Viewing Corona: Phenomenology and Orientation.

HERE is a link to some current statistics that compare the flu and corona.

The thing I think that video in my previous post marks out is that what makes coronavirus so incredible is that we are looking at it “in just that way”, which is to say, that we are seeing something through a particular ability or manner.

I am a layman, so I could be entirely wrong in my interpretation of this, but…

What I hear the doctor saying is that what we consider the flu is just a few instances of pathogen in a vast array of contagions that cause people sickness, either cold or the flu or various other types of illnesses. Coronavirus is the name for a particular set of viruses that cause symptoms, that cause sicknesses. The reason why we often hear it called “novel coronavirus” is because it is a new mutation of a type of coronavirus. Coronaviruses are around all the time and people get sick from them all the time, it’s just that the scientific community is relatively familiar with these various types of coronaviruses, influenza, the common cold. But the one that we’re calling COVID-19 (corona virus disease discovered in 2019) is one that we’re not familiar with, a mutation that we aren’t very familiar with. We aren’t really sure what it’s going to do because it’s a new type of mutation.

But what the doctor in the video is saying, I think, is that given any cycle of various types of viruses and pathogens that cause sickness, such as respiratory sickness or digestional sickness, there are thousands of such pathogens that enter the human biome and then exit the human biome, routinely.

The scientists monitor this cycle of growth and recession of hundreds if not thousands of pathogens all the time. During these cycle they kind of make an educated guess about which pathogens we are going to have to concern ourselves with. For whatever reason, this particular cycle had a “novel” pathogen that was taking place more than what they were counting on, what we were paying attention to, what we were expecting; the novel coronavirus fell outside of that kind of usual monitoring. So they decided to start monitoring it.

And what they found was pretty much the same as the flu. Yes it is more contagious than the flu, and is more intense, but the way that we stop spreading the virus has less to do with how contagious this is (what is inherent in itself) then it does with preventing that we get it (what we do about it). How contagious a particular pathogen is doesn’t say anything about whether or not I’m going to get it. The determinant of whether or not I’m going to get it has to do with the situation that I am being.

Nonetheless, statistically, I think he is pointing out, almost the same percentage amount of people that die from any other similar sickness are dying from the coronavirus and just as well, people that are getting it is not too much larger than any other type of pathogen of this kind. The difference is that we’ve just somehow decided to pay more attention to this particular novel pathogen in any given cycle.

I’m not sure exactly how true that may be because if people all around my neighborhood are suddenly getting sick to where they can’t go to work and function that in itself shows that there’s something slightly different going on with this one.

But from a statistician point of view…

…the doctor is really saying he’s not really sure how it happened that everyone got so excited and worried about this particular pathogen because if you look at any other pathogens throughout the world they’re all pretty much doing the same thing; that is, a small percentage of people are dying from it, a somewhat larger percentage of people are getting sick from it, and a vast array of people are carrying it around, or are positive for it, but are not really getting sick from it.

And we probably need not mention Miellassoux’s remark about the reason why the world should hold together for any amount of time, for we should expect that we would be walking down the street one day and all of a sudden everything changes beyond comprehension or completely falls apart. Well, that’s kind of what happened with the coronavirus, and indeed that could happen at any moment due to the nature of nature. 


So, as I said in a previous post, the question really becomes about the climate. And it really begs the question of, less perception or how people’s opinions or beliefs might affect how they act, and more about how ontology, how a person’s being is in-formed by a fundamental way of viewing the world which then allows them to see what Is real.

Innoway it is more philosophical, which is to say, how being is, as opposed to religious, theological, or epistemological, which is to say, what we believe, how we feel about those beliefs, and how we might analyze objects of knowledge that are feeling-belief.

The reason why it is nonsensical to argue something like “everyone is being hysterical”, or “The corona pandemic is not real”, it’s because the reference of those sentences is too imprecise to really address what is occurring so far as real reactions real perceptions real occurrences in the world.

