transcendentalism”. How tentative. How civilized. But her approach, I must say, just like all subsequent considerations, asks good questions but then never quite gets to any answer what so ever more than a reiteration, a parroting of conventional method. In very short verse: this is correlationalism. The very moment of her critique is correlationalism in situ. The proposal of Miellassoux set as is it in play, as I have said, is prime occasion to speak of the Significant Event; those interested will have to wait for the book, since the development is much larger than the blog format.

Suffice it to get to the issue behind such proposition. We might consider what ‘throwing away the ladder’ means. I am sure there will be the usual preponderance who hang onto the ladder for the use of arguing what one means by throwing away the ladder. And they won’t even see the redundancy and ridiculousness of their position; how indeed they may have thrown away the ladder yet are telling us what Neitzche and so and so mean by this and how they thus might qualify to having already thrown away the ladder, and then give further reason why now having thrown away the ladder, so and so says this and so we argue this and that based upon the meaning of so and so, that we may present the problemitization of throwing away the ladder such that we can the grant our position such that we now are moving beyond the ladder or not.

This little dance reminds me of a jazz artist in the late 1980’s who put out a CD with liner notes that described and made an argument in a quite intellectual fashion, how Jazz is not an intellectual art form or musical expression. I love jazz, but I just had to laugh, and then listen to his non intellectual music that, in my opinion, had with so much obvious talent and expertise so little soul and depth, so much explicit expression and so little inuition and grasp of the reason why, at least I, listen to music.

I draw this analogy to philosophy. The death of philosophy is evidenced exactly in such philosophers talking about the possibility of philosophy relinquishing the transcendent, parting from Kant and such. Obviously the meaning of philosophy has taken a turn, and it hardly hinges upon relinquishing anything, but rather more a hanging on to the well established method working of social lubrication and conceptual capital to make a name and a living. So much for every hobby and career; rarely it seems, if never, do the users of ideas really take to heart what they are talking about or reading about, keeping all meaning at arms length for the sake of quick access and face.

So as I have said of Harman, we have to give these brain users a benefit of doubt, and grant that they do indeed feel and believe with a passion that their involvement and discussion are really involving a type of truth, a type of real working. So it is that we must locate such thinking people in an arena that takes quite seriously their deep ideas, and call it ‘reality’ as a place, space or position, and ‘conventional’ as a method fitting and no larger than the arena, the terms of which holding such a value for investment, the infinity of such an arena, calls to such thinkers to regard it as quite inescapable and indeed thus always accounting for every possibility in its potential; always climbing the ladder, they are, even as they talk about whether it might be thrown away or not.

It is good to be the straw man, because this particular kind of straw man is not allowed in the correlationalist cycle, for it indicts the conventional method, rather, it bases of method. For logic is not a tool; it does not show where truth is located. It is a vehicle, a route by which conclusions may be shown. The idea of a ‘hidden’ truth which by the tool of logic may uncover is a conventional trope, an ideological dogma. Along such conventional lines, such confrontation is rebutted by saying that it defines a nothing, a nihilism, which is why so many authors now are considering and defining what nihilism might ‘really’ mean.


The post just before this one, here in Constructive Undoing, the “reblogg” post, is the example for which we say that we must destroy the transcendent. Miellassoux is being much too kind, much too diplomatic. The reason for this necessity is that the real conventional discourse relies upon the transcendent even as we might want to and in order to posit that we might get rid of it. And if anyone has been reading my blog, it is only in the act of blatant and obstinate denial that an arrangement of terms may effectively do anything, let alone now not have a transcendent involved in what reality may be. In fact, this is also why we must say that reality is the place where discourse determines what is true. We need not reiterate the past year of posts of Constructive Undoing. It is enough to use the “reblogg” to give a concrete and specific example of what it means to destroy the transcendent, what divergence means and why it is necessary. I’m not sure if this post will cover all that right now, but at least it will get to showing what we are up to by distinguishing ‘conventional methodology’.

Thus a throwing away of the ladder really evidences the problem I indicate by referring to the “Reblogg” post. Let’s look there now, the comments and discussion arena after the blog….Heres the link: http://darkecologies.com/2014/12/03/the-battle-in-philosophy-time-substance-and-the-void/

Ok, we’re back. Now keep in mind, I am not rebutting his essay for its content. In fact, D.E. rebukes me for not wanting to discuss within the parameters of what he has presented. Yet, we might say that part of the discussion of the Significant Event concedes the benefit of doubt to the argument in question, that for this case, the author of D.E. (Sorry man, I never got yer name) has indeed read the authors quite thoroughly and is fluent enough in the verses to bring to mind various quotes appropriate to the issue in question, and that such referencings likewise connote a good possible consideration of the matter. We concede that the opinion expressed is a valid opinion, in as much as it most probably sticks to the commonly recognized version of meaning, that this common reading thus laid admits various hazards, that these hazards will surly be rooted out, voiced and problematizing in various ways, etcetera.

My question is always: What does that mean? When I read his essay (as this is the example here), I have a pretty good idea of what he is saying, as well as the problem he suggests or implicates, as well as how an impetus for discussion has been set. Having a pretty good reading of the authors myself, I understand how the stage has been set, why the lights are faced here and there, the actors supposed to enter here, turn there, the music come in here. While I know the play, and the different showings and performances, and casts, that each is slightly different, with different stage sets, different colors, interpretations of phrasings, tempo, mood, timbre, etcetera — the play is the same play. It may be entertaining to see the play every year at different venues, but it always suggests the same meaning even while differing in reference to the moments in which I attend the showing, as my attendance and watching may have different significances to my regular life at the various times.

So it is that when I read philosophy, i am informed to meaning through the question of what does it mean, what is the author saying. Now, the problem I wish to shed light upon. In this effort for meaning, a reader inevitably comes to want to find out what is ‘really’ meant, and so dismisses the meaning that is gained in potential through definitional ‘gaps’ such that now the reader has to look for context that does not seem to appear in the present text, i.e., the reader needs to read other authors and see what they are saying, and so on. What this process amounts to is a storehouse of information that when drawn upon appears to be conveying deep significant meaning, but when stood back from, really just presents a bunch of terms that says nothing in particular; this type of discursive posturing that seems so profound by its educationally privileged layering is what I call metaphysical (in the bad way) because the level that is supposed of its definitional structure is supposed to get at some more real or more true meaning of the issue presented.

It is this kind of philosophical method that is correlational, that which relies upon a transcending aspect of discourse by which to assume or propose an actual truth of the situation. As we might see in D.E.’s talks on Zizek; Zizek himself talks in a way to show this very situation: that there is no subject that has any actual or substantial truth to it, but that we are viewing it in a particular way, in a particular fashion. This is what all the various Zizek talking abouts on this particular issue means: there is nothing there.

Now, philosophers will debate this, but the debate will be based upon the fact that obviously there is something ( but again Zizek accounts for this in various places also, but how he says it is less important that what he means; how he says it is just nice to look at). So the philosophers will bring in their storehouse of authorial knowledge to pose and discuss what Zizek may be saying and what then may be the actual truth of the matter. But never do they stand back and find out what it is such rhetoric actually means. The point which Zizek reiterates all over the place is that such rhetoric is nonsensical, that the discourse itself, a particular discourse that he references capitalistic, sees its elements as substantial capital, actual true real things that are negotiated. But the point I’m making is not to dispute what Zizek is saying; the points of Zizek will be pronounced in the Significant Event. The point I wish to expose is that the various arguments that would rebut or expound upon Zizek often miss what Zizek says over and over.

A most specific and pertinent example of the motion of conventional correlationalist philosophy occurs in relief through the exchange in the comments of D.E. of the link I gave, between him (her? Come to think of it, I don’t really know) and I.

Hopefully my distinction will be made more clear.

I use the term ‘True Object’ in my writings. This usage often gets the best objections in the form of it making no sense. My question is what sense is there not to be made? The philosophers (and I have encountered this over and over in many places) routinely bring argument against ‘truth’ and ‘object’, and are typically repulsed by ‘faith’, at various junctures. My proposal is of a simplicity that is completely missed by the conventionalists that I see is due to their investment in the storehouse of authorial knowledge. I am saying that reality is constituted of True Objects, objects that cannot but be helped to function in reality as true things. Like the car I drive down the road. There is a car. The question of what a car may ‘actually’ be as an object is of no concern; indeed I am, as I drive, driving a car down the road. The ideological or theoretical considerations do not come into play here; much like Harman’s Third Chair, but most like the ‘First’ chair, what ever may be the actual ‘car’ does not come into play in my driving down that road. The car is a True Object. To argue what the car may actually be is entirely a theoretical issue, but more, an issue that is entirely metaphysical, which is also to say, concerning what is more true or more real, which is for all other terms, concerning what is transcendent or for better terms, as a methodological reduction, concerning ‘The’ transcendent.

There is no theory that needs go into this, but the theory is already there in the various authors all over the place. Harman’s difference with Zizek, even as he may say he disagree with Zizek, is in as much as Harman is invested in the truth of the terms he is using, as his terms are stemming from a sort of essential relation of thing to thing (the ‘thing’ that is Harman, and the ‘thing’ that Harman is addressing: object -> object). As I have said, he must argue this because this argument then validates retroactively the position by which he attains his truth of reality. And this next is key to my proposal of the situation of the True Object: his difference with Zizek takes place in reality.

Once this situation is understood, then we can consider the meaning ala Miellassoux, correlationalism and transcendence. Then, once this situation takes hold, the question no longer concerns what the author means, for this routinely beckons conventional method back into its correlation of ideologically ordered (Foucault) and scaffolded (Wittgenstien) terms — and besides, we have already climbed the ladder of this meaning — but rather the question becomes: What does this situation mean? Hence, to question this situation stems from a position that is not real. The real ladder of meaning must be thrown away. The question comes to concern the Significant Event.

We can see this in action in the comments of the linked blog on Dark Ecologies. That the simplicity I propose is countered by recourse to an authorial bank (Freire) of knowledge. The conventional philosopher cannot understand what I am referring to because he is caught in the metaphysical correlational world of ‘real’ discursive method. Hence, divergence.

