Post-trauma: Humans as blackboxes, machines as transparent

Humans as blackboxes, machines as transparent

Humans as blackboxes, machines as transparent
— Read on markcarrigan.net/2019/11/11/humans-as-blackboxes-machines-as-transparent/

Interesting problematic.

What might this say about us, that we might look to machines and thier analysis of behavioral data to tell us what’s going inside a human being?

I tend to agree with the impetus of the excerpt; that empathy between human beings is being devalued in this look to machines.

Yet another, less practical view, might see machines as indeed producing nothing larger or extraneous than an ability for humans to perceive one another. Maybe the transhumanists speak similarly, but I think what we are really looking at is the abuse, or disconnection which occurs in the institutional use of data to tell us what humans are, and not really, what we could call, the mere use of machines to tell us about ourselves.

We might then return to a question of what is occurring here. Might we ask what kind of mental picture is being relied upon? Which is to suggest that the view itself, that one would see institutions and machines as something which supplants something which is otherwise human connection, might represent a case of a kind of insanity, an upheld view placed at the extended end of a finger of blame, but then acted upon as the view as if the indictment is indeed indicating something which is wielding power to displace inter-human connection.

For for sure we could point back to the fears of the beginning of the modern industrial era located in the movie METROPOLIS to find a confirmation of a culmination that might come to pass in our present day. But might we stop pointing there and see that there is no culmination which has lead to some great terrible turn to machines, to see that we have already turned over our humanity in the fear itself which misses the event already having occurred? Such that we are merely replaying a trauma in the viewing and thus reenact the products of an event which we have yet to acknowledge ?

Embodiment and reality.

Body Theology?

https://thenotsosolidearth.wordpress.com/2019/04/22/body-theology/
— Read on thenotsosolidearth.wordpress.com/2019/04/22/body-theology/

By the way, “the not so solid earth” guy I totally love his posts so my comments are an addition to his essays, rather than a condemnation.

I am not sure I like the term “theology”. Let’s just be honest: there is no theology without religion. Theology seems to me a way to have religious faith without having to admit it, as though if I have theology then I am better than those ignorant people who foolishly believe in religion.

That’s just me, though.

It is interesting to me how Philosophy means different things to different people. Personally I think philosophy is something that does that it is. But I get a sense that there are many people that view philosophy only as a particular way of reasoning within thought, that there are all sorts of types of reasonings that can be accomplished philosophically.

Anyways…

The first comment I have, the first thing that I notice stuck in my mind, is the idea that modernity is associated with no transcendental horizon. Granted, many people would like to talk about all sorts of logico-historico-traditional discursive manifestations, and indeed these develop ‘layers’ as “not so solid earth” guy has talked about in a post long ago, in a galaxy far far away, as a sort of sediment.

On the other hand, if I’m really trying to talk about what is actually occurring over being-involved with what we are actually doing, as when what I’m able to do coincides or otherwise occurs within “thinking”, then I think we must enter into the contradiction that much of everyone wants to avoid in our human commonality of metaphysical being. And this is to say that so long as we entertain ideas within “thought”, so much as thought is the ubiquitous and impenetrable ground of existence that human beings can be involved with, there have we found the modern transcendental horizon, for anything that is known is known within possibility. And I say this because anything anyone would put into discourse automatically depends upon this transcendental horizon; every idea is an idea of something that is not the idea. If there is an idea that is only an idea, then it is nothing; we begin to get an inkling of what modern being is about then: limit and exploitation that come about through the effort invested of believing the contents of ideas.

So what we are really talking about when we are talking about what is actually occurring is not so much the either/or ideal, and actually more what is absurd in the Kierkegaardian sense. Contrary to what (post-) modern religions want to posit of Kierkegaard, he is talking less about an “either/or” rational human existence, and more about what is rational outside of the either/or correlation. And so I say that what is absurd is what does not lie within the entirety of ontological ubiquity called “thought”, but is likewise not “irrational”. And again this is not an either or proposition; it is an “and” proposal.

And (lol) coincidently I think this is exactly what the Peterson/Zizek debate handled dialectically, what so many commentators completely missed. See my posts just before this one; not the one on Kant , but you could check that one out also.

We are involved with what we are able to do. The better manner of getting outside the modern correlation is thus to look at what people are doing, rather than what their argument is trying to prove. Find the view upon things while understanding the content as well; that is, not merely retain focus on the content as though it is all of everything.

The next comment I have has to do with technology. I think often people have a very narrow sense of what technology is. Whenever I see the word technology I always read it in context. If I’m reading Newsweek or Wired or something Then I know to expect that the authors are talking about a very narrow idea, a very specific and practical idea of what technology is. It is curious to me that people extend this narrow idea of technology into philosophy, and claim that narrowness as philosophy as opposed to thinking philosophically about everything that is in the world. To me it seems kind of reverse of what is supposed to happen with philosophy. Indeed; was it Badiou who said that philosophy is not something that is ever put down?

Personally, Philosophy is not something that I do at times, like watching TV or reading a book, like going swimming or walking my dog. I don’t understand philosophy in the context of various things that I do in my day. I mean, I am able to understand how philosophy can fit into that kind of approach towards life, but I am not really one that naturally segregates my life into various activities such that the most basic thing that I am is a thinking human being. I am a philosopher; thinking is part of philosophy. In fact it is difficult for me to segregate the idea of a human being from philosophy. And I suppose that’s why I problematize thought as the significant feature of being, both the human being as well as the object of philosophy.

So for me philosophy is primary, inseparable, identifying. And so when I am in the context of philosophy and people mention technology I already understand Technology as something that I cannot escape, as something that is innate and inherent to thinking philosophically about the human being. In other words, I think the human being, philosophy and technology are foundational aspects of existence. To not include these three aspects in activity — somehow it makes me think of something else, something that is, to be honest, quite postmodern and significantly religious.

If someone is making an argument about the human beings’relationship to technology I generally understand them as viewing the world through the eyes of the central thinker, which then moves towards privilege by segregating existence.

