TRIPLE O THE PSEUDO-FOE: notes on the Zizekian gentrification of OOO

Graham Harman’s OOO was born refuted. Incoherent in its fundamental premises, responding to a non-existent problem, positioning itself in a totally …

TRIPLE O THE PSEUDO-FOE: notes on the Zizekian gentrification of OOO

——- I feel obliged to represent rebuttals. Personally, I think many of them are kind of weak, and show really a misunderstanding of Harman’s proposals. I have read Harmon’s book “tool being”, I have read probably half of “gorilla metaphysics”, and I think the most significant thing that I’ve read by him is the essay that I have reposted called “on vicarious causation”. And I’ve read at least a few of those links that Terrence gives on agents form there, as well as agent swarms on critique. And I’ve read bits and pieces of arguments against Triple-o. To me, I’m not sure if any of them are really holding any water. I mean, they hold water within their own domain I suppose. But when I read Graham Harmons work, it’s like nothing I’ve ever read before. There is no phenomenologist of the 20th century that even comes close to the significance that I find in Harmons work . so that’s just me.

But that being said, Terrence has talked about Fayerband for sometime now, and I finally bought one of his books. And I got to say this dudes on point so, there’s that.

It seems that Terrence Blake and I overlap and concur in so many ways, but then in discussing it, we seem to differ on very basic and fundamental premises.

Anyways….

😘

I don’t know what I would say to someone who is giving me a rebuttal based on a misunderstanding of what I’m saying. Of course, I would try to explain it to them. But one should imagine that after a while of encountering the same kind of rebuttals, the same kind of questions, eventually, sooner or later, I would begin to be able to tell very quickly whether or not this person is “starting off on the right foot” toward or into my proposals, say. So after a while of repeated incidents.I would probably Learn that it is futile and just stay quiet and address those rebuttals which appear to me as Being closest to comprehending what I’m putting forth.

My analogy example that I’ve given at least a couple times in posts somewhere in my blogosphere here, is that there’s no amount of description of snow that I can give to someone who has never encountered snow to get them to understand what it is, let alone believe that it exists. Any approximation in their mind that they would have from my description of what snow is would fail at every instance until they actually encountered snow itself.

So I agree with Harmon in his celebration; “to the things in themselves!” 

But of course, as with everyone who has an ax to grind, if I don’t respond to your prodding, then that shows you evidence that I have no ground to stand on against your questioning. And ironically, indeed I wouldn’t! Because the ground of that persons understanding is fundamentally different. So indeed in that person’s domain there is no ground that I can occupy, because everything that I would say would necessarily sink into his quagmire of shifting sands. 

It would be as if I went into a programmer’s office and started telling him how the formatting of his coding is incorrect, or giving him arguments about how he should change things. Indeed, I know what all the numbers and symbols and letters are, I can even understand what lines of code are. I know where and what the computer is. Etc. But just because I know what the symbols are doesn’t mean that I understand one tidbit of the coder’s world so far as the coding functions toward an application. So it is the terms of discourse themselves likewise are analogous to this situation under certain conditions when two philosophers get together to compare notes.  The idea of discourse does not even then Keynote a common category through which we can all understand each other. In the same way that a professional baseball players understanding and approach to the world cannot be comprehended buy a librarian, nor vice versa.  there is nothing that either could say to each other, no description that either could give to the other, which would do justice to either of their experiences. We have to let a librarian be a librarian, and a baseball player to be a baseball player, in themselves.

*

So again, as I keep giving examples of as well as keep attempting to explain, we have evidence of two routes Upon objects. And, yes, I have attempted to give an example to round out how philosophy itself can be an object in my recently published essay “an essay concerning the possibility of a unified theory of counseling” (see my post with the link).

It is a kind of exercise in futility against which one retains more integrity by remaining silent.

Four, how loud would a baseball player have to be, how violent would she have to get upon the librarian in order for the librarian to agree that the baseball players world is actually the true world? And yet philosophers don’t see this as a violence, nor do they see themselves yelling, because they don’t even admit that within the category of philosophy there are baseball players, librarians, landscapers, and rocket scientist. Philosophers would say that all those categories must answer to philosophy and that philosophy is able to address The one in total category. 

It becomes obvious, though, after a while of trying to entertain people who claim to understand, as I’m trying to speak to them or speak to the rebuttals or comments, that they just plain do not get it. And it isn’t really as much that they don’t understand, as much as it is that the basis of their understanding is unable to formulate the conceptions. And this is not an insult. For the insult falls into the assumption that everyone who claims philosophy does have access to all things of knowledge. Actually, it is just a description of the facts. 

The overwhelming and obvious evidence is that there are two fundamentally different views, what I say are Orientations, upon what knowledge actually is.

It is not an argument about some reductive quality of a unified category of “knowledge”. Harman clearly distinguishes this in his works. What is phenomenal, has a form in as much as what is formal is likewise a phenomenon. These two causes overlap, but in essence they do not reduce to either one successfully nor truthfully.

.As I say in many places in previous posts, what we are witnessing is that there is no traversal across a category. For any given category that I might bring up, it is apparently obvious that it fails, no matter how much or how detailed I would wish to describe the extent of that given category, the problematic category whatever it is, Communication is simply not taking place. It is not a communication that I don’t like, as some theorists would want to say that communication is always occurring, it’s just you may not like what communication is occurring. What people don’t like, in truth, is to admit that there’s no communication  in this case taking place. It is a kind of stubbornness, indeed a phenomenology of subjectivity involved in the assertion of its own privilege and privacy, instead of actually looking at, viewing, and understanding the truth of the situation that is presented. It is what we could call a modern denial and justification of an inherent offense to one’s own being. 

I say no; in this particular case of philosophy, there is no communication that is taking place. The open presentation of sensible discourse, of arrangements of clauses and disseminating of definitions is not being communicated in its integrity to these other parties. Definition, no matter how detailed, has failed. This is what is occurring despite the protestations. One can even go so far as the contemplations of the end of history, in the end of philosophy, and the decline of civilization, is coinciding with a denial and failure to address this inherent failure of communication . It’s like we have to double down on the denial because were so offended. 

So as I say, in these particular cases of philosophy and interaction, it is more responsible to allow a tree be a tree and a rock a rock, instead of demanding that there must be some sort of fundamental essence that makes a rock a tree, and a tree a rock, some essential ether, or some basic material of which both a rock and a tree are made of which thus negates the Rockness or the Treeness, except as a further abstract category. 

As I put in my previous post, the question that we have to ask ourselves is what are we trying to do when we engage with philosophy?

And this demands honesty. And this demands responsibility for what we are doing or trying to do.

Are we are trying to find some essential of oneness at the heart of everything, whether it is an infinite relativity of discursive gymnastics, or whether it’s a basic and fundamental big bang at the beginning of everything, or whether it’s a prime creator.

 or, are we involved in just talking about what there is without any presumptions about how knowledge should proceed in order to be knowledge.

Or, are we involved with something else.

Philosophy, often enough, as soon as I say the word philosophy, all the sudden the assumption is is that we are all involved in this grant process of reducing everything to one unitive truth.  So I guess another question I have is are we able to discuss things to their ends, to the fundamental causes, without then having to reduce whatever series of final causes, to a great and wonderful “big unitive cause”?

I don’t know. All I’m saying is that I’m not involved in trying to reduce something to one great unitive cause. There might be other projects. But I’m also saying is that most often people will not admit what they’re really trying to do, and this is why I ask for honesty and responsibility. Because it would go along ways not only to accept the situation as it is, but allowing people to be heard. 

*

While I respect Terrence’s Philosophical approach and work, and he and I have had lengthy interactions and discussions in years past, it is simply a matter to me that many people are simply not understanding the text in front of them as it is intended.

In fact, in a post that I wrote maybe four or five years ago, I talked about how Harmons answering and rebuttals to critiques or a bottle of that obviously do not understand where he’s coming from, amounts to an effort of bad faith on Harmons Part. Namely, that he is reifying the mistake, in terms of Lacan. But also, I attempt to correct that mistake by pointing to the issue of orientation, instead of standing in a firm position of object oriented ontology. The issue is orientation. The issue is not whether or not Harmon has an argument. Indeed Harmon Hass to have an argument because he makes his living doing philosophy. But the significance of his work, Ironically, is that he’s almost required to defend his position against three bottles from people who are missing the mark. (as I describe all through my blog).

The failure is not in the misunderstanding or the mistake that everything should be able to be understood of everyone else’s position philosophically. No; The failure is in philosophy, as a discipline, as a whole effort that various people think they are involved with, admitting where junctures and differences actually arise. It is not argumentative, in fact I would go to the extent to say that it is ante- or pre- argumentative.  The division or the juncture occurs before any argument can be made in rebuttal. Because what is required is the first understand the position that is being described. It is not a matter of understanding the position as an argument. see again my two routes. 

It is not difficult to find this occasion of failure, and then begin to comprehend what is actually happening socially and in reality. Not only in the context of race relations, but mental health in general, we find everywhere in critical circles that intention is not sufficient. It does not matter what my intention is, because it fails. What matters is that I become open to the possibility of other despite my intention.

And we see this in the political realm presently also. It is not difficult to see what is happening in American politics is conservatism sticking to the centralized intentional subject, as its values and beliefs are understood as essential to the universe and human beings, or at least people who live in the United States, the citizens. This conservatism is located in the figure of Donald Trump. This figure at every turn just claims hey, I’m a good guy, I don’t mean to offend anyone I’m just speaking my truth. As Zizek suggested 4 years ago, Trump is the epitome of phenomenological intention, Despite what the left would want to say about its subjectivity.