Again; this is not to say that D.E. essays do not present valid points, but rather that the meaning of the points are routinely missed for the sake of the correlationally (transcendentally) justified arguments that stem from an assertion of identity, from the equivocation of the object and the discourse (terms) about them — but not just any discourse; a particular discourse that can be associated, as Zizek does, with the capitalistic paradigm wherein True things exist because of the metaphysical discourse that supplies the ‘more true’ reason for its objectivity — as if I am not really driving a car down the road. The car is thus a True Object due to the insistence of the metaphysical support.

But to get back to Malabou; the question of ‘why’ should the transcendent be relinquished (I apologize; I have only listened to the first 20 minutes of her talk. My input may change when I hear the rest) is made nearly moot due to the understanding that comes through the simple understanding of what authors such as Badiou, Zizek, and Laruelle, (if not many, more; such as, Kant, Hume, Hegel, Faurbach, Spinoza, Kierkegaard, Nietchze, Wittgenstien, Heidegger, Sartre [my spelling is horrendous] and many, many more, whose names apologetically do not directly come to mind right now — oh, and if not Miellssoux, and Harman) are really saying. The difference between these varied authors concerns the awareness of the following: The transcendent must be destroyed because it is the transcendent that perpetuates the continuance of real confusion. We must not ‘relinquish’ it because, as Malabou also says, to relinquish is more like a kind parting, and such a codependent relationship will never kindly part ways.

“Should humanity be saved?” Laruelle has asked. I say: humanity should not be saved. Because, should humanity be saved it would not even know that it had already been saved, if indeed humanity should have been.

Harman and the True Object.

The question is no longer that of Being, for Heidegger has destroyed being, like a forensic analysis of material. Being was viable so long as there was a dialectic whereby reality could be based upon its one vision through the oscillating features held from one another, like a binary star. Hiedegger destroyed the dialectic (for conventional method), encompassing the description of how such an interaction takes place for reality, what the dialectic does, how it works, a description from a distance, in a nice neat package, defining the Trueness of the Object called Dasein, ready for distribution. Hence, the question anymore is not of being, but of truth. The issue with Graham Harman is that he stands upon the dialectic through setting aside the destruction of being, and thereby enacts a deception. He thereby may speak of other than human Daseins through the dialectical vehicle, all the while holding the dialectic out of sight, withdrawn as the Dasein by which other Daseins are possible is likewise set aside for the sake of proposing again a ‘new’ one reality where the dialectic is gone, and the subject likewise dead. He thereby may propose a new ontology of being: Object Ontology.


I must admit, as a read more of Harman I am becoming increasingly disillusioned and bored; I tend to see the rise of Speculative Realism and then it’s Fizzle to have ran along these same lines as I am experiencing and discovering. And I must say that it is because of what has occurred, what was enticed early on as a sort of promise has lead to merely another philosophical system; quite boring, but even more irritating was that it seemed like Harman might be one to be able to pull it off, but then he comes up with another system that proposes a more real version of reality. So conventional; so regular, run of the mill. So it is, the reason for this motion of his that lead to a positing a more real system is explained by the essay of the Significant Event, that such deceptions can no longer stay viable; that is, except in so much as the deception is working, and where it succeeds is exactly in that audience where denial is operative. The deception works because the conventional method is already submerged and distanced in a self imposed deception: the term-object identity.

The boredom of Dasein explained by Harman is symptomatic of the reversal and contrivance we see in Harman’s Ontology. Admitting the short reading, the boredom of Being Dasein in need of some danger is at the heart of why Harman’s seem so boring: because the danger of Object Ontology comes in response to the boredom of being that is, in itself, a preliminary mood, that is, a mood that has not been allowed its maturation, has not been let to risk, and so discusses subsequence. Like a lacuna, this mood that Harman seems to understand is the offense that is the Ontology in its Ontological functioning. Harman is required for his Dasein of many colors to describe as enactment the results of having True Objects as the basis of a reality that is ubiquitous as it is total in its assertion of a universe of only objects. This is to say that he is arguing his identity, an identity that has arisen due to his investment in the State of reality. Here multiple Daseins exist as the evidence of the description of how it’s being is not presence, like an oxymoron, defies and contradicts its own meaning. Beings may exist with a certain facticity of ‘being there’ as an environmental inclusive state, but the being of Dasein thereby includes the fact of other Daseins within its own ‘there being facticity’. The implication here is the point of contention between eternity and progress, between what Badiou calls ‘immortal’ and ‘victim’; Harman is enacting his victimization. The dangerous move apparently seen by Harman is gained by his view of his Dasein as a meaning of meaning, as a Being that is exempt from the situation that Heidegger presents to mean Dasein. The meaning of Dasein for Harman is already a meaning represented as a object of Harman’s presentation. Harman apparently already was viewing the significance of Heidegger’s work as a significance fundamentally different than what the meaning of Dasein would entail, which is to say, the corpus that is the explanation of Dasein was already in the format of meaning that represents as a presentation the True Object (meaning of meaning) as an objective reflection, over the meaning that the corpus presents. Harman already was was viewing the world as a whole constituency of True Objects, already was his faith unquestioned, already his faith not doubted, his naïveté a sham before it could be authentic. Rather than the danger which is the being bored as the boredom that is being, Harman’s risk, what is dangerous for Harman, is by his faith, that his deception might be uncovered.