Indeed, the word “real” and “reality” necessarily designates something that must be dealt with, an imperative, something that not cannot be dismissed by a wave of the hand, Or a whim of witty intellectualist thinking. It is a manifestation of concrete material.

Indeed if I fall onto the sidewalk without putting my hands forward I will probably hurt my face and bleed. And even while there is no argument that can be put forth to ever prevent that same fate every time it occurs, there are ways of thinking, ways of speaking, ways of acting that could alter the situation so that the event happens at different times, more or less, or not at all. So by analogy, even while the coronavirus pandemic may be blown way out of proportion, it is indeed blown to the proportion that it is, and indeed blew the way that it did blow. We surely must take precautions. Just because something might be blown out of proportion, as a way of speaking or understanding the situation, does not necessarily mean that one should not take account for it and act accordingly, yet also that one should be able to make an argument for why it is not the way it indeed is. Not how it appears, as though it is an illusion. And this is exactly because it is real. The question becomes more about the tools we are using to address reality. Less about perceptions and belief.

To address the situation as if it’s some sort of an illusion is kind of like trying to use a scalpel to hammer in a 4 inch nail. Not only is the tool (the tool we call ‘illusion’) inappropriate to the task, but also, it could work given a certain condition of application and time. These two possibilities do not really correctly reduce to one or the other because to approach the scalpel with the need of hammering in a 4 inch nail into a 2 x 4, by all reasonable and sensible standards of knowledge, amounts to nonsense, in this analogy that I’m putting forth here. But in fact, the tool called ‘rationality’ is also imprecise to move to describe why a common occurrence could cause such an “irrational” response (along the same argument of ‘illusion’), because then we are attempting to exclude the real situation of how most people are able to see the world and their role in it, which is to say, what human beings’ purpose is in the world as a teleological signifier for what they (the individual) is and supposed to be doing. What most people ‘think’ is more like a instinct (inthinked? Perhaps a phenomenological theological tenet?)

The scalpel is an imprecise manner of approaching the nail. However it might “know of it” never does the nail “do” what it is by applying the scalpel. Of course, we can create any sort of meaning we want of hammer and nails and scalpels–the post-modern phenomenalist loves to come up with all sorts of interesting perceptions upon things and situations and see those as foundational to everything. But the assumption there, in a way, is that scalpels must always be able to hammer in large nails. The phenomenalist refuses to see the nail as the nail simply because he sees what he is able to view. Sure, I could use a scalpel to comb my hair with, but it is an imprecise way to comb my hair. Lol. It is not ethically wrong, it is simply a limitation that defines the objectivity of the phenomenon, in the same way a nail defines itself, and a scalpel. It is about an ability to respond.

Presently, as I have argued elsewhere, the Traditional categories and methods that we use for philosophy are no longer sufficient to grasp , contain or communicate the situation that we are coming upon so far as knowledge might relate to what the world is, or the Being of the World.

So Again, we can begin speak about the climate of world and knowledge. 


Here Is another flu/corona comparison article.

Counseling and Philosophy

Counselors are not the scientists. The scientists are the psychologists, neurologists, social workers and psychiatrists. These latter tend to defer to the numbers into the Givens with Little question.

The counselors are the ones that acknowledge science can at best account for only a small portion of the human experience and why anyone may behave in the way that they do. 

It is plain despite the faith in science that psychiatry and such would invest in the scientific/medical model of mental health, that while the bones and organs can fit into such a organ->problem->symptom scheme of disease, the mind and mental issues do not fit simply into such a model of brain. That anything which has to do with the psyche, mind and health must necessarily concern philosophical foundations of knowledge, and not merely scientific appearances.

Does the Banach-Tarski Paradox Anticipate The Two Routes Upon Objects ?

This is the best vid I’ve seen all month!

I definately am Not a mathematician, but this vid explains this paradox pretty well. And, despite the scope of his conjectures at the end, a significant philosophical question would concern whether reality presents a sufficiently able manner for conceptualization to encompass all that we are able to know?

