The first part of the philosophical hack

The concluding unscientific post script to event.

The First Part concerns the defining of a space that is regularly understood as having no boundaries.

The Second Part, out soon, concerns the conditions for something existing outside of the political world, thus, opening knowledge (hacking into the space discovered in the first part) to the truth of the object in-itself.

Open to your consideration and coming to mind near you.

THE SECOND PART * crossing your mind near you.

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The Philosophical Hack: The First Part. On Sale Now !

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Support independent publishing: Buy this book on Lulu.<>CLICK HERE to BEGIN THE HACK !

(hopefully the link will work.)

 

This is the First Part of a Six part series by Cedric Nathaniel.

Using Slavoj Zizek’s book “EVENT” as a platform, this essay is a hack into conventional philosophical reality.

It is indeed a hack: A repeated application of an algorithmic protocal upon a closed system. What is this closed system? Through the compromises developed through the Hack the closed system is defined while simultanously creating an opening to that situation many currently see as unescapable, which is to say, immenently and infinitely contained.  As part of this endeavor, the beginnings of a science of philosophy is thus put forth.

Mr. Nathaniel feels that philosophy which concerns the world should be able to be accessed by it. He thus opted to give readers bite-sized pieces to be able to enjoy and digest well.

What is The Truth?

 

Quite soon The First Part of The Philosophical Hack: The Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Event will be published.

The truth of the situation is that the notion of our “post-truth”, or the incredulity involved with not knowing how to discern what is true, is itself true.

So, what does that mean?  It means that the theoreticians which would back-step to say any thing assertive about post-truth are caught themselves in a synthetical theoretical suspension of reality which is not truly encountering the facts of the matter.

Who said that?

Truth?  Facts? No one is allowed to say these things and be speaking of the present critical-philosophical situation. At least, say it an expect to be taken seriously.

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Using the platform of Slavoj Zizek’s “EVENT!”, the essay “The Philosophical Hack” is a hack into philosophical reality. An attempt at legitimacy.

It will be offered in, I believe at this point, 5 parts.

The author Cedric Nathaniel feels it is better for digestion to take small bites and be able to chew and enjoy thoroughly, but also to have the time to eat the whole meal.

We hope you will want to be part of the feast.

140 pages. pocketbook format. estimated price: $7

Published by Od Parcel.

Badiou’s seminar on Lacan and The Philosophical Hack.

Badiou’s seminar on Lacan

https://doctorzamalek2.wordpress.com/2018/11/26/badious-seminar-on-lacan/
— Read on doctorzamalek2.wordpress.com/2018/11/26/badious-seminar-on-lacan/

One of the next books I’ll be getting. But From the Amazon description, it sounds in line with my long awaited book, “The Philosophical Hack”,which I will be start releasing soon.

The subtitle of my book is “Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Event” and is somewhat a filling out more-or-less what Zizek leaves aside primarily as room for discussion.

Being that I am not a Big Name, Nor have a cohort of thinkers who support my work, I have to start small and consider how best to market my book to reach people Who I know would be interested and indeed would find it compelling, but who might not otherwise give my book a second look.

So, I will be releasing my book in Parts. Part 1 should be available by February 2019, merely 6 months later than anticipated. 🤘🏾

I will keep you posted on the unfolding developments.

The coincidence of knowledge is not a matter of singular reason.

Reality, Naivety and Addiction; Part 2: Google and the failure of communication.

(Note: These posts refer to Slovoj Zizek’s talk he did in Spain a few months ago; this one:

 

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This ‘post-traumatic world’ that might exist in a utopian dream, if it were not for the naïve subject who is able to have a view where by hope can reside, does not occur within the Symbolic and Imaginary frames; or rather, such a utopia is possible as a political empiricality within such effective frames. Where the ‘post-carnival’ state is possible, there do we find what is ‘the carnival’ itself, the moment wherein things are not what they seem and indeed shift and change in the single view. This is what Zizek (Lacan) calls ‘the impossible’, or, the Real order. The manner by which we make sense of what is impossible is called, for Zizek, psychoanalysis. When we see that these states do not change through subjective agency acting upon some actual empirical object but rather are only changes in view, then we must ask: What is this state wherein Zizek must disclaim his lecture in order to be understood, at once, to be not contradicting his innate imperative for logical consistency, and then as well not offending the sensibility that is discovered through psychoanalysis? Or more precisely: What is occurring such that this state, that he would have to qualify his subjectivity as naïve, against which a Socialist Bureaucracy seems preferable, or, what might be best to deal with things ‘after the carnival’ , needs be stated? Does not a state reflect itself de facto, automatically and axiomatically in the presentation?

What is occurring in the naive state is an inability to be dismissed from the carnival; an inability to make the next move; hence, for Zizek to communicate at this level and be honest he must qualify his presentation: What is naive is that which understands itself as not subject to psychoanalysis. So, the trauma continues and the carnival goes on; this is reality, the effect of the various periodic failures of the Symbolic and Imaginary Orders, and the solution to these evental failures is usually and commonly to resource the Symbolic and Imaginary orders, the orders by which the political world gains veracity, or the semantic scaffold by which what is political may be known.

One does not simply decide to give up on their world and then the world goes away; the world must be destroyed without consent. This is a fact. If we must speak of effective ideologies, we can hear Zizek through his book “Living in the End Times” (paraphrase): It is only at the time we notice the impending failure of an ideology that we fight hardest for its truth. We do not simply give it up, even if we know the battle is lost; we still man our stations and fight for the state. We do not simply and easily relinquish our world because we have a conception that it is ending. Notice the general responses to global warming. The rhetoric is not a condemnation of our system, rather the reaction is either flat denial or a call to adjust how we approach our modern living.

*

Likewise the recent Google diversity scandal. Notice that there is nothing terribly irrational or non sensible in the manifesto. In fact, his essay makes good sense from a open-platform ideal: Every voice should be heard, even the voice that has been marginalized in the popular political environment. He is not saying that Google should not address inequalities in the workplace; he is saying that the manner that they are being addressed may be based upon an incomplete consideration of the facts; a more complete rendition of the facts of inequality or structural misrepresentaion or skewed hiring and promoting practices being the logical and rational ideas that he presents, which are, actually, not too radical. He is not saying anything that I haven’t heard; whether or not I believe them or not, the various notions about gender he produces are indeed valid — but in a certain light.

Then look at the answer that is made by Danielle Brown, Googles new diversity manager.