But in one manner of speaking, he need not be worried, because his faith is vindicated in the power that establishes reality, as he is invested in this reality, as he has faith in this power, he is justified. His risk is entirely of his faith.

Nevertheless, the boredom or disappointment comes because while his categories seem to really get at something, he leaves us flat in a world of intellectual ‘weirdness’; but the weirdness is barely interesting — or maybe as interesting as watching someone solve a Rubic’s cube. I know now that every time he preludes an idea with weird, it’s not going to be weird at all but rather mundane and obvious; but somehow I am sure that it is weird to a certain type of type of reader and author, and this type is probably one who is oriented upon the True Object. For a while I thought Graham was really following the philosophical maxim of looking to oneself, but it’s seems his route for this is more conventionally methodological than it is novel or introspective.

Yet, I should say that we must give Graham the benefit of doubt; I am sure that Graham indeed feels that he is looking to himself and not being conventional (why else would he say that ideas might be ‘new’?). And this is exactly where the discourse of the Significant Event gains its footing; because Graham can not see beyond his faith. Faith makes true. The discursive posturing may appear quite the feat of meaning, but philosophically speaking, while impressive, it risks little.


An Unheard Blow: A Strike that Can’t Be Blocked to Graham Harman’s Wondrous New.

Dealing with Graham Harman and the True Object oriented.

I got a copy of the book series called “Xplained” on Martin Heidegger written by Graham Harman. I thought it was something different, but when I got the book and started reading it I saw that it is more an actual kind of primer of Heidegger. It is very good; it places everything in a nice historical perspective with Heidegger’s personal history and influences, with Husserl and Phenomenology, and brings in the contextual philosophical problems he had and indeed philosophy in general faces, the significance of his proposals and such. One can tell Harman is quite informed, and I am sure one does not place very much weight on a layman such as myself, my opinion, to say that it evidences quite a scholarly understanding of the subject — as if Harman or the institution of philosophy really values, cares or needs my stamp of approval.

Yet is this very ignorance that evidences the exhaustion of institutional philosophy. The vastness of the human world populace as well as our internet availability for exchange of information of all sorts and types marks a coincidence whereby (institutional, academic, conventional) philosophy must now 1) be resolute in denial by closing its blinders to narrow its view, while 2) asserting its relevance for a larger totality, by 3) redoubling its effort to deceive, and 2) be oriented toward reconciliation upon politics and ideology. But, as I’ve said, there is plenty of drama in reality that needs a grand discourse to negotiate; reality demands its big negotiators. I am more concerned that such discourses assume to be talking about what is true outside the grand narrative. We have to ask what such grand narratives are based upon and how it might be possible to actually believe that such narratives are indeed accounting for all of reality. indeed; could they really hear what I’m saying here? I doubt it. It is more that such individuals are involved in a division of labor.

This, what could be called a philosophical ‘turn’ is more like a ‘shift’ but is really a motion of denial based in offense, or an outright deception.

It is true; philosophy, as the discourse that indeed addresses the One reality in its oneness, ends with Heidegger. Whereas prior to and including Heidegger, in one way of viewing, one orientation, philosophers were attempting to inscribe, or otherwise suture the subject and object, the subject into reality, to reconcile the individual and reality, Heidegger does away with the need for suturing. The philosophers since and in the interim until Laruelle and Badiou begin on one hand to describe how this ending manifests for the subject — a phenominalist step for sure but one that, one one hand, enfolds upon the object, involves with it, without reducing the object to subjectivity (Sartre), but on the other, turns the subject out upon the object and removes its more ‘artistic’ interpretations for the sake of ideological and social contingencies, such as gender and race and social justice (sufficient cultural critique). But despite such delineations, philosophy continues upon the same course of attempting to reconcile reality and the subject of conventional power. Heidegger’s meaning is thus set aside as a True historical Object, so what seems should be philosophical effort has not been undertaken but rather has changed its course upon an assertion, as Miellassoux might suggest that the motivating base of previous philosophy was mistaken. The question should be upon how philosophers see themselves enacting anything different than any other period authors.


Laruelle and Badiou thus can be seen to represent an historical ‘fulcrum’. Laruelle transcribes the Heideggarian tool-work into its discursive actuality, such that philosophy can no longer stand on its own for its own, but must unknowingly assert its primacy and importance against the ignorance revealed of it by non-philosophical means. But this is not to say that philosophy becomes useless, but rather a different type of mechanism for dealing in reality has taken place. We propose that this ‘new’ mechanism is denial, for if ever there was a One reality, discourses needed not to deny anything because the assumption of power was de facto the omniscient and effective power (colonialism). Badiou, on the other hand, models the ‘Philosophical scenario’ (called: the Romance; but again, by one orientation) in mathematical schemata, his book “Being and Event” a model and description of said Romantic Event (the Significant Event). Again, another historical marking; here though, one that evidences at once a total understanding and acknowledgment that indeed such Heideggarian Event is not an (small ‘r’) romantic personal experience of caprice and individual interpretation (as conventional philosophy would have it, as it continues to argue for its Object), but rather a specific mapping of the routine transcendental (clausal) consciousness under certain conditions. It is this mapping that the individual invested of the State of reality does not wish to see, such a description that is utterly offensive to the faith in the transcendental clause of conventional discourse that allows for the exploitative capitalistic fetishism.