The precipitate of this first question thus moves retroactively as opposed to redundantly:

If we can take the initial object as any real object, then we can likewise take ‘reality’ itself as an object which itself is real. If we are to understand anything, communication of reality must be involved in some manner.

The initial issue, then, is if what is proposed to have been communicated is able to be viewed and understood as not having been communicated. And then if what was not communicated is able to come through as this latter view, that is, what has not been communicated being communicated but not in the former instance and not a replacement of the former (what was indeed communicated is not nullified by the communication which was not communicated by the proposal of what should have been communicated)?


The initial contemplations upon truth can be found in Nathaniel’s The Philosophical Hack.

The Object of the Subject

Nathaniel: Revisiting “On Vicarious Causation”

This excerpt from Graham Harman’s “on vicarious causation” from 2007 in the journal called Collapse (it is not difficult to find the PDF online) represents succinctly what Cedric Nathaniel means when writes that his philosophical work is not concerned with “what is behind the scenes”, what he generally ascribes to metaphysics, what he calls “conventional philosophy”, and what Francois Laruelle refers to as “sufficient philosophy”.

Harman’s article here puts in very clear terms what Nathaniel means when he talks about what is ‘actually occurring’, that is supposed occurring right in front of our faces, as opposed to what our introspective minds might dredge up from the underworld of “subjective” or what Nathaniel generalizes as phenomenological truths. (Nathaniel inverts Harman’s categories and says that what is phenomenological is ultimately real, where what Nathaniel calls true is what Harmon calls real).

It is how Harman says; phenomenological sensual Truths ride along top of the real object, and as I’ve said recently in a post of mine, That ideals based in subjective, discursive, linguistic etc. modes ride along top what is actually in front of us (that is, once we get beyond the appearance of the phenomenon) like the Hawaiian islands ride along top of a hotspot in the earths crust.

This (object, as opposed to subject) orientation upon things of philosophy I see is much more useful in its truth than grounding whatever theoretical activity in whatever subjective imagination of sense that an individual might be able to fit together; That is, if we are ever trying to get anywhere in philosophy besides a crate load of artistic freedom of expression. Hence I find in Cedric Nathaniel’s books an interesting move towards a science of philosophy.

I would suggest revisiting Harmons seminal article written in 2007, “on vicarious causation”. And consider it in light of James Hillman’s “healing fiction” just what sort of fiction that conventional (phenomenally based)  philosophy writes for itself, given the evidence of the condition of our world, and where intentional communion with the object of thought might be creating more destruction than indeed healing.  perhaps what we are considering imagination it’s not so imaginative after all.  Perhaps there is a weak consideration of what imagination is so far as it might be applied to real activity, which is to say, a weak estimation, a correlation even, between imagination and what is good for the world, as evidenced by the shape or condition of the world, so far as whether we are actually harming or helping that condition. Slavoj Zizek is tight in his discussions about capitalism as quite difficult to imagine beyond: as Nathaniel says, It is due to the phenomenological redundancy which sees in its own reflection an infinity of objective truth obtainable from intuition of a transcendent other (religious communion), the excess that profit and investment arise from.


And I imagine over December I’ll produce a paper along these lines. 😛

Grow. Begin the hack.

Don’t look behind that Curtain!

The event of Modernity is represented by the plot culmination of The Wizard of Oz: The moment that the Feminine Mystique is comprehended in its reality: The all and power Oz, the great wizard that holds the good society together is a fraud. The myth of the evil witch is destroyed upon arrival but then there is another bad witch that pronounces the struggle and the good witch helps expose the sham, thereby ushers in post-modernity. We first find the hierarchical power structure, then individual truths and relativity itself actually go into the reestablishmeant of modernity as a unitive effort of a now common whole of pluralist truths in progress, just like The Emerald City was before with all the “guilds” and various sorts, sizes, colors and shapes of people, when Dorothy arrives, all the different people who were other wise living happily except for the shadow of the wicked witch(-es) who now appears Becuase Dorothy kills her sister when she arrives. Now that witch is gone, and everyone has their own truth (again), another specter will arise: the struggle-fantasy of the white man-woman oppression ends with the man remaining in the Fantasy Emerald City and the woman returning to her black-and-white world, of which the real figures of life were represented in the fantastic struggle.

