Event and Substance

Various philosophers have already discussed the “event”recently. I generally consider three philosophers contemporary that are significant to the discussion of truth. I talk about them all the time: Zizek, Badiou, Laruelle; The indivisible remainder, void, and void qua void as implicated in non-philosophy, respectively. Which is to say, in a very Witgenstein manner, that whatever might be nothing is nothing to be concerned with. There’s nothing even we could begin to say about it that has anything to do with what we name it. Nothing here becomes foundational as opposed to merely speculative.

It is this last significance that encompasses the event. The event is nothing that we can talk about, but it is everything that we must be concerned with. In this way it is not fully present, as various sorts of random occurrences filled with content That occupy as well as catalyze change due to the fullness of their content that we unpack meaning from. Rather, it is very much like Rudolph Otto’s slight mention in his book The Idea of the Holy where he quickly suggests that the “mysterious tremmendum”, the “awe-full-ness” Which motivates our very being, which in his discussion is really the root of the holy, is that center of vacancy around which religion arises.

But the event is also not pure nothingness. Zizek points to this contradiction of speaking about nothingness as “a catastrophe” Which arises at the beginning of the universe, where everything is turned on its head, and what we understand is love becomes the manifestation of real evil. With Zizek, Nothingness inscribes us from all sides and indeed it is the event which brings us into the middle to form political identity, as one might say, out of nothingness, or, in the middle of nothingness, stretching backwards to a moment of pure absurdity, and extending forward into a ‘Master signification’ which avoids all scrutiny.

Badiou attempts to tell us what being and event actually is. Indeed his masterwork book is called “being and event”. We find, though, that he too must take up a sort of Zizekian tack and move everything into the political realm. In very short, Babiou says that the event is where being irrupts into the world. The event “begins the count” of reality. And I imagine we are supposed to gather that this “count” is quite similar to the generation of meaning by human beings. And so where else do we generate meaning but in the political realm, I guess.

Laruelle is really the only one of these three that actually takes seriously the idea of nothingness. He takes it so serious that it becomes a foundational feature of existence. Like I said, there’s nothing even to say about it; it is being so effective. One could even speculate that if I had anything to say about nothingness, it must not be very effective. One could also gather that where nothingness is effective thereby do we find Truth; and indeed I’m pretty sure that this is why many people have accused Laruelle of conspiring toward a religion. Indeed, many people that really enjoy this philosopher sound like religious fanatics, but I would say, honestly, it’s because those people really don’t understand what he’s talking about.   When nothing becomes substantial, when nothingness is indeed a foundational term of a universe, Then something changes in the way that we reckon the universe. This is to say, as opposed to the invisible given that what we understand is the regular or conventional philosophical approach, what Laruelle calls “sufficient philosophy”, Understands as an essential substrate, a criterion of truth where everything revolves around everything else, all the while assuming that there is this fundamental “truth of the universe” that we are finding through experimentation, empirical science, academic philosophy — I’m not really sure what label we would put on this given. Badiou I think makes the best proposal for this kind of real philosophy, because it gives everyone involved a legitimate stake in the game by allowing their being, they’re thinking, their efforts in reality, to arise from nothing without ever having to admit that indeed nothing is what is informing their activity. How offensive to my being in the world to consider that everything that I’m doing is based in nothing! (It is devastatingly offensive, in fact. What the hell is alienation if it isn’t an identity which understands itself in the context of nothing and thus meaninglessness?)

In truth, this is why I believe it is more justified to call such a real activity thus “religious” in nature. Because in reality we can talk about whatever we want to as if it has substance, for example, we can talk about nothingness and what it might be and how it manifests in various this and that, but all the while never recognize or rely upon that nothingness as indeed as that which is informing the activity again. Instead, people point to the effects, and use that as an argument for an ontological foundation of relativity and eternal interaction of thinkers which establish for themselves and for each other the world, the real universe, etc. Such approach I call religious because it requires a certain amount of energy, or force, in order to overcome the contradiction involved in having all efforts actually based on nothing. Because most people will quickly retort “well, what is nothing?” And begin the cycle of eternal recurrence again.

There’s is a faith because they (we) are involved with what the philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre Proposes that every good being does when they encounter the “abyss” of freedom: we “revolt” from it to gain our freedom. There is no freedom in nothingness, though; nothingness is really nothing else but nothingness, And the “…of freedom” part of the encounter is really the ability and capacity to deny what offends us.