In other words, the people that are thinking of technology as something that the central thinking human being uses, which is to say, something that is essentially segregate from being — such people are probably involved with understanding what I’m saying as a critique, which is to say, that I’m pointing out something that is incorrect in the way that people might be understanding things. And this is where I get into contradiction, absurdity. As I say; if we are to find truth we have to look into the contradiction and inhabit that space. More than a few people of intelligence and with knowledge — and I don’t mean like a Buddhist saint or “authentic Christian” necessarily or some sort of enlightened spiritual being or some Big idea like that — actual real people who live very regular and significant lives, call this kind of in-habitation of contradiction as embodiment.

What this means is I am simultaneously calling out a certain kind of approach to viewing the world, while also showing that such a view is not incorrect: it is both correct and incorrect. Lol. It is correct in that people indeed are thinking that way, i.e. viewing the world through the either/or condition of the transcendental horizon, and are indeed validated in that view. But as well, the adherence to that view as the singular truth under which or against which everything else in the universe, which all human beings are part of that universe, must be included, I submit is an incorrect understanding of what is occurring. As well, what I need to address to the either/or condition is that I’m not excluding myself from the indictment that I am making; this is to say that I’m not accusing people of something that I am not involved with.

*

I wonder if anyone will go back and listen to the Zizek/Peterson debate in mind if this post.

?

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=78BFFq_8XvM#dialog

————–

Btw: Here is another example of complete ignorance posing as knowledge:

https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.popdust.com/jordan-peterson-slavoj-zizek-debate-2635106896.amp.html

Meg Hanson doesn’t know what she is even speaking of. She is regurgitating poop 💩 I mean pop retorhic without even a hint that her opinion has been fed to her. She is absolutely to epitome of Zizek’s argument, and she is utterly unable to see it.

–In truth, each man is a caricature of a public intellectual—entertainers rather than leaders. They both excel in provoking strong reactions from their detractors. To many, Peterson is nothing more than an anti-PC muppet come to life (imagine if Kermit got really into race science), while Žižek reminds some of a “raccoon who lived in a dumpster behind a university’s library who was transformed into a human by a witch” (and thanks to his film career, you can watch him drown in Titanic).

oh wow.I gotta make a post about this one.

The postmodern condition: Google is Manipulating You – Putting You in Their “Filter Bubble.

Google is Manipulating You – Putting You in Their “Filter Bubble”

Google is Manipulating You – Putting You in Their “Filter Bubble”


— Read on josephratliff.com/google-filter-bubble/

This blog, this video and the producer of the video, The fact of them now, bring up many issues, and more than whether or not Google search engine is biased and whether or not we’re being manipulated.

Let me see if I can address the issues that seem apparent to me just off the top of my head.

One. The thing that sticks out to me the most is that Jean-Francois Lyotard already told us this in his seminal essay the Postmodern Condition. And very short: the postmodern condition is where knowledge is determined by the experts. Of course he said a few things more than this but in very very very short term is this is really what he saying, significant to this post at least.

Let this sink in: for much of history humanity has thought it self as existing from some sort of open freedom, freedom, free thought, choice, free will, etc. And more recently, that we as intelligent creatures, intelligent human beings have a capacity to view things for what they are, and that we really just need to make a choice to investigate things to find out what bias is or what agenda might be inherent in any particular presentation. The postmodern condition is where that capacity or ability is commandeered, as part of a whole motion, such that this ability itself, the very idea of a sort of intelligent or free detachment from the object of our perception or conception, has already been determined by a certain set of people that we know, as an ideological disembodiment, as “the experts”. And his point in the essay is that this coincides with technology because human beings are, in our moments, a technological creature.

Now, when I hear anyone talk about postmodernism I think of Lyotard’s essay. I think of other authors to, postmodern original authors, but I do not really think about people who consider themselves “post modernist”, and when I hear other people critiquing postmodernism, most of the time from their critique I understand that they are talking about the subsequent category of authors that call themselves postmodernist. And so then I know right off the bat that the person who is staking their claim against postmodernism is really talking about something that I consider a somewhat superficial. Sure, what they have to say might be relevant in a kind of pop culture way of viewing academics and what academics do, so far as they have to be involved in making social commentary all the time, and indeed make money doing it.

So anyone who thinks they know what postmodernism through the authors Derrida, Deleuze, Guattari etc.. Really should read Lyotards essay, in my opinion, because really the essay gives everyone else teeth. I feel like the other authors talk about various aspects of this condition that Lactually defines. What he is saying in that essay basically encompasses the impetus for everyone else’s discussions. At least, as I say, that’s how I see it.

So once we understand what he saying is the postmodern condition then —

Two. What this video is saying is not new. In fact, we already knew that this is going on, and just because there is a computer program or the Internet that is making it more obvious to us does not mean that all the sudden we are being manipulated or being conned into thinking something. For the postmodern condition is that condition whereby what is considered knowledge is already determined for us through our humanity. And this is to say that what we think is free speech or freethinking, even to say intelligence, has already been determined by “the experts”.

Three. What does this mean? What does this mean that there is this person who is putting out this video to warn us about how biased Google search engine might be, as though this is something that’s coming up just in the past 10 years, say, or something that’s really becoming important just right now or in the past year because of technological capacity or ability. When we read the postmodern condition essay we should already understand technology as involved in this very human way of being to determine what knowledge is through expertise; because it’s manifesting in a particularly visible and tangible way actually shows of what the human being actually is as a universal object.

So again, what is the significance of the fact that this video has appeared right now, and really saying in the context of the post modern condition?

Just as a case in point for my post here:

Honestly, I have to ask myself while watching this video who is searching for that shit? Who is really caring whether or not googles or any search engine for that matter search engine is bias or not?

Of course, I think this is a little oblique of a question for most people, but it really goes to the fact that I don’t use Google very often to search for anything very important. And yet here is a blogger actually taking the time to produce this video to tell a bunch of people that what they think is an unbiased search engine is very biased and so people should be careful about being manipulated towards particular information.

So to my mind she is not talking about everyone, but she is only talking about a particular type of person.

And I have to go back to this question of knowledge being ordained by the experts.