…I found that it [the anti-diversity manifesto] advanced incorrect assumptions about gender. I’m not going to link to it here as it’s not a viewpoint that I or this company endorses, promotes or encourages.

Does anyone notice anything peculiar between the two discourses?

At risk of putting myself in either camp and looking as if I am defending the manifesto, the anonymous writer is merely putting forth his view under the ideal that everyone should be heard, he is saying that perhaps Google’s diversity policy should be put on hold until everyone is heard. There is nothing radical about this ideal; it is a very democratic and American ideal, liberal as well as conservative.

How about Ms. Brown? Her decision has already been made. The judgement of the diversity manager is that he is “promoting incorrect assumptions about gender”.  Is that really true? It kind of sounds to me that it is the diversity manager that is promoting assumptions that are not true, namely, that the dude is promoting incorrect assumptions. But as Lyotard noted,by what ground shall we legitimate either of these discourses?

Nevertheless, this (his, the Manifesto) incorrect assumption is one that Google does not endorse, and indeed is why he ended up fired.

I don’t think there is a better indication where this world of ours is headed: Nationalism is on its way out; Corperatism is in. Democratic ethics is no longer the standard but is indeed being commandeered by corporate policy, policy that will decide what is ethical for the future.

Just from a (fair) neutral position: I am curious what exactly his manifesto says that is an incorrect assumption about gender. Are we not allowed any more to suggest that men and women are different? I thought in the discussion about race, at least, we are supposed to embrace difference, acknowledge difference and not be blind to color of skin and cultural expression. Any considerate and intelligent person is left to wonder why difference in gender is not to be acknowledged and embraced? Don’t we do that when we fuck?

In the corporate world we do not fuck each other, we fuck other companies. Competition defines the space of ethics; a meta-narrative of ethics does not yet define an umbrella space of companies. Difference, it seems, is not to be abided in the consideration of the workers value: Only the overt potential involved in the equality and sameness of human beings in general is to be considered in the place of production. The ability to produce is the standard, and we, as corporate subjects, cannot afford the inefficiency that can arise in the a priori classification of workers ability: All workers are equal in the potential to produce. That is the (post-) modern ground of ethics.

What do we have? We have the very postmodern condition coming to fruition. The Manifesto Man speaks of a Google echo chamber. What could be a better description of his very condition: He is speaking about a kind of ethical space that we all know of, but because the our existential condition (for lack of a better term here), the ethical condition that is the liberal agenda of freedom and equality that has been with us for at least 200 years, he cannot be heard, indeed will not be heard. Knowledge no longer exists as some source  or conduit for access into an essential and ideal ground for ethics; knowledge now is determined along lines of which knowledge is valid, and so which knowledge is able to be heard. Lyotard puts it in terms of which knowledge is efficient. The Manifesto Man is speaking, and we all (but do we?) know what he is meaning, where he is drawing his knowledge from, but it is mute. Such knowledge is invalid: It is no longer a kid of knowledge that is included in what is valuable. The ‘experts’ have agreed and they have decided.

*

What better description of this world: carnival. And as well: dialectical. So what happens after? The discussion by two or more people is shut down and the discussion continues as if in an echo chamber, which is to say, the movement merely occurs and everyone just rides along, regardless of what sound is made. The Dialectic continues but under a new semantic rubric that is understood to not be new. Indeed; there is an irony occurring. For, while the point I make in my recent essay about ‘the event of the past’  and Zizek being naive, I find that around the same time (well, relatively speaking I suppose, lol) I was writing that post, Zizek himself was in Spain speaking about how he was going to proceed as naive (listen to the youTube above).

In this sense, we find a certain psychoanalytical significance to what is occurring at Google, but in the context of addiction as well. The naive subject has a voice that is always heard in the context of the times as a political voice, able to bring change to the world, in various potentialities, at various moments. But what occurs is that voice is automatically referred to a context that is outside of the communicative potential of the subject: She speaks, but it is as if in an echo chamber. The dialectical subject of ethics speaks of justice, but her voice resonates only in its own space, the sound that is heard in reality is offensive and indeed (now) incorrect, and actually promoting assumptions that no longer reflect what is true, except in as much as this echoing voice affirms the present justice; the past has been changed. As Zizek describes in his book “Event” determined by the facticity of the past itself, the present act alters the very condition by which it has come about to reflect the actuality of the present moment.

**

The addict in his cups is not privy to the change; she is determined by her past as she works to keep the past constituent to that ideal and dialectical moment. The addict sees the material as being unchangeable and essential, and ideal world or “musts” and “is’s”. Reality never breaks into the Imagined world to disrupt it and the addict stays in her echo chamber yelling for someone to hear her. But the world only hears a sound that no longer reflects the true of reality. The two exist within a dialectical moment that is denied for the purpose of asserting a justice that is already occurring, indeed has been occurring, albeit, to challenge the past which determined the criteria by which such justice has been ascertained.

Time behaves atemporally, as witnessed not only by Lyotard 40 some years ago, but in the movie “Fight Club” some 25 years ago:

This is no figure of speech, metaphor, or interesting artistic juxtaposition. It is the actual psychoanalytical situation that occurs.

(This clip is just so perfect ! lol)

Zizek and the Event of the Past: Part 2.

AMOREINOBLOG commented in part one and asked me a question, the answer to which, I think helps clarify what Im saying in the original post. So I am posting it here.

Please comment.

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AMORINOBLOG: “I find this post really interesting. But I need clarification, because I’d like to defend Zizek vis-a-vis the quotes you gave. But I understand where you are coming when you say “discursive gymnastics”, so rather than be a mindless sycophant for Zizek, I need to understand more about why you say his discourse is breaking down here. Is it because he’s just stretching how much the psychoanalytic theory really applies to reality? It seems to me he is definitely being metaphorical to a certain extent. For example, with the Event changing the past- its just a more complex version of “who controls the past, controls the future”. Or is it the apparent lack of self-awareness about the metaphorical aspect of this discourse?”

LANDEK: I am not exactly sure where your quote comes from, but I feel Ive heard it before and with my understanding of Z Id say it is similar. That being said, there is little that Zizek says that doesn’t come right around into everything else he says; it doesn’t really matter what occasion is presented to him. Also; I think I could agree that he evidences a certain ‘lack of self awareness’, but Im not sure what you mean by metaphorical. Could you elaborate on what you mean there?

There a lot going on in your question, I will try to be specific and brief but Im not sure how well I am able to stick to that ideal. Lol.

First off, I should admit that I am a sort of Zizekist. lol.