It is the ability Part that is most significant for me, because it indicates to me that this is not some essential truth of existence, something that all humans do automatically or something, or how the universe actually is or — again I don’t even know how I would talk about it in the short venue right here on WordPress…

But it is an ability of consciousness, an ability of the human being to revolt from that abyss to create our own worlds of intention, worlds that we want to have. Worlds that we desire, worlds that we use desire to make. Etc.

This context from which I’m speaking here on this post, this particular post, I am just saying that while I might be able to revolt from the Abyss , I don’t have to revolt in order for the universe to remain viable and for me to be an actual person in society. And in fact I think that is a significant issue is whether or not I’m revolting from anything. Here and there are use the term “acceptance”. Indeed, human beings have an ability to revolt from the abyss of nothingness in order to gain their freedom in society, but this freedom is not essential in the sense that it somehow is implicit in the nothingness. The nothingness is nothingness. It is nothing. It’s nothing to talk about. It is in our effort to speak that we find freedom in denial that such speaking is based in nothing at all.  The overcoming of this contradiction I call faith.

It is a particularly 20th century industrialized capitalist democratic religious congregant which finds its identity in revolting from the abyss of freedom in order to make choices about who and what they want to be in the world.

Presently, it is this particular mode of reacting that we call “modern”, and what I described amounts to a reason why it is so difficult to think beyond capitalism. It is just one particular mode of being human, but being in general, though, and that indeed it projects itself both forward and backward, we must necessarily understand that it is not some essential human trait, or some essential human way of being that has gone on since the beginning of humanity — But it is indeed the “beginning of humanity” that is arising as a psychic component within the modern individual around the event.

When these parameters and limitations Are realized, are comprehended and accepted, Then we find the only truthful way to discern what we are involved with in our current situation is a religious faith, A mythological cosmology which is actually effective.

X



A Bridge which Defines: On Richard Rorty’s very pragmatic interpretation of Gadamer Hermeneutics in his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979)

It is easier to describe what something should be not, then to formulate what something should be, as it is easier to deconstruct then to construct. …

On Richard Rorty’s very pragmatic interpretation of Gadamer Hermeneutics in his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979)

————- If we can take this short synopsis of these two authors as minimally representative of what the two authors say in general, Then what we have there, with Rorty anyways, Is a proposal which allows for the subsequent developments in philosophy of the 90s up till present, as represented by Badiou, Zizek, Laruelle, and even the speculative realists.

The point he describes is a kind of “empty space” that is then elaborated upon by these authors I just mentioned. This empty space can be understood to define two ontological situations, together which constitute what Laruelle calls “unilateral duality”. This unilateral duality posits two conditions that do not reconcile back into another unitive condition, but then also defines the state of each of those conditions.

One condition is exclusion and the other condition is inclusion.

Badiou Likewise considers things in this way, though he doesn’t enjoin with Laruelle at terms.

The one condition, which We can call the conventional route, excludes anything which arises outside of its semantic mandate. Basically, it posits a one reality in which everything exists and of which human beings find out through applying ‘reason’. The one route says that there is nothing that falls outside of the potential for reason; this route is necessarily a systemic route, it posits systems within systems that even extend so far as to imply there’s a grand overreaching system which we may not ever be able to comprehend. The way the exclusive route functions is the reduction and exclusion based of contradiction; it includes only that which constitutes itself in potential. It includes everything that is possible in potential.

The other ontological condition is the one which includes. This ontological condition includes the exclusive condition. The exclusive condition posits the possibility that it includes everything, yet by its own activity is necessarily exclusive to anything that might arise which does not conform to its particular semantic mandate. 

By contrast, The inclusive route includes contradiction as well as that which is exclusive. It is what Laruelle calls “non-philosophy”, in order to allow the exclusive route to lay in what is most common, namely philosophy as a positive method. 

The speculative realists understand and attempt to incorporate or use this ontological feature of non-reduction, non-philosophy, or what The link to post here would define “In contrast”, such that what we have for a new philosophy, what we have on the ‘other side’ of that empty space posited above, is a new manner of philosophy which resides parallel to its counterpart: Unilaterally dual in nature.