But then we could say on the other side is the Black Lives Matter kind of thing. This side represents the opening to the possibility of the other. The willingness to give up my concrete intention and good willingness for the sake of believing someone else and their experience might fall outside of what I am able to understand.

*

So when we Juxtapose these two situations, philosophy, politics and reality, and we have a sort of triad of mixture of juxtaposition Ing, we can find a reason why I am able to speak to philosophy itself being viewed as an object. And as well that there is this “thing” that I call “conventional philosophy” which demands that anything I say is able to be understood, comprehended, and addressed by anyone else using language, But so long as we play the game of phenomenalism and its brother in law, discourse.

  yes, I say, it is possible and indeed we do find that demand. But in the end, again I say, it is not very responsible for what is true of the situation at hand.

A Bridge which Defines: On Richard Rorty’s very pragmatic interpretation of Gadamer Hermeneutics in his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979)

It is easier to describe what something should be not, then to formulate what something should be, as it is easier to deconstruct then to construct. …

On Richard Rorty’s very pragmatic interpretation of Gadamer Hermeneutics in his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979)

————- If we can take this short synopsis of these two authors as minimally representative of what the two authors say in general, Then what we have there, with Rorty anyways, Is a proposal which allows for the subsequent developments in philosophy of the 90s up till present, as represented by Badiou, Zizek, Laruelle, and even the speculative realists.

The point he describes is a kind of “empty space” that is then elaborated upon by these authors I just mentioned. This empty space can be understood to define two ontological situations, together which constitute what Laruelle calls “unilateral duality”. This unilateral duality posits two conditions that do not reconcile back into another unitive condition, but then also defines the state of each of those conditions.

One condition is exclusion and the other condition is inclusion.

Badiou Likewise considers things in this way, though he doesn’t enjoin with Laruelle at terms.

The one condition, which We can call the conventional route, excludes anything which arises outside of its semantic mandate. Basically, it posits a one reality in which everything exists and of which human beings find out through applying ‘reason’. The one route says that there is nothing that falls outside of the potential for reason; this route is necessarily a systemic route, it posits systems within systems that even extend so far as to imply there’s a grand overreaching system which we may not ever be able to comprehend. The way the exclusive route functions is the reduction and exclusion based of contradiction; it includes only that which constitutes itself in potential. It includes everything that is possible in potential.

The other ontological condition is the one which includes. This ontological condition includes the exclusive condition. The exclusive condition posits the possibility that it includes everything, yet by its own activity is necessarily exclusive to anything that might arise which does not conform to its particular semantic mandate. 

By contrast, The inclusive route includes contradiction as well as that which is exclusive. It is what Laruelle calls “non-philosophy”, in order to allow the exclusive route to lay in what is most common, namely philosophy as a positive method. 

The speculative realists understand and attempt to incorporate or use this ontological feature of non-reduction, non-philosophy, or what The link to post here would define “In contrast”, such that what we have for a new philosophy, what we have on the ‘other side’ of that empty space posited above, is a new manner of philosophy which resides parallel to its counterpart: Unilaterally dual in nature.

But this empty space cannot merely reside in conceptual reason, as the link to post talks about. As he suggests, philosophy must involve something more than just reason, more than just a capacity to think through Aristotle or reductive logic based away from contradiction; it is thus a bridge. 

But we could equally and just as well go back 100 or so years before and say that it is a ladder that then after we climb, or cross, it must be thrown away, or actually it disappears. For once we climb the ladder, once we have gotten to the ‘other side’ of the bridge, there is no incrementally reductive manner of reasoning which will allow us to cross the gap, what Slavoj Zizek knows as “the parallax gap”, And what  Badiou understands as “the void”. There is no way to use language or discourse to communicate how to move accross the gap Because the very foundation of discourse has changed by virtue of what, by all reasonable standards, is not reasonable. This is similar to what Kierkegaard calls a quantitative leap, as opposed to a qualitative leap; it is absurd to the conventional exclusive route of reason.

In short, the conventional philosophy of incremental reductive reasoning is insufficient to realize the full ontological extent of being in the world, which is really being of the world. Just as Heidegger had a real conflict, (Is Nationalist Socialism the actual culmination of history? And do I have an obligation to believe what I reason is so?), an actual breach in the rationale of his Dasien, An interruption which occurred from what is actually real in itself, outside of reason’s ability to conceptualize toward reduction, The fall back into reason had real ontological repercussions which shows that Heidegger’s original proposal of his book “being and time” is faulty. (That is, his philosophy is compromised Because he made the wrong decision, as evidenced by history.)

But the fault is not internal to his philosophy; rather, it is faulty Becuase of how we might be oriented upon what his philosophy is talking about. The fault lay in that there is no inherent truth which is discernible by the Method of reductive philosophical reason into his “being and time”; but the truth of Dasien is reckoned when we see that it is not based in reduction, that is, the centering of thought within the content of history of reductive reason is contradictory in-itself. It is contradiction spelled out ‘long hand’.

As much as the exclusive methodological philosophical route would want to argue that there is an essential truth to be found be a close reading of reason to his book, or any philosophical books really, ultimately the truth of what he is saying can only be found by crossing the bridge, passing over the gap, moving through the void which leaves the reductive method behind to fail in its want and desire to posit any truth found by its method. This is evidenced by any attempt which would want to argue ‘what he is really saying’: We keep discussing and arguing over it anyways.

Yet this failure does not mean that it does not still function. This is the meaning of a unilateral duality: Two Routes which are ontologically necessarily, one which posits philosophical sufficiency, and one which accounts for the truth of the situation.

Current Deontology

When we do not suppose that morality is created by thoughtful humans, as opposed to existing in-itself, then it becomes possible to read Kant’s categorical imperative (or his basis of deontology) as meaning that which can occur in no other way than it does. This reading seems to deny the traditional reading which sees deontology as having to do with an the morality of the doing of the act, as to choice.

The question that I have yet to see be held against this latter sense arises when we find that we are using hypothetical reason to address the categorical imperative, or, that what Kant proposes as Pure Reason answering to the Practical. The question should be: why?

When the other why question is never addressed to the categorical imperative involved in the practical thinking approach to pure reason, then we have a deontology which contradicts is own meaning by answering to whether any act is justified morally in-itself, and we view Kant as suggesting that a categorical imperative has to do with an ought. Which is to say, ethics and morality are imperative to human existence.

As a side, Kierkegaard already questions this: what the attempt to iron out self-contradictory motions of reason implies (or at least the half he was able to see given the ideological conditions of his moment).

Yet, when we understand pure reason, as a thing that exists, as really having nothing to do with morality in the first place (morality is something that can be accounted for by the imperative rather than a by-product [Nonphilosophical unilateral duality]) then we can understand what Kant is really saying about the categorical imperative. Namely that it is a thing, an act that is existing or that exists, that occurs in no other way than it could, A thing which is consistent with its category, a thing which cannot occur except how it is. It is a category which occurs the only way it can, and thus affords no purchase by the practical; that is, except in as much as the practical or hypothetical is already being understood through its own imperative of Being, which is to say, as the ubiquitous and proper way of Being, which denotes a proper way of seeing, thinking and understanding, as this proper way axiomatically excludes the act of thought by its definition. 

Wiki says that deontology derives from the Greek deon which means obligation. That’s cool and all. But I also like de-ontology. In the same way I like to use intension (in tension) when speaking of phenomenology and such, as opposed to intention.

We are able to see what we are able to think, but also vice-versa — and not simultaneously.

Have we yet begun to think?

{for those who read the unedited typo version previous to this post: I have no idea where the last comment, which is now deleted, came from.}. 👨🏽‍🚀

Some Material for Psychology

www.researchgate.net/publication/336613223_Zizek_and_Peterson_Demonstrating_the_Importance_of_Higher_Order_Dialogue_Cadell_Last_Independent_Scholar

” To connect to this point such a pathway is a form of self-responsibility that allows us to overcome internal and unconscious pathological prohibitions. In the old traditional world we had “Master Figures” (embodying the moral superego) to tell us what to do in relation to a “Cause” which transcended pleasure. Now such “Master Figures” (embodying the moral superego) are negated. However, this negation did not open up a world of free subject’s enjoying their simply pleasures (as presupposed by 1960s counter-culture), but instead a world of self-enslaved subject’s who become frozen or static in relation to internal and unconscious pathological prohibitions coming only from their own head. Such a world can only be transcended through self- responsibility (not more rights), from becoming aligned with the inhuman Master (Death).”

And my Two Routes comment:

The significance of the Two Routes is in as much as there is one route which sees discourse as indicating specific and localized actualiities. That this one route does not encompass or tell of all there is or can be. For example: As though Zizek’s discourse is saying such and such, and means this and that, then or now — specific local identies which can be overcome through relying upon that/those identities. For example, the “master signifier” that this author uses to talk about how there is no longer an ideological “master figure” which allows us to have cogent and substantial sense of self in the social atmosphere, that its been “negated”. The author thus uses this to construct an argument to say that what is required then is we take responsibility for this dissolution of the figure, that it is or has been dissolved and no longer functions as the static signifier, that we are left with a sort of Sartrean Existential situation where we have to just make our own meaning.

Then there is the other route which would say that still Zizek’s model is operating, and indeed there is a master signifier that is drawing forth this particular essay and discourse in the sense that there is an underlying or over arcing structure through which I can understand what his essay could mean. And that at no time has what Zizek or Peterson talked about or described been overcome in any way or changed in anyway so far as it indeed is having to do with the subject that would presume to be able to overcome the discourse: the subject is indeed intact and involves responsibly; what is needed is a radical break into existential responsibility (Christ). Here discourse ‘floats’ over real things granting appearance of change through the identification with the term rather than, what I call, the truth.

This is the Laruellian issue in his non-philosophy. The way it plays out in “actuality” is that one of these routes needs to be denied in order for progress to occur, which is to say in order them for the subject to make for itself a place of identity within the ideological sphere. The issue is then just what progress occurs?

Hence again the discussion of this essay occurs along two routes that are always in play and cannot be reduced to one or the other necessarily or contingently; this is to say that the moment it is reduced to one or the other is exactly when we find out the authors’ orientation upon objects, and we find out because of the nature of choice (discussed elsewhere).

In other words, there is no “old” in the sense this author used the idea except in as much as he views himself as occurring within an ideological construct (Zizekian and Petersonian and “world state”) which has ties constructed ‘in state’ as a stable and manifested static identity or entity unto which a free or unfree subject can then enact itself in the “actual” omnipresence that is the “figured” political world.

And Zizek’s discourse replays itself as a capitalistic-Christian God-world-cross substance prefigured in Peterson’s archetypical psychology.

Responsibility can indeed take the form of centering ideologically in the capitalisitc excess of subjective agency. Or the responsibility can arise as emancipation through a radical break which allows for the embodiment of material limit.

Does the Banach-Tarski Paradox Anticipate The Two Routes Upon Objects ?


This is the best vid I’ve seen all month!

I definately am Not a mathematician, but this vid explains this paradox pretty well. And, despite the scope of his conjectures at the end, a significant philosophical question would concern whether reality presents a sufficiently able manner for conceptualization to encompass all that we are able to know?

The precipitate of this first question thus moves retroactively as opposed to redundantly:

If we can take the initial object as any real object, then we can likewise take ‘reality’ itself as an object which itself is real. If we are to understand anything, communication of reality must be involved in some manner.

The initial issue, then, is if what is proposed to have been communicated is able to be viewed and understood as not having been communicated. And then if what was not communicated is able to come through as this latter view, that is, what has not been communicated being communicated but not in the former instance and not a replacement of the former (what was indeed communicated is not nullified by the communication which was not communicated by the proposal of what should have been communicated)?

#thetworoutes.

The initial contemplations upon truth can be found in Nathaniel’s The Philosophical Hack.

The Object of the Subject

The non-spiritual notice of a philosophical event

There is a kind of therapeutic intervention, or philosophical manner which describes how or why the therapeutic intervention should have its foundations.

It is called, for lack of a better term, the “noticing self”. What it asks of someone who has an issue is for them to sit and be mindful or aware of what is occurring. For example, one finds a comfortable way of sitting or standing or whatever, and then soon notices the sound of a jet flying over to the left and above. Crickets chirp Ahead and to the right; the small clicking of a dogs paws on the cement. The tug on one’s arm and the various muscle groups extending through that arm and into the back and in the body… etc… whatever it is, the person is asked to just point their attention to these things that are occurring in various ways.

Thoughts going through one’s mind might eventually come forward into awareness. The thoughts about the sound of the plane, thinking about the dog’s small clicking paws on the cement, etc.

The ideas that go through the person’s head about the things that are in awareness become things that are no different than those other things, so far as they enter the field of awareness.

People tend to associate themselves, their issues, their problems, their identity, their persona, their humanness, their being, their souls, etc. as indeed one with one’s thinking and thoughts about such matters. Hence the difficulty of mental illness, hence the difficulty of attempting to try and help someone that might have a mental issue — any problematic mental occurrence really, whether it has to do with thinking in particular or one’s actions that may or may not stem from thinking but it least concern the fact that one might be thinking about it.

So there is a particular type of therapeutic intervention called the “noticing self”. And what a “noticing self” is is an awareness of one’s thoughts. And the actual intervention is for a person to see or comprehend the possibility that there is something else that is noticing these things, something that is noticing the thoughts that is not exactly thinking.

*

I might postulate in reflection to Agent Swarm‘s post is that what is stable or unshakable is indeed this noticing self. The noticing self does not change under all these other conditions that are noticed. But indeed the noticing self only changes under these conditions when one understands the noticing self as a condition of these aspects that it notices. The noticing self does not change, but to speak precisely, if the noticing self changes then there is no noticing self. These are two mutually exclusive situations, not one situation that must reduce to one or the other.

*

Philosophically speaking, there is nothing that a therapist can do, or a philosopher, to get a person to realize or understand what this noticing self might be. In fact there is no amount of talking or guided visualization or analogy or descriptive philosophy or argumentation that can make a person recognize this noticing self. And because this is the case, one is only left to say that indeed there are two situations, at least, of being human.

It is not so much that such people are incapable of noticing or are simply not noticing something that is inherently common of being human. Rather, because, say, the therapist understands it self in the context of a noticing self, the unshakability of the therapist, with regards to this noticing self and as involves the relationship and interaction, allows that person with a mental issue the contingency available to them as truly having no self that can be noticed outside of the conditions which are those things that thought is attached to. The interaction can occur because there indeed is a differential in ontological bases.

*

Two Routes is not about a reductive ontology but is indeed about an effective and functioning teleology. One that recognizes difference as indeed different.

The Philosophical Object.

Phenomenology says that we all have subjective worlds that are reflected in our opinions and views.

The Speculative Realist conference philosophers spoke to the point of how that formulation of reality leads to a closed loop of philosophical correlation. Thus, their problem has been how to find something outside of this closed system.

The concern of an orientation upon objects is how that correlation occurs outside of the talk about it, encompassing the talk about how we are to get outside of it.

The issue here then arises between an object which withdraws from view (Harman) and the subject which is never expressed or communicated (Lyotard).

The difference, I say, lay more with orientation and less with ontological ubiquity. More with the manner that the subject is able to view the world and less with how there is a “real” world that subjects can only partially view.

The difference is thus between the phenomenon and the object. Less about how we situate philosophical definitions and more about the manner of being able to see.

Philosophical Dimension.

https://soundcloud.com/usertransspace/reason-emotion-and-religion-groove-n-talk

@

it is possible to understand philosophy as having two dimensions. Non-philosophy thus is the philosophical ability to comprehend the use of the real object called philosophy.

The issue that philosophy raises against this Confinement of its resources and agency, is that philosophy seeS itself –or permits a view that is itself –as without dimension; it understands or otherwise presents reason as having a link to an infinite source, what we generally call transcendence, or what the postmodern called immanence — because what the postmoderns are really saying about immanence is that the human being is able to get a hold of transcendence entirely .

The only argument that philosophy can make against what we are beginning to understand is it’s own limitation is to merely reify it’s access to infinite reasonable adaptation.

And this is why we have to speak of the two routes: conventional philosophical thinking is not really grasping that it is at once an infinite resource, while at the same time able to be described to its limitation. Conventional philosophy will use the rebuttal of no predictive capacity to say that philosophy is not being defined to its limitations. And then the only response to that is that conventional philosophy is not comprehending the issue at hand. Conventional philosophy sometimes then will take that as an affront to its agency, to its eminence, to its privilege and centrality. And thus would be Because it is not grasping that to describe itself to its limitation is not an insult nor an invalidation; rather it is an invitation to its constructive use. All the while opening up an avenue for thought that it is unable to conceive or otherwise encompass.

As well, it generally cannot conceive of an act that is not involved in an assertion of power as it understands power as the ubiquitous universal underlying force. Again, this is the reason why we have to speak of two routes upon objects that do not reconcile into a further unity.

Wellness and Oppression

wellness is not about being well; unless you are already sick.

I saw this article this morning through my Apple news. my wife sent it to me; she’s definitely not caught up in this type of mind control, but I can’t know for sure that similar type of thinking and reflection don’t go through her mind at times. She passed this article along to me because she is more concerned with instruments of oppression than she is about keeping up with the Joneses.

It got me to thinking about curvy women or larger women or just whatever the correct word is for the other 99% of the real women who are not the mega media image of oppression.

By the way: I am not trying to get in an argument with people who might read this who might say that I am using incorrect terms or not politically correct or am using some terms that might offend people. I admit I don’t know all what the hell words to use so To not offend people, but I am open minded enough and intelligent and understanding enough to know that I might be using words that might bother people or that might offend them in someway, and so here I am, and I apologize if I’m not using the correct verbiage.

Ok.

So it seems to me that any non-media obsessed real woman is told that she might do better if she just accepts her body The way it is. And I don’t mean to be stereo typical to say this is women only because I’m sure there are plenty of men that obsess over making their body fit into some “accepted standard of wellness”. But I think the sane thing is that people are OK with themselves; I think that is the universal standard of being human for every aspect of being human: everyone just wants to be OK with them selves and should be, no?

I am going to get really philosophical here because I am a counselor and I am a philosopher so here we go.

The article above is a kind of critique of An oppressing discourse. It addresses what at least I see and I would imagine the author understand, as a kind of oppression that is being an acted upon people across the world having to do with body image, food, and behavior in general including reaching over into psychology. Please note;My little bit right here is not making a comment upon whether the article is right or wrong or true or false; I think it is right and I think it is true, but this post is not critiquing that article nor its methodology; I am more using it as an occasion to point out or indicate what I understand as the two routes.

The short of my position is that everyone is exactly the way they’re supposed to be. The real issue then is why people don’t feel that way or think that way about themselves. Now, also I am not suggesting that there is some sort of “actual utopian ideal human being that is totally comfortable with themselves”. Rather, I am indicating a certain manner of being that human beings are.

Everyone is exactly the way they’re supposed to be and perfect in that way, whatever it is. I think that is a good statement of really what we’re after so far is human being in the world; I think when it’s all said and done and we’re sitting there taking our bong hits or drinking a glass of wine at the end of the day, ultimately we want to be OK we want to feel OK we don’t really want to be angry we don’t want to be sad we don’t want to have to do all the myriads of negative self talk, etc.

OK, do you have that picture?

The next question is: why are we not? The real question that comes up in everyone’s mind is why am I feeling bad about myself; why do I think my large body is somehow not too “well”; why do I doubt myself?

And I think the answer to that is telling: The typical answer to that is always that something else is making me fucked up. Now, again, I repeat, I am not suggesting that we need to come to some sort of inner acceptance within ourselves. Of course, that is what we have to do, but that is not the point that I am suggesting, nor is that the medium upon which I am placing this discourse of this post right here.

Already, if you are understanding what I just wrote then you might be able to begin to understand what I mean by two routes, or, two orientations upon objects. Subjective and objective is of the one route. The idea that there is some thing that is making me do something that I would rather not do, or is making me think a certain way or behave a certain way –that is an absolutely valid and real way of understanding oneself in the world.

But I’m getting at something when I do that I feel is more significant. I was tempted there to say “more substantial”, but I try to tend away from suggesting that something is “more real” or “more true”. I am not involved in this essay right here, of the two routes, in a capitalistic frame of trying to discern what is more correct or better. I am more concerned with establishing a ground of facts.

So we might ask ourselves where the idea that I am perfectly OK comes from. And then along with us we might ask ourselves where the idea that something else is making me do something or look at myself in a way that I don’t like comes from also.

In particular I point out the part in the article above that the author points out when she finally got comfortable with eating intuitively I guess, where she just Kaina eats what she wants and doesn’t trip out on it too much, she has the same body that she has had through all her obsessing about the various diets and the binging and they’re restricting and the eating healthy and all their various facets of trying to stay skinny, I guess.

What this says to me is that however she was being, she was not being in any particular way because something else was telling her to be that way. Rather, that both of those real items were arising in existence simultaneously and conspiratorially for her being.

Now try and keep in mind the two routes as I’ve tried to describe them briefly so far in this essay as I go forward: it is not that society is erecting this image of women and people such that then people get low self-esteem and want to do terrible things to their bodies or eat only lettuce or work out three times a day seven days a week. There is no element that is causing them to behave in such a way or to think in such a way, if we can include thinking as a kind of behavior.

And to stack up on that kind of awareness, I’m going to bring in something a little more personal to me; because I am a white man, many people would probably say I’m filled with shit commenting on this kind of stuff. Which I admit maybe I’m overstepping my bounds and I am actually filled with shit, that’s OK, I’m totally open to learning where I might be failing.

My daughter died suddenly two months ago. It was a purely random event, she died of viral meningitis. Sure, we could probably sue the hospital and get to the root cause of it and get people in trouble for malpractice and stuff like that because no one diagnosed her with meningitis until it was really too late. So put that aside, that we could’ve retaliated. There is also no reason why she should’ve got it, no one we know nor no one that she has come in contact with has meningitis that we can find her that we know of. The doctors hypothesize that it was just kind of a perfect storm of infection that got into her brain.

I am dealing with it pretty well, I suppose overall. But even at times I find that suddenly I will randomly start to cry. Sometimes, or actually somewhat often, Some innocuous thought our image, like a tree or a song, will lead over into some sort of reminder that Marley is gone or some other thing that Hass to do with various things around her death, and I find myself getting emotional and getting teared up. And it is kind of interesting to me in a way that something will start that kind of cycle but then there is this also kind of sub cycle where some part of me feels like I have to continue in that cycle and ruminate and be emotional and miss her and be sad. I’m not making judgments upon myself; I’m just looking at it through an intellectual lens; I am fortunate to be studying counseling and so I had many people and do have many people that are helping me on this path.

So, of course I can say that I am grieving I am involved in the process of grieving still and that the reason why I cry at times that seem random is because, is caused by, this outside thing that is my daughter having died. There is something that occurred that is not me that is making me behave in a manner that I would not otherwise enjoy. As I said, not only do I find myself getting welled up with tears at random times, but then there’s also a further kind of talk to myself of myself that somehow feels like I should continue to dwell in these images and thoughts of loss and sadness and death and missing her, etc. it literally is as though something from the outside, something that is not me or something that I’m not in control of controlling how I am being, how I am viewing myself, how I am behaving, how I am thinking, that I really would not like to have to go through.

And yes all you psychologists out there, don’t read this as though I am in denial or I’m trying to reject my feelings or anything like that because I’m not. 🙂 I am positive that no one would choose to have to mourn for someone they loved dying. So I’m not saying anything about maybe criticizing myself about the fact that I am mourning and grieving; I am not beating myself up or trying not to grieve or trying not to feel.

OK I just had to clear that up, because this is a philosophical consideration based upon a real valid and significance experience that probably millions of people go through every day.