Presently we are involved in the consolidation of a one world. This is to say, the overdetermining manner of consciousness is involved with its function of the reconciliation of difference. What such a function rejects, though, is the notice which brings to understanding that such difference and reconciliation was and is already already occurring at all times.

In reality, the current struggle always must remain paramount. The involvement with that activity is called justice.

The difference involved with the attempt to get justice for the group that is oppressed in a present condition of difference Always takes precedence over the past or historical situation. This is to say that what we learn from history informs the present struggle. Yet what we don’t learn from history, the lesson of history that should otherwise commandeer or correct the present situation for eternity, or for a kind of utopia, is that some group will always be oppressed. This is to say, in the overcoming or correction of a presented condition of oppression, another oppressive situation arises that needs to be corrected. The present situation towards justice always has to take place towards a limited ideal based in a utopian frame. The idea that there is no actual “utopia” is really a statement of empty set, because if we actually ever believed that that was true then there would be no reason to make any efforts whatsoever to address a present injustice.

The two situations that I present here exist at all times. While they may be ideological, and indeed we can find all sorts of ideological structures which will support various meanings of oppression and freedom, even that cognition itself exists within a utopian condition of oppression.

Hence the two routes. Hence the non-philosophical unilateral duality.

Due to the imperative of the present moment, which is characterized presently by an effort of reconciliation, this as opposed to “destruction” or “Deconstruction” — which is to say as a historical motion of consciousness — One is not allowed to speak of facts in a general sense, because the problem of difference has not been sufficiently reconciled into the One reality. For, if there indeed was a One Reality wherein everyone had sufficient recourse to a personal idea of freedom, happiness, or whatever sort of “good” conceptions and recourses of self in a world, then we could speak of facts, say, the “fact of the human being”, because then no one would have a recourse to an offense that the very idea of a “true fact” elicits by its very nature. This is the theological mandate of the current postmodern religious paradigm: I can only speak of “facts” under particular ethical headings.

So, in order to speak of truth and facts, As things in themselves that are actually facts and actually true things, a partition in reckoning must be erected.

There is a reason why most religions have an esoteric arm of the system of belief: Because the general real tenants of ethics and morality that the particular religious ideology pro pounds and supposes upon, understood intuitively by the congregants of that belief, do not allow a recourse to exposing the potential falsity of whatever theological structure: Ideology is mythologically self-referential (correlational). Indeed the congregants rely upon the cosmological maxim in order to go about their (our) daily lives. They (we) exist, in fact, in the absolute true world of either/or mentality, of essential choice despite what theoretical ideas might come out of them, because any theory I would come up with to describe how there may or may not be choice, whether it be evolutionarily, discursively, biologically, neurologically, socially, is a theory that is relying upon me/someone choosing to do things.

This fact of an ethically absolute true world thus does not contain all that exists, but neither does “another description” negate the “first world”; indeed other things can be known and talked about which do not answer to the “absolute true (first-ethical) world” that is the relative universe of subjective views and opinion. Much like the difference between quantum physics and classical physics, there is two absolutely true universes which do not reconcile to a further one knowledge in practice.

This is how it must be only now, but also never. As well as only in possibility.

The Human Resistance.

Human beings resist knowing themselves and are generally more comfortable with only operating as a human being. It thus uses its Reason to stay outside (or otherwise totally contained) aof knowledge, which is to say, to stay the sovereign progenitor of knowledge. The generator and the owner of knowledge.

Similarly, the individual human being does not want to know what the universal object “the human being” is. It is generally unable to desire to know itself; it desires regularly to “just Be” what it wants. It thus uses the deferment generated by its self-centered privilege, which is redundantly propped up by its knowledge, to keep itself from having to encounter itself. Technology is one manner by which it finds itself in a comfortable segregate agency; physiology and biology is technology.

The key component to by-passing the defenses inherent to the common real human being is to understand that describing the ontological situation does not thereby suggest that something is wrong or incorrect about it, as though we thus are required then to come up with a better way of conception.

In other words, my description here does not suggest that we should do away with technology or that biological understanding is wrong or an incorrect way to comprehend real aspects of the human being.

We are involved in finding the universal object called the human being, and not so much attempting to destroy it in the effort.

It is an effort of honesty over interest, truth over opinion, actuality over ideology.

It is the effort of the Big Risk. The Long Game.

Emotion and Reason. Part 3

So back to my original intention behind this post that I have now divided up into three parts.

I am challenging the notion that reason is the crowning authority of human existence and consciousness. And, as a commenter on Part 2 pointed out: I do agree with the observation that what we often think is rational or reasonable is often hardly that.

But I would even counter this observation by saying that such an observation is based in an assumption of reason: it is by reason it’s self that we are able to make such distinctions.

I suggest keeping in mind the idea of the Two Routes, which is an extrapolation of the non-philosophical premise of unilateral duality: by pointing something out and describing it I am not therefore suggesting that something is wrong with it nor making an argument that I have a better idea: I am simply describing a fact. If I say the tree is green and it has bark, I am not suggesting that I have a better way that the tree should be. Of course we can fall down the rabbit hole of what I call conventional philosophical speculation and consider all the probability and possibility of subjective experience of that tree. We can talk about how these subjective reality is may be true and that how our world is constituent of a plurality of subjective worlds. I am not making any argument about whether or not phenomenal subjective worlds are true or false; The veracity of any subjective opinion is absolutely up for debate.

What becomes evident by the contradiction that arises between these two types of understanding, though, is called a unilateral duality. This is to say that we take each of those two situations as situations that indeed are true, but then also note that the activity of the attempt to reconcile those two situations into a further reconciled state only speaks of the One Route. Hence what I am proposing as The Two Routes. Readers can look back at some of my posts to try and wrap ones head around this more fully, one can read Francois Laruelle’s non-philosophical books, and one can investigate what other people have to say about non-philosophy, if really need to comprehend all those details to be able to move over into the issue of an orientation upon objects. It’s OK. No shame there.

Nonetheless; The example that I’m working with here is the strange paradox that (1) reason can somehow analyze it self to say that this situation over here is not reasonable or not rational, and then this situation over there we’re going to categorize another various sort of system, and then this over yonder is what we call actual reason in comparison to these two or three or more possibilities, and then the whole thing amounts to an argument that we can negotiate over about what reason is, and (2) That reason as an object in-itself is characterized by point (1). This is an example of a unilateral duality, and it characterizes a particular manner or approach by which we can begin to understand what the human being is doing.


This approach is not dissimilar to the way that counseling might approach someone with, say, anxiety or depression or some sort of neurosis, to use an older term, or some pervading issue that a client may come in for psychological help.

I believe a particular theory that I am nodding toward right here is called Internal Family Systems (IFS). But there are a few theoretical approaches that incorporate a similar manner.

I think the idea is not very new: A client comes in complaining of an inability to stop Behaving in a certain manner, say for example, avoiding parties or social situations because of accute social anxiety, say. Keep in mind that I am not a practicing counselor but I’m just beginning to learn.

In any case, a possible approach to this situation is to get the client to externalize the problem. In other words, what the client is having trouble with is this whole thing that she calls her self which manifests in general as a thinking subject that is her self. The point of the intervention is to help the client see or look at the presenting issue as though it is not part of a whole system that is “her Self”, to help her to To gain sufficient distance from the issue in order to view the issue and address the issue as though it is affecting her self rather than being constituent of her singular whole person.

The issue here is not a speculation or a negotiation about whether or not there is this whole subject called the client herself. We treat the client as though she is an interrelation of various effectual aspects as the primary methodological material, as opposed to a “whole” person who is screwed up in various ways.

In reference to what I’m talking about so far as reason, or as I tend to call “philosophy” sometimes, by suggesting that the client may be affected by a problem rather than being the problem itself, I am thereby not suggesting that the problem may indeed not have to do with a whole system. Rather, I am suggesting that we can approach the whole system by viewing the system in a different manner yet while the system is still functioning and operating as a whole system, which is to say, excluding nothing.

So I will repeat; to point out the fact that reason itself is implied in the activity of indicating things that are not reasonable or indeed irrational as opposed to reasonable or rational, does not negate the fact that indeed reason is allowing for this division of itself. Developing different terms in order to compensate for this apparent paradox gets us nowhere significant into understanding what the human being actually does as it is, except that it gives us insight in that this is indeed what the human being consciousness does: A fact of the object that is the human being. Developing new terms in this way maintains and reifies the one route. Reason is not negated by describing what reason does, neither does such an honest description suggest that there is another way that reason might be operating. The conventional philosophical route Is thus characterized by a method wherein a fact can only be argued with by denying the fact itself. Hence, I say the conventional philosophical method is based in denial. Yet I am not suggesting that there is a better way, or that philosophy/reason should do or be something different. I am merely stating a fact about conventional philosophy.


I believe by this line of reasoning I have come up with a second fact of the phenomenal subject. I think I came up with a first fact a year or two or so and you would have to look in my past posts for it. I think the first fact is that a phenomenal subject is bounded by nothing. But I could be wrong. Lol. Actually, with these two facts in place we could thereby come up with a third fact of the phenomenal subject that we have been calling “correlationalism”. Science is based on an honest acceptance of the facts, even while the facts might be tested.

OK. Well it looks like I’ve gotten done with part three and I still haven’t gotten to the original intention behind the whole post so it looks like there’s going to be a part 4


Algorithms and institutional isomorphism: A Call for a more Philosophically Comprehensive Theory Of Counseling.

Algorithms and institutional isomorphism

Algorithms and institutional isomorphism
— Read on

This is quite interesting.

It resonates with ideas I have been throwing about. For example, the way that I use the term religion in my work seems consistent with the way that internet platforms are homogenizing corporate identities, as this summary (the link) might suggest. Less about what corporate activity, ability, or work that they do or products they make, the platforms through which they present such corporate subjectivities not only limit their ability to be viewed but indeed function as a space of reflexivity which thereby allows them to view themselves as a unique and valuable contribution to the socially economical universe, Even as this universe is contracting in its ability to grant universal value beyond its domain.

Also, as I suggest in The Philosophical Hack, what is significant is our relationship with technology. Less our subjective meanings and relative interpretations of our thoughts and feelings that we have about our relationship (which are indeed valid, if overworked and often understood as substantially ubiquitous), the relationship has more to do with how such subjectivities manifest as the relation. For example, how technology tends to allow us to think our meaning is unique and individual all the while confining that presentation to specific technological items.

We might then see through the lens of counseling, as counselors, that subjective issues may find more resolution by the smaller possibility for explanation rather that a wider one. The more possibility is understood for a context of therapeutic help, perhaps the less individual help will be achieved.

Hence, I might hypothesize that a more coherent and less divisive ideal for therapeutic help is indicated. Less assertions of various conventional scientific methodological truth( this method is more correct that that) as argument (less acceptance of universal subject-relativity and individual argumentative validity) and more theoretical philosophy which might function to supply a model which contains, explains and addresses the phenomenal possibility for therapy.

In other words, less client choice in therapy and less Counsellor self-righteousness about appropriate treatment options, could lead to a more effective therapy as a whole movement and client responsiveness to treatment.

Because it seems right now, on one hand the client has so many choices for therapy that they don’t even know what they might be choosing, and on the other hand counselors as such might be so self righteous and myopic in their theoretical basis that they are asserting a particular type of methodological solution up and against the larger arena of counseling which posits that there could be many effective treatments. I am proposing that if the theoretical basis of counseling is it self limited within a larger explanatory philosophy rather than granted in infinite relativity, then the client might feel like they are actually getting significant help even before the therapeutic process begins.