Second; Id have to admit that Im sure there are other instances of this ‘breach of protocol’ throughout Zizek.

Third; Id have to ask, how familiar with Zizek are you and have you read “Event”? You don’t have to answer that, but that’s the first thing that comes to mind, because I might naturally refer to things that are native to his ideas.

Second Third; I would have to ask into psychoanalysis. I think that Z uses a certain kind of vagueness in using this term, but he wont deny it; the cool thing about Zizek is that there is really no ‘getting one over on him’ because hes got an answer for everything. And he knows it; I think there is no comment that can be made about his work (his philosophy, critical theory, discourse, etc..) that he has not accounted for in his work itself somewhere. So see that my post concerns this aspect of him: That so far there really isn’t anything that one can successfully argue against what he says because hes already got an answer for why his discourses say what they do. It’s a kind a intrisicity. My answer to this second question is that it is this intrinsic and innate aspect to Zizek that defines what he means by psychoanalysis, and also in the sense that I have of him (and it).

See that he is not talking about Lacan; he is not merely saying again or putting forth some belief he has of Lacan. Zizek accounts for this in various places: He is using Lacan psychoanalysis to position himself, to gain a footing for what he has to say, which is, quite ironically, quite coordinate with Freudian and Lacan psychoanalysis.

I am not a scholar of Lacan or Freud, btw, but I know a little bit, enough to be able to read through Zizek to Lacan and Freud. Again, Zizek is using Lacan’s theory, but he is not expressing what Lacan was saying exactly: He is expressing what Zizek has to say.

Likewise, Zizek is not ‘speaking Hegelanese’; he is using Hegel. He is speaking Zizek.

This is the point of why he uses these discourses: Because together they, the three of them, their discourse, indicate a certain condition of discourse in its totality. To be brief: This is what I call the ZLH scaffolding, for which I am comfortable in replacing with psychoanalysis.

Yet also this is why he wants to make the argument about how the event changes the past even while the unchangeable (and transcendent) past remains unchanged: Because this is the condition that he finds himself within, this is the bearing of his discourse, how his discourse comes about. He is speaking only the truth, yet the truth is contingent upon there having been a condition whereby he could be Zizek: Two basic conditions are Hegel and Lacan. The truth then is not stable, it is developed in the event that is Zizek coming upon discourse in the manner that he does, such that he can only express his subjectivity through those conditions, conditions which he argues from as he is changing them.

The issue is that psychoanalysis is and is not a theory. It is in so much as he references it; it isn’t in as much as it is indeed describing the situation at hand.

I am saying that if we can understand the totality that Zizek is expressing at every juncture, then for him to be able to reach outside of it to say that the ‘act’ in a general human sense – that is to suggest that he is talking about all human beings – changes the past which allows for the event itself, he has then made a metaphysical statement, a statement that shows that psychoanalysis is no longer in operation for that moment and has been transformed, right at that moment, briefly, so he can quickly dodge back into the psychanalytic a moment later. It is not that he is not allowed to do this, though; it is that psychoanalysis does not admit this.

Usually Zizek stays comfortably right in the psychoanalytic, using every occasion to speak about himself and his condition. But right at that moment, the moment where he reaches outside to admit that there is another human being(s), but one who thus falls into his psychoanalytic as an agent who is also subject to a psychoanalytical condition that is not Zizek’s and yet is, right there he opens up his discourse to critique that cannot be repaired back into the totality that is the psychanalytic method without admitting that psychoanalysis is merely another theory, and thus not reflecting a totality, but merely an opinion that is partial.

The reason why this is important is because Zizek is the subject of psychoanalysis that exists within a space that is excluded in its inclusion (Parallax). To suggest that his condition is repeated for all human beings is simply not true; it is not repeated in every human subject in the multiplicity of subjective possibility; it is repeated in non-philosophical objectivity. The simple fact is that for psychoanalysis, contingency is not a real aspect, it is a symbolic and imaginary aspect. Yet, he is suggesting that a pure past is contingent upon the act. Anything that is contingent is real; all anyone has to do is reflect upon their own experience: I am not a metaphysician nor ‘believe’ that metaphysical speculations approach truth, but it does not take a genius to look around and see that everyday, throughout the day, we make choices upon definite situations. If there is a psychoanalysis that accounts for experience, then we understand that choice (the act, or choice-act) is determined by the condition in which it arises, totally. And that to view choice as an aspect of contingency is to admit the reality of the greater human species of individual human beings that all behave through the same basic mechanisms, albeit individually, essentially: Thus psychoanalysis in the theoretical sense, but not in the total sense.

From my window, Zizek is using the situation that is naturally (commonly) excluded through the theory of psychoanalysis; this is to say, he is betting that no one will look at crucial moments, and no one will see when he must ‘suspend’ his true and total psychoanalytical situation for the theoretical one.

Zizek usually does not let such contradictions lay; that is, if they are noticed.

 

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Im not entirely sure what this option below does, but please try to use it. And then tell me what happens 😉

Zizek and the Event of the Past.

In his book “Event”, the chapter section ‘Connection 5.2’, Slavoj Zizek, in his usual manner of changing the stakes of the game in the middle of the game, discusses what he notes Delueze calls the “pure past”.

I think Zizek kind of fails at this attempt (at least we can safely excuse Delueze’s ‘Zennnnnnnnnnnn Ohhmmmmm’ descriptions for being too close to the Event). And this is significant because Zizek is famous for keeping his juggling balls in the air; I think he dropped one.

(around page 126)

…”eternal pure past which fully determines us itself subjected to retroactive change.”

“This perhaps, is the ultimate meaning of the singularity of Christ’s incarnation: it is an act which radically changes our destiny. Prior to Christ, we were determined by Fate, caught in the cycle of sin and its payment, while Christ’s erasing of our past sins means precisely that his sacrifice changes our virtual past and thus sets us free”

“…the real task of Caesar is to become worthy of the events he has created to embody.”

“…a kind of folding back of the condition onto the given it was the condition for: While the pure past is the transcendental condition for our acts, our acts do not only create new actual reality, they also retroactively change this very condition. “

First of all: When does this happen? I say, it doesn’t happen for everyone, that it only happens for some people. Explanation, even if it makes sudden sense to many people, does not ‘make it happen’ to them. It may allow them to deeply ponder the possibilities, but it doesn’t ‘make it happen’. More on that later.

Here (the quotes) is one moment where Zizek is just about losing it, has really no argument to make and such ‘fudges’ discourse to ‘push’ out a meaning. It really is discursive gymnastics, but this time he didn’t nail the landing. But it’s Zizek, so he can do those things and people just oooo and aaaa.

He is saying nothing there: He is putting out and taking away as if there is some residue of substance that remains in the motion.

The pure past as a condition which exists as a transcending condition which determines outcomes (eternally, atemporally), that actually places acts in the non-transcending reality, becomes changed by the very act of the act taking place as an act.

Sounds profound. But when one considers what it can mean as a possibility, which is to say, if we bring the meaning of the statement(s) into a field of meaning to try and have it compare to what is occurring in our consideration of it, it is actually saying that there is no ‘pure past’, or that the very notion of the ‘pure past’ that occurs in this way is utterly theoretical, and unconditional by its very nature (it is transcendent). We have to wonder then how we are even able to come to any understanding at all of what that can mean, since if the pure past is transcendent to the situation of the act, then how in the act can there ever have been a condition which transcends it? Only in a partial reality, one that defies Zizek’s psychoanalysis, can there be an aspect of something which transcends that same something.

We have only to conclude that we have found the opposite of what Z says earlier of the philosophical police that he talks about earlier: We are not in the business of finding where ‘nothing’ has been committed, in the effort to find the proponent of totality.

Our effort here is to find out where that totality has been breached, where ‘nothing’ is being posited as ‘actually something’. He has made an error by conflating his philosophical psychoanalytic with real (impossible) determinations. He has come upon an overt instance where, for his discourse to have weight, a totality and partiality must intertwine; so, where his psychanalytic is the situation of totality, he must be able to bridge totality into partiality in philosophical discourse. The problem here is that the only way he can do it is to resort to the transcendental aspect by which partiality is able to be partial; this is to say, he must leave his total psychanalytic world and admit that it is not a totality. In most of his discourses he does well at translating what is inherently partial (symbolic, imaginary) into what how it is not only real (unattainable and impossible to estimate or transcribe) but true (the description of the total system); his philosophy is that his Lacanese phychoanalysis can account for the totality in partial terms, which is to say he proposes to be speaking of reality but as well and most pertinent, all of human reality; this is his cultural theoretical part. But, in the effort here to describe how acts change the condition of past determinations, he has stepped too far out into the partial world that it becomes noticeable; the suturing, the discursive stitches can be seen.

We might come upon this view when we consider that we are not caught in an illusion of any sort, that from the psychoanalysis point of view, we come upon subjectivity through a total sense which designates as it marks off, coordinates as it distinguishes, every aspect of what we call reality. In this, we know what the past, present and future is, if only by mere convention.

Consider what Z is presenting here and what he is attempting to show. The Event, in this case, is the case of subjectivity as it has a past that determines the field of contingency which shows up in a life a reality. He is trying to show or describe that the past is changed as a necessary element of its constitution for a present subjectivity, and that this change is an Event, that this is what an event is. He is attempting this feat in light of what is usually understood as temporal order. The regular uncritical version of things is that events are understood laid down and fixed in their place, they occur and become manifested against the contingency of the present which occurs mediated through choice-act. Choice is commonly understood to fix variability into a specific and unchangeable state. The manner by which we go about life is that we make choices upon fixed situations, and these choices determine the condition of ‘future presents’ upon which choices will be then made.

Zizek, as usual, is disturbing this notion. He is saying that the act of choosing does more than determine a set of conditions for the future; he is saying that present acts change the past even while the past remains fixed in its determination, that the act (of choosing) also changes the condition of the past whereby we have a decision to make. In short, he is positing a blatant totality as partial, which is a weak move in one sense, and negating of the psychoanalytic he wields so well.

That is contradictory. If we are to remain in the true telling of a total reality (what Zizek does so well), we would like to be able not to notice blatant, unresolvable contradiction. What Zizek has done is presented us with such a contradiction and then fails to resolve or resituate it like he is famous for. He merely states the same contradiction in various ways, but he cannot get beyond the quite stubborn condition that the only way you can change an unchangeable state is to talk about a different state. Zizek is a master of transformation; the only way he can transform this particular state is to deny it, to use a smudging of discourse to appear like he is not merely saying outright that ‘here is another contradiction that I am resolving’; his talent is in showing us and thus transforming a state into a different state. Here, Zizek has merely used different phrases to show us that one and two are mutually exclusive but while saying that they are uniformly intersectional and interdependent. That is hardly the level of what we usually expect from Zizek and, frankly, clumsy and premature. But some situations cannot be glossed over, even by an expert glassier like Slavoj.

Good try.

A Bit Comment well into Zizek’s “Event”: The case for philosophical divergence.

from my notes:
Absolute knowledge?

Not that everything is madness, as we live through a sort of illusion, rather, that ‘normality’, the reign of reason, is a self-annihilation of madness.
In the same way as the rule of law is the self-annihilation of a crime.

Politics crime= totalitarianism.

Philosophical crime = totality.

(91) There is an [overdetermination] straight line from philosophy to politics [conventional reality]:
• The task of the philosophical police is to discover from philosophical books that a political crime will be committed.
• The philosophical police goto philosophical symposiums to detect proponents of totality.
o They try to detect those about to deconstruct the religious and moral foundation of our societies.
o “universal(ized) crime is no longer a crime – it sublates (negates or overcomes) itself as crime and turns from transgression into a new order”(91) [Idempotence]
♣ crime is essentially a moral situation [is there a teleological suspension?…]
♣ ‘property is theft’
o the external opposition is transformed into the opposition, internal to the transgression itself, between particular transgressions and the absolute transgression which appears as its opposite, as the universal Law. (92)
♣ ex: a marriage without love is already a divorce
• true adultery is not to copulate outside marriage, but to have sex within marriage without love.
o Simple adultery is a violation from outside, while marriage without love violates from inside.

And my comment:

The significance to be found here is in the very conception itself, for similarly, it would be a violation of natural law to conceive without conception. Hence we return from philosophical honesty and direction back into, what we properly may call, conventional philosophy that wishes to apply a certain conception without conceiving first the situation at hand, which is, that there is and has been a violation in the ‘natural order of things’ in some investments and applications of conception itself.

What we mean by this must then be told outright: This is not game of argument, not an appropriation of meaning actively and with intension made upon conceptions that already existed as objects to be appropriated along a particular correct manner of ‘Being-there’, or as an object to manipulate. The obscenity arises in so much as we might have to tell people that we had no baby there already upon which we can now experiment. It is nearly ridiculous if it were not so serious and life-threatening (in as much as the response to such an ethical breach is to kill the perpetrator (in old times) but at least to incarcerate them) that we must appeal to that ‘natural philosophical order’ that would behave as if the baby was already there, that no conception was needed, or that the conception could take place in a sort of ‘baby factory’ or someplace other than the center of reproduction that is the site of conception itself. And the further absurdity comes when we indeed have to tell them this, that their conception is unnatural [the universal is the ethical], because for them it is the most natural thing that could occur: They simply do not, indeed, are incapable of grasping what is ‘not ethical’ in this sense!

This is why we need to clean up what we typically generalize into ‘philosophy’; we need to begin to talk about what philosophy is doing and specifically what applications particular moments of philosophy can be used for. Because right now we have a bunch of people (of letters, money and institution) talking through and over one another and oblivious to what one another is saying.

Take the example of the Zizek/Harman talk.

I think the most telling example of what I am saying in my post here occurs toward the end, when Harman says to Zizek (I can’t seem to find the time marker, sorry — so I paraphrase) “I don’t think we mean the same thing when we say ‘reality'”.

This is interesting, for I think I have a pretty good baring on Zizek and Harman and I would say that they really are meaning the same thing with the term ‘reality’. For Zizek, the Event that he frames through his book “Event” is a disruption of the Symbolic Order by the Real, a radical break in the continuity of sense that is the Symbolic polemical structure, but also a terrifying confrontation, and intersection, if you will, of the Imaginary with its distanced other, a meeting of sorts between what is the Imaginary world (with all its Symbolic scaffold structure) and its ‘imagined’ reflection. The Real is that which, as he says somewhere, occupies the spaces in between the polemical structures, yet identified in the withheld imaginary reflection.

The simplistic ontology of Harman is summed up in “real objects withdraw from sense”. Now, to me, this sounds like the same thing as Zizek. Granted, all the details that Harman may wish fill into the withdrawn area (how is Harman able to know what is withdrawn if it withdraws from sense? is the typical question) will inevitably fill out the difference between them, but this is exactly the kind of difference that I think Harman won’t allow, and indeed cannot see.

But also, we can notice the whole of the discussion. Aside from personal demeanor and style, if we entertain a certain view, we can see that Zizek is being strategic in his comments, while Harman is playing more to the strength of his theoretical position an opinions. While it appears that Zizek is answering the various questions by the mediator and Harman himself, it becomes pretty obvious that Zizek neatly avoids answering the direct questions and instead gives answers that really, often enough, if one is being attentive, route the listener back into questioning the basis of the question itself. But I think Zizek knows this tendency of himself (maybe not), and so really tends to hold back, often in mid-sentence and thought,from the direction of his response, and change what he was really going to say, because it seems, or one gets the impression at least, the first response would either bring into question the arena itself (which them shuts down all discussion) or directly implicates the questioner as well as the colleague (Harman) to their faulty position (which directly brings into question the Event of their discussion, of why it is even occurring).

What we have there is an example of two philosophers who are not communicating. Harman does not really understand Zizek, but thinks he does, and Zizek has fully accounted for Harman but is not allowed (ethically) to let on that this is the case.

It is easy to get offended in this kind of analysis, but it is just this kind of offense that keeps philosophy in its ‘institutional whole’, and misses the productivity that could occur if only we had an open way to allow our philosophical egos to be hit and not respond with denial and obstinacy, but respond with acceptance and thus be able to approach the tasks at hand in a coordinated division of labor (as opposed to a sport of oppositional competition where we are never really sure if we have gotten anywhere even after the victor takes her laps). 3003_pia20521_16x9

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The Significant Event: The Romance, Irony and the Veto.

Significance. What we can call the Romance is based upon and or around what I call the significant experience, which falls well in line with Alain Badiou’s ‘Event’, what could then be called the significant event. The irony that surrounds this feature of being human concerns a confusion of the individual, between what arises of the pure multiple and such Event. This confusion is being worked out as we speak; its ways, immanent. Its formulation has been established by Badiou in the distinction pronounced by ‘void’ and ‘set’, but more particularly, more humanly, the pronunciation’s initial voice is heard through Francois Laruelle and non-philosophy, as this divergence, that which is signaled by irony, is located in the distinction that has found and described the motions of philosophy, what I feel is more correctly termed ‘conventional methodology’ or just ‘convention’. The distinctive move that has been signaled, as referenced here through philosophy, can be noticed lately in the works loosely coined as ‘existentialism’ and ‘post-modernism’, but most recently ‘speculative realism’; so appropriately begun in the real, taking reality ‘into’ its object for what it is and what possibility it holds, such speculation thus calls for its counterpart, as I frame, that is specifically not real, since it is this feature of and in response to the philosophical (sticking here with the non-philosophical designation) reality, that works to deny that which originates in the Event.

The Romance is this evental feature of human experience by which we have the conventional historical designation of Romanticism or the Romantic Period or Era, and by which, so apropos to convention, we likewise have the real disclaimer that has reduced and conflated the period and human experience to one of mere caprice, of usual passionate undependability, fantasy and a specifically derogatory mode of irrationality that decries as it celebrates conventional methodology’s victory in placing the human so far from itself as the free individual for the purpose of maintaining the status quo of the teleo-ontological fortress of religio-ideological power. So compete in the assertion of itself, the conventional romantic designation flaunts its power through accentuating the discrepancy by calling what is Romantic ‘subjective’ diversity and uniqueness of individual creative and emotional freedom; though there may have been such an era, it was indeed because of the ubiquity of the true reality. We need not go into the exploitation and oppression that is the capitalization upon the discrepancy here, but suffice it to say that reality itself is romantic, whereas the Romance, a particular significant experience involving an actualization of relationship with the world, has been historically shanghaied into servitude and keelhauled under the dreadnought of historical progress — the now ‘fractalized’ Hagelian History the individualized romance of willful self determination upon the seas of manifest destiny. This is reality; it is not that people are or were having similar experiences — of the pure multiple they indeed do, and that within a particular universal horizon. It is more that such experience, by virtue of being human, may connote an individual of reality in the manner that is reducible in the same way that Badiou describes the situation of being and event, which is to say that the real individual misses the irony of Its existence for the sake of the True Object of its faith. This is not to disclaim in the effort to eject the human being from the helical oscillation upon which history makes its claim to progress, but rather to introduce to suggest that while progress is a situation of reality, the progress of reality is misconstrued in the conventional reckoning of history.

*

The significant event is singular, but the nature of its significance brings all subsequent experience under or within its scope; thus the attempt to explain what this experience is or was becomes not only an ironic experience but indeed irony, for the multiple by then necessarily falls into the originating experience and becomes a singular experience — though it ‘becomes’ only in as much as it is always becoming multiple and singular in the same move due to the originating experience informing all experience. So I repeat, this occurs in the explaining of the event, but not so much in the explaining what the event means or meant, again, because the explaining of the event cannot become dismissed, overcome or otherwise detach from what the event means as the event serves to give significance to the subsequent multiple that is real life or of lived experience, that falls back and or has fallen into singularity.

Oddly, it is in the explaining of the meaning of the significant event that develops theory, rationalization (see below), as a proxy, as a way of distancing oneself from the Event because its significance as the Event, defies reality, and reality is where we all begin as an individual, our faith invested in reality. Hence we can speak of Soren Kierkegaard’s ‘sickness unto death’, ‘offense’ and ‘sin’. When one attempts to explain what the event means or from what it means or meant, then he becomes stuck in an eternal decision of how he might go about situating the meaning of what for real determinations is the eternal moment — a redundancy, a stalemate, where the ‘point of insertion’ into reality cannot be determined — that requires a type of break which will move the in-decision past its incubation into a specific topical discourse which then might become the identity of the individual. Yet the conventional methodologists will need no break for they are already invested by the break itself, that which is the offense in discrepancy, in the suture that is the effect of faith, which supplies the True Object and where discourse is about asserting proper meaning of that reality. Theirs has to do with the prevalent veto that is choice, in the particular presence that says ‘no’. That which requires a break is not the requirement for a ‘leap’ as Master Kierkegaard has termed, but rather its opposite; such a break relieves one of in-determination, necessity, which is to say, the relief is the contingency that is choice, whereas the leap is of necessity.

By contrast, yet with consistency, what one could call a ‘pocket veto’ appears in the potential of the significant event to be able to make or be the qualifying break; the pocket veto appears as something one has available for choice, to use for the purpose of stopping the reduction that will bring meaning to the significance that is the eternal moment that thus necessitates the leap, and so be able to bring what is otherwise impossible into the discourse of reality despite it not being necessary. The conventional veto rallies against the Event, where as the pocket veto enacts the instrumentality of decision once the significant event has taken hold. For it is as if within the Romance of the significant event the person has ‘held out’ on it, as if carrying something in his pocket, that though the experience may be a motion of love, the question always remains: “Is this real?” But indeed, if this discourse is any indication, it is at least ironic, for the answer one finds reveals whether the veto was ever truly in the pocket or not. This then defines the paradigm of bad faith; that which was in good faith considering the other party was already compromised for what contingency may arise to change the stakes of the original deal.

This essay concerns how the pocket veto allows for a way to describe the situation of the Event, as well as creating an opening to eventually describe the Romanitc Experience itself.

For we have two situations of the event, but really three. One where no pocket veto is ever needed, having the tool of veto readily at hand, and one where a pocket veto may be applied. But these two situations then show that they still are dealing in reality with reality, as theory is the distancing of oneself from the experience. Yet this is not a necessary discounting. Being that there is a necessary principle at work, all elements of the universe must belong to that principle. What this principle is exactly is the discrepancy between contingent and necessary aspects as such, which is also the discrepancy between the object and the talk about it, as well as the relations of particular thoughts (see my earlier essays); Quentin Meillassoux, in his book, “After Finitude” does an excellent job at describing this situation, in particular as it has to do with the object itself. So in as much as these admitted operations indeed operate, it is no problem that two apparently distinct and even opposing routes based upon the same discursive substrate, the same ‘meaningful issue’, would co-operate in-dependently to reveal its object and even say different things from the same orientation.

We have then the framework by which the dual nature of the discourse that has been called ‘philosophy’ may be apprehended. To bring in Alain Badiou’s formulations; on one hand, we have the philosophers of the multiple who are attempting to describe the One Reality of the True Object, so to speak, that I call ‘conventional methodologists’, and on the other we have the philosophers who are involved with the significant event.

The conventionalists (Francois Laruelle’s philosophers, the ‘objectours’ of philosophy) we will leave to their ‘philosophy of…’ methods.

For the philosophers (my use) of course, we need discover what might need a veto, and this concerns how irony might come about, and this concerns the significant event.

*

What occurs in the significant romantic experience? A feeling of privilege and or secrecy upon intimate knowledge, one might even say a feeling toward a kind of esoteric mysticism; of being ‘let in’ to some profoundness; of being ‘allowed to make your acquaintance toward a loving relationship’. Now, when I say this, of what am I speaking? Am I not speaking of every possible experience? I am speaking of one particular experience, but in what way does it not speak of every experience? The profoundness of some ‘private’ experience, but also the common experience of the individual in reality; loving as an intimacy and loving as a basic position by which one ‘has’ an arena to act, whether one would call it ‘mystical’ is really a preference of the moment, yet in so much as we could say one ‘loves’ by virtue of the fact that there is a relationship that cannot be overturned, we can also say one has faith; in reality, here religion leads the way. So, In one move I have described the condition of the particular Event, while also describing all events, and as I attempt to put forth the unique situation the move presents the common situation, the humble and the willful.

But what happens in this romance ? The sense of love remains but the feeling goes away, and then comes back, and then goes away. In the Romance it is called repetition; in reality it is called a number of things, a mundane repetition, psychological self fulfilling prophecy, incorrect appraisal of the situation, spiritual motion, karma, magic, physical resonance, coincidence; I could go on. What is occurring? Significance. The meaning of the event in reality. On one hand, the ‘setting’ of a pure multiple within the context of the pure multiple, sets of sets. A ‘cordoning off’ of meaning to sets of meaning allows for one event to have more or less significance than another, and thus have significance. One the other hand, the event of the significant romantic experience is being ‘found’ at particular moments of the multiple, which is to say, in reality. Reality can thereby be understood as a sequence or as the arena where significance occurs, but by this designation also as the ordination of fidelitous subsequence, or that which must be not real.

For the conventional philosophers of the One Reality there are True Objects and the role of these philosophers is to be able to discern what the true nature of the ‘grand’ object called reality is. It does not matter if they suggest multiple realities or multiple universes or how they situate terms; their faith begins and ends in the True Object, in the absolutely particularized pure multiple that begins, progresses and culminates in real truth. These philosophers see theory as coming from or being about the true reality. Significance comes at moments of proper arrangement of objects, of particular situations of meaning, such as reading and studying and then coming upon an ‘ah ha!’ moment, and these significances as a matter of course are then coordinated into what is called theory, a willful assertion of appropriated facts about objects.

