A Bridge which Defines: On Richard Rorty’s very pragmatic interpretation of Gadamer Hermeneutics in his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979)

It is easier to describe what something should be not, then to formulate what something should be, as it is easier to deconstruct then to construct. …

On Richard Rorty’s very pragmatic interpretation of Gadamer Hermeneutics in his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979)

————- If we can take this short synopsis of these two authors as minimally representative of what the two authors say in general, Then what we have there, with Rorty anyways, Is a proposal which allows for the subsequent developments in philosophy of the 90s up till present, as represented by Badiou, Zizek, Laruelle, and even the speculative realists.

The point he describes is a kind of “empty space” that is then elaborated upon by these authors I just mentioned. This empty space can be understood to define two ontological situations, together which constitute what Laruelle calls “unilateral duality”. This unilateral duality posits two conditions that do not reconcile back into another unitive condition, but then also defines the state of each of those conditions.

One condition is exclusion and the other condition is inclusion.

Badiou Likewise considers things in this way, though he doesn’t enjoin with Laruelle at terms.

The one condition, which We can call the conventional route, excludes anything which arises outside of its semantic mandate. Basically, it posits a one reality in which everything exists and of which human beings find out through applying ‘reason’. The one route says that there is nothing that falls outside of the potential for reason; this route is necessarily a systemic route, it posits systems within systems that even extend so far as to imply there’s a grand overreaching system which we may not ever be able to comprehend. The way the exclusive route functions is the reduction and exclusion based of contradiction; it includes only that which constitutes itself in potential. It includes everything that is possible in potential.

The other ontological condition is the one which includes. This ontological condition includes the exclusive condition. The exclusive condition posits the possibility that it includes everything, yet by its own activity is necessarily exclusive to anything that might arise which does not conform to its particular semantic mandate. 

By contrast, The inclusive route includes contradiction as well as that which is exclusive. It is what Laruelle calls “non-philosophy”, in order to allow the exclusive route to lay in what is most common, namely philosophy as a positive method. 

The speculative realists understand and attempt to incorporate or use this ontological feature of non-reduction, non-philosophy, or what The link to post here would define “In contrast”, such that what we have for a new philosophy, what we have on the ‘other side’ of that empty space posited above, is a new manner of philosophy which resides parallel to its counterpart: Unilaterally dual in nature.

But this empty space cannot merely reside in conceptual reason, as the link to post talks about. As he suggests, philosophy must involve something more than just reason, more than just a capacity to think through Aristotle or reductive logic based away from contradiction; it is thus a bridge. 

But we could equally and just as well go back 100 or so years before and say that it is a ladder that then after we climb, or cross, it must be thrown away, or actually it disappears. For once we climb the ladder, once we have gotten to the ‘other side’ of the bridge, there is no incrementally reductive manner of reasoning which will allow us to cross the gap, what Slavoj Zizek knows as “the parallax gap”, And what  Badiou understands as “the void”. There is no way to use language or discourse to communicate how to move accross the gap Because the very foundation of discourse has changed by virtue of what, by all reasonable standards, is not reasonable. This is similar to what Kierkegaard calls a quantitative leap, as opposed to a qualitative leap; it is absurd to the conventional exclusive route of reason.

In short, the conventional philosophy of incremental reductive reasoning is insufficient to realize the full ontological extent of being in the world, which is really being of the world. Just as Heidegger had a real conflict, (Is Nationalist Socialism the actual culmination of history? And do I have an obligation to believe what I reason is so?), an actual breach in the rationale of his Dasien, An interruption which occurred from what is actually real in itself, outside of reason’s ability to conceptualize toward reduction, The fall back into reason had real ontological repercussions which shows that Heidegger’s original proposal of his book “being and time” is faulty. (That is, his philosophy is compromised Because he made the wrong decision, as evidenced by history.)

But the fault is not internal to his philosophy; rather, it is faulty Becuase of how we might be oriented upon what his philosophy is talking about. The fault lay in that there is no inherent truth which is discernible by the Method of reductive philosophical reason into his “being and time”; but the truth of Dasien is reckoned when we see that it is not based in reduction, that is, the centering of thought within the content of history of reductive reason is contradictory in-itself. It is contradiction spelled out ‘long hand’.

As much as the exclusive methodological philosophical route would want to argue that there is an essential truth to be found be a close reading of reason to his book, or any philosophical books really, ultimately the truth of what he is saying can only be found by crossing the bridge, passing over the gap, moving through the void which leaves the reductive method behind to fail in its want and desire to posit any truth found by its method. This is evidenced by any attempt which would want to argue ‘what he is really saying’: We keep discussing and arguing over it anyways.

Yet this failure does not mean that it does not still function. This is the meaning of a unilateral duality: Two Routes which are ontologically necessarily, one which posits philosophical sufficiency, and one which accounts for the truth of the situation.

Badiou’s seminar on Lacan and The Philosophical Hack.

Badiou’s seminar on Lacan

https://doctorzamalek2.wordpress.com/2018/11/26/badious-seminar-on-lacan/
— Read on doctorzamalek2.wordpress.com/2018/11/26/badious-seminar-on-lacan/

One of the next books I’ll be getting. But From the Amazon description, it sounds in line with my long awaited book, “The Philosophical Hack”,which I will be start releasing soon.

The subtitle of my book is “Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Event” and is somewhat a filling out more-or-less what Zizek leaves aside primarily as room for discussion.

Being that I am not a Big Name, Nor have a cohort of thinkers who support my work, I have to start small and consider how best to market my book to reach people Who I know would be interested and indeed would find it compelling, but who might not otherwise give my book a second look.

So, I will be releasing my book in Parts. Part 1 should be available by February 2019, merely 6 months later than anticipated. 🤘🏾

I will keep you posted on the unfolding developments.

The coincidence of knowledge is not a matter of singular reason.

Ray Brassier Social Philosophy.

the REPOST first :

Originally posted on >ect podcast: >ect explores why philosophers are compelled to try to understand the social reality of which philosophy is a part https://soundcloud.com/ectpodcast/ect-9-in-conversation-with-ray-brassier “To really distinguish the ideal and the real is to understand how they are distinguished in practice, and not in thought – in what we do, and not in what…

via >ect 9 In Conversation with Ray Brassier — synthetic zerø

When the Speculative Realism symposium occurred, I think everyone acted like 1950 rock and roll fans. If Zizek is Elvis..

(But this is more on the mark)

then the SR guys were like the Everly Brothers…

Ray Brassier was at both of the Conferences.

Now,

we should not be too unavailable to the whole presentation embedded of these figures and their reception. But when we begin to discount what is occurring here, we are likewise able to have a view.

From the first moment of SR, those philosophers were attempting to put down the popularity. This seems to be because all the hoopla was around another sort of idealism, despite what the SR’s would be saying in their respective philosophies. The reaction to their popularity can be found even in the fact of the authors attempts to dismiss themselves from some a sort of common “philosophical school”. Even as I can say “the SR’s” we should be careful not to lump them into some organized category; each purports to have different views on various topics. But the main thing that organizes (-ed) them is they all felt that there should be a way to get outside of what we know all too well, the “central phenomenal thinker” as this aspect tends toward exclusivity. It is no wonder that they decried their pop-star-lartity.

This ‘new’ idea of getting outside of the central thinker was the right move at the right time, but the manner that they proceeded, and proceed, is and has been a let down overall; a let down to philosophy, that is, but actually really good (in this case, at least) in the area of critical thinking, social structures, and social justice. Though many did or do not realize what happened, the basic fault is that the only way to get outside of the central thinker is to set the issue of the CPT (central phenomenal thinker) aside. As I have said, perhaps we need to begin to be more clear about what philosophy does, is capable of doing, and is allowed to do. Maybe Im splitting hairs, but it seems like Brassier has become less a philosopher and more a critical theorist. He even proposes that it is less ‘thought’ and more ‘practice’; Sounds like he’s falling right in line with Pierre Bourdieu and those other social French.

What this does, or did, was close-in the walls of free thought into the defined parameters of religious theology. Basically, the flattening out of the activity of the mind to a defined category called “thought” announces as it proclaims that every philosophy is basically and universally based in central thinking that will no longer be individualized within a universe of possibility. 700 years ago we would have called this given “the soul”, and even 100 years ago “the spirit”, and argued over not only it’s the stance of quality but indeed how it is supposed to be situated in the truth of the human being and it’s world. Now, the free thought will be organized within a defined limit that we call the universe, as the universe is now defined as the given region where thought occurs over a common category of being called human; this then is suppressed to be given, unnoticed, as an essential substrate no longer addressed, to be enlisted in the common goal of “humanity”, now another defined object amidst a multiplicity of universal objects, a universe of ‘social’ situations. If we never had an actual “humanity”, the SR’s allowed for us to confine our situation to there by begin the long historical process of sterilizing it, commodifying it, to there by establish more thoroughly and definitely its worth as a thing of the (catholic/capitalistic) cosmos; a thing to be used for the purpose of furthering the interest of humanity, or as they would have said 700 years ago, “God’s Plan”.

OK. no problem. If there is a problem then I should hear about it.

*

This then allows us to gain purchase on what Brassier is really talking about.

Pave over the distinction between “appearances” and “reality”. In short, our current moment is occupied by a need to account for random and apparently uncontrolled occurrences. Something is occurring from the “outside” that we have not been able to account for nor control; things like Trump, addiction, climate change, Russia, China, market fluctuations, technological authoritarianism, commercial manipulation, etc..Ray’s lecture is a short theological report of how humanity can come to terms with a freedom that is confined (imposed religion), with the apology that it such a confinement is needed if we are to ethically address these obvious social concerns.

We can’t have thinkers who are really free contaminating the scientific research toward of anarchistic, random fluctuations. We are on a species (special) mission of control.

*

It is at this point that we are able to come upon a significant philosophy. Of course, this is not to discount the need for critical thought and creative solutions for actual social problems. But if you look at the over arcing statement by Ray we have the implications of the discourse that moves towards authoritarianism rather than creativity itself; he says that any philosophy that does not consider it’s route and what is social should not be taken seriously.

Here we have the usual divisional strategies that go along with authoritarianism.

With a layman ear, the ear that most people will hear him through, even those intelligent, educated and lettered “laymen”, he is not just saying that society and considering social solutions is very important, he is saying that any critical philosophical thought that does not found itself in these issues is not a serious philosophical pursuit.

“To really distinguish the ideal and the real is to understand how they are distinguished in practice, and not in thought – in what we do, and not in what we represent ourselves as doing.”

“A philosophy that doesn’t try to understand social reality – that doesn’t try to understand its own connection to a world that wasn’t created to be philosophisable – is not being done seriously.”

This kind of statement should put us on notice, but also we don’t want to be too reactionary to this reactionary statement and proclamation. Yes; as I have said elsewhere in this blog, philosophy should consider actual real issues. Yet, of course, philosophy and social reality cannot be distinguished except under particular conditions, conditions that allow for what is particular. I am not sure why or how any one could write anything that has any meaning or purpose behind it and not be considering the social arena. We could even go so far as to say that a discourse, or philosophy, that would situate itself in not having to do with the social realm is actually a move that finds itself in contradiction such that its meaning would have to be non sequitur to the proposed area that it addresses. Indeed; as I have indicated of a certain non-philosophy: It is done in Bad Faith. But then isn’t that the real issue? The issue of Reality?

So on one hand, Brassier is situating us to not look at the contradiction; SR itself is a move away from the further consideration of contradiction, a move into that region where contradiction is the marker of what is true of reality over what may be true in itself. So in considering Brassier’s proposal here, we might consider an original panel member of the Speculative Realism talk, Graham Harman, who advocates getting back to the thing in-itself. We are dealing here with an agenda, a specific and particular manner of speaking about things, a particular manner of using things, objects. for a certain purpose. Right now, the single most necessary object we need to deal with is a social one, so this object has been associated with what is ‘real’ because of the necessity involved with being human in the world right now.

On the other hand, we should at least understand that he is involved in an institution which, after his “great” contribution to the SR, Along with his growing need to appear relevant in the academic community, must be upheld. He has reached a certain position of authority and stature that must be maintained if not as a conscious choice at least as a theological man date required by his position: he has no other way to make a living and so he can’t really suggest anything too radical, that is, except by reducing the object of that “radical” to something that is actually not very radical at all. We begin to see why SR became so popular for about a half a second and now has kind of falling into philosophical mediocrity: Because thats what people want: to offer reparations to a claimant for an issue that they do not understand.  In other words, communication is likewise taken as a given potential accross a unitive category, even as we alteady know such a category is highly problematic.

yet, This is not a fault of Brassier; the issue has been laid out by his mentor, Alain Badou, and I doubt it was missed by Brassier. I like him, and I like SR, but it is a truth that, once pointed out, is commonly set aside as an indicator of intension to rebuke or deny. This is not the case with me or this post. This post is a description, a laying out what is before us in its blatancy. This is to indicate a certain categorical set where communication does occur. Again; it is not so much that we don’t need to consider Society it’s problems and ways to solutions through thinking critically, it is more that philosophers tend to lump “philosophy” into this generalized common category that as they go on in their institutional position are seeing more and more to be speaking to the whole category of not only philosophy but humanity in general as indeed a common ethical substance.

When we begin to understand what this motion is, and that an acknowledgement and recognition of this type of motion does not negate the validity of what is moving, then we begin to understand how such philosophical statements such as Ray’s here is really, often enough, limited in its scope of appropriation and provocative only in the sense that he is promoting a particular type of theological belief, at that, A necessary one that we call social justice.

*

We have stepped even deeper into that domain about which institutional and conventional philosophy becomes nervous.

In particular, we should see that the issue of race relations, in particular, problematizing Whiteness, is presently salient. In light of this, we would be remiss if we didn’t look to the end as it involved the reality of being human: If we at some point gain a sufficient equity of peoples such that race no longer can be used as a marker is power and oppression, what then, of a real humanity, do we have then? Do we think that Medieval Fuedal Europe was about race? Or the Ottoman Empire, or the Chinese Dynasties? or Pre-European Africa? Of course, because we are currently enmeshed in a pertinecy of race relations, we will inevitably see power and race being wielded everywhere, but if we take a cue from Descartes tac (highly unfashionable in this moment), we might just glimpse that race is not always the central issue. The issue is always power, that even within what we could generalize a homogegeous cultures, power is still wielded in an oppressive manner through manipulative systems and tactics upon people regardless of what type of people that might be. In fact, we might see that the discussion of race might move over into having to define what is not actually or specifically racial into it being the case, or analyzable through the racial trope. This is the post-modern condition we have; we need not go into how discourse may or may not determine reality and the repercussions of such an ideal here.

But to make short what could be a very long essay, I ask the reader to consider what systemic racism means in light of the following statement, and how that might have to do with philosophy, the turn away from the CPT, and the defining of the parameters of what should be taken “seriously”:

There are people who continue to write outside of white standards, to our collective benefit. But to reap the social fruits of their labor we must remove the standard of white-centric history.” ~Andre Perry, The Hechinger Report, Jan. 30, 2018

The issue of correlationalism and access appears to haunt the SR/SM thinkers; a very obvious and easy way to set this issue aside (the SR’s love ‘setting aside’ as a methodological tenant issues that directly challenge thier positions) is to move into the ‘social’ maxim.

HERE’s SOME MORE ELVIS TO GET YOU THROUGH YOUR PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEMPLATIONs!

The Perfect Crime: Enchantment as Vehicle of Subjective Purpose. 

Comment on this REPOST..

I’m not very familiar with this B guy philosopher that I hear a lot of here and there. (sorry I’m voice dictating and I didn’t really feel like going back and finding out exactly how to spell boy do they really lard lol) .

I’m only going off of a quote that’s on the link of the link. So I could be completely wrong and what the conclusion really is that this guy says be on the excerpt.

From what I’ve gathered from B it seems that he’s kind of a complainer. This excerpt in the link talks about some sort of lamenting that we’re no longer in the sacred zone or something like that. Hey saying like oh nothing is sacred any longer because now everything is a commodity everything has been flattened so we have no sense of the sacred. 

I think he is representing and immersion within transition. The From and the Where To don’t really matter in as much as the expression is one that goes along with transition, and this is to say the feeling that goes along with an attachment to what is seen of the past as good or somehow quality and a perceived future or even present situation that is indicating a future that is not as good or somehow lacking in substance.

Now, when  we are able to get beyond such lamenting transitions, we might then see clearly that we have not lost the sacred but we have merely moved the blocks around; the sacred is still there. The terms have changed but they indicate the same situation. The question is do I still have a sense of spirit to spite what I think the world is doing? And, is the world ever a holy and sacred place? What am I depending on when I say that we have lost a sense of the sacred? 

I would say that “we” have not lost anything, And that the people who love a sword of doom and gloom philosopher of a bleak future are ” optimists”, because they hang onto a static and stable sense of the past and or their central sense of being projected into a future hope that more and more never comes to pass. I, on the other hand, am a sort “pessimist ” because I see each moment as full of potential as I try not to project my resentments out upon the world to cloud my view. They of course are a certain kind of Realist because in reality everyone has all sorts of opinions and attitudes upon situations and their outcome, and of course their presence in the world is very serious matter. 😄

 So it is that B evidences a type of human moment that sees words as indicating actually true essences of being, such that the larger conflation of these essences show them reflexively and automatically a bad end. 

Yet, When we discover what an object is, we are no longer are caught in that kind of limited paradigm, no longer caught in reliving the past as a present identity toward the future;  which is, as many have said, death. Hence the lament. 

The perfect crime is that B himself has committed the crime but is putting it off into something else so we all look over there and not at the actual culprit. 


The manner of Being enchanted follows the rationale behind Plato’s Allegory of the Cave. The Allegory itself is an enchanted image of realty where people are existing in various roles and stages in a progressive march of the human species into the future. 

So it is that when we can see B as merely   expressing a particular mode of Being a human in history, then B can appear to resound with the meaning of Graham Harman’s “always been disenachanted”. If we understand that the human being is always (as a general and common condition) caught ‘in the middle’, seeing no correspondence of their Being with any being that is outside the human correlation: The evidence of other human beings correlated with ‘the only Being’ allowed, as a thoughtful excersizing, presents an axiomatic limitation in all a thinker can know. This limit thus supplies the necessary catalyst for displacement of Self in order for it to commune with a transcendent ‘other’ that confirms its exceptional placement in the universe, but also an exceptional role whereby such Being can have an effect upon the ‘separated’ and functioning world. This displacement thereby allows such human Being to understand its alienation within a context of purpose, which manifests as (probably) one of three Selves: The Colonizer who speaks the future as a ‘good’ Being as The Soveriegn whereby all others gain their purpose; the Colonized who speaks the past to bring about a ‘good’ future; the Complainer who speaks the future as the ‘good’ past. But in fact, all three are caught in what Paulo Freire called “the game of the oppressor”. These are thus subjects of enchantment, or for another term, Enlightemnent, as each plays their role in the respective world of progress. 

We find that human beings have always been dis-enchanted when we start to understand consciousness through what it does rather than by what it processes, as a universal object before a centralized thinking subject. We find that the Allegory of the cave, while an enchanted idea, nevertheless always finds itself as describing a relational situation wherein the (conventionalized, normalized) point of the Allegory withdraws from view to allow for what Badiou might call ‘the beginning of the count’.