But this empty space cannot merely reside in conceptual reason, as the link to post talks about. As he suggests, philosophy must involve something more than just reason, more than just a capacity to think through Aristotle or reductive logic based away from contradiction; it is thus a bridge. 

But we could equally and just as well go back 100 or so years before and say that it is a ladder that then after we climb, or cross, it must be thrown away, or actually it disappears. For once we climb the ladder, once we have gotten to the ‘other side’ of the bridge, there is no incrementally reductive manner of reasoning which will allow us to cross the gap, what Slavoj Zizek knows as “the parallax gap”, And what  Badiou understands as “the void”. There is no way to use language or discourse to communicate how to move accross the gap Because the very foundation of discourse has changed by virtue of what, by all reasonable standards, is not reasonable. This is similar to what Kierkegaard calls a quantitative leap, as opposed to a qualitative leap; it is absurd to the conventional exclusive route of reason.

In short, the conventional philosophy of incremental reductive reasoning is insufficient to realize the full ontological extent of being in the world, which is really being of the world. Just as Heidegger had a real conflict, (Is Nationalist Socialism the actual culmination of history? And do I have an obligation to believe what I reason is so?), an actual breach in the rationale of his Dasien, An interruption which occurred from what is actually real in itself, outside of reason’s ability to conceptualize toward reduction, The fall back into reason had real ontological repercussions which shows that Heidegger’s original proposal of his book “being and time” is faulty. (That is, his philosophy is compromised Because he made the wrong decision, as evidenced by history.)

But the fault is not internal to his philosophy; rather, it is faulty Becuase of how we might be oriented upon what his philosophy is talking about. The fault lay in that there is no inherent truth which is discernible by the Method of reductive philosophical reason into his “being and time”; but the truth of Dasien is reckoned when we see that it is not based in reduction, that is, the centering of thought within the content of history of reductive reason is contradictory in-itself. It is contradiction spelled out ‘long hand’.

As much as the exclusive methodological philosophical route would want to argue that there is an essential truth to be found be a close reading of reason to his book, or any philosophical books really, ultimately the truth of what he is saying can only be found by crossing the bridge, passing over the gap, moving through the void which leaves the reductive method behind to fail in its want and desire to posit any truth found by its method. This is evidenced by any attempt which would want to argue ‘what he is really saying’: We keep discussing and arguing over it anyways.

Yet this failure does not mean that it does not still function. This is the meaning of a unilateral duality: Two Routes which are ontologically necessarily, one which posits philosophical sufficiency, and one which accounts for the truth of the situation.

Zizek! Pandemic!

www.haaretz.com/world-news/.premium.MAGAZINE-slavoj-zizek-s-brutal-dark-formula-to-save-the-world-1.8898051

———–Every once in a while, I just gotta look over and see what Zizek has got to say.

Maybe this is a good time to revisit Plato’s remembering and forgetting- but in a modern context.

The forgetting is the state. The state Co-opts everything that occurs as though it is taking care of it, as though we are handling it, however we are. The state posits a history that we learn from and that directs us to meta-rational (hopefully) decisions about what to do next. But we have already forgotten in that path. That is the nature of the state: to distract, consolidate, renew.

But, again hopefully, there is remembering. Here, the modern state is viewed for what it is, a particular operation of psychology which places the self into a world and works to maintain it at all costs. The state is a fantasy of ontological trauma, always putting and throwing up new signs of deliverance, but we are delivered always back into the state, never to a true solution, and more toward the one authority. The guiding call of solution changing at every contingency, due to that state, appearing and confirming that the solution is the ethical same, an actual utopia of goodness.x

Time to come home now.

Revealing the Substance of the Gap: Is the Tragedy of Peterson the Irony of Zizek ?

The Tragedy of JBP

https://evolutionistx.wordpress.com/2020/02/22/the-tragedy-of-jbp/
— Read on evolutionistx.wordpress.com/2020/02/22/the-tragedy-of-jbp/

“Come down, you distanced travelers, from your great intellectual heights, down to where we humans can meet, again, eye to eye.” –c.n.

Wow. Makes one think.

…and kinda makes one sad as well.

I decided that I’m just gonna post the comment that I put on the original post:

“Damn. Makes one wonder about celebrity. You know, I thought he had a pretty good point, I think Peterson has a pretty good point to make so far as psychology and mental health, and then some of his philosophical support I think it’s pretty good but it just goes to show that the kind of continental intellectual left… I mean, if I can say “we“, we’re kind of mean sometimes.

