The Conventional Limit

–from “Re-visioning psychology” by James Hillman.

The modern idea of ownership permeates into every thing that we think. This preoccupation with one’s “owned” ideas manifests world as some thing to be or to have as owned. Hence we have the eternal problem for the modern individual which shows up in one instance as rational subjective opinion in a world of argued relative opinions, and in another instance as mental illness. We might even begin to discern what mental health is by understanding how it seeks to commandeer the problematic modern individual which is — by the plain evidence of all the problem it vomits everywhere by simply being itself — ideologically and institutionally mentally ill, by placing it in a “positive spin”. For I think the most salient and pertinent issue of philosophy and not only psychology is: What exactly is mental health?

We tend to ignore this question as well as ignore the absurdity involved in the object of mental health by trying to reduce it to some physical state of brain or some organizational state of some “pure” mind, by trying to bring about various conceptual apparatuses, or simply talking about “ways” or practices that we can do to thus be mentally healthy by the doing of them. But none of these ever really tells us what mental health is except maybe a sort of stillborn fetus of modern science to poke and prod at.

And the people who are really suffering are the ones who mostly get to remain in a state of suffering overall.

Why do we continue to remain so myopic towards a problem which doesn’t seem to be responding very well to these narrow idealistic methods? 

But this is not really to make any sort of criticism against processes, interventions, and other efforts to help; for sure, we have to try.

 Here, we are taking on the interface or relationship between psychology, activity, and philosophy. 

The most pertinent philosophical discussion of modernity in this regard was made by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in their book “capitalism in schizophrenia”, but indeed their work is saturated with the attempt to come into a plural solution to the problem of the singular self. 

The issue, though, that we find permeating philosophy, or what I call conventional philosophy, can be viewed through the adjective pronoun “we”; for, what those philosophers pronounce in their philosophical works, in their psychoanalysis in one sense, is exactly “not” we, but indeed that group of people which is only able to understand humanity as a generalized and common, modern, “we”: Meaning, not the We that arises as world to form the contours of self, but indeed the modern We which is the presumed isolated self within a world of individual isolated selves “out there”, huddling in cold groups, and indeed only of beings associated with the category that we call human. The We doesn’t think of the We which involves rock formations, buildings and quarks. Anything that lives outside of this, what I call, religious and theological designation, we label and denote as ethically inferior and or in need of correction due to its epistemologically implicit error of cognition.

We might then ponder what indeed the idea of correction is manifesting around in this regard. What is this idealistic calcification attempting to protect?

*

I’ll stop there. 

Viewing Corona: Phenomenology and Orientation.

HERE is a link to some current statistics that compare the flu and corona.

The thing I think that video in my previous post marks out is that what makes coronavirus so incredible is that we are looking at it “in just that way”, which is to say, that we are seeing something through a particular ability or manner.

I am a layman, so I could be entirely wrong in my interpretation of this, but…

What I hear the doctor saying is that what we consider the flu is just a few instances of pathogen in a vast array of contagions that cause people sickness, either cold or the flu or various other types of illnesses. Coronavirus is the name for a particular set of viruses that cause symptoms, that cause sicknesses. The reason why we often hear it called “novel coronavirus” is because it is a new mutation of a type of coronavirus. Coronaviruses are around all the time and people get sick from them all the time, it’s just that the scientific community is relatively familiar with these various types of coronaviruses, influenza, the common cold. But the one that we’re calling COVID-19 (corona virus disease discovered in 2019) is one that we’re not familiar with, a mutation that we aren’t very familiar with. We aren’t really sure what it’s going to do because it’s a new type of mutation.

But what the doctor in the video is saying, I think, is that given any cycle of various types of viruses and pathogens that cause sickness, such as respiratory sickness or digestional sickness, there are thousands of such pathogens that enter the human biome and then exit the human biome, routinely.

The scientists monitor this cycle of growth and recession of hundreds if not thousands of pathogens all the time. During these cycle they kind of make an educated guess about which pathogens we are going to have to concern ourselves with. For whatever reason, this particular cycle had a “novel” pathogen that was taking place more than what they were counting on, what we were paying attention to, what we were expecting; the novel coronavirus fell outside of that kind of usual monitoring. So they decided to start monitoring it.