The postmodern condition is something that is defined by Correlationalism, And you can Google that(lol) if you don’t know what it is or what it means because I’m voice dictating while I’m walking my dog so …

And this is to say that the condition is such that even “intelligence” is knowledge that is again defined by the experts, and if I haven’t been clear, what I’m saying is that this definition itself is biased. And involved of my point here is that the very idea of a free thought is already been determined through a biased created by expertise which is supposed to be unbiased but which really is not: The very idea of intelligence as some sort of grounding or ubiquitous aspect of being human in which freedom is likewise essentially grounded, is a manipulation.

Through this very simple analysis of the post modern condition with relevance to one of its products, the space apparent in between the truth of the matter and the real manifestation of the matter, points to a particular type of human being and not a whole category of universal species that we typically understand when we say or refer to “human being”.

Because again we have to ask what is the point of this video. I think there are two answers which really indicate again this ideological unity of the intelligent free human being:

The person who made this video obviously feels very concerned about people being manipulated against what would otherwise be free thought.

And, The point of the video is to elicit a reaction, to activate a legitimate fear, so to speak.

And I would say that these two things combine to form a certain concept of the human being that to such people that are alarmed or are supposed to be alarmed, create and antagonism with in humanity whereby if you are not alarmed then you are not ethical or not moral or are otherwise not intelligent.

And I don’t mean this in the sense of that we should not be worried about it, I mean this in the sense, in the same sense as climate change: we’ve known about this for a long time and in fact it is not something that creates a condition for us that we can make choices to not have occur. Indeed we should be concerned, but I would say in a manner that insights responsibility for what is actually occurring.

But the very fact of the video is an assumption that this kind of responsibility is not available to many if not most people. Apparently it’s not available to the person who made the video, but as well it’s not available to the people to whom the video is intended.

Now what does this mean in the context of a post modern world where everyone is supposed to have an equal and equitable voice?

In the words of Slavoj Zizek, It is a catastrophe.

So something to think about.

Algorithms and institutional isomorphism: A Call for a more Philosophically Comprehensive Theory Of Counseling.

Algorithms and institutional isomorphism

Algorithms and institutional isomorphism
— Read on markcarrigan.net/2019/03/10/algorithms-and-institutional-isomorphism/

This is quite interesting.

It resonates with ideas I have been throwing about. For example, the way that I use the term religion in my work seems consistent with the way that internet platforms are homogenizing corporate identities, as this summary (the link) might suggest. Less about what corporate activity, ability, or work that they do or products they make, the platforms through which they present such corporate subjectivities not only limit their ability to be viewed but indeed function as a space of reflexivity which thereby allows them to view themselves as a unique and valuable contribution to the socially economical universe, Even as this universe is contracting in its ability to grant universal value beyond its domain.

Also, as I suggest in The Philosophical Hack, what is significant is our relationship with technology. Less our subjective meanings and relative interpretations of our thoughts and feelings that we have about our relationship (which are indeed valid, if overworked and often understood as substantially ubiquitous), the relationship has more to do with how such subjectivities manifest as the relation. For example, how technology tends to allow us to think our meaning is unique and individual all the while confining that presentation to specific technological items.

We might then see through the lens of counseling, as counselors, that subjective issues may find more resolution by the smaller possibility for explanation rather that a wider one. The more possibility is understood for a context of therapeutic help, perhaps the less individual help will be achieved.

Hence, I might hypothesize that a more coherent and less divisive ideal for therapeutic help is indicated. Less assertions of various conventional scientific methodological truth( this method is more correct that that) as argument (less acceptance of universal subject-relativity and individual argumentative validity) and more theoretical philosophy which might function to supply a model which contains, explains and addresses the phenomenal possibility for therapy.

In other words, less client choice in therapy and less Counsellor self-righteousness about appropriate treatment options, could lead to a more effective therapy as a whole movement and client responsiveness to treatment.

Because it seems right now, on one hand the client has so many choices for therapy that they don’t even know what they might be choosing, and on the other hand counselors as such might be so self righteous and myopic in their theoretical basis that they are asserting a particular type of methodological solution up and against the larger arena of counseling which posits that there could be many effective treatments. I am proposing that if the theoretical basis of counseling is it self limited within a larger explanatory philosophy rather than granted in infinite relativity, then the client might feel like they are actually getting significant help even before the therapeutic process begins.

The logic of Two Routes in Application. A Discourse in Freedom.

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The very interesting thing about this 5G (if not all of modern technology) Is that it means nothing less than volunteered enslavement. It is no mere coincidence that lately the nature of free-will is being commandeered by neurobiology: It is not that we are not or cannot be free, rather, it is that if we want to be free we would actually have to fight for it, and who (in their right mind) would want to argue with Neuroscience? (trick question: the battle does not reduce to a confrontation with neuroscience.)

The keen indication is that the modern free agent is what it has always been: A rare artifact in the imposing consciousness. There has never been a free humanity; on the contrary, there has only been a few free people that speak in such a way that everyone else wants to be and so the “commoners” start to use the language of “the free”, or way a speaking (way of organizing discourse).

We can get a glimpse of what freedom might actually be beyond the relative conventional scientific assertion (conventional philosophy; theological and ideological rhetoric; mistaken ((the weak)) postmodernism) when we think about the various social scientists and psychologist’s developmental models of morality. Very few people, they suppose, reach what we could call the “higher” stages of moralistic thinking (moralistic thinking reflects a kind of intellectual ability or capacity). And yet most everyone likes to think of themselves as though they are of this higher bracket of thinking.

Nevertheless, only a few people really have the ability or capacity to think about the world in this “higher” kind of moralistic manner. These few people are able to formulate sentences and meanings (structure discourse) of this “higher” manner of being able to perceive the world in what it does, and in so indeed speak of something that is common to the human creature. Those who do not think through this manner (have this moral capacity), though, who reside within a “lower” stage which is basically, for lack of a better term, being law abiding and having a sense of good that comes from absolutes (relativity is an absolute in as much as relativity must mean or indicate a definite quality absolutely and not just relatively) see or otherwise understand that transcendental essences are being expressed in these discourses, such as the topics that the Socratic dialogues entertained, e.g. justice, virtue and such; most people fall into this latter general category of being, to various degrees of ability and development, law-abiding and having essential truths based in good and bad, right and wrong, etc.

After not too long, the appropriation of the “higher” discourse into the law abiding scheme defines a technological space which forbids the delineation of a human being which is not entirely encompassed by the technological ideal of free agency. Nietzsche said as much: Technology equivocates humanity to the lowest common manner, all the while allowing for the “Idols” of equivocation to take control of the common agents. This is Nietzsche’s meaning of enslavement, or the slave mentality. Because the former “higher” order of “moralism”, being communicated in a particular manner, draws their natural attentions to what is good and just (viewed as essential or absolute categories), such people begin to behave in such a manner that these discourses seem to be advocating. They do this unthoughtfully and automatically as part of their critical process; that is, these higher discourses appear to them to be communicating a rationality of the absolute (unrecognized in-self reflection: the view of conventional faith). Yet, such people really do not understand this “other way” of understanding the world through a broadened moralistic intelligence, thus de facto do not have the ability to think through these discourses nor really what these kind of discourses mean or are indicating in themselves, and thus take these discourses as indicating elaborations upon what is right and wrong, good and bad in essence; In short, they take these discourses as being a discussion about absolutes or essences of law.

This is the significance of technology: Two manners of viewing technology inform human beings, or what we could now rightly call, world citizens, as to what is true and real. One manner understands its freedom as an essential tenet of being human given the conditions of free agency to manipulate and develop useful technologies, which then function as a closed system or ideology which supports the ideal of the free agent. Another manner speaks truthfully about what is occurring in the actual relationship with technology that is being human in the world. The latter’s use of discourse thus (sometimes inadvertently, but more often with intension) serves to consolidate the technological authority’s ability and capacity to control agents through refining the ideal of freedom. In other words, most people are enslaved and have no actual ability to enact any effective countermeasures to abort such confining motion because the nature of their intellectual capacity prevents them from truly grasping that situation by which they indeed are being human in the world.

It really is an ignorant bliss disguised by intellectual complexity and sophistication (sophistry).

Mistaken Identity: Something Other Than Human: A Reification of What it Denies?

Here is a REPOST in which there is a link the the post which has the comment quoted below that I address. Whew!

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The author of the link in the repost seems to have issue with the idea of some Post-human proposals that we need get beyond the ‘human’. The question: Why does everything have to begin and end with human?

Note: Im gonna be greatly confrontative, and possibly even rude, so, just take it as I expect just as much back. It seems sometimes that everyone is too civil. Maybe that’s the problem: Everyone is too comfortable. IDK. I throw a hand grenade into the room, and find out whats in there by the effects of the explosion. Often its dead people who don’t know they are dead, but sometimes there are scientists with special instruments who get some interesting readings.

O kay…

Orientation: This is an essay about identification and not condemnation.

I say such a position (reflective of the comment below) does not understand its own position. Rather, it creates a position that is naturally complicit to the state it is supposed to be critiquing. Similar to what I suggested in my POST about Anslem’s God Proof, this is to say that the position it advocates (as a critique) is artificial (as it proposes to account for all reality), and insincere, as well as in direct contradiction to the meaning it proposes to be conveying as a suggestion for…what…belief? So it is unstable in its posture. When we think about it, I think the first thing that comes to mind is How are we to take the notion “post-human/beyond human”? As a belief? A suggestion for how to organize terms? An answer to a view? As an academic position? As pure nonsense?

Can we PLEASE be honest with what we are doing? If we do not ask our selves the purpose of what we are doing, then, what are we doing?

No one is really trying are they. (Irma Dork. 1977.)

If we are to take its base (Deleuzian mythos, I ass-u-me) as cogent, which is, as representing itself in total, and not as pieces to be assembled together and applied will-nilly (despite what rebuttal would say “its all pieces to be put together as we wish” (ZZZzzzzen).); if we can get under the determination which proposes a complete view despite what it argues to the contrary (I am going to argue that the argument I make is not an argument), then we have a manner to actually see the truth of some things (this allows for two routes to become visible/knowable) We allow for the possibility, however tight and hole-proof our logic and reasonings might seem, to loosen ourselves from our own noose mythology.

The Deluezian ontological base, which supposed to remove (maybe) itself from an ontological proposal (Modernity in general) through a de-ontological definition (or even a definition that smooshes them together – the Deleuzian Zen-like ontological default), as though definition establishes a non-essential essence that destabilizes…um….more definitional essences (wait a minute), perpetually only destabilizes itself, and argues its own fantasy through an over-determination of its power and positional authority; in short, it perpetuates the same ideological form of reality that it proposes to destabilize: It argues itself as having an ability to destabilize itself through its apparent stable ideological position of de-ontology.

My question is, can we just stop with the magical thinking? Or, can writers just be forthright with what they are doing?… And Deleuze, (sorry folks) is the #1 philosopher of magical thinking (as least it appears from his proponents). I mean, I am sounding silly there, but if you really read Deleuze for what he is saying, and be honest (as opposed to wanting to be ‘seen as an intellectual’), it pretty much just repeats stuff you already know, and, it seems to me, actually says nothing (how ironic, huh?). So it is that he uses the example of him saying nothing to explain the fact of how it is that people will see him as saying something, and then spend years and years discussing it. (Wasn’t it Deleuze who said something like discussion is extraneous? I mean, wtf? )

We can use the following comment as an example of how such a ‘deontology’ falls into itself. (also note: I could be wrong in assuming the comment below stems entirely from a Deleuzian shoot, but even the employment of other theorists here move to the point of contradiction regardless.)

The difference between this older classic version of technicity and the conceptions in our contemporary speculations is this notion of supplement (i.e., prosthesis). In the old system we invented these prosthetic technologies of externalized material supplements because we lacked something essential in our own nature (i.e., the whole Prometheus/Epimetheus mythos). In our current thought following those like Deleuze/Guattari who overturned the Platonism of essentialism in which the concept of lack and deficient give was to difference and repetition; or, the notion of our unconscious as productive (Deleuze/Guattari) against the unconscious as a lack/void (Lacan/Badiou/Zizek) becomes integral.