But I always thought Peterson was making a good point from a mental health standpoint. But it seems nowadays especially since Zizek. That a whole intellectualized group of people are really unthinking when it comes to their assertion of theory and what should make a proper argument and things like that.

When you look at the debate between Z and P. I really think that Zizek saw this of Peterson and was kind of giving him a break. People saw this is kind of like a sucky debate, but I think it was a really good debate because Zizek had the good sense to be able to see there was no point in him unloading all his theoretical BS upon someone who could give a shit about it; which is to say, and I have made this argument too and some of my posts — and I even sent Peterson a letter of what is this debate about really, but I didn’t insult him in it — that Peterson really doesn’t understand what Zizek And the generalized Continental force is really saying Nor what it’s really doing. And I have made arguments other places in my blog that I’m not really sure that the Continental’s, and the generalized group of people that support that kind of intellectualism, I.e. the Fans, really know what they’re talking about either, but they’re vicious, they really don’t think about humanity as this thing that they are a part of as a group. It appears sometimes that the Continental Intellectual Fans behave as though everyone needs to be ultra rational and that this rationality supersedes any sort of compassion or considerations of what the being of human actually is.”

…And honestly, I wonder if that is the present Continental philosophical conundrum aggravated and expressed as phenomenalist correlationalism: the frustration  involved in not being able to breach what is correlational in their existence thus being forced out, or projected, upon the object of their frustration: Peterson and his ‘weak’ philosophical-intellectualism. Yet, ironically, when you take away his Christian motif, what is left so far as a psychological approach is really the problem of ideological correlationalism,  so it would seem that Continental Philosophy. is exactly the problem Peterson psychology is aiming at. 

Peterson asks how can we use reason to make these large jumps to great ideological structures in which we are encompassed if we don’t first come to terms with who we are as being, who we are as essentially a human entity, so to speak?. He suggests that the kind of philosophy that finds the subject within these ideological structures and then attempts to solve the problem of subjects interacting according to these ideological structures, are itself the manifestation of a psychological mental health problem.

Then he further suggests that the solution of this problem is to be found within oneself, to look and see what people (we, me, I) are doing when they are using these ideas, these ideologies, to situate people in structures of power. That the solutions to our current world problems are not to be found in trying to manipulate ideological structures that influence what the subject is within this ideological space. That the ideological space is indeed the problematic space. Rather, if we want to find a solution to the problems of our world we need to get honest with ourselves and start with ourselves as the fundamental philosophical problem.

And indeed, while everyone loves to read Zizek as talking about politics only, Zizek really is indicating nearly the same thing when you begin to understand and take ownership of what is occurring as discourse, within the material world, so far as we are subjects within it. But Zizek tries to imply this kind of situation, Attempts to show the problem involved in ideological situations such that the only way to solve this problem is come back to the original source, the Hegalian-Lacanian historical consciousness, so to speak.

The “parallax gap” is that fundamental space that is left out of political focus: the subject. The Lacan angle thus shows how ideological posture function through a basic historical trope that is the ‘other end’ of the Master Signifier; the ‘petite subject a’ and the ‘barred subject’ are aspects of the discursive symbols for what is imagined to be substantial, or the ‘big other’.

Lacan says that consciousness behaves like discourse, but this is to say that the problem begins in the psychoanalytical mirror stage where the child identifies with the image and thus becomes ‘castrated’ to him or herself to become indeed the ideological subject, the basic and fundamental mistake as the heart of all political struggle.

But no one desires to realize the truth of what we are dealing with, hence what is Real is always held at bay, so the subject of this initial trauma (of constantly being confronted with a truth of the reflection it has identified with) replays the event through this post-traumatic fantasy which keeps the subject limited by a freedom of the image. Emancipation is thus always recouped by the political ideology to manifest as the mechanisms for capitalism.

Recalling the Zizek/Peterson debate, we can see how both were centered upon the same problem, working together in a dialectical manner in the effort of revealing the oppressed subject which lay at the center of the ‘mistaken’ views upon the ‘material’. One one hand Zizek playing from the ‘negative’ , and on the other Peterson playing from the ‘positive’ iterations of the emancipated subject.

