The Machine and Being: The Commons.

“We must situate what has been left out if we are ever to get anywhere beyond repeating the same old philosophical tropes.”

55394256-machine-learning-production-line-with-idea-lightbulbs-being-processed-by-the-microchips-circuits-co

*note on the note: ‘They’ are those who are ‘in the commons’.

{WIKI:

Commons:

– The definition from the Digital Library of the Commons is; “the commons is a general term for shared resources in which each stakeholder has an equal interest”.
– A common is a shared resource managed by a community who create rules to make the resource durable. The resource can’t be monopolised by one or a group of individuals, it has to be as opened as possible. The resource is not private or public, it’s a third thing : a common.
– }

…But this also is not complete. We should at all times understand that this discussion has been made more than once, and by those who made it, we should assume that all the bases were covered, all aspects revealed and discussed. When we thus refer to the discussion, ‘it’, we also then cannot but remember that, strangely enough, not everything is expressed.

The discrepancy, or contradiction, evident in those conjoined sentences (just previous), thus reveals how it is possible that I might have something to say about it, since we have then the very essence of time (1) (Heidegger) played out through the stretch that occurs between any multiple of authors who had something to say about it. Further, we have an issue that arises when we consider that everything has been expressed in whichever discussion, but somehow not everything was expressed; this is the issue of the contemporary (2) because only the contemporary is able to view what has been said as, at once, describing the whole situation yet leaving something out. It is an issue of the contemporary because she does not make issue with what the other had to say, but only notices what he hasn’t said: Thus the issue of the condition of discourse (3) becomes salient. When we likewise reflect upon what is occurring, we cannot but help further notice that not everyone is privy to this view, but some are. The axis where this situation plays, what we can call the matrix that arises in the noticing of this strange situation, we call the point of contention (4), because it appears that though we might speak about it and describe it plainly, using the terms of the day and playing by the rules where by clausal structures relate definite meanings, the meaning is still not conveyed to most. One one axis (perhaps) we have the immature before the mature, and we cannot blame natural process for placing knowledge along whatever path of progress becomes each learner. On the other axis (perhaps) we have a more insidious situation because it has to do with what offends, and where offense might take place (Kierkegaard); we have the situation where the mere fact of being offended reveals a certain argumentative camp. We must situate such types within the continuum of consideration in order to be able to speak clearly about what is occurring, because there is no intension (Hursserl) to offend, but indeed such a discourse will offend certain types. It is the idea of intension where things often get fouled up.

Here then we come upon a term ‘conventional’ to describe that group who apparently cannot understand the simple meanings that are conveyed through the standard communicative medium of discourse. We thus come back around to a reason for why the term ‘common’ becomes so wonderful to indicate those who do not grasp the discussion that has already been had, nor that which is needing amendment, nor how the amendment is indeed amended to the previous and ongoing discussion, that is, over arguing with the points is has brought. Such a group are common because it is such a usual thing to place the varied elements and constituents of humanity in a hierarchical order of Being, that when someone describes this very situation to them in simple terms, terms which merely add to the discussions which have already occurred in total and describing every aspect of the situation at hand (5), the cannot but help themselves to view the description as a very complex thing, having so many aspects pro and con which can be tested by sematic meaning calculators that weigh importance within the hierarchy of meaningful ideas. They (common) simply do not (can not) see the simplicity, but must go through the hierarchy of semantic Being, (Foucault’s “order”), apply the complex functions of meaning to it in order to maybe get a glimpse at the initial simplicity of the whole situation and what has been occurring. This is the most common manner to approach knowledge as it is thereby (in the commons) already been categorized and classified into its semantic niches by the ‘identity machine’ that is the unreflected agent of faith involved with the unified reality of ideological religion (Deleuze) (belief and ‘unchosen thought-Being’)

As we have said, though, this is nothing new, but only an amendment to what has already been said in its completion about the whole of the situation. The amendment is to not figure into the automatic commonality that at one time we could call ‘reality’ and be working not only within but also toward a common human, but universal, purpose. Reality itself has become insufficient to contain the possibility of what exists, but has instead become a ‘unit’ of measure, a mode of classification, whereby knowledge may gain its quality of valid Being, such that what is common thus also defines which knowledge is valid (Lyotard), as well as through a kind of ‘established absence’ (subaltern; Spivak, after a manner) what now cannot be heard. What is ‘in the commons’, in this respect, marks a particular manner of understanding and processing things so that everyone can be included in the hierarchical ‘semantic’ universe and be put to good use with the best possibility for people not to question their situation: For the situation by this time has already included all the questions and supplied all the answers.

~{ this is all taken from my upcoming book ~ L.K. }

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