Though I think there are some typos in there, I think we can get a pretty good idea of what is being said.

Before I get started: that last statement appears incorrect: It is lack by which subjectivity becomes infinitely productive; desire is not productive, at least as a reasonable manner (sure, we could say that using 3000 rounds of ammo to kill 50 people is productive, but…how inclusive and nihilistic do we want to be? Yeah, we could say that The Final Solution was productive, but why? ) it is fetishistic, it produces and maintains fantasy, and falls into and move toward nothing (lack). Any discourse that places these in a exclusionary framework is most probably trying to sell you something; probably a product. The historical distinction of ‘techne’ arrives through a desire, that is, a blank spot, a point of nil, so that kind of Historical Consciouses could be said to have ‘produced’ the World Wars. Also, though I agree with the synopsis of ‘techne’, I think the results he proposes do not follow in all instances, hence its overestimation.

My response is: first we have to begin to get over our want for discursive fantasies of degenerative-progress. If we hang on to our tendency to want fantastic stuff, like unicorns and Pegasus, chaotic aliens, Neuromancer bestsellers, a purpose for history, etc… then we pretty much continue to stew in our sweat, over and over. Sure, it makes for good fiction books and movies, but I doubt that such theorists are putting forth theories for the purpose of inspiring fiction; the regular idea of ‘philo-fiction’ is a misapplied “pop” excuse (but it doesn’t mean its bad, it just means that the theorists that claim sincerity in their theorizing perhaps need to reconsider their methodological base.)

Can we please just be honest? I know that in another arena, the author of this comment will pivot back and forth upon the concept, off Deluezian “plateaus” to say that we can speak of different ontologies through different “rhizomes”. So perhaps I am commenting more on what is implied within the quote: Not even a critique, but more a type of sense that, if we call to such “philosophics”, has nothing ‘common’ about it, but just makes sense, then a comment on any position that allies as Deleuzian could go something like this:

— {His point in the post, I m pretty sure, was that ‘human’ is just a construct that is becoming outdated. That we need begin to think away or beyond what is human. I think this is a theoretical fantasy that is more a discursive commodity than it is any type of legitimate theory. But we all know that such a distinction doesn’t matter now. (that is the postmodern condition). } —

This kind of discursive gymnastics goes back to Kierkegaard’s complaint, as well as his admitted style and ability. It is easily seen for its magical connotations, but only once we understand that we are no longer caught within the paradigm of discursive identities; such identities is but one manner (one route) of appropriating discourse (it is not wrong to take this route, but travelers along this route do tend to condemn and or discount other routes as false and wrong). Here, as an example, the author supposes to get beyond identities through defining things in different manners, at once, in some instances using Deluezian “deontological” categories to supposedly shake up ontological categories; using definition to pose a definition that is (somehow) outside of definition or indicates something outside; so easily such wizards can wield the magical terms to state their case beyond question. Off to one side, there will be a discussion about how everything reduces to an indeterminable moment wherein all past, present and future collapse into nothingness, unsupported except through some (miracle?) of (what?) discourse? Then out the other side of the polygon Janus we get some sort of ordinary Greek version of terms (of an old order)? On and on down the rabbit hole of a definition of immanence such a position will routinely grab ahold of a transcendent, only to then confound us again by telling us that “transcendent” is defined differently, or that they are not sure what ‘transcendent’ means, or what is transcendent is countered through another definition of… — why ? Because we have defined things in such a way or by a recourse to a tradition that supposedly only exists in an atemporal ‘zone’ ( I guess) that can behave in a manner that defies all notions of consistency. It seems (oddly enough) the only consistency is some sort of schizophrenic biological brain or organ or “body without organs” that is able to somehow get outside of this never-ending discursive cycle (somehow “brain” or “consciousness” or “plateau” etc.. is able to transcend the ever-recycling immanence to be able to speak of something “substantial”? Something ‘beyond this human conundrum’?). And no one look where the accusation is made toward Platonic recurrence and repetition; here we are with a Deluzian discourse entirely unable to indicate to us how it is different except by using its own scaffolding of definitions that say it is. It is different because it is putting together the terms of discourse differently? How does that accomplish any difference from the mode it is supposed to be different from? Admittedly,

what?

this is really kind of a “Adam Ruins Everything” kinda essay. I am The Philosophical Hack. But the need is real; many people see it and it doesnt mean the end of the world, only >some people’s world, and that can be hard to swallow. These kinds of philosophy do not get us anywhere but more things to discuss; it’s a philosophy of self-fullfillment proclaimed and argued internally to apply to all human beings. Here it is, the overdeterming in application of a traditional discourse to the common category of human:

…In this sense then originary technicity states that ‘techne’ and technology were there before humans,”

On which Deluezian plateau does this “before humans” reside?

“…and in fact it was technicity that conditioned and shaped the human rather than the other way around.

How is this possible? From where is this statement gaining its veracity? Ill tell you: From the very history that the larger Deluezian slight-of-hand says is a suspended kind of ‘illusory’ trick of consciousness (oh yeah: Consciousness gets a get out of jail free card also). If its an illusion, the question becomes, then how is it possible for someone (say the author of this comment) get a hold of another author (say Deleuze) to be able not only draw upon his ideas, but to even be able to understand it to be able to agree with it? From where does the ‘illusion’ arise? At what point in history? Nevermind the extensive scheme of definition that cannot be challenged due to the ever present philosophical method of weaving and dodging that the method had prescribed through its (de-) ontology.

I know this is useless, but is anyone getting the picture?

“… And, in our time we are realizing that the human was a fiction, a transitional being for whom technicity has all along been utilizing it for its own ends and purposes. This fatalist and determinist view is not that technicity is opposed to the human, but that humans have never been human and that we are grounded in technicity from the beginning. So that in our time with the rise of the Mechanosphere (Deleuze/Guattari) we’ve come to see ourselves as part of the machinic phylum, as machinic multiplicities whose organic systems are over the coming centuries going to give sway to inorganic systems, a mutation from one material platform to another with modifications of intelligence and robotics as one pathway to this. This notion of Superintelligence is just one more technicity which is part of this conditioning process of transition.”

We should see that “we” in this context is the picture itself of the philosopher who takes himself too seriously, that is, who sees the terms that are come by as identifying ideal substrates, ideal mechanisms by which his consciousness is functioning. And this is to say that this is what consciousness does. It is not that what he is saying has any credence in my world, except as it is an aspect of my world, an identification of a process; not the process the author (or Delueze) describes, but the process that wishes to justify itself in any world, which is to say in this instance, that author’s ideal world. Human was a fiction because this agent of desire could not fulfill itself in another way than to proclaim itself over the entirety of this kind, which is, not human in an actual general sense, but merely one particular human (and maybe a few more). No matter what he argues, this ‘we’ somehow includes me only through the proclamation of his omniscience, but as well, a condition of my existence: He realized that his whole situation is equivalent with the common human, and so it must be that ‘human’ was a fiction. How is he able to understand what a human was if he is involved with a fiction? How was he Being a fiction? Its funny how such topics lend themselves to actual fictional stories. Sounds like he doesn’t want to take himself seriously.

But here is the kicker: Delusional Guitar Player (Delieuze and Guittari) says nothing less. This is an example of a self-fulfilling aspect of consciousness, such that it defines a moment as that moment extends out beyond itself. It is indeed a proposal of unconsciouness based in –not merely any desire –but the desire that is overcome by its lack, which is, namely, the author that subscribes to such a philosophy as though it actually describes what has, is and will occur. The point is that such philosophical analyses reveal their own bias within the asserted encompassing context itself.

And the extra-point: This whole ideal is based upon the founding term of “human” as an essential and common thing in-itself, a basic premise that underlies the whole motion that desire wishes to accomplish: attain the Subject as a valid and real identity. This is why these folks must come up with “post-” human things: because they have found that their “humanity” is lacking. This is why “before” techne meant something –what? –better ? or just indicated an organization that was different than what (should be?). Such that now we should or are going to have a different (better?) relationship with technology. Of course! My failure at fulfilling myself as a human (in the attempt to ‘fill’ my desire with the ‘substance’ of discursive and non-discursive ‘things’, I ended up with nothing) means that ‘human’ was a fiction, and that this thing that ‘humanity’ made (this thing that I made that was unfulfilling for my desire for it to fill me) will surpass what is human, to thereby justify my empty Being of desire by being that which is ‘after’ what was once human (that ‘thing’ that I believed in which failed me). Frankestien’s Monster! What a novel analysis! But wait; didn’t Mary Shelly tell us this very same thing like 300 years ago? Oh yeah; NOW things are really going to hit the shit fan. Finally. Boy, thank God for us modern theorists. I would have never known that we are going to have a ‘new’ relationship with technology. Genius!

Nevertheless: The world and technology may indeed occur through the author’s analysis: The real world is the world of desire. Post-human ideals will have repercussive effects in meaning, but first ‘post’ would need to depart from regular analysis to exit from the historically progressive fantasy. The point here, then,  is that such an analysis does not concern every human being, and thus is not speaking to what may actually come to pass as “post-human” because there is no True category for which ‘human’ can be exceeded or surpassed; there is no effective unitive category called ‘human’ that can be overcome or gotten past. Indeed, it is the epitome of a basic misreading of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard to suggest that there is anything “beyond” or “post” but a fantasy made out of the desiring machine that is over generalized into “human”. Once such a desire is understood for what it is, then the world changes because the fantasy is dispelled. Yet, the Subject of traumatic unfulfilled desire (or the Subject of imposed trauma) becomes a “post-traumatized” so long as the Subject still identifies with the fantasy. There is no ‘post-human’ reality except in as much as the Subject is still attempting to justify itself in the same metaphysical space. Our relationship with technology is the same: We always use it as a prosthetic of some sort, despite what definitions are in place. We are always human, even if I become a car; even if I am Robocop. The ideal of post-human is another fantasy of desire, based in the lack of fulfillment of that desire, or the relative fulfillment of repeating defacement.

The ideal of getting beyond how humanity actually functions as a unitive category is a utopian dream. This dream is then placed in ‘post-human’ category of (often dystopian) progress for the purpose of satisfying the failed desire of an individual identity. It is based in a complete misunderstanding of its own theoretical base: ironically proposing nothing. The best we can do is use this aspect in discovering and admitting a true human for its universal object. 

*

See, though, that my critique is an identification. My intent is to show where and how particular philosophies operate, and not so much that what it proposes is incorrect. It is a description of the dynamic and universally ingenious manner that consciousness “creates worlds”. Similar to Graham Harman, here I using a foundational term “consciousness” to delimit what is most universal of universal objects; I could have said “rock”, and then we could speak about all the aspects of “rock”. No longer are we concerned, then, with “rock-ness”, because we already find that “rock-ness” is already encapsulated in the Being expressed as itself a rock. It manifests rock as rock and is in this way impenetrable as a subject of discourse: Discourse reveals in one way or another everything there is in relating to the Being-there of the rock…

This resonates with the author’s statement “…that humans have never been human and that we are grounded in technicity from the beginning.” But with a caveat that is not included in the phenomenal mode of such desiring-subjectivity; namely, that we have never been human in as much as we adhered to human as an aspect that my consciousness has access to in-itself, as a universal object that has properties that are uniquely human, that is to say, that only we perceive things, only we create ideologies, and have political identities. It becomes obvious that this is not the case, once we get over the phenomenal obsession with identity. The question of how we could know this is made once we realize that the entirety of our Being is contained in the objectivity of being human; not so much in the interrelatedness of the common category called human, but in the objectivity of universal Being, not as a known ‘consciounsess’ of cosmic proportions, but as a relation of the unity that always withdraws from view. The parameters of subjectivity have been laid out; we have only to fill them in with whatever real situation presents itself, which are eternally diverse as they are manifested through consciousness functioning. This is nearly concordant with the statement, that we are determined by objects, subjectivity being the ‘empty place’ of conflation of effective objectivity. But the phenomenonal intension behind the statement will exclude itself (will withdraw) from the more generalizing universal mode for the purpose of, again, establishing its ‘world’ as an all inclusive ideal. The irony only ends when we allow it, that is, when weve had enough of it. This doesn’t  mean that it ends or the world ends, or humanity fades away with its own creation. It means that humanity will always be humanity despite what terms we use to define it. And this will be proven 200 years from now to those who read this essay (under certain conditions). 