And what they found was pretty much the same as the flu. Yes it is more contagious than the flu, and is more intense, but the way that we stop spreading the virus has less to do with how contagious this is (what is inherent in itself) then it does with preventing that we get it (what we do about it). How contagious a particular pathogen is doesn’t say anything about whether or not I’m going to get it. The determinant of whether or not I’m going to get it has to do with the situation that I am being.

Nonetheless, statistically, I think he is pointing out, almost the same percentage amount of people that die from any other similar sickness are dying from the coronavirus and just as well, people that are getting it is not too much larger than any other type of pathogen of this kind. The difference is that we’ve just somehow decided to pay more attention to this particular novel pathogen in any given cycle.

I’m not sure exactly how true that may be because if people all around my neighborhood are suddenly getting sick to where they can’t go to work and function that in itself shows that there’s something slightly different going on with this one.

But from a statistician point of view…

…the doctor is really saying he’s not really sure how it happened that everyone got so excited and worried about this particular pathogen because if you look at any other pathogens throughout the world they’re all pretty much doing the same thing; that is, a small percentage of people are dying from it, a somewhat larger percentage of people are getting sick from it, and a vast array of people are carrying it around, or are positive for it, but are not really getting sick from it.

And we probably need not mention Miellassoux’s remark about the reason why the world should hold together for any amount of time, for we should expect that we would be walking down the street one day and all of a sudden everything changes beyond comprehension or completely falls apart. Well, that’s kind of what happened with the coronavirus, and indeed that could happen at any moment due to the nature of nature. 

Anyways…

So, as I said in a previous post, the question really becomes about the climate. And it really begs the question of, less perception or how people’s opinions or beliefs might affect how they act, and more about how ontology, how a person’s being is in-formed by a fundamental way of viewing the world which then allows them to see what Is real.

Innoway it is more philosophical, which is to say, how being is, as opposed to religious, theological, or epistemological, which is to say, what we believe, how we feel about those beliefs, and how we might analyze objects of knowledge that are feeling-belief.

The reason why it is nonsensical to argue something like “everyone is being hysterical”, or “The corona pandemic is not real”, it’s because the reference of those sentences is too imprecise to really address what is occurring so far as real reactions real perceptions real occurrences in the world.

Indeed, the word “real” and “reality” necessarily designates something that must be dealt with, an imperative, something that not cannot be dismissed by a wave of the hand, Or a whim of witty intellectualist thinking. It is a manifestation of concrete material.

Indeed if I fall onto the sidewalk without putting my hands forward I will probably hurt my face and bleed. And even while there is no argument that can be put forth to ever prevent that same fate every time it occurs, there are ways of thinking, ways of speaking, ways of acting that could alter the situation so that the event happens at different times, more or less, or not at all. So by analogy, even while the coronavirus pandemic may be blown way out of proportion, it is indeed blown to the proportion that it is, and indeed blew the way that it did blow. We surely must take precautions. Just because something might be blown out of proportion, as a way of speaking or understanding the situation, does not necessarily mean that one should not take account for it and act accordingly, yet also that one should be able to make an argument for why it is not the way it indeed is. Not how it appears, as though it is an illusion. And this is exactly because it is real. The question becomes more about the tools we are using to address reality. Less about perceptions and belief.

To address the situation as if it’s some sort of an illusion is kind of like trying to use a scalpel to hammer in a 4 inch nail. Not only is the tool (the tool we call ‘illusion’) inappropriate to the task, but also, it could work given a certain condition of application and time. These two possibilities do not really correctly reduce to one or the other because to approach the scalpel with the need of hammering in a 4 inch nail into a 2 x 4, by all reasonable and sensible standards of knowledge, amounts to nonsense, in this analogy that I’m putting forth here. But in fact, the tool called ‘rationality’ is also imprecise to move to describe why a common occurrence could cause such an “irrational” response (along the same argument of ‘illusion’), because then we are attempting to exclude the real situation of how most people are able to see the world and their role in it, which is to say, what human beings’ purpose is in the world as a teleological signifier for what they (the individual) is and supposed to be doing. What most people ‘think’ is more like a instinct (inthinked? Perhