Event and Substance

Various philosophers have already discussed the “event”recently. I generally consider three philosophers contemporary that are significant to the discussion of truth. I talk about them all the time: Zizek, Badiou, Laruelle; The indivisible remainder, void, and void qua void as implicated in non-philosophy, respectively. Which is to say, in a very Witgenstein manner, that whatever might be nothing is nothing to be concerned with. There’s nothing even we could begin to say about it that has anything to do with what we name it. Nothing here becomes foundational as opposed to merely speculative.

It is this last significance that encompasses the event. The event is nothing that we can talk about, but it is everything that we must be concerned with. In this way it is not fully present, as various sorts of random occurrences filled with content That occupy as well as catalyze change due to the fullness of their content that we unpack meaning from. Rather, it is very much like Rudolph Otto’s slight mention in his book The Idea of the Holy where he quickly suggests that the “mysterious tremmendum”, the “awe-full-ness” Which motivates our very being, which in his discussion is really the root of the holy, is that center of vacancy around which religion arises.

But the event is also not pure nothingness. Zizek points to this contradiction of speaking about nothingness as “a catastrophe” Which arises at the beginning of the universe, where everything is turned on its head, and what we understand is love becomes the manifestation of real evil. With Zizek, Nothingness inscribes us from all sides and indeed it is the event which brings us into the middle to form political identity, as one might say, out of nothingness, or, in the middle of nothingness, stretching backwards to a moment of pure absurdity, and extending forward into a ‘Master signification’ which avoids all scrutiny.

Badiou attempts to tell us what being and event actually is. Indeed his masterwork book is called “being and event”. We find, though, that he too must take up a sort of Zizekian tack and move everything into the political realm. In very short, Babiou says that the event is where being irrupts into the world. The event “begins the count” of reality. And I imagine we are supposed to gather that this “count” is quite similar to the generation of meaning by human beings. And so where else do we generate meaning but in the political realm, I guess.

Laruelle is really the only one of these three that actually takes seriously the idea of nothingness. He takes it so serious that it becomes a foundational feature of existence. Like I said, there’s nothing even to say about it; it is being so effective. One could even speculate that if I had anything to say about nothingness, it must not be very effective. One could also gather that where nothingness is effective thereby do we find Truth; and indeed I’m pretty sure that this is why many people have accused Laruelle of conspiring toward a religion. Indeed, many people that really enjoy this philosopher sound like religious fanatics, but I would say, honestly, it’s because those people really don’t understand what he’s talking about.   When nothing becomes substantial, when nothingness is indeed a foundational term of a universe, Then something changes in the way that we reckon the universe. This is to say, as opposed to the invisible given that what we understand is the regular or conventional philosophical approach, what Laruelle calls “sufficient philosophy”, Understands as an essential substrate, a criterion of truth where everything revolves around everything else, all the while assuming that there is this fundamental “truth of the universe” that we are finding through experimentation, empirical science, academic philosophy — I’m not really sure what label we would put on this given. Badiou I think makes the best proposal for this kind of real philosophy, because it gives everyone involved a legitimate stake in the game by allowing their being, they’re thinking, their efforts in reality, to arise from nothing without ever having to admit that indeed nothing is what is informing their activity. How offensive to my being in the world to consider that everything that I’m doing is based in nothing! (It is devastatingly offensive, in fact. What the hell is alienation if it isn’t an identity which understands itself in the context of nothing and thus meaninglessness?)

In truth, this is why I believe it is more justified to call such a real activity thus “religious” in nature. Because in reality we can talk about whatever we want to as if it has substance, for example, we can talk about nothingness and what it might be and how it manifests in various this and that, but all the while never recognize or rely upon that nothingness as indeed as that which is informing the activity again. Instead, people point to the effects, and use that as an argument for an ontological foundation of relativity and eternal interaction of thinkers which establish for themselves and for each other the world, the real universe, etc. Such approach I call religious because it requires a certain amount of energy, or force, in order to overcome the contradiction involved in having all efforts actually based on nothing. Because most people will quickly retort “well, what is nothing?” And begin the cycle of eternal recurrence again.

There’s is a faith because they (we) are involved with what the philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre Proposes that every good being does when they encounter the “abyss” of freedom: we “revolt” from it to gain our freedom. There is no freedom in nothingness, though; nothingness is really nothing else but nothingness, And the “…of freedom” part of the encounter is really the ability and capacity to deny what offends us.

It is the ability Part that is most significant for me, because it indicates to me that this is not some essential truth of existence, something that all humans do automatically or something, or how the universe actually is or — again I don’t even know how I would talk about it in the short venue right here on WordPress…

But it is an ability of consciousness, an ability of the human being to revolt from that abyss to create our own worlds of intention, worlds that we want to have. Worlds that we desire, worlds that we use desire to make. Etc.

This context from which I’m speaking here on this post, this particular post, I am just saying that while I might be able to revolt from the Abyss , I don’t have to revolt in order for the universe to remain viable and for me to be an actual person in society. And in fact I think that is a significant issue is whether or not I’m revolting from anything. Here and there are use the term “acceptance”. Indeed, human beings have an ability to revolt from the abyss of nothingness in order to gain their freedom in society, but this freedom is not essential in the sense that it somehow is implicit in the nothingness. The nothingness is nothingness. It is nothing. It’s nothing to talk about. It is in our effort to speak that we find freedom in denial that such speaking is based in nothing at all.  The overcoming of this contradiction I call faith.

It is a particularly 20th century industrialized capitalist democratic religious congregant which finds its identity in revolting from the abyss of freedom in order to make choices about who and what they want to be in the world.

Presently, it is this particular mode of reacting that we call “modern”, and what I described amounts to a reason why it is so difficult to think beyond capitalism. It is just one particular mode of being human, but being in general, though, and that indeed it projects itself both forward and backward, we must necessarily understand that it is not some essential human trait, or some essential human way of being that has gone on since the beginning of humanity — But it is indeed the “beginning of humanity” that is arising as a psychic component within the modern individual around the event.

When these parameters and limitations Are realized, are comprehended and accepted, Then we find the only truthful way to discern what we are involved with in our current situation is a religious faith, A mythological cosmology which is actually effective.

X



A Bridge which Defines: On Richard Rorty’s very pragmatic interpretation of Gadamer Hermeneutics in his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979)

It is easier to describe what something should be not, then to formulate what something should be, as it is easier to deconstruct then to construct. …

On Richard Rorty’s very pragmatic interpretation of Gadamer Hermeneutics in his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979)

————- If we can take this short synopsis of these two authors as minimally representative of what the two authors say in general, Then what we have there, with Rorty anyways, Is a proposal which allows for the subsequent developments in philosophy of the 90s up till present, as represented by Badiou, Zizek, Laruelle, and even the speculative realists.

The point he describes is a kind of “empty space” that is then elaborated upon by these authors I just mentioned. This empty space can be understood to define two ontological situations, together which constitute what Laruelle calls “unilateral duality”. This unilateral duality posits two conditions that do not reconcile back into another unitive condition, but then also defines the state of each of those conditions.

One condition is exclusion and the other condition is inclusion.

Badiou Likewise considers things in this way, though he doesn’t enjoin with Laruelle at terms.

The one condition, which We can call the conventional route, excludes anything which arises outside of its semantic mandate. Basically, it posits a one reality in which everything exists and of which human beings find out through applying ‘reason’. The one route says that there is nothing that falls outside of the potential for reason; this route is necessarily a systemic route, it posits systems within systems that even extend so far as to imply there’s a grand overreaching system which we may not ever be able to comprehend. The way the exclusive route functions is the reduction and exclusion based of contradiction; it includes only that which constitutes itself in potential. It includes everything that is possible in potential.

The other ontological condition is the one which includes. This ontological condition includes the exclusive condition. The exclusive condition posits the possibility that it includes everything, yet by its own activity is necessarily exclusive to anything that might arise which does not conform to its particular semantic mandate. 

By contrast, The inclusive route includes contradiction as well as that which is exclusive. It is what Laruelle calls “non-philosophy”, in order to allow the exclusive route to lay in what is most common, namely philosophy as a positive method. 

The speculative realists understand and attempt to incorporate or use this ontological feature of non-reduction, non-philosophy, or what The link to post here would define “In contrast”, such that what we have for a new philosophy, what we have on the ‘other side’ of that empty space posited above, is a new manner of philosophy which resides parallel to its counterpart: Unilaterally dual in nature.

But this empty space cannot merely reside in conceptual reason, as the link to post talks about. As he suggests, philosophy must involve something more than just reason, more than just a capacity to think through Aristotle or reductive logic based away from contradiction; it is thus a bridge. 

But we could equally and just as well go back 100 or so years before and say that it is a ladder that then after we climb, or cross, it must be thrown away, or actually it disappears. For once we climb the ladder, once we have gotten to the ‘other side’ of the bridge, there is no incrementally reductive manner of reasoning which will allow us to cross the gap, what Slavoj Zizek knows as “the parallax gap”, And what  Badiou understands as “the void”. There is no way to use language or discourse to communicate how to move accross the gap Because the very foundation of discourse has changed by virtue of what, by all reasonable standards, is not reasonable. This is similar to what Kierkegaard calls a quantitative leap, as opposed to a qualitative leap; it is absurd to the conventional exclusive route of reason.

In short, the conventional philosophy of incremental reductive reasoning is insufficient to realize the full ontological extent of being in the world, which is really being of the world. Just as Heidegger had a real conflict, (Is Nationalist Socialism the actual culmination of history? And do I have an obligation to believe what I reason is so?), an actual breach in the rationale of his Dasien, An interruption which occurred from what is actually real in itself, outside of reason’s ability to conceptualize toward reduction, The fall back into reason had real ontological repercussions which shows that Heidegger’s original proposal of his book “being and time” is faulty. (That is, his philosophy is compromised Because he made the wrong decision, as evidenced by history.)

But the fault is not internal to his philosophy; rather, it is faulty Becuase of how we might be oriented upon what his philosophy is talking about. The fault lay in that there is no inherent truth which is discernible by the Method of reductive philosophical reason into his “being and time”; but the truth of Dasien is reckoned when we see that it is not based in reduction, that is, the centering of thought within the content of history of reductive reason is contradictory in-itself. It is contradiction spelled out ‘long hand’.

As much as the exclusive methodological philosophical route would want to argue that there is an essential truth to be found be a close reading of reason to his book, or any philosophical books really, ultimately the truth of what he is saying can only be found by crossing the bridge, passing over the gap, moving through the void which leaves the reductive method behind to fail in its want and desire to posit any truth found by its method. This is evidenced by any attempt which would want to argue ‘what he is really saying’: We keep discussing and arguing over it anyways.

Yet this failure does not mean that it does not still function. This is the meaning of a unilateral duality: Two Routes which are ontologically necessarily, one which posits philosophical sufficiency, and one which accounts for the truth of the situation.

Nathaniel: Revisiting “On Vicarious Causation”

This excerpt from Graham Harman’s “on vicarious causation” from 2007 in the journal called Collapse (it is not difficult to find the PDF online) represents succinctly what Cedric Nathaniel means when writes that his philosophical work is not concerned with “what is behind the scenes”, what he generally ascribes to metaphysics, what he calls “conventional philosophy”, and what Francois Laruelle refers to as “sufficient philosophy”.

Harman’s article here puts in very clear terms what Nathaniel means when he talks about what is ‘actually occurring’, that is supposed occurring right in front of our faces, as opposed to what our introspective minds might dredge up from the underworld of “subjective” or what Nathaniel generalizes as phenomenological truths. (Nathaniel inverts Harman’s categories and says that what is phenomenological is ultimately real, where what Nathaniel calls true is what Harmon calls real).

It is how Harman says; phenomenological sensual Truths ride along top of the real object, and as I’ve said recently in a post of mine, That ideals based in subjective, discursive, linguistic etc. modes ride along top what is actually in front of us (that is, once we get beyond the appearance of the phenomenon) like the Hawaiian islands ride along top of a hotspot in the earths crust.

This (object, as opposed to subject) orientation upon things of philosophy I see is much more useful in its truth than grounding whatever theoretical activity in whatever subjective imagination of sense that an individual might be able to fit together; That is, if we are ever trying to get anywhere in philosophy besides a crate load of artistic freedom of expression. Hence I find in Cedric Nathaniel’s books an interesting move towards a science of philosophy.

I would suggest revisiting Harmons seminal article written in 2007, “on vicarious causation”. And consider it in light of James Hillman’s “healing fiction” just what sort of fiction that conventional (phenomenally based)  philosophy writes for itself, given the evidence of the condition of our world, and where intentional communion with the object of thought might be creating more destruction than indeed healing.  perhaps what we are considering imagination it’s not so imaginative after all.  Perhaps there is a weak consideration of what imagination is so far as it might be applied to real activity, which is to say, a weak estimation, a correlation even, between imagination and what is good for the world, as evidenced by the shape or condition of the world, so far as whether we are actually harming or helping that condition. Slavoj Zizek is tight in his discussions about capitalism as quite difficult to imagine beyond: as Nathaniel says, It is due to the phenomenological redundancy which sees in its own reflection an infinity of objective truth obtainable from intuition of a transcendent other (religious communion), the excess that profit and investment arise from.

…..

And I imagine over December I’ll produce a paper along these lines. 😛

Grow. Begin the hack.

LARUELLE AND RADICAL SCIENCE FICTION: full English text

LARUELLE AND RADICAL SCIENCE FICTION: full English text

https://terenceblake.wordpress.com/2019/10/07/laruelle-and-radical-science-fiction-full-english-text/
— Read on terenceblake.wordpress.com/2019/10/07/laruelle-and-radical-science-fiction-full-english-text/

Live-blogging Laruelle’s TETRALOGOS (1): a democratic proposal

Live-blogging Laruelle’s TETRALOGOS (1): a democratic proposal

https://terenceblake.wordpress.com/2019/07/31/live-blogging-laruelles-tetralogos-1-a-democratic-proposal/
— Read on terenceblake.wordpress.com/2019/07/31/live-blogging-laruelles-tetralogos-1-a-democratic-proposal/

Empathy as a Philosophical Response to Phenomenology

Empathy as a Response

Empathy as a Response
— Read on xhened.home.blog/2019/07/23/empathy-as-a-response/

I like the way my comment formulated to this post on Edith Stein, about empathy (I call her Edith Catholic saint lol).

“… I suppose what I’m talking about is the call for a true self reflection. That’s what phenomenology is all about: seeing in the reflection ones self reflecting. But as Graham Harmon indicated, often enough people who talk about phenomenology talk about it as though they are not really seeing them selves in the text (Derrida) , they thus often “over mine” or “undermine” what is actually going on, what I call over determination and under determination, because they are determining themselves in the text as something that is more than the text or something that is within the text, which is to say “under” The discourse.

And so what appears to be called for by some contemporary continental authors is a determination that is actually determinate, or as a friend of mine might like to say, “mind”, lol. Which is to comment on Harman’s “mined”, A determination that is actually mined. And what we mean by this is that it is not a mind (mining) which is coming up on things that it reflects upon, to then contain everything within its own phenomenological conception as being.

The call , as Laruelle might say, is to see oneself as the reflection and not as the thought of the object in-itself. This latter is phenomenology, but phenomenology which has not taken the full turn, or really the quarter turn in Laruelles estimation, to actually see it self as what it is doing, as what is occurring.

From here then it is possible to notice the edges of phenomenology, what some philosophers have called “in the last instance”, what other philosophers have called “the end of philosophy“ or “the end of history”. Once that edge is reckoned then we are able to entertain possibilities that were not able to be understood or entertained in a thoroughly phenomenological world.

This is where I think Edith Catholic saints idea of empathy begins. ”

–the Philosophical Hack.

And on a further considerate note: Zizek talks about Plato, when Socrates talks about whether there is justice and nobility, wisdom and such in the lower things, such as shit and piss….

… and I might add.. drug addicts, homeless people, …hackers, etc….

One More Z/P Goodie: Nature, Culture, and the Displacement of Time

On Slavoj Zizek and Jordan Peterson: Nature, Culture, and the Displacement of Time

On Slavoj Zizek and Jordan Peterson: Nature, Culture, and the Displacement of Time
— Read on iambobbyy.com/2019/04/27/on-slavoj-zizek-and-jordan-peterson-nature-culture-and-the-displacement-of-time/

It appears that the people who really do use their thinking skills took a little longer for their comments. Here is another goodie. Bobby gets a little deeper into the various philosophical authorial substrates, and a couple play by plays from the debate.

*

Bobby points out one of the significant parts of the debate that I forgot about; namely, that Peterson definitely sees a kind of progress of history, sees history as a ground outside of human cognition, and then that cognition indeed is able to perceive this ground and make analyses of it. Then; Zizek’s rebuttal to this kind of suggestion is, basically, that though it is possible to perceive some sort of progressing lineage, the lineage itself is articulated at the same time as these articulations disrupt the continuity of the scheme, and at that, at a notably random times.

Bobby has a better version of what they actually said, and then goes into the various philosophical ideas around this idea, for example, Derrida’s trace and erase.

*

I Am digging his approach, but I depart from Bobby’s analysis in a couple of ways.

1) I am not sure that there is any argument that can be made which overcomes the presentation inherent of the debate. And, what I mean by this is that when we understand, say, Derrida, then there is a further development philosophically that shows us that there is no “proper truth”, As though By virtue of what Derrida proposed the nature of human existence demands that there is no historical ground that human beings can cognitively know in the manner Peterson stakes his position. I describe this particular situation and I am indicating right here some of my earlier posts, perhaps from a year or two ago; I will not rehash them here. If we understand Derrida, then much of what he says is like the wind — “the wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth…”

2) It is sufficient to say, that the argument (as a form) has only a particular bearing upon truth, and that Francois Laruelle’s non-philosophy has basically disrupted the idea that there is some sort of unity of truth that human beings can be suspended within to thereby exist in a argumentative reality. The suspension is itself, as I say, real, but not true.

In my work, I try to show how this particular method, this particular way of coming by or upon reality, that I call the “conventional method”, is but one manner, The One Route of the Two Routes. Further, these two routes do not further indicate a “reasonable or rational” route as opposed to and “irrational” route, but that this kind of argumentative way of establishing truth is indeed one “rational’ manner of coming upon objects. The routes are mutually exclusive in a non-philosophical manner, not complimentary as the early 20th century Existentialists would want people to believe: Belief is required first for the compliment to be realized.

In short, I am saying that all Bobby really does is kind of lean on supporting what Zizek is reputed to argue in relation to a traditional lineage of authorial representation. And that’s ok.

And –

My take is that there is no reduction of this sort possible once we understand what Laruelle is saying; and indeed, this is what I think Zizek was relying upon, as it indeed accounts for why he did not plow into Peterson.

My position is that these two men represent The Two Routes upon objects. These routes do not further reconcile to another unitive, and a singular route. And this is to say that what the debate shows is that these two routes function together without necessarily reducing to either, nor to another further unity.

Indeed Petersons argument is valid by the mere fact that people — regardless of what argument I want to make to pronounce upon such ‘other people’ — indeed can and do experience and encounter reality in exactly the way that Peterson is philosophically describing in his solution. And that this particular way, or route, is not false by virtue of the fact that I may come up with an argument against what they are saying. These people are not wrong or somehow have some sort of invalid way of understanding the truth of reality. The way they (those who understand an objectively knowable history) understand it is indeed True. And this truth, while perhaps in communication with me nevertheless does not fall into falsity due to my points, nor theirs due to mind. And, our existence is not relative nor reductionary to either that or this. It is true. Period.

Objects do not require my acknowledgment or permission to be true, or otherwise have or hold truth.

Also,

And whether or not Peterson understands technically what is going on philosophically in this ‘larger’ sense, Zizek nevertheless does understand and that is why (I submit) he didn’t plow into Peterson about his ignorance, to show how ignorant Peterson might be upon these philosophical intricacies and subtleties.

(See my earlier post about what Peterson might actually be involved with.)

We can find evidence everywhere in his talks and writings that Zizek Understands what I’m talking about: when he talks about “naïve”, he is talking about that particular kind of existence which does not answer nor even fall into the category of the philosophy he proposes by his analyses as a sort of categorical imperative. The ‘common people’ do not answer to his kind of philosophy, and indeed exist outside of it in an essential sense, even to the extent that those people’s reality (truth) has nothing to do with what analysis he is making upon them. This is the nature of his philosophy and it forms a foundational ground that most people seem to miss or are unable to reconcile with their experience.

*

If you are interested in The exploration of the two routes, please check out The Philosophical Hack: The concluding unscientific post-script to event, by Cedric Nathaniel.

It is crazy inexpensive.

Historical Apologetics: Against Non-Philosophical Humanism

Against Non-Philosophical Humanism

Against Non-Philosophical Humanism
— Read on syntheticzero.net/2018/10/29/against-non-philosophical-humanism/

Though I would have something to say about his conclusion or estimation at the end, the first 87% of the essay is excellent description of non-philosophy and some of it it’s philosophical problems.

The perspective of this essay is still based from modern-post-modern centrality, which is to say, within historical structures.

The Non-Philosophy of Francois Laruelle.

matrix-pod
From the Philosophical Hack (out soon):

Laruelle’s is the ‘best’ conventional proof of what cannot be proven through the conventional method. I have already spoken about the distinction between Laruelle’s and my terms. Laruelle distinguishes his project by asserting a positive withdraw in reference to the real common occurrence of philosophy, to call his Non-philosophy a state that purports to communicate this alternate unity (that he calls “real”) must be more real, yet in terms by which its placement is ultimately a contradiction of the ‘philosophical’ terms; whereas mine remains in the positive stance to indicate philosophy as the proper domain of the issue, I then refer to the common occurrence of philosophy as conventional. He likewise implicitly, if not explicitly, asserts that his Nonphilosophy is a better or ‘more true’ statement of what is actually real, where as I simply place reality with what is common,. What is not common, in my view, thus, in reference to this common state, not real. The true issue with Laruelle’s Non-philosophy is it falls into so many contradictory and accusatory pitfalls that it is basically and ironically non-productive to discuss what he could possibly mean as a philosophical position (ironically, it is called non-philosophy); but his point is aptly illustrated despite the easily discerned conventional problems. The most overt of these problems is that in order to agree with his proposal to be able to argue from it, in most conventional cases, one must inevitably and ultimately end up using exactly his phrasings; this is to say that regardless of what anyone want to argue about the veracity of his proposals, an extended rebuttal of his ideas will bring the proponent to have to quote him exactly as a responsive defense. This facet brings accusations of the religious quality of his (non-)philosophy; because the only way to argue with his proposals is to use his exact definitions, which then denies that the rebuttal has any grip on what could be an effective argument to the contrary. The end result is that one merely understands what Laruelle is saying, but really there in no point in arguing his points (as a proponent of them), except that the proponent might then be less a philosopher than a religious convert. The ultimate point of his (non) philosophy thereby can argue the religiousness of conventional philosophy as a whole, because often enough, the same will apply by extension. Thus, we can safely say that to argue his (non-)philosophy without quoting him exactly or using his exactly phrasing or having a firm working knowledge of his definitional lexicon is to misunderstand what he is saying, which begs the question if indeed he is living in his own personal and isolated reality –for how are we able to ground his assertions in any experience but his own except to admit he is a kind of prophet? Thus his position, though valid, represents a condition of philosophy itself that is best “passed over in silence”.

The point of this explanation is to indicate the ridiculousness of taking what can be seen as the most rigorous presentation of nonphilosophy as if it is indeed a philosophy.

Also, it shows in relief how my explanation will be said to not understand what Laurel is saying, for various philosophical reasons. Then, ultimately, we will find that there is nothing one can say to the people who consider themselves “non philosophers” to tell them anything about how they might be a little off in their reckoning, so it is best just to let them be on their own, Being, as they are, so correct in their ideals.

Again with this Love?

…Here Kate spells out the truth of Densher’s betrayal: he feels guilty, and refuses to profit from Milly’s death, not because he doesn’t love her and is for this reason unworthy of her gift, but because he does love her—not while she was alive, but from the moment she died.

— from “The Parallax View” by Slavoj Zizek used in the post by Neotenionos

The difficulty of speaking about love in the sense that Zizek wishes to convey in this segment is that the manner we have to use language is close to, what we can call, the point of contention in discourse. The meaning is quite similar to what Jaques Derrida attempts to convey, and even Theador Adorno, both who attempt to grant examples reflecting definitions in one setting. For conventional philosophers, it is that arena where ‘discourse’ begins to collapse into the space that brings an equanimity that is called demonic in one sense, and ridiculous in the next, nonsense to those worried about stature, and undifferentiated contradiction in still the next.

Where Zizek does succeed, though, is at remaining in the exact middle of what we could call, and as well locate through understanding the views inscribed by parallax, two states. The psychoanalytic of Lacan allows for an inscription upon the text of history; unfolding as contradiction (Adorno), Zizek represents an understanding that is repellant, or rather, that those who would understand him specifically or particularly are unable and indeed incapable of grasping, so offensive (Kierkegaard) to what we generally call the Real world. Zizek speaks, thus, the break, the gap, but in doing so manifests an historical-politcal moment that founds itself through the engagement with it (capitalism), since this engagement that does not see its own offense but instead understands the offense through the context of excess, perpetually finds itself drawn into this moment even as it resists and reestablishes its own mass (substance) and thus gravitas (objective identity).

We might see now where we are being lead even now.

We should not shy away from Francois Laruelle’s non-philosophy, and for a quite similar reason that we often confidently engage with Zizek even while we are effectively repelled. Slavoj does not often (at all?) engage with Laruelle, and the most probable reason is because Laruelle represents the explanation of the Hegel-Lacan-Zizek psychanalysis that effectively places it outside of the frame in which and through which Zizek works so fluently; the frame that most others think they can expose, confront, challenge and overcome through various agencies, Zizek knows is unassailable, yet he behaves concordant with the rules presented with any particular moment of how the frame is being challenged; he cannot but do so. This is the point that is so offensive.

The significance of this segment is in that Densher “refuses to profit from Milly’s death, not because he doesn’t love her…but because he does love her”. This is what is offensive to the conventionally oriented philosopher/critic. It is not that he is not choosing to profit; it is that due to his love that was not real love during her life, but only after, that by virtue of her sacrifice he is only able to love then, which is to say, because thereby does he realize how much she loved him. He there by is already sentenced, but it is a sentence that he suspected all along, and one that only now, once she dies, comes to fruition. The trauma of guilt is relieved by Kate helping him to be honest. He will be then the post-traumatic subject who no longer “lives” and yet is still alive, one who no longer ‘exists’ within the ethical confines that the love that was in bad faith had defined. He is thus free to love beyond the confines of ethics, his ‘punishment’ is that he cannot choose to escape this situation: He is free.

If Denser profits, then it is because he could do nothing else, thus, it is in effect no profit (profit depends upon the ability to notice a distinction, which needs a space for choice, a situation with excess, with room to move), and as well, a noticeable point of contradiction in the fabric of sensible (structural) space.