The latest philosophical (realist) ‘turn’ is founded upon nothing more than an assumption and assertion that discourse presides over what the human being is in its essence; such a position must be asserted as it is denied because of the overwhelming presence of elements that would not inherently conform to the grand narrative except that they must due to the ‘magic’ of capitalistic fetishism demanded upon the human beings as an enforced imperative of divinely inspired progress, denied as such based upon the True Objects of historical discourse. Hence conventional real discourse. For what Heidegger is showing us is that discourse is merely a vehicle.

The problem arises in so much as the precipitate of his ideas shows that Heidegger (at least) was dealing with ‘two sided’ objects; where one side is the Event in its most full meaning, as ‘environment’ but also revealed of the Romantic scenario, and the other side still sees discourse as inherently involved and associated with actual True Objects. To distinguish how we might answer, and the results of answering, the question of side, we have to ask (as Heidegger did of thinking) if philosophy really has any integrity, or if philosophy is now merely another means to an end for various capitalist literary venturers? Is the act of being creative and imagining into logical writing automatically philosophy? How can we discern what is philosophy from creative writing? And if we have to consider such a question ‘philosophically speaking’ then I’m afraid we’ve already found our answer. For it is the ‘two sided’ object that establishes a partition that offers no quarter and no types; a boundary that evidences the move of conventional discursive power.


Therefore it is a strange twist that Harman puts upon the reading of Hiedegger, and indeed upon his readers. For if one is not keen on the reading of this book, Harman’s explanation of Heidegger, it would be easy to see that Harman is merely giving us an easy version of what Martin was saying; but he is not. Harman is giving us a loaded explanation of Heidegger. It is not difficult to feel a strangeness in this reading; the explanation is interspersed with interpretation in the guise of explanation that lends itself to give itself to Harman’s argument and project, which is Object Oriented Ontology, so by the end of the book it appears the ‘first and second’ objections come naturally of course, but it is after all the course that Harman has laid for its outcome. When we begin to see what is occurring, it is not His OOO that then seems weird; it is weird that his deception would be taken as honesty.

His first objection: Dasein is not only human. That is; it is not the human ‘being there’ that causes things to come into play. Rather, Dasein may be other things too; ‘being there’ rocks; ‘being there’ podiums; etcetera.

Harman’s second objection. Change is not accounted for; and, “how can there be multiple simultaneous perspectives on the same entity” (pg. 163).

I’ll just come right out and say it: Harman’s objections are non sequitur to Heidegger’s proposal. And I do not need to go and site argument by argument. This is to say that Harman’s objections are derived, or maybe better said, contrived, through a misdirection implemented by Harman. For, if Harman does indeed understand Heidegger as he seems to, then he should see that his objections to Heidegger are non sequitur to Heidegger’s meaning, that the meaning Harman is using to formulate his objections do not correlate with the Event by which Heidegger brings philosophy to its end. Therefore, Harman derives an argument based upon a structure of argument that is assumed to be able to be made of Heidegger, and thereby appears to ignore the meaning of the argument in its place as the Event.

In other words, one can say that if indeed Harman has understood Heidegger, then Harman should have been allowed to be able to come upon the Significant Event. But ironically, two contingencies yield for us the same result for Harman’s proposals. For if Harman was come upon by the Significant Event, then it is in so much that he gained inspiration from this encounter that he may move to say something new of reality; but most probably, due to his orientation upon Heidegger and his ideas as True Objects, as indicative within the term-object identity, Harmans’ reading was an occasion by which to deny the said Event as some True Object (term-object identity) for the purpose of establishing his real identity. Either way, Harman thereby can be said to have enacted a pocket veto; a veto that has held in the pocket until such a time when it was needed to retain real identity.

Hence it is highly ironic but unfortunately conventional that Harman is involved in an act of deception by presenting ‘Object Oriented Ontology’, as we will describe more thoroughly in the next segments.

SE part 10ai, part B: The Revolution Will not be Televised (nor disseminated in virtual media or social networking sites).

I suppose the question left is a trick question because one cannot dismiss the link already established between philosophy and ideology and politics; there is indeed reality to be dealt with. The question behind philosophical learning has to do with if it has already been or is being dealt with by the historical discourse, if there is a progress of the human being itself, if the philosophical discourse is actually moving the individual human being to better ‘know thyself’, if a record of historical discourse allowing the human being a better purchase upon what it is to be a human being and what occurs in this process? Or, does conventional philosophy perpetually lure the human being away from itself? Or to be even more crass; Does the conventional route present a deception of itself, for itself, so that it can move upon a platform of substantial belief such that human beings are gaining some sort of solution? And then of course the pivotal issue of this forum: What is education?

The trick is seen inso much as such a question may be voiced from a valid position, because then the proof that would put philosophy in bed with politics and such, and thus deflate what otherwise would be a ‘good use’ for philosophy to a ‘well esteemed and well paid methods for engineering maintenance’ and would elevate the lowly conventionally methodological philosopher to have to drop his broom for a gun in the effort to defend that identity thus created by ideological faith — but this is reality. The trick in this discussing types or routes for learning is in so much as one sees that they are being deceived; a trick of mirrors; it is not that there is no mirror, but that the mirror into which philosophy most often looks shows its identical reflection, that is, the right hand in the reflection still is the right hand from the reference of the reflection; the left, the left…

The notice made by Negarestani (essay link in part A) might give rise to the construction of meaning that will show how the terms themselves allow only particular formations of concepts, that the structure of a given situation allows for and recalls to itself necessary arrangements of meaning and thus offers what might be called a ‘lexicontology’, amoung other transformations, a type of argument for determinism. Our situation thus asks into the excess, the ‘world’ that is the haphazard method of finding the necessary arrangements, what can be called the conventional bias. Notwithstanding this problem, his can be seen as further evidence of discourse coming to terms with itself, as the (engineering, of Negaresanti’s essay) discourse is seen as not arising from some unitive structure toward some systematic resolution (revolution), but rather that the structure is the object in correspondence with discourse at various functional junctures; a quite deconstructivist approach. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to see how such offer-recall of objects locates the imperative of faith to disjoin from the object and deny its recall (distance). Presently such an ontology is not part of the real discursive structure-function (it grants no reflection), but there again, the Significant Event suggests that in so much as we are already and always human, such an ontology would be merely another real scheme of faith, yet one which in respect of the position that would recognize such ontology would bring about a repetition of history, a reinstatement of beginning such that a much longer period of knowledge would have to be allowed to rebuild the subsequence of discourse to the point that such a repetition could be recognized. Of course, the usual arguments against determinism will always apply, for the significant feature of an effective ontology of determinism, one that functions as such, must relinquish the position that determinism proposes, which is also the relinquishing of its counter argument, contingency, which only happens in the conventional human reality; this is what is meant by, with Zizek for one, but others, forgetting, and its repercussions, a (re-)instatement of repetition (Kierkegaard), as well as the mistake denied of redundancy.

The purpose of any revolutionary discourse is to jolt the human being from its individual sleep of reactionary default. So, it may not be too far a stretch here to completely offend the reader by saying that the human being does not change through history, but reality does. The default linkage is that which informs the offense inherent to the rebuttal because the rejection stems from a particular direction, or vector, of linkage; the dismissal of such a statement comes from the individual that is invested in the state of reality determined by the term-object identity, where the subject is held against the object in a directional mode, subject-> object, as an imperative, the conventional method. For reality, where discourse is able to come about through the inversion of this relationship, there we have Harman’s Object Oriented Ontology, object->object, but where this is really a motion of object->subject, the situation implied of this essay, but ironically, of a determinism as determinism, the route that is always denied in effective reality despite its conventional appropriation. It is the Significant Event that allows for this effective determination.


Of the second type of student from Part A we mean to suggest that such humanity and the world is not questioned but is rather taken as a platform upon which to wonder and ask upon the objects of its view. Thus all discourses are merely information about objects, even as the object in question is the human being. Mythology and history offer stories of past humans and insights into the nature of humanity and what it means to be a human being. Scientific books tell of methods of analysis that were correct and incorrect, answers that were correct and incorrect and why they were so. The whole range of possible information grants this student a picture and a palette, and a canvas upon which she can create and add to the wondrous and vast compendium of personal, social, useful and not useful items of the human plate.

Tangental to such neutrality, the issue brought up in part A about the move students may make into gathering more discursive information indicates a particular priority of vector for knowledge. For the implication of such a movement does not necessitate any particular discourse to be revealing to the student, rather it presents the possible repercussions of the route. It is just as sensible, along these lines, that a person would venture into ‘spiritual’ discourses as well as strictly philosophical notions and begin to see the elements of those routes as truely true. For example; there are many many people who like to offer us a vision of ‘planes of existence’ where there is a ‘Godhead’ of consciousness, and this Godhead thus can be disseminated along certain logical lines to bring various states of Being that thus serve to explain the human participation in the universe. We might call this a type of New Age conflation of a further variety of philo-spiritual systems, one that arises from the ancient Hindu, Buddhist and or Kabalist ideas, but also modern theoretical physics. One could also read Alastair Crowley and describe the truth of how the universe disseminates along Magickal lines. Pagan or Wiccan cosmology offers a route as well to tell of the truth. Likewise, modern science offers its own meaning for its research in its own right, of non-locality and complexity and such, often removing from its discourse the spiritual voice but all the while telling us of this Truth of the universe and our true place in it. Philosophers, oddly enough, appear to be the most stubborn, for as soon as one brings of a term that has possibility to be unclear or is already attached to certain authorial matrices, such as ‘phenomenon’ and ‘discourse’ and ‘transcendence’, and ‘metaphysics’, these students will route the discussion to the potential of truth that such philosophical discourses hold, so when one speaks they must automatically resolve themselves by their speaking to ‘idealist’, ‘realist’, ‘materialist, etcetera… domains of truth that, as a part of the philosophical truth, are held in suspension for the discussion that arises simultaneously toward and upon the philosophical truth. But these are more than just speaking; somehow, for all such speakers, they appear to constitute The Actual Truth of the universe.

