Stiegler’s Faux-pas?

I have been chipping away very slowly at Stiegler’s Negathropocene.

And here is a paragraph from the end of Part 2 in the book that I thought encompasses, what we might call, a faux pas in reckoning.  Similar to Lacan’s mistake , i’m calling this author’s mistake a faux pas because it seems to me that his mistake he could not help because of his investment in the ubiquity of the social criterion, or so it appears.

In particular I bring out to relief his suggestion that what is required is a change in the theory of value.

what I am calling a faux pas in the context of his proposal is the same type of error that is indicated in Lyotard’s “The differend“, and elaborated on in “ThePost modern condition”.

So It is interesting to me that just prior to this posted paragraph the author comments how he attempts to show where Lyotard’s condition Is insufficient. My answer before I even read his piece is, “of course it’s insufficient because from your position you are required to argue a denial of the situation at hand”, which I have discussed in other posts of mine.

I submit, that if we understand what Zizek has described as “A change in how we reckon change” as an indication of the same requirement that Stiegler is talking about, then he (S) would have to first give us a disclaimer about how what he is writing about a change in the theory of value is not already invested in the very value that is attempting to change by the submission of this essay. Without it, That is called duplicity. Often we have an example of why these theoreticians who are so invested in the social equation and the phenomenological involvement of subjects actually serve to function the perpetuation of the theory of value that they would so hope to change through their use of discourse.


The question that haunts every modern philosophical text is whether it embodies and thus accounts for this odd incongruence. It is the incongruity that shows up in the lacuna between Hegel and Kierkegaard, As well as Kant and Wittgenstein.


When we get beyond the either/or of quick subjective assertion (I want to be heard! And seen! ) then the political realm garners a more appropriate response. Such reply then has little to do with value as an issue, for the adversary is understood as and inherent part of the struggle. It becomes less an effort of attempt to rid or dispel the adversary and more about changing the relationship. A theory of value is that which is inherently changed by virtue of the fact that the real relationship is changed.  Thus does not occur in politics (the ethical universe), and thus the political effort of argumentation does very little to change the theory of value (see Kierkegaard). But again, this is not an either/or statement (Kierkegaard was caught in his historical moment: hence his despair). It is not suggesting that a person somehow becomes or refrains or steps outside of the political sphere;!rather, the individual’s orientation upon that arena has changed implicitly.


This condition should be what Stiegler stands upon. In this sense, the “macro-economic” reorganization does hint at a recognition, but I think the either/or might have him by the bit, which then leads him in a circle, or maybe and ellipse.

So it seems that Stiegler is arguing the condition that must be brought about by his discussion, and so moves beyond Dasein in as much as he must argue history and society already in the motion of getting beyond: negentropy: which sounds suspiciously Similar to what he is arguing that he is stepping beyond, or that we have stepped beyond. He begins to sound startlingly similar to a child singing in the dark instead of flipping the light switch which she knows lay just in reach on the wall.

I am not sure his historical argument is quite sound beyond the mere words.

But I will read on, and i will report later upon my progress through his book, and I will reflect upon whether or not I was incorrect in this initial assessment of mine.