The issue we have before us is the debate between the phenomenological field, and the empirical field. the age old debate between the subject and the object. These seem incompatible, and they are. The reason why they are incompatible is because of the nature of their foundations.
As I explained in the last post, the phenomenological field is wide open. It is so open, it can destroy basically any argument that is not itself. This is what we learn from Kierkegaard ( I won’t go into all the K stuff here). Once doubt had manifested as the basis by which all things are able to be constituted, then everything that can be argued must take account in the apparently true aspect of cognition to destroy everything theoretical. This is the problem of the phenomenological reduction of Hussserl: The criterion to which any real thing (valid argument) must measure against is the ability to account to nothing. This is the catch of the phenomenal ideal of cognition and its concordant method for argument, that…
anything which proposes to be based in something without theoretically grounding it in nothing is invalidated.
Yet the same can appear from the other camp; which, for a term, could be called the “Object” camp. The camp where there are real things that we have to contend with that do not conform to the central phenomenal cognition.
This camp, in effect, says that
we indeed gain information from elements of cognition that do not reside within the central phenomenal subject.
The catch is that the argument is already on the side of the Object-Realists. This is because of the way theory is represented, not to cognition, but to the real field of cognition. The real field of cognition, thus, is also likewise chained to the phenomenological field. This is not only because they form a closed loop of cognition, but also because they apparently are unable to see the truth of the other side. and therefore, both rely upon a transcendent other by which to gain their positions. This other they absolutely cannot account for due to the nature of the cognitive presentation; that which contradicts the particular position, is simply not viewable but only viewable through the cognition that is operating at the time. As well, the ideal that we can through a series of cognitive appropriations and conceptual manipulations, get outside of this correlation, is occurring on both sides (objectively) even as it appears to be subject to the condition of phenomenological field.
The two correspond in this way:
If I walk into a wall, the bloody nose I get and the pain running through my broken nose, as an event, defies any sort of cognitive phenomenon. The phenomenon of cognition always appropriates the event after the event, at which time, the event has ceased to exist and become a feature of cognition. Yet,my nose is bleeding, and this cognition indicates an objective field that we must assume has some sort of validity. But in both cases, the assumption is that we can extend the event of pain into a series of knowable causes and outcomes, whether it be “merely cognition” or “objective reality”.
The debate, it seems to me, can only come to bear the fact that we are not dealing with an either/or situation, but a kind of faith in the apparatus of cognition to give us reliable information as well as a reliable manner to process it truthfully from the experience of worldly things, which is to say, a posteriori.
I think we still have a ways to go. There is a correspondence that we have not come upon yet. The question is which faith, which expression, is keeping fidelity to the truth of existence, not merely phenomenal word play, or intensional assertion, but the objects beyond the abysmal playground?
To get anywhere is to explore all the conceptual defaults of a paradigm. We have explored most of the subject phenomenon, because intensional theory must ‘jump ahead’ to create demand for the intellectual product (where are we going so fast? We missed something! ) now we go through the object.
So the issue is just where to draw the lines, where to prevent the continued fall into conceptual nothingness of relation, and where thus to draw the line which best grants us a view onto what is able to effect us from outside.