Wow. Thanks for your little research on Peterson because actually just the other day I was wondering what he was doing. I figured he just kind of settled back into his academic career and was kind a like a, well that was interesting. But it kind of seems like it really affected him, and not in a good way.”

Some Material for Psychology

www.researchgate.net/publication/336613223_Zizek_and_Peterson_Demonstrating_the_Importance_of_Higher_Order_Dialogue_Cadell_Last_Independent_Scholar

” To connect to this point such a pathway is a form of self-responsibility that allows us to overcome internal and unconscious pathological prohibitions. In the old traditional world we had “Master Figures” (embodying the moral superego) to tell us what to do in relation to a “Cause” which transcended pleasure. Now such “Master Figures” (embodying the moral superego) are negated. However, this negation did not open up a world of free subject’s enjoying their simply pleasures (as presupposed by 1960s counter-culture), but instead a world of self-enslaved subject’s who become frozen or static in relation to internal and unconscious pathological prohibitions coming only from their own head. Such a world can only be transcended through self- responsibility (not more rights), from becoming aligned with the inhuman Master (Death).”

And my Two Routes comment:

The significance of the Two Routes is in as much as there is one route which sees discourse as indicating specific and localized actualiities. That this one route does not encompass or tell of all there is or can be. For example: As though Zizek’s discourse is saying such and such, and means this and that, then or now — specific local identies which can be overcome through relying upon that/those identities. For example, the “master signifier” that this author uses to talk about how there is no longer an ideological “master figure” which allows us to have cogent and substantial sense of self in the social atmosphere, that its been “negated”. The author thus uses this to construct an argument to say that what is required then is we take responsibility for this dissolution of the figure, that it is or has been dissolved and no longer functions as the static signifier, that we are left with a sort of Sartrean Existential situation where we have to just make our own meaning.

Then there is the other route which would say that still Zizek’s model is operating, and indeed there is a master signifier that is drawing forth this particular essay and discourse in the sense that there is an underlying or over arcing structure through which I can understand what his essay could mean. And that at no time has what Zizek or Peterson talked about or described been overcome in any way or changed in anyway so far as it indeed is having to do with the subject that would presume to be able to overcome the discourse: the subject is indeed intact and involves responsibly; what is needed is a radical break into existential responsibility (Christ). Here discourse ‘floats’ over real things granting appearance of change through the identification with the term rather than, what I call, the truth.

This is the Laruellian issue in his non-philosophy. The way it plays out in “actuality” is that one of these routes needs to be denied in order for progress to occur, which is to say in order them for the subject to make for itself a place of identity within the ideological sphere. The issue is then just what progress occurs?

Hence again the discussion of this essay occurs along two routes that are always in play and cannot be reduced to one or the other necessarily or contingently; this is to say that the moment it is reduced to one or the other is exactly when we find out the authors’ orientation upon objects, and we find out because of the nature of choice (discussed elsewhere).

In other words, there is no “old” in the sense this author used the idea except in as much as he views himself as occurring within an ideological construct (Zizekian and Petersonian and “world state”) which has ties constructed ‘in state’ as a stable and manifested static identity or entity unto which a free or unfree subject can then enact itself in the “actual” omnipresence that is the “figured” political world.

And Zizek’s discourse replays itself as a capitalistic-Christian God-world-cross substance prefigured in Peterson’s archetypical psychology.

Responsibility can indeed take the form of centering ideologically in the capitalisitc excess of subjective agency. Or the responsibility can arise as emancipation through a radical break which allows for the embodiment of material limit.

The Irony of Zizek.

The irony inherent of Zizek is that within his daseinic Hegelian-Lacan presence of material world consciousness, he seems to more and more be missing the synthetic polemical operation of time/material itself. That is, the change in the way we measure change that should be accounted for within the materialistic analysis seems to be outside of Zizek’s calculus. How much more irony could we stand?

Zizek’s Activist Irony.

https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.independent.co.uk/voices/trump-hillary-clinton-populist-right-left-democratic-party-civil-war-a8975121.html%3famp

Cedric Nathaniel wrote in his book “the philosophical hack” that is Zizek rides the line of contradiction, which is to say, he follows the road not taken that is determined by contradiction as opposed to that path which opens up possibility by rejection of contradiction.

And here is the perfect case in point so far: he has apparently taken an active role instead of sort of just sitting back and being a political/social commentator/philosopher. But of course he’s always making opinions like this; but it seems that this one having to do with Trump really hits home.

For a long time Zizek has been telling us and every opportunity that Trump is the solution, that Hillary Clinton is the problem. But what he means by this is ironic in the sense that he is not talking about a solution to specific politicized issues; rather, he is talking about our American democratic systemic ideological woes.

Basically what he saying is that the system is fucked and the only solution to repairing it is to elect Donald Trump, but because what it will achieve is a restructuring of an effective Left — not because Trump is some sort of American savior or some super great leader. On the contrary, It is because he is a reflection of everything that the left has been trying to deny of itself. The exposure of what it’s trying to deny achieved by the election of Donald Trump will best lead to a restructuring, a “civil war” as some people have put it, within the Democratic Party itself.

So his activism was actually irony in its fullest sense, in its intentional sense, and this is why Slavoj Zizek is the Elvis of critical theory.

One More Z/P Goodie: Nature, Culture, and the Displacement of Time

On Slavoj Zizek and Jordan Peterson: Nature, Culture, and the Displacement of Time

On Slavoj Zizek and Jordan Peterson: Nature, Culture, and the Displacement of Time
— Read on iambobbyy.com/2019/04/27/on-slavoj-zizek-and-jordan-peterson-nature-culture-and-the-displacement-of-time/

It appears that the people who really do use their thinking skills took a little longer for their comments. Here is another goodie. Bobby gets a little deeper into the various philosophical authorial substrates, and a couple play by plays from the debate.

*

Bobby points out one of the significant parts of the debate that I forgot about; namely, that Peterson definitely sees a kind of progress of history, sees history as a ground outside of human cognition, and then that cognition indeed is able to perceive this ground and make analyses of it. Then; Zizek’s rebuttal to this kind of suggestion is, basically, that though it is possible to perceive some sort of progressing lineage, the lineage itself is articulated at the same time as these articulations disrupt the continuity of the scheme, and at that, at a notably random times.

Bobby has a better version of what they actually said, and then goes into the various philosophical ideas around this idea, for example, Derrida’s trace and erase.

*

I Am digging his approach, but I depart from Bobby’s analysis in a couple of ways.

1) I am not sure that there is any argument that can be made which overcomes the presentation inherent of the debate. And, what I mean by this is that when we understand, say, Derrida, then there is a further development philosophically that shows us that there is no “proper truth”, As though By virtue of what Derrida proposed the nature of human existence demands that there is no historical ground that human beings can cognitively know in the manner Peterson stakes his position. I describe this particular situation and I am indicating right here some of my earlier posts, perhaps from a year or two ago; I will not rehash them here. If we understand Derrida, then much of what he says is like the wind — “the wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth…”

2) It is sufficient to say, that the argument (as a form) has only a particular bearing upon truth, and that Francois Laruelle’s non-philosophy has basically disrupted the idea that there is some sort of unity of truth that human beings can be suspended within to thereby exist in a argumentative reality. The suspension is itself, as I say, real, but not true.

In my work, I try to show how this particular method, this particular way of coming by or upon reality, that I call the “conventional method”, is but one manner, The One Route of the Two Routes. Further, these two routes do not further indicate a “reasonable or rational” route as opposed to and “irrational” route, but that this kind of argumentative way of establishing truth is indeed one “rational’ manner of coming upon objects. The routes are mutually exclusive in a non-philosophical manner, not complimentary as the early 20th century Existentialists would want people to believe: Belief is required first for the compliment to be realized.

In short, I am saying that all Bobby really does is kind of lean on supporting what Zizek is reputed to argue in relation to a traditional lineage of authorial representation. And that’s ok.

And –

My take is that there is no reduction of this sort possible once we understand what Laruelle is saying; and indeed, this is what I think Zizek was relying upon, as it indeed accounts for why he did not plow into Peterson.

My position is that these two men represent The Two Routes upon objects. These routes do not further reconcile to another unitive, and a singular route. And this is to say that what the debate shows is that these two routes function together without necessarily reducing to either, nor to another further unity.

Indeed Petersons argument is valid by the mere fact that people — regardless of what argument I want to make to pronounce upon such ‘other people’ — indeed can and do experience and encounter reality in exactly the way that Peterson is philosophically describing in his solution. And that this particular way, or route, is not false by virtue of the fact that I may come up with an argument against what they are saying. These people are not wrong or somehow have some sort of invalid way of understanding the truth of reality. The way they (those who understand an objectively knowable history) understand it is indeed True. And this truth, while perhaps in communication with me nevertheless does not fall into falsity due to my points, nor theirs due to mind. And, our existence is not relative nor reductionary to either that or this. It is true. Period.

Objects do not require my acknowledgment or permission to be true, or otherwise have or hold truth.

Also,

And whether or not Peterson understands technically what is going on philosophically in this ‘larger’ sense, Zizek nevertheless does understand and that is why (I submit) he didn’t plow into Peterson about his ignorance, to show how ignorant Peterson might be upon these philosophical intricacies and subtleties.

(See my earlier post about what Peterson might actually be involved with.)

We can find evidence everywhere in his talks and writings that Zizek Understands what I’m talking about: when he talks about “naïve”, he is talking about that particular kind of existence which does not answer nor even fall into the category of the philosophy he proposes by his analyses as a sort of categorical imperative. The ‘common people’ do not answer to his kind of philosophy, and indeed exist outside of it in an essential sense, even to the extent that those people’s reality (truth) has nothing to do with what analysis he is making upon them. This is the nature of his philosophy and it forms a foundational ground that most people seem to miss or are unable to reconcile with their experience.

*

If you are interested in The exploration of the two routes, please check out The Philosophical Hack: The concluding unscientific post-script to event, by Cedric Nathaniel.

It is crazy inexpensive.

The Point of the Slavoj Zizek Vs Jordan Peterson debate: An Assessment

Slavoj Zizek Vs Jordan Peterson: An Assessment

https://aussiesta.wordpress.com/2019/04/27/slavoj-zizek-vs-jordan-peterson-an-assessment/
— Read on aussiesta.wordpress.com/2019/04/27/slavoj-zizek-vs-jordan-peterson-an-assessment/

Thanks Neotonos! I agree with much of his assessment.  He hits on some significant turns of the debate; Im glad, because I didn’t really want to assess a play be play.

I’ll use this repost to give my final comments on the Z/P debate.

*

It’s intresting to me that none of the commenters saw what I saw, which is, really saw any big picture. It really is, like Neotonos said “like a bunch of people reporting on a cricket match”. To my eyes and ears, it really is like people miss the debate for the spectacle. I think Noetanos gets a little more involved that the others I’ve read, though.

First off; yeah, I get it: people wanted a WWF slam-a-thon, of whatever that WWF thing is.  Zizekians wanted Zizek to take Peterson apart, and the Petersonians wanted him to show Zizek where he is stupid liberal, or something like that. These two celebrity philosophical figures represent a certain polemic in the philosophical world; people wanted a battle.

The thing is, if you have been listening to Zizek lately, and understand Peterson’s general effort (which he does use his point in the Z/P debate), both are actually more concerned with the world than they are just political voice boxes. Both actually care. They both advocate responsibility.
You can listen to and read my essay about the current state of philosophy HERE, the essay I wrote before the debate. One of the main reasons why one can tell they actually care is because they don’t give a shit about towing the political lines.

It is interesting to me that people seem perplexed about Zizek’s apparent shift from what they understand as his usually Marxism, and his basic support for capitalism. But if one is familiar with Zizek’s philosophy, he has not changed his view; rather, he had elaborated more upon the situation given the condition at hand.

In the debate Zizek even alludes to his earlier work about Marxism, of which he says he’s not going to take the debate that way; it is obvious to Zizek that Peterson has not read Zizek enough to be able to address the subtleties involved with Z’s “Marxism”. He highlights his Hegelianism. But the reason for this, I think, is because Zizek was not concerned with showing how Peterson is a ignorant fool (like many of us were hoping). Zizek’s point has always been Marxist in that the subject is a state of being which is involved with a dialectical reality which shows up in the Lacanian manner at all times. That is; through the symbolic order mediated by what is ‘imagined’, or what is the real fantasy. This fantasy is manifested in the (further) dialectic between what appears should occur due to the symbolic presentation. But there is a problem (as we understand the “barred S”). When the subject attempts to speak about what the symbolic world is presenting, a transformation takes place: similar to Derridean issues of subjectivity, what was once the true meaning of reality is noticed as a fantasy. The issue within this world, though, Is that one has to be able to notice it (clean house; think).