Here, though, we are addressing specifically philosophical truth, but through this discursive vehicle bringing into question all routes. But not that philosophy as a particular discursive arena thus amounts to The true reduction of all routes, but that any route, if viewed as a particular suspension of meaning as opposed to its being involved with terms that are understood as actually anchored of objective truth, may be reduced to any other route. This is the principle that all discourses are valid and hence contribute to the transformation of that principle; that individual discourses constitute the economy of discourses by which reality is manifested. Hence the query that brings the respective routes of the second and first student to the question of a particular vectorial move that conflates the two students to one route that then presents itself suspended (ironically) in particular assertions of truth: What is occurring that brings the student to assert a particular truth in opposition to another? And, what is that situation that is able to move through such anchored scaffolding to thus be able to make the correlation of all systems? Hence, the question that is brought by my sited essay above (by Negarestani): What is the function of the structure, and the structure of the function? This is not a suggestion to delve into subjective justification per say, but is rather addressing under what conditions does a unitary discourse of reality arise? What does such a unitary discourse as and in its unity suggest of reality?

I shall back up and elaborate, for the question of ideology has to do with that for which it does not account, or otherwise accounts for it by incorporating the (it’s) presented lack into its structure. From where, or how, does, the ideology of reality function as an incorporating structure?

This question involving the first student is: If the student were so interested in the question of existence and her presence on the scene and how the world might be or otherwise present itself, is the historical philosophical discourse necessary to her finding those things the traditional discourse ponders and proposes of questions and answers? This is to ask, is the conventional route the only route? To be more specific: Is it necessary to read Husserl to know about that of which phenomenology speaks? Of course, all those prideful philosophers will have a field day ripping apart this question so much that they will see such a question as hardly reflecting a knowledgable positions of the issue. They will bring such questions as “well, yes, because phenomenology was a system of thought coined by Husserl in which he said this and that and phrases things this and that way… so if anyone were to know about phenomenology, they would necessarily have to have read him or at least spoken to someone about his ideas”. And of course I would have to say that they completely used their over philosophical brain that processes given information to arrive at that answer, just like the second student I just mentioned.

So I shall reiterate: Is it necessary to have read Hesserl to come to a notion (very, very generally speaking) that all phenomena of the world arise in the subject? And again I can just hear it: “the only way one would know there was a subject in which phenomena arises in is to have knowledge of philosophical rhetoric”.

Am I making any head way here?

Again: If a person were so interested, could they come upon the meaning of Husserl’s founding premise without having to have read about it? And I am not asking if they could know that Husserl said this. Along this line, can a student understand Husserl without a primer, without the usual historical and academic philosophical contextual introduction? We suggest, contrary to the conventional assumption, that perhaps Husserl’s idea is not an idea that came about due to Husserl, but that such an idea is innate to the human experience given that one is motivated to plainly look.

Likewise; Is Kant’s notion that knowledge reflects of itself, an idea that can only be gained by knowledge of Kant?

Likewise; Is Fauerbach’s idea of an economy of human knowledge dependent upon Kant’s idea? Is any proposal of authors dependent upon the previous statements of other authors?

Likewise; Is Harman’s idea of Objects (Object Oriented Ontology) due to his pronouncing the idea, or is such an idea innate to reflective human experience? Is Miellassoux’s idea of an object that exists antecedent to the thought about it an idea that he and only he came up with? Was his idea dependent upon other authors’ proposals? Nevermind that if we say ‘yes’ we are setting aside the very method by which we insist upon questioning what the author is really saying.

So; If such ideas do indeed depend upon and are allowed to be generated because of previous authors’ proposals, then we have a proposal of a particular type of human reality. We have the conflation, but conventional discernment, of philosophy as a conspiratorial agent of political and ideological investment.

If not, then we have a completely different situation.


Part of the problem of the point of contention is that if we can say that authors are drawing upon ideas that are innate to the human being, then we can say that it is possible to point to specific notions of respective discourses, certain subsequent conclusions put forth by various authors based upon the innate factor or element, that do not reside innately to human reflection, that is, to all humans who may reflect, proposals that are particular to that author’s presence in the world or experience in knowledge and or their particular method of disseminating the innate experience of knowledge, articles that must be learned through the banking model. We can say that humans are capable of understanding the subsequent moves, but we are also saying that the subsequent moves are sufficient to the necessary premise, that if the premise is innate, we can thereby understand why or how the author might draw such subsequent conclusions, even we might see them as incorrect. It is by this maxim, this discrepancy that is the evidence supporting argument, i.e. I know what you mean here/ I don’t know what you mean there, or, I know what you mean, but the consequence is mis-drawn, is an indication of problem and elicits from this situation the aspect of the discourse on the Significant Event that we have called opacity, where the distinction put out upon the reality implied by discourse reveals faith and its operative mode of the veto, but specifically to those authors who appear to recognize the discrepancy, the pocket veto. Hence also, we set aside the question of conventional reality and its authors, for its method assumes and relies upon such opacity (argument; choice; veto), the space wherein arises impetus for real progress, and instead we address particular philosophical discourses that evidence opacity (the pocket veto) within itself as its presentation reveals opacity between what is innate or necessary, and what is hypothetical or contingent; for what is innate appears through all discourses in one way or another, through various shades and veils, screens and partitions, despite how ‘Pure Reason’ may be located in Kant to be a conventional Western philosophy property. Such propriety is entirely hypothetical and practical.