Hence the philosophers of the significant event thus far deal in irony, but the issue overall has been the confusion that arises in the development of theory. To wit; the former philosophers are dealing with the true object and the latter are dealing with the significant experience. It is only now that the division that is just due is taking shape. Yet, as was just mentioned above and consistent with non-philosophy, the confusion has arisen because the philosophy of the true object is the ‘greater’ vehicle, it is the discourse of power, the discourse that stems from the One Reality, that is the designation of the ‘proper’ meaning of terms. This is historical, traditional, ideological and political as it has to do with a specific ontological and ethical horizon. Non-philosophy is a blatant announcement of the division and brings into relief what the post-modernists (Deluze, Derrida, Foucault, to name three biggies) could not bring to sway; to wit, their move was inherently conventional, that is, not so concerned with the Event itself as they were its meaning. They were still attempting to account for the significant event in the One reality, as the philosophy of the true object was not seen for its stature and unrelenting power; or, they capitulated to its power because they were already invested in it for human identity, they still thought reality could be changed into something less dishonest and more human, an offering and a withholding – which is to say now of something withheld, something not real – and at that because they were inspired; they could not introduce the significant event because the One reality demands that the significant event must fall under the domain of the pure multiple, and thus be not so significant — but at least it could be a type of psychological ‘malady’ or maybe ‘form’ if it were not posed with strategy, in tactical guise of particular manipulations of terms, in short, if it were not posed in theory. So we are lead to ask how it might be that someone so disturbed or ‘not living in reality’ came to have such an effect on real discourse? That such a person could have developed such a good theory?

Hence, its significance. It is exactly this theory that does not hold water, for their theoretical position occurs only in conventional reality. Theory is supposed to be an argument, a proof for a proposal of truth, as the proposal is merely a part of coming to the truth of the True Object through negotiation; it is supposed to be a surmising of the facts in a proposal for their unitary meaning to be critiqued accorded to the relative information allotted to each critically thinking individual who are also involved in the common universal effort for the ‘whole’. Theory is not supposed to be a ‘costume’. So irony describes the situation of belonging instead of including by exclusion and confounds conventional reality. So it is that which is most honest is thus taken by convention with a pinch of salt, a skeptical eye suspecting bluff, and at times called out for its dishonesty, if not plain nonsense. if much of post-modernist theory is any indication – check out the post-modern generator website (if it still exists) – one can easily tell that conventional philosophers really had no clue what was being told. The meaning of ‘original’ post-modern/existentialist writers was taken most seriously in its capacity to hold an object for its truth, and soon enough the ‘theory’ that was being produced by the adherents of the proper method (Laruelle’s ‘philosophers’) based upon the significance that rides through conventional reality despite itself resounded with utter nonsense. This can be said to be due to the fact that there is indeed a discrepancy between what is real from what is true, that reality’s pure multiples are ‘really set’ upon a situation undisclosed to the situation of infinite sets, which should show, for conscious experience, the fidelity to the true object of coordinated sets that are romantic in various significant situations that I call conventional reality, distinct from the true fidelity that marks the void in and by ordinate subsequence, or, the significant event that I have called the Romance — but distinct in a non-philosophical manner, which Francios Laruelle has termed as a unilateral duality, one which includes and one which belongs.

The almost polemical move of ‘speculative realism’ from what could be called traditional philosophy, as well as traditional philosophy itself, both occur in reality, about real objects, whereas what is ironic, or as indicative of the counter-partial move of what is not real, is the dual move from reality. Due to the necessity of the motion of contingency in reality, the speculative and the ironic appear to reveal a necessary element or feature that is unknown or at least uncomfortable to conventional reality. Irony upsets the endeavor for the True Object, so it is not difficult to see how conventional methodology would tend away from its tellings; it holds a tentative truce with irony, setting it to a type of spiritual psychology it doesn’t enjoy, one that brings it to have to assert is power for ubiquity, urgently revealing as it does so its nervousness steeped in bad faith. Yet while Speculative Realism announces its divergence from traditional philosophy, its way is still conventional, it is still attempting to alleviate the risk of exposure of the Romance by its resorting to what is romantic; hence it is ‘speculative’. Yet it is close; its difference lay in the significant event, and may yet be an indication of where or how such a pocket veto may come into play.

*

Significance occurs in three, what I shall call, venues. In my essay “the description of irony”, I discuss these but I will elaborate more here.

Events can be significant. Getting married, having children, graduating from school, meeting someone, avoiding an accident, etc… Any event may have significance. Real experience is segregated into meaningful situations, each with more or less significance. Reality is a pure multiple of attainable sets, where any set can be divided into an infinite amount of sets, and any series of sets can be a set. Infinity likewise becomes a multiple that can be placed into sets of various sorts. Like a divine lotus flower, reality unfolds, emerges, arises and falls, like an active chaotic Mandelbrot set of fractal imagery. Most people have experience and understanding that can be described and explained analogous to this type of significance, to significance that can be described with reference to such chaos and complexity, as such simple and straightforward explanation can comprise and account for reality. But the ‘incorrection’ of this type of patterning of significance is found – if I may stay consistent with the Eastern theme I have touched upon here – in the assertion of will; so much that this very statement reveals its conventionality in double, in the same way the notion of karma is seen as meaning purpose, but one that arises as one asserts oneself, ones desire for things in the very event that arose due to choices made within an essentially free universe.

Hence the difference between the event(s) of the pure multiple and the Event from which the multiple may arise in fidelity is one of significance.

*

In ‘The Analysis of the Mysterium’, chapter 5 of his book “The Idea of the Holy”, Rudolf Otto describes the situation:

“Representations of spirits and similar conceptions are rather one and all early modes of ‘rationalizing’ a precedent experience…They are attempts…to guess the riddle it propounds, and their effect is at the same time always to weaken or deaden the experience itself. They are the source from which springs, not religion, but the rationalization of religion, which often ends by construing such a massive structure of theory and such a plausible fabric of interpretation, that the mystery is frankly excluded.”

His point is to get to how it is that we come to a category of ‘holy’, but my take I think he missed.

Here, the ‘precedent experience’ can be similar to an event, any event of experience, but here let’s say the significant event, the Romantic experience. We approach from a certain manner for discussion here: What is it? Otto would say that it is of the mysterium, of awe-fullness. So what is it? I say: it is only what becomes of the discourse that surrounds it, which is to say, itself is nothing.

But it has significance. The significance leaves itself to the discourse about it such that itself indeed has significance, and this is to say, the event itself is denied for the sake of the discourse about it so much that the event is the discourse about it. This linking, this suturing, is of faith, conventional faith. Faith allows for the romance to take place, for significant events to arise. But here this is only to suggest that significance motivates the will.

Differentiated from common significance of events is the significant event. Here, what is significant does not resort to individuated, multiple events and remain local or in proximity to them, such as with a first kiss or a coincidence, where discourse would speak specifically about each event and their significances. Here when a significant moment arises it refers to the singular Event, such that each significance is so of and refers to the originating event. This is to say that each significance in reality calls forth the Event so that each event refers to the Event for its significant meaning. The singular becomes multiple so the multiple remains singular. As opposed to real experience that resides in the pure multiple and ‘seeks what it finds’ by including the void in its coordination of sets, the significant experience stems from the void and ‘begins the count’, or establishes the vector, the ordination of subsequence, because such event belongs to the void, and as Alain Badiou might put it, occurs in the evental horizon. Thus one can say that moments of significance should not have ‘more’ significance, but have the ‘same’ significance, each real significant event recalling the originating significance. Hence also, reality does ordain significant events such as birthdays and great holiday vacations, but such significance can be said to be relative to the Event as one knows which has the greater significance and what actually motivates, where the cardinal value arises as a denial of such relation through relative knowledge that we have called ‘correlationalism’, or what is constituted by the pure multiple of the real possibility of coordinated sets. Consistent with real transcendence, the cardinal indicates how value is situated and meaning finds form, and with a nod to Quentin Meillassoux, how reason itself relies and substantiates upon a stable yet undisclosed substrate, which I say is demanding of faith because it is the philosophical object, its objective, the ‘philosopher’s stone’ of reason, and which he says is the ‘necessitarian inference of probabilistic reasoning’ [QM; pg 97]. Again the irony resounds.

The question has to do with this latter area of significance.

We are talking about meaning. Significance concerns meaning. When we say that there is continuing significance as opposed to ‘another’ significant event, we are speaking to the meaning that continues through the various occasions, the various significant events. It is the same meaning in different contexts, showing itself, the same meaning, through different lenses. But usually the Event is not seen in this way; the ‘lenses’, the objects, are not seen as occasions of the Event, but rather as occasions that are ‘filling in’ the object, indicating a progress of knowledge that has to do with a greater knowledge of objects, which is to say, of reality. Recall the transcendent and empirical elements of reality; this latter viewing occurs in oscillating fashion, to the effect of significant revelatory experiences that are leading one along some purpose which is the simultaneous progress of the knowledge of the True Object and the individual of reality.

The True Object and the individual are defined and specific elements of reality; they are identities in contrast (ala Martin Heidegger) to what is the same. They are ‘cordoned off’ in meaning to have real identity. In the same way, significance occurs. Such identities arise from effectively segregational meaning. In reality we build things and take them apart and find how they work and put them back together in different ways to find out what each identity is, and this process is cumulative and culminating such that typically, even when the significance continues through the multiple events, the Event is viewed as a segregate identity, that is, as above (Otto), the precedent experience is kept segregate by the virtue of the faith that is invested in the ability of the term to identify its object. This is why the Event becomes denied in reality; this accounts for why the Romance stays romantic, in the either/or condition, ala Soren Kierkegaard, instead of moving into the Romance that is marriage.

It is the continuing significance that defines how reality is situated in truth, for now we are dealing with the individual for whom events have significance because of the originating Event. This corresponds the individual in reality who comes across the romantic experience. He draws from the mystery into a relationship that would destroy reality; this relationship (for now in speaking) is the Romance. In this real situation the individual is appraising the situation in real terms such that the Romance is such by virtue of an identity with which or whom the individual has a relationship with, but which he also seeks as to its reality. The first question is always, “Is this real?” But because of the initial investment in reality that every individual has, the question of truth is not distinct; the question of truth is a precipitate of the next question playing out in the activity that is real life, which is “what should I do?”, but then as the significance of the Event passes into the terms of reality that seek to bring the meaning of the Event into reality as purpose, again as Otto above, “the mystery is frankly excluded” and the significance of the experience itself falls away, or rather becomes real. It is then sought after and is found again as progress is the investment in objective identity.

If the question “what should I do”, which connotes the meaning of the experience as purpose, is answered, then reality is saved, faith in the True Object is upheld in that the ‘mysterium’ has been solved as purpose. The significant event is set in context as ‘inspiration’, or for a probably better colloquialism, ‘spiritual experience’, but even if the inspiration denies the experience as spiritual, here inspiration itself saves reality. It is when no performable act is conveyed, and no purpose is able to be termed, that reality falters. Doubt is the operative mechanism here, for the present is only presented as ‘path’ in a retrospection that cannot project it out upon the future as ‘a path’ of inspiration; reality is changed.

Hence, what I understand of the ‘pocket veto’ rings a particularly interesting note.

The playing out of the question of reality brings the question of truth and grants thereby in relief the significance of the pocket veto. For we are not talking about the veto as it is held in the pocket; this is indeed the Romance in reality. We are now talking about the veto once it needs be played and if it can be or not. If it can be, then the mystery that has been frankly excluded is conveyed into reality intact as a real item for negotiation, as a proposal, a hypothesis, a theory, that moves reality in its progress as a significant object to be considered. Yet if the veto cannot be played – and this evidences a particular showing of a true polemic of power – then the mystery that is frankly excluded is indeed excluded in reality, which is to say, it is destroyed. And this mystery is exactly the transcendent.

*

END Part 1.

I believe I should leave some bibliography, which will also do for part 2 and if there is a part 3; in fact it could probably serve as a seed biblio for what is to come.

Martin Heidegger. Being and Time, and other essays of his.

Alain Badiou. Being and Event.

Quentin Meillassoux. Beyond Infinity

Francios Laruelle. Principles of Non-Philosophy

Rudolf Otto. The Idea of the Holy

Soren Kierkegaard. The Sickness Unto Death, and, Fear and Trembling

**
For a brief discussion about the Romantic Era – and as a bibliographic site: http://www.historyguide.org/intellect/lecture16a.html

And thank you Dave at Inthesaltmine.com for our continuing interaction, and his coining of the idea of a ‘pocket veto’.