It is in this dialectic that Zizek locates his Marxism, because it indeed functions to supply all the multiplicity of material for and by which the subject is able to act in reality. There appears to be an element or aspect which oppresses the subject’s ability to appear in the world. This is why Lacan’s “Real” is impossible; because reality presents that which appears to not exhibit a contradiction in its terms for existing as such. It indeed shows aspects of its operation everywhere as contradiction in the, what i call conventional and what Zizek calls naive, sense, but because the withdraw that this ‘Real’ enacts occurs in the dialectical relationship with the symbolic-imaginary domain, as I just said, manifesting an appearance of real truth. As Cedric Nathaniel discusses in his book The Philosophical Hack, it is this ‘real-truth’ that is the political world.

There is no “actual” reduction to the usual traditional-conventional rhetoric or some “actual” political state where the “pure” Marxists or the “pure” capitalists exist because these supposed entities, states, or situations are –yes — already occurring in the discussion, as Nathaniel discusses, of term-object identities. The idea of ‘identity politics’ is a mistaken or distorted use of the the concept of the Term-object Identity in the same way that reality is a ‘mistaken’ apprehension of what is Real. They are dialectical mechanisms.

Now, the situation that I described above is the real political situation. It accounts for why we are having such huge discrepancy in political ideals and ability to get things done in government across the globe. It is the situation of what I call “no communication”. This situation of no communication is what Zizek refers to when he says that he does not see a way out of our capitalistic situation of inequality and exploitation, because it is exactly the ‘equality’ which is posed in the politically real estimation which is able to skim profit off of the ‘excess’ which occurs in the dialectic between what is true and what is real, between what is ‘equal’ in the dialectic of relation of what is Real, and what is ‘unequal’ in the dialectic of what is real politically. This current process of existing in which humanity finds itself now, seems inescapable because it is indeed how we function ethically, which is to say, in remaining fidelitous to what we know as true (Soren Kierkegaard defines this space, and Alain Badiou describes our activity within it).

OK. Peterson, on the other hand, sees a ways out. Both philosophers (Z and P) do not see any constructive point in continuing with the regular status quo situation which they both see in their ways. They both do not simply give up and be naive nor inauthentic (in the Kiekegaardian sense).

In another lecture, Peterson gives us a similar description of Capitalistic nihilism, of the situation that Zizek cannot see a way out of: Peterson describes the situation of larger projects losing their ability to be effective. His idea is thus that we must begin with the smallest or more local project. As he says, we must clean our own house first. We must begin with ourselves, put our own houses in order. He thus extends this manner of being able to get honest with oneself and associates it with a Christian kind of theme.

Both of these philosophers thus pose the same question, have a similar manner of understanding it, and also see that the only way through is, indeed, Capitalism; we must use what we have, and stop attempting to escape the problematic situation through all sorts of fantastic psychic mechanisms (for those kinds of ways of denial enforce the philosophical correlation). Hence, Peterson’s “see how apparently antagonistic positions can work to communicate”, and Zizek’s “think!” as their closing statements, respectively.

Yet, to focus on the small, segregated, details of the debate is exactly a capitalist manner of approaching discourse, even if one says they are Marxist. The hard Marxist activists are indeed perpetuating the capitalist agenda by constantly reifying routes of control for the capitalist congregant (all of us). It does not matter what kind of revolutionary (or fundamentalist) state would do or say to assert a proper manner to have reality because reality itself is being informed by the ontological exploitation of subjective excess. Hence, political-reality is that inescapable condition where philosophers find themselves. And yet, the move seems to be to stop attempting to be Gramsci-esque proponents for the masses, because so long as this kind of philosophically ‘enlightened’ manner attempts to alleviate the struggle of the disenfranchised, the activist has only asserted that those she would help are indeed lost, as they both become as now a positive historical cause.

Yet I am skeptical that siding with the super-wealthy (as some have already decided is best) will be any more effective, for they, as a general class, are “large scalers”, abusers of excess, exploiters of the world, creators of chaos and confusion.

Ok. I could go on, but I think Ive made my point. And if you ae really interested, you can always read mine and Nathaniel’s books.