Now we can get to the clincher, the most offensive proposal of divergence, the caveat that would often buck the philosophical reader. We can also say that what is innate to the human being is only innate to those for whom it is innate. The problem is inherent to the proposal of divergence, for when this is mentioned within a treatise that is called philosophical, whatever the phrasing, the meaning will always be brought back to the conventional philosophical rhetoric, the meaning of meaning. One problem is in the use of the term ‘human being’, and this is used specifically to avoid the term ‘humanity’ for certain contexts. The individual, on the other hand, does refer specifically to the human being invested in reality. So it is that the distinction is commonly and en route seen to divide by which to implicate the whole, and, move for the whole by making distinctions by which the whole there comes. It is thereby (by this method) that divergence will not be understood, for when we speak of the human being we must be speaking of an individual, one that is a single member of a common whole, and a potential that thereby is available to the whole. In this case, if there is an idea that is innate of the human being, then we are also saying that any and every human being may have access to it. Yet, the question must be, if every human being has access to this innate idea, why do they not express as an idea innate to themselves that they apprehend this idea? But not only this; if there is an innate idea found merely through the looking at that which is innate to the human being, why do people require it being described by others for them to understand the innate idea? What is it about such innateness that is being aroused un-innately? Yet if such innateness is aroused by a sort of sympathy between (subject-)objects, such that perhaps a type of ‘resonance’ is occurring by which such latent idea thus is apprehended as innate, what is the situation where 1) only particular people are privy or have access to such discourses of the idea? And, 2) even if such discourses are available to people, most people do not or cannot apprehend them? And, 3) even if such discourses are supposed to be apprehended they are not viewed as have arisen innately, but rather comprehended as a unit of information that had not been there prior to the learning it, that is, the gaining of the piece of information that says it is innate amounts thus to it being innate as a price (distance; commodity) of definitional information?

The situation presented by these three instances, which occur at all times in nearly every place one can come across, thus must signal a divergent discourse, one that speaks of humanity but a specific humanity that apprehends the innate idea. We can no longer assume that any sort of revolutionary transformation can or will arise, (for the revolution has de facto already occurred) and neither, without a certain forlorn demeanor, can we settle to treat all production of discourse strictly like a work of art. The category of which we speak no longer compromises itself to a usurpation of multiple perceptions or interpretation of sets of sets, but even sets these conventional term-identities within a different categorical imperative. We thereby speak of divergence in its most full and true sense. This situation is similar, say, to people who know how to program computers. As an analogy; no one will suggest that the skills, language and let alone the perception upon computers that these people have automatically must be able to be reduced to the skills, language and perception of say the users of Microsoft Windows platform, that the programmers must reconcile their ‘computer programming world’, or the code or language they use and the perceptions of problems and solutions of computer programming, to the general user of Windows, the but neither must the Windows users be reconciled in their using to be automatically included in the programmers ‘world’. But this is exactly what is presumed of conventional philosophy for the category of philosophy as a single imperative within which all the -ism’s and -ologies arise. This is to say, that the significance of divergence does not reduce itself nor is required to reconcile itself to what is more real of reality, and, the discussion that considers these facets of knowledge of reality as an all inclusive meaning, while it may use the ‘results’ of such divergence for its varied purposes, likewise is incapable of addressing the divergent discourse beyond such addressing as being material of divergence (face to face).

The ramifications of discourse itself of attempting to describe and thus bring about such a reconciliation has a long history, indeed inscribes as it proscribes history, most significantly and poignantly in the rhetoric of revolution. But the fact remains that even the most recent conventional manifestations evidence the real attempt that still reifies and depends upon a discrepancy that is not being overcome. We propose that this is due to a confusion (mistake) that occurs in the effort to conflate what is inherently divided into a one reality, a confusion that persists due to the effort for reconciliation. The Significant Event thus describes how and why such an effort fails for reality, as well as describing how and why such real effort persists, and thereby exposes conventional philosophy as a play for importance of its namesake, for what could be better called, more legitimately, critical or political theory, cultural anthropology, critical psychology, or just plain ideological negotiation, or what might be for a more correctly identifying term, purely academic sets of conventional analytical methodology.

To put this in a conventional phrasing, “the revolution will not be televised”. The irony of divergence cannot be overestimated. Hence, for its weight in truth, we must discern such a divergent discourse that yet remains philosophical, as not real. There is no line being drawn here, the line is already drawn; reality will continue as it always does, conventionally.