The production of desire abhors a vaccum, and due to its desiring machinery will fill the hole with evidence of a world that is vacant, or in time, becoming vacant –of what? Of that which the desiring philosophical agent cannot achieve in its fulfillment: a filling of what is void: desire itself: the world. Hence, the meaning of such historical analysis will always yield a fading of humanity. Under every sort of definitional scheme, whatever was of a ‘history’ will be absorbed into the empty space of desire, discourse will coalesce around this ‘cognizant space’ to manifest the emptiness, the nihilism as an actual true basis of world.

But the Truth of the situation is that subjectivity is filled infinitely with many things; it is not empty. The idea that there is no existential ground meaning nothing, that all is void and meaninglessness is a particular take upon terms, a particular orientation upon things that amounts to a twisting of desire into its want: the empty subject, nothing. It is not sad that there is no Subject; it is amazing because such a statement means that we get to look at what the subject actually Is. The point of the existential as well as a few of the postmoderns is that this fullness is not illusory, but rather that it cannot be communicated sufficiently. It is not that there is nothing or that all is meaningless. It is that nothing is still something, and meaninglessness still contains meaning. But for many f not most, this fact is never communicated, indeed, cannot be communicated in its Truth.

We can then re-approach the whole of Western philosophy under a different light, and begin to understand the meaning of Hiedegger’s proclamation that “the spirit is destitute”. It is not that we are left to a dystopian future; it is that this is just a moment that marks a significance, and it is not that we ‘lose’ our humanity to some machine A.I or any manifestation of technology that commandeers the meaning of human for another essentiality….

Post Script:

In his book “Dante’s Broken Hammer, Graham Harman appears (half way through the book) to make an argument against a formalist ethics, and toward a materialist ethics (again, Im only half way through the book, so my opinion may change).

In short, he says that Dante is more interesting and actually more intellectually stimulating because he deals with ethics within a sectional and progressive scheme of value, and that Kant’s ‘formal’ view of ethics is rather dry, and actually accounts for why we ned get over Kantian idealism.

In a way, this is what I am pointing out of the Deleuzian form: It is a kind a materialist ideal of graduation of experience, and inclusion of all possible experience of Being into a explanatory text (metaphysics; he does say he is a metaphysician; no irony there). But this this is why Graham must situate his Object Ontology as a proposal of polemical ideals: Because it is more interesting. Personally I think it is more interesting when we see the issue itself concerns an orientation upon objects, over the strict ideological proposal of an Object Ontology. I have said elsewhere that the reason why he must be ‘speculative’ is because in order to do anything progressive within the institution, one must adhere to traditional memes (in the original sense). One has to tow the line. And strangely enough, I am saying that this kind of line towing tends to argue against itself: Regardless of what Harman might say that has significance, it kind of loses its punch when we have to recourse to the traditional lineage: Its as if I present you with a wonderful brownie, but then when you go to eat it, it is switched for a carrot. Still good to eat, but the brownie seems much more interesting in the actual reckoning of experience. Once presented with the carrot to eat, yeah, carrots are ok, and they are good for you, but its still a carrot, and Im still thinking about that brownie.

I am not saying that Kant’s ideal formalism is correct necessarily, but more that despite what was presented, the meaning gets dilluted and too often becomes an argument of how good it is instead of the goodness that was innate in the idea itself. Materialism can be formal, and it is this kind of delineation, to “human defined essences” (conditions that human are able to not only define for themselves, but actually come to understand an interact with them as indeed universal essences), that reveals to us the extents of colonialization as a human aspect, a manner by which humanity behaves in the creation and establishment of worlds. It is not bad, it just is. And, it is only through the same kind of redundant institutional posture that we can have a ‘materialism’ that is in opposition to a ‘formalism’: the very idea that there can be a distinction is itself a ‘formal’ distinction. This is why we say postmodernism is a kind of religious apologetics: because we are not concerned here with various ideological manifestations, but their scientific application, which is to say, their control. One does not discover and or create an atomic reaction due to the politics of its use; these are segregate and independent aspects that only fall into a common praxis under the imposition of a unitive politics. Both may be involved with a situation, but not in actual simultaneity.

We cannot have an individual that recourses their behavior at all times to a fact that, for example, their freedom is not really free, but only defined as such. This simply does not happen, and the rationale that arises to ‘explain’ freedom in this way does nothing to impose itself upon daily activities and affairs, that is, except as one sees such metaphysical proposals as ‘always’ enacted and occurring even when not under the specific conditions of its activation; which is to say, only under the presumption of a religious truth. We find this very thing in contemporary China, where the issue of freedom is not regularly applied to the transparency for government, but is more understood as an actual lived experience.

*

Dante may be more interesting, and more juicy, but then when we start to talk about how this is the case, we automatically entered into a formalist state, even as we attempt to argue away from it through the definitional disclaimers. It appears, all to regularly, as a false dichotomy.

Something else is occurring in philosophy that tries is damnedest to stay hidden. 

Larval Subjects, the Impetus for Communication and the Common Thought of the Past.

Prof Bryant has an interesting post today.  And it inspired me to comment, below:

As I taught Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics today, I emphasized the manner in which so many of the virtues he lists are social in nature. Although we intuitively value many of the virtues Aristotle lists, I don’t think it would occur to many of us to count these among more or ethical issues. I wonder what the […]

via The End of Dialogue? — Larval Subjects . 

Levi;

It is interesting that you happened to ponder communication right now, because I was also pondering it, but along a slightly different line. I think you are commenting along a different vector of knowledge, perhaps a different category, but still…

I was asking myself if the academic form-method of “papers” and “journals” are even needed any more, if they are relevant in the sense that considers the actual possibility of being human, in the sense of being involved with what can Be. 

