Philosophical Dimension.

https://soundcloud.com/usertransspace/reason-emotion-and-religion-groove-n-talk

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it is possible to understand philosophy as having two dimensions. Non-philosophy thus is the philosophical ability to comprehend the use of the real object called philosophy.

The issue that philosophy raises against this Confinement of its resources and agency, is that philosophy seeS itself –or permits a view that is itself –as without dimension; it understands or otherwise presents reason as having a link to an infinite source, what we generally call transcendence, or what the postmodern called immanence — because what the postmoderns are really saying about immanence is that the human being is able to get a hold of transcendence entirely .

The only argument that philosophy can make against what we are beginning to understand is it’s own limitation is to merely reify it’s access to infinite reasonable adaptation.

And this is why we have to speak of the two routes: conventional philosophical thinking is not really grasping that it is at once an infinite resource, while at the same time able to be described to its limitation. Conventional philosophy will use the rebuttal of no predictive capacity to say that philosophy is not being defined to its limitations. And then the only response to that is that conventional philosophy is not comprehending the issue at hand. Conventional philosophy sometimes then will take that as an affront to its agency, to its eminence, to its privilege and centrality. And thus would be Because it is not grasping that to describe itself to its limitation is not an insult nor an invalidation; rather it is an invitation to its constructive use. All the while opening up an avenue for thought that it is unable to conceive or otherwise encompass.

As well, it generally cannot conceive of an act that is not involved in an assertion of power as it understands power as the ubiquitous universal underlying force. Again, this is the reason why we have to speak of two routes upon objects that do not reconcile into a further unity.

Philosophy, Religion and Negation.

Here I am reading the paper that Was accepted to the conference at the University of Toronto, Negativity, Pessimisms, and Sad Affects in the Study of Religion Conference. Next week, April 18-19, 2019.  Right before THE GREAT ZIZEK PETERSON DEBATE!!

I just realized I said the name of the conference wrong in the video 🙂

 

 

 

 

I am not able to attend, though, so I made a video.

Note – the negation of the speculative negative theology can appear as a philosophical venture of arguing philosophical primacy as not a religious effort. We can call a move of bad faith, the “sickness” which permeates some avenues of philosophical effort; that is, a sickness unto death. Hence the problem Highlighted in my essay. See also this essay. This is to say that the problem does not dissipate through philosophy but is rather suspened, which then perpetuates real psycho-social aggravations.

My paper can be viewed at Academia.edu HERE. Even though I wanted to post the paper with resources, it looks like it has posted without them.

And HERE is the Researchgate listing, with references.

(Im pretty sure I formatted the paper incorrectly. Oh well. Learn by living, learn by trying.)

Maybe someone will want to give me some pointers.

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Heres the three books I cited:

Carol Gilligan’s In a Different Voice

Graham Harman’s Tool Being

Slavoj Zizek’s Living in the End Times

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If you want to hear all the hoopla about the Zizek Peterson debate, just search Zizek Peterson debate.

Of course, I have my opinions, which can be found throughout my blog.

 

 

Disenchantment and the Long Game.

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“…before we get to the idea of a disenchantment [that has always accompanied humanity in its existence, ] …we first have to address the insistence of enchantment.

Enchantment, in this context, is the view that what is teleologically sound indeed reflects an actuality of human special motion. This is not to say that humans have has no history. Enchantment is the operation of meaning that conveys humanity within a context of a necessary progress, a motion where humanity is not only capable of upholding an actual memory of a truth, of some sort, to thus be able to move forward; which is to say, roughly, toward “the good”; ‘the good’ is a conflation of meaning in which the ideas of humanity, civilization, technology and general well-being are joined together to be ideologically very difficult to separate.  This type of meaning, though, this type of progress, does not indicate a potential for belief; this situation does not rely upon nor insinuate its potential within belief, or a capacity or ability to believe whether or not it may be the case; on the contrary, belief itself is based in the idea of such progress.

This is so much to say that a human being is not able to ‘force’ itself to have an existence which does not find itself within a context of historical progress. How could one even get out of bed, tell her parents and siblings that she loves them, go for a hike in the summer air without a historical sense of progress: There can be no such conceptions without the knowledge that she was born, has grown in physicality and knowledge, has relations with various people or wish to recreate or exercise or relax without a correspondent history of some sort installed before hand.

We cannot make an argument in this case. The argument is negated in the fact that no argument of this sort can be made. The issue is how far this situation can be extended and still be viable for Being…

The logical conclusion of the history of philosophy finds itself, in the end, as contradiction; there is no discussion that decides this, the discussion itself reveals the case.

Certain repercussions arise from this ‘end’, but we will not go into the various formations here

Instead, I invite the reader to make this jump with me.

“Any concept is a concept ‘within’. The mechanism which allows for this confinement is operating successfully when the confinement is not noticed; we take a certain tac and begin in a certain corner to say that the mechanism for the concept functions to avoid recognition of its operating. This adjustment is so seamless that even while toward the closing in on the corner such that the concept of the limit of the concept arises to view, the mechanism will uphold its function to allow the concept to reveal its position, its truth, through the concept that will then thereby allow it to remain unknown; the activity of the concept itself moves in such a way to ‘change the past’ while establishing the change as an object that ‘has not changed’; this is to say, the concept remains viable no matter what it shows. This is the way of conventional method…

“This is the contradiction that has occurred in the ideal of ‘limit’, as the post-modern/existential revelation, that has brought about the culprit as the “Copernican” or “Kantian” central thinker,  and the ‘culprit-solution’ of the speculative ideal of ‘outside’. What has occurred is the mechanism of the concept, revealed, has functioned properly and its slight of hand has allowed philosophers to continue in the concept without ever really confronting the mechanism.

We likewise cannot be too quick to talk about biology and neurology, for these help to avoid the issue, and indeed add support to the avoidance of the mechanism by having the concept find its basis in a mechanism that is evidently getting beyond the concept; this is the nature of consciousness: No argument can be made to deny this situation. this is what happens whenever the concept reveals its basis to itself: Another aspect arises to indicate to the conceptualization that its concept is more than a concept, i.e. that the concept has found its basis, it object.

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Consider now the 1970’s movie “Logan’s Run”.(I have not read the book, but am only going off the movie’s telling.)….

…(Spoiler) In the end, that which brings down the facade of the City’s operation is the contradiction involved with the City’s Operating System recognizing the necessity for an object that corresponds with the term: “Sanctuary”. Logan is sent by the operating system to find out about this ‘sanctuary’ that lay outside the City; Logan will be permitted by the OS to go outside the ‘seals’ (hermetical seal?), outside of the the definition of what the City is. No one in the city (is supposed to have) has ever heard of the word let alone what it might mean, so inclusive the City in its operation is.

The operating system thus sends Logan 5 out to find this sanctuary because, to the OS, the word exists and has meaning and so must therefore have a corresponding object. It is interesting that when a human interacts with the City OS, the procedure is to “identify”….

“Logan returns from the outside and the OS ask him if he found sanctuary. Logan is in a kind of human-computer interface, but he refuses (for some reason) to answer the computer who sent him and so the computer ‘hacks’ Logan to find the answer. The answer that is reluctantly given by Logan is that there is no sanctuary (the outside is just outside of the City, bare nature, but there is no ‘peaceful’ place of freedom). This “does not program”, it does not compute. The computer melts down, the computer is destroyed, and everyone in the City is let out of the City, the first humans to see what is beyond or outside of the City in over 2000 years…

The City was constructed to save humanity from an ecological crisis; ‘civilization’ was informed as a response to the hostility of the natural world. But over time, what was outside was removed from sensible knowledge, from the ability of knowledge to make sense of, from the truth of the outside. The ‘outside’ was a catalyst for the consolidation of knowledge and civility; after a very long period of time, the outside became inconcievable in-itself and the actual reality of the outside was a function of maintaining containment of the City, such that knowledge of the actual outside was a contradiction in terms, a notice for the collapse of sense-knowledge.

“We are not told in the movie why the OS feels that it must send someone to locate Sanctuary. Neither do we really know why Logan does not want to tell the computer that there is no sanctuary, nor why the actual answer causes the computer to fry itself. (Maybe the book has more answers)…

Nevertheless, we can see an analogy to my point in this essay.

…What is ‘outside’ is not the reality of what is actually outside. What is outside is only understood within the context of that which has posited ‘outside’; the actuality of what is outside, in the ability for the scheme of meaningful reality, is unable to admit that its version of outside has no ability to recognize what it posits as ‘outside‘….

“…This is the case with conventional philosophy. It recognizes the ability of its conceptual scheme only and any position that is not already contained by the conventional route simply “does not program” and is outright, automatically and in due course, systematically denied. Yet, because such an outside is indeed truthfully encountered, the position revealed by its presence within the convention, as an ‘un-communicated truth’, functions (ironically) to upset and ultimately fry the “OS” or the ‘scaffolding’ (Wittgenstein) of reality. And as this melt-down occurs, the only manner by which that reality is able to continue to uphold its manner, the manner buy which (supposedly) ‘life is upheld’, is to affirm its truth in denial…

“Take for example ‘climate change’….

“The questions [that continue,] allow it to continue to get worse. But even while we make antagonists out of those who do not believe that climate change, or global warming, is real, those who would want to implement changes to hold off or avoid the ‘bad’ repercussions of climate change are totally incapable of bringing those ‘good’ protocols about…”



From book 3 of The Philosophical Hack, due 2018.

c.2018 Lance A. Kair

Orientation.

Issac Asimov’s “Foundation” is to the philosophical issue “of the two” as Gilles Delieze and Felix Guattari metaphysics is to “the multiple”.

The distinction is the difference not only of investment, but of orientation upon objects.

Metaphysics, while definitely involved with real occurrences of political and ideological dimensions, outlining a certain real description of how institutions arrive and the consequences that entail for subjectivity and identity, is, in every case, a religious outline. D and G thus describe the course that inscribes humanity to its universal (catholic – not Christian in the narrow idea) religion as a teleological prediction to ontological surety.

” …[The] ..description and thus utilization of religious inevitability does not rely solely upon such metaphysical constraints like the adherents of congregational knowledge. Rather it arises outside of the religious function to occur within it as contradictory and heretical, as knowledge invalidated by the experts (the priests of the theological dogma). Hence, democracy finds its limit through a reflection which reveals itself but projected outward to have the world, while what is not adherent to the theology uses the reflection to determine what the democratic limits define, how the democracy is structured, and what it will be used for. ”

What we find is a difference between those who admit and acknowledge their own lack to thereby work in the mind of others, and those who uphold the certitude of their view, who only see their own mind as the unity of proper world.

Each has its own advantage, but on opposite ethical fronts.

Metaphysics is the manner of the latter, of the colonizer, the Freirean oppressor, G and D the insightful description of what happens due to this always-aggregate and indeed real popular orientation.

Oops (title: Here).

REPOST of THRE-POUND-BRAIN’s no results for ‘Cognitive Psychology of Philosophy’

and reply and reply, of Baker question, then my answer…
(please check out his full essay and the comments if you are intreated in the whole thing)

sbakker
April 13, 2017 at 9:30 am
“I don’t think I get it. So the racial theories of the Nazi’s were appropriate to the particular kind of being they were interested in?”

REPLY
landzek
April 13, 2017 at 11:00 am
“The issue is not whether there is ethical value. Of course there is.

The issue is involved in the arena where I am not disagreeing with you. Don’t get me wrong; I live for disagreement and argument; I work to be shown where I am incorrect; to me, that is the point of discussion. But the point of contention is how it is that I can agree with what you are saying, yet, somehow, you defend against me having that understanding of you, as if how I am agreeing with you is based on an incorrect appraisal of you.

I am playing with the idea around how Foucault says it in the intro to “The Order of Things”. Basically he says in one of the last point there, that he rejects the idea of some transcendence, some sort of spiritual or consciousness that resides apart somewhere. He thus is one of the first (I think) to actually say that he looks at things as upon a horizontal plane.

I agree with his sentiment, so far a existentialism in the larger sense goes (not necessarily as the academic category goes). Discourse is all we are dealing with; there is nothing outside of discourse that we are able to deal with. OOO and SR and such are good religious apologies, but I get into that elsewhere.

So, if this is the case, if there is no getting outside of discourse, then there is the problem of agreement. We get into the PMs then.

See, I notice that you are and have noticed the same things and issue that I have. and even much of the conclusions you come to are so close, but then I find that you fall into, what I might call, a kind of dogmatism that excludes me from understanding you, that it appears you place as a condition upon your rhetoric so to keep me from you, or to uphold a kind of exclusionism.

I think PeterJ could be onto something with his latest comment.

But I think it is more that meaning itself, discourse itself, does not unfold or present itself upon a inclusive plane. Discourse itself may set upon such a horizon, but then we get into (as you have noted here and there) heuristic problems. But I think it is in this moment, at this juncture that you may be pulling the ‘non-transcedntal’ clause down to blanket and protect your ‘personal heuristic’, so to speak, As if, to use a non-phil idea, in the last instance you deny all that has come to you to bring a certain ‘open-ended’ conclusion, and ‘close’ the meaning.

To me, this is a methodological maxim, a procedural constant of what is ‘philosophy’. It, as Laruelle, ‘relies upon a prior decision’ in order to establish identity.

Perhaps this is why I wonder about your science. Science, as a pure kind of endeavor (never mind Latour right now), just ‘does’. The identities is deals with are not philosophical argued but are grounded in a different kind of ‘substantiating material’ than that of philosophical identity. This is why philosophy is not ‘wrong’, it is merely ‘doing what it does’ and is also why I call for a clearing up of philosophy, its domain, and what problems it is capable of addressing.”

And, yes. The racial theories of the Nazi’s were appropriate to the type of Being they were interested in, which we could say, is the Being of the Spirit which is now destitute in its approximations.

Discourse may function upon a horizontal plane, but it is downright Un-ethical and offensive to understand Hegel in his more blatant presentations.

The Sad State of Speculative Religion.

Like many of us, I did like what the Speculative people were getting at, but also as we know, they really failed to come full with the promise.

But the horse is already out of the gate, and the nature of our reality, which is based in the developing of identity for the purpose of generating excess capital, just tells us that they are merely doing what everyone else does. Nothing wrong with that. But the problem with their philosophy is that they are now trapped in their identity they proposed to do away with through Objects. They are already on our list of great philosophies, so any critique that would poke a real good hole in there foundations of their start, is usually useless. They are laughing to the carnival bank. “$5 a show!!” or “$130 a book for this most significant piece of philosophical chicanery!!” If we take it as what is really is, entertainment, then maybe some of them are worth $100. But not for its substantial philosophical content, in many cases.

the main critique Ive heard of the SR (and extensions) is that they are merely repeating old phenomenological tropes in different terms, that we aren’t really hearing anything new. I think I got a more significant handle in a critique, but I doubt any of the career philosophers will address these issues regardless of how sound a critique it is. That is the beauty of SR and our day for the production of philosophy: As much as they might ask, our modern media prevents them from having to hear any valid and good critique. Maybe in a few years they will. But I doubt it.

sideshow-alive-on-the-inside

In particular, Harmans’s Object Ontology is about objects’ Being only inso far as he is involved with the topic of objects, this is to say, the Speculative turn is one based in an apparent misunderstanding of the issue, and this is to say because :

1)the argument that says reality equals discourse.

2)discourse is affected by human agency (the thinker)

3)continental tradition is constantly proposing that we can therefore change the situation of Being human itself by addressing the different terms of discourse.

4)Specultive turn thereby proposes to change where the human being is positioned in the universe by changing the focus to objects.

5)what happens is that indeed discourses change, but the human being stays right at the center of it.

6)the Specultive turn is based in a suspension of credibility, and deception. Like a magic show that people like to be entertained by. They are no longer involved with something foundational or basic, but quite suspenseful and speculative. Like a modern movie that never resolves, they merely precipitate out in a quite noticeable fashion the ‘sand-like’ nature of much of philosophical activity, falling through ones fingers as they attempt to hold it, washing away and shifting with the tide. Like a façade on a building that advertises the business, but in this case, a façade that is proposed to be actually occupying and representing the substance of the building itself — even as Quentin Miellassoux talked about the problem of ‘magical thinking’.

7)this goes well with out current Capitalist state because it proposes that the idea as well as reality of change breaks through the correlational cycle into actual substance (chaos, super-contingency). It therefore not only relies upon capitalist maxims and operations, but uses it to support capitalist ideological foundations.

8)this is not wrong or incorrect, but inherently either based in ignorance (in so far as they see the manner by which they come to their arguments and how they use them as achieving something philosophically different or progressed), or deception (in so far as they see that the manner is based in a denial of what should be obvious).

The Speculative turn will go down in history as a marker of philosophical division, a division that I don’t think any SR will expect or approve of.

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I should say again, they are not wrong in their way. I actually enjoy much of their stuff. It is only that they could not produce what it seemed was promised, in a manner of speaking. And I wonder if they just went with it despite knowing that their ideas were – can I say it?? – kinda empty.

Love and the Truth Procedure (second try)

This post is my attempt to answer the question that Agent Swarm put forth in his recent post, which I reposted just before this post. 

Q: “Why is the truth procedure that includes love called “love”?, which should not go without saying. Why should “love” (the truth procedure) include psychoanalysis but not religion?

Q: “Why is “love” a matter of the Two and not one of multiplicities and metamorphoses?

We already know that any situation that can be spoken about always resides within what we could call a ‘phrase universe’, ala Jean-Francois Lyotard. There is no discussion about this; it is or it isn’t. If it is not then the person does not understand the notion. This is because the question is always “If there is something beyond discourse, then what is it?” How can there be something without using a series of terms (clause; phrase) ? If there is something outside or beyond discourse, then it is completely negligable and does not concern human beings.

Now, the misinterpretation of this maxim is founded in what we can call ‘speculative method’, which is to say, human beings get to use their imagination to come up with things that could exist outside of discourse. It misses the bare fact that as soon as we come to posit “that which is beyond discourse” we have collapsed the supposed realm of what is beyond discourse to discourse. This is why we can speak of ‘philosophical denial’. But more: It relies on retroactively appropriating the question of discourse for a central human agent-thinker who then uses this privilege for the purpose of placing all real things under this human privilege; in short, it places everything that can possibly exist (discourse) as a mechanism of meaning which can then, by default of a total inclusion of all agents, say that even the idea that everything exists as a function of discourse can then produce actual real situations that can exist outside of that maxim. It is a distortion as well as a deceptive act of production and a symptom of the decadence of conventional philosophy.

It is within this context we must find what I call the ‘founding term'(I think it is Delueze that also wrote about this very same idea; but it goes to my point that regardless of Delueze (or whoever) the issue does not concern what a history of tradition/conventional philosophical thought might have posed, because it is always available to anyone who already understands the situation at hand). Within any phrase universe there can be found a pivotal term whereby the whole argumentative structure finds its meaning. The whole of conventional philosophy resides upon a comparison of phrase universes, and the finding of the foundational term that enjoins (enframes) the two (or more) universes such that they may be compared in the first place. The mode of operation of conventional philosophy, though, is to deny the idea of the founding  term, as well as phrase universes, for the sake of its functioning; this is to say, that if the only thing conventional philosophy is doing is working toward the foundational term (the ‘end’ of any reduction), then such philosophy cannot be really discovering anything true, because upon finding the foundational term one is then left to find another universe by which to then reduce this ‘found’ term to a further reduction; this is the basis of post-modern multivocality and such. And, if this is all that is occurring then philosophy as an activity could be said to be basically spinning in its own slop. Such it is that the ideal that must go into philosophical work must be one of progress, and of establishing what is actually true of the world, in other words, reality. Conventional philosophy thus is so concerned with ontology, and thus we eventually find that philosophy must pivot from finding out what is actually true, to talking about what is merely philosophically real, and this then is nothing but establishing a metaphysical truth despite the emptiness that exists all around such argumentative descriptions. We find that there is a certain multiplicity that is concerned only with religious position and the identity of the acting free agent. We find then that there are two independent functions that collapse in the encounter with each other, and toward and within whichever effort would have brought itself to such a moment of contradiction. This moment cannot reveal itself unto itself, but only establish itself in the denial of the effectiveness of its dialectical opposite.

Badiou discovers and admits as much, and this is because he cannot but be involved with the dialectic. If we are to escape from the ever-presence of conventional gestures put to work for the dogma of ontology (religion), we must be talking about the bare Being in the world and not some special universal situation of ontological unity (cosmology of reality).

Further, we should not miss Badiou’s complicity with a Zizekian notion: Love is Evil. The whole dialectical appearance in history cannot contribute to a pinning down of its own irony. Hegel can never be underestimated and the motion involved that he describes will always yield the moment of contradiction wherein we must investigate (what I call ‘contradiction of non-contradiction’, and what Adorno notices as well). The method that would place a centrally stable conscious entity through which all things retain an ethical universal validity as well as veracity, will always miss the oscillation of ethical terms; i.e. what is evil should always qualify to ‘evilness’ under a strict objective logical application, and what is good likewise; essential categories must exist within a humanly identifiable matrix of meaning such that good and evil may retain means to be known as such; evil cannot be good, nor good evil, except as ethically justified, again, within a scheme that denies its own foundational terms. So it is not difficult to want to find a term that could avoid these ethical mandates yet while retaining the ideal whereby good and evil could be justified.

Hence we find the the foundational feature of everything that must ‘be’, could be called ‘love’, and at that, upheld within its own dialectically ironic theme that defies the perpetual want of philosophy to reify its ontologically real (and discursively argumentative) structures.

Likewise; “Give unto Caesar what is Caesar’s”. Religion (real ontology; cosmology of real things, their organization unto the totality) should be left unto its own devices as real estimations should be left to its own method of negotiating real (politics, ideologies, etc) situations because –and this is the idea where everyone gets pissed off and offended — such people who are involved with using metaphysical truths by which to situate contingent discourses to thereby discover real (social, cultural, political, ideological) solutions de facto are not involved with what we loosely may call ‘psychoanalysis’, for they are involved with functioning though these operations and cosmological structures and behaving within them as omnipresent and immanent truths (zizek: frames): They react within such real structures because they are incapable of understanding anything else; as we say, they behave within the tenants of their faith. Yet they cannot simply decide to step aside from their faith to thereby consider psychoanalysis; only in the destruction of their faith are they able to begin to consider if their faith was the problem. In most cases, their faith was not destroyed, but is again used to justify the distracting event into the total reality20140103-000828.jpg that is their religious faith.

I think I have put forth a good general proposal of why Badiou talks about things the way he does and have justified such postures: It is because he is involved with the dialectic despite whether or not he speaks of traditionally dialectical issues.

Note: Of this dialectic, I am not excluded from They.