So if we look at the fact that I just start crying at random times. There is no immediate cause that I can really know of; of course, Though, Ido it all the time: I reflect upon myself (like I am doing here, coincidently, lol) and I can say oh it’s because I went into her bedroom which is still set up the way it was when she was alive. I can say that oh the cause that I just started crying randomly was because I brought some water into her lizard into her room. But that’s not really the cause. Maybe we could say it is a proximate cause; but I’m not getting into trying to define a system right at this moment. So if we back up, we get into the general category of grief trauma and loss and so we have to say that my behavior overall is conditioned, or caused by, the loss of my daughter.

Yet, there is no reason that she died. Without going into all the various aspects and break down all the arguments of possibilities about why she died or the cause of this and cause of that, The very simple conclusion is that she got sick for some unknown reason, and this sickness developed until she died despite the best efforts of her doctors. But that doesn’t really give us a true cause; it satisfies a desire for reason, but only if I don’t think about it too much. 🧐

So what I’m really saying is, what I really must be saying is that the cause of my grief cannot be found. There is no reason why a cry at those specific random times; sometimes there is a trigger, other times it just pops up. Because, if I say the reason is that Marley died, and then I say that there is no reason why she died, I would kind of have to say also that the reason that I am grieving has no cause.

And so I must repeat again, here, I am not making a reduction in my thinking to justify or somehow deny the fact that I am in grief or that Marley died or that all that stuff.

This is the nature of the two routes that I’m trying to convey: The basis of the two routes is that they are mutually exclusive and do not reduce to another common unity. The fact that I can understand this ontological truth does not mean that somehow I am comforted by it or somehow I’m trying to deny the fact that my daughter died or trying to prevent myself from having to experience grief or sadness. There is no underlying psychology (Reason, cause) which links these two aspects; and this is to say that where a linking is understood, there we have fallen back into the one route. And that the distinction that I am making is the nature of the two routes, the nature the way that consciousness indeed functions: reduction is a particular function of consciousness, it does not necessary constitute consciousness toward its entire truth.

I’m saying that these events arise conspiratorially in the same sense that there is nothing wrong with my body. There’s nothing wrong with me. I am exactly the way that I am supposed to be.

And so coming back to the article that lead this post. Accepting who I am as a person with all my flaws, whether or not I’m binging and purging and doing tons of exercise every day and being on comfortable with myself and otherwise worried about people not excepting me etc., is both at once caused by other people and arising coincidently. And these two ontological situations do not indicate a further unitive cause.

And so the radical idea I think I’m trying to suggest is that me being OK with myself has nothing to do with rejecting that thing which I understand as causing me to be in a way that I would rather not be. The fighting, the rejection of that perceived outside force really, it seems to me, just reifies the fact that I am not comfortable with myself as a type of comfort. It allows me to be in this particular world that I know so well; the reduction we call “world/subject”. I call this the cosmology which positions the subject in reality.

The radical move of the two routes says that I am never removed from the struggle in reality even as I am entirely OK with myself, and at that, even as I might be totally in shambles. The world is not causing me to be any way; neither is something wrong with me. They are Co-incident, parallel. The reduction to a further “psychological” meaning is ultimately of the one route, the “real world”, the cosmological argument.

And that is not an indictment; it is simply a fact.

Repost: Notes on Orientation

Notes on Orientation

https://realityhc.wordpress.com/2019/05/28/notes-on-orientation/
— Read on realityhc.wordpress.com/2019/05/28/notes-on-orientation/

Note: This author’s notion of orientation appears to me to get very close to describing a reduction to what I am calling Routes, which I also call two orientations upon objects.

Yet, in my proposal, such Routes do not reconcile. But I am intrigued at this author’s effort Becuase it seems he or she is coming very close to grasping what I call the issue at hand.

So here is my comment on the linked post:

I like it. But then something bothers me about it. Also.

I’m not entirely sure what it is that strikes me as off —

– I think it is good as a sort of psychological sense. Like, if someone is looking for a pseudo-scientific-Philosophy to help them with “life’s meaning”. I’d say this is a good one.

Yet also, it appears to me you move through 3 stages in this theory: 1 and 2 . A pretty good bridging of phenomenality with the rational thinking subject. 3. Purpose.

My issue: 1 and 2: I’m am not sure that this distinction is not a conceptual device which functions from (3) instead of toward it; but together they make a nice bond, for sure.

Phenomenality, as I understand it, is the correlation of thought and world. The Phenomenon is existence; it is that the whole field is understood as existence, And yet within this field there appears something that does not seem to accord with the experience of the field; i.e. that there is something that appears to defy that everything is the known field. This situation is a phenomenon: the explanation is itself an effort to sort out a particular contradiction into non-contradictory states. This seems like what you have done, and then the last part is to fill the last gap that comes about in the contradiction of sorting out the non-contradictory aspects of the (first or primary) contradiction.