I recall a post you made a while ago where you were questioning the academic proper method and presentation of papers, how the whole act seemed in some instances to mock the content of some of the papers themselves, as though the manner by which an author has to present their ideas in academia in order to be taken seriously actually functions to devalue and or discount what they have to say, actually invalidates their ideas, such that the seriousness required detracts from the significance of the meaning of the paper.

heresy-cover_2175694a

I wonder what you might think of this:

I was thinking along these lines:

The reason why ‘papers’ and journals and that whole thing came about (I could be wrong) was because thats what they had. Thinkers had to be able to communicate their ideas at length and so they had these vehicles by which to circulate those ideas so other thinkers could consider them and comment on them. The whole idea of ‘communal’ -cation.

And when you think about the whole ‘modern’ – ‘post modern’. thing, and then this ‘speculative realist’  kind of thing; It seems to have occurred in correspondence with the methods of communication available.

The breakdown of the metanarratives that Jean-Francois Lyotard brought up occurred with the opening up of methods of communicating, namely computers and similar technology. But perhaps, old ways die hard.

Think about back in the pre-computer day: It could appear that everyone was involved in a common progress, every philosopher involved in moving toward some great reckoning of knowledge (of sorts), like knowledge itself was moving in a particular direction (of enlightenment, of progress, etc). because there was only a relatively small number of papers one could come accross, not that one could read, but just the sheer lack of theoretical material, or, at least, people could still entertain the perception that because there was only a relative few number of people who were saying anything significant, we were indeed moving in a progressive motion. Also, though, just the (again relative) small number of people who even entered into “higher education” or were even allowed if not privy to being privileged even to be able to think intelligently and critically, was extremely limited. It was easy to think there was a “manifest destiny” of sorts, an “historical conscious’ moving philosophy and indeed the world. It was easy to discount the ‘ignorant’ as the necessary condition for such ‘thought’, as an historical and divinely ordered hierarchy of progress.

Now think about now. What does it mean when we have raised the ability of the aggregate and or average of people in the world to be able to consider these once effectively esoteric philosophical ideas? Is it not possible that the product itself (philosophy) might change under different conditions? What happens, say, just as a hypothetical example, when instead of 1 out of 10000 people are able to understand, consider, ponder and respond appropriately to ideas, now 50 out of 100 are able to understand, but 75 out of 100 are able to also give a considerate response. And more: The bare fact that all these people can now actually enter the discussion via our technology. I would think that not simply do we have the situation where many more people contributing to what is possible within the possibility of thought, but more so we have an entirely new arena in which thought is possible. Indeed; do you not think there would be a difference in not only the nature of ‘thought‘ itself but in fact the ‘nature‘ of thinking also? It is an odd perplexion; we need only consider what is occurring all over the world to begin to start to understand that perhaps what we are calling thought or thinking is not something that is commonly understood, but only assumed as common thing, and indeed enforced. Must we stop at the Colonialization of a particular era? Does that now bring into question what we have merely accepted due to the Fact of Colonization?

We might discover that what we are calling thought is really a harkening to another time (time is a construct also; Heidegger beckoning us to that other time), a time when there was indeed a functioning meta-narrative, a time by which we displace our time and are unable to reconcile what we experience with what we are knowing of thought and thinking, this because we are not actually considering what is really occurring right in front if us through the ability of consciousness as it is occurring right now, but are rather considering how things should be with reference to this common thought of the past.

What might happen then if we look with opened eyes upon what is occurring now? We night find that Lyotard was correct, but in a significantly different light. It is not that we become aware in someway that we must now be critical in some form about general descriptive and directive narratives. No; such an approach is missing what is occurring for what we think should occur. It is the fact that we are unable to look at knowledge without an authority as to which knowledge we are supposed to consider, why we should consider it, and how we are allowed to consider it. It is a condition of knowledge and not some logical reductive result of a traditional heritage: The heritage is alive and well in the proposal that we had some choice over whether we should approach philosophy through these tropes (meta-narratives).

Perhaps we might be able to glimpse that what occurs through the convention of Papers is no longer a general communication that concerns a direction and purpose involved in finding out independent, dependent and dynamic aspects of our world, but rather an exclusive correspondence between those who decide which knowledge is valid, a manner by which knowledge is to be contained within a certain traditional lineage of what thinking is supposed to be, presumed to be, but indeed, perhaps, allowed to be.

You, Professor Bryant, who facilitated the very notion of Object Oriented Ontology, who entertains the idea of Being machinery, involved with the Speculative; is it not possible that what before was functioning implicitly (Zizek), invisibly, is now merely staying invisible though the very ideal mechanisms that are supposed to defy such oppression (the Modern by the post-modern: The liberal critical academy) ? Would this not be a minimum plausible factor in our moment of the attempt to account for and displace the nihilism of Modernity not coming to pass?

Think not only about how difficult and fortunate you were (are) to have gained a position as a professor at an institution, but how much more difficult it is now to get one, but also the anxiety that accompanies such a position; I am thinking of The Academic’s Peculiar Dissonance — Samir Chopra, his recent post on this topic.

**

Here I get speculative:

One could argue that it has always been difficult (We have always been disenchanted), but I might venture to say for the cloister itself, that the difficulty has reached a different timbre now, and not merely more of the same kind of difficulty; I think a different type of difficulty might be in play now. Perhaps you might disagree? No?

Perhaps it is not merely an effort to keep one’s position of power and prestige, as well as identity capital that is involved, but a creeping suspicion, maybe not even yet apprehensible, that the academy is no longer involved with the legitimacy it is proposed upon. Perhaps it is more involved in the perpetuation of a particular kind of thinking, and that this implicit agenda is behind the difficulty, and the sheer number of ‘thinkers’ that are just as able and who have just as novel thought hiding under their dresses, pants, belts, bras and jock straps, are eager congregants just waiting to impeach the Ideal Priests of the Academy so they can Preach the message?

LOL.

I do get grandiose; for sure.

 


But I think there is something in there that needs consideration –I mean, if we are indeed involved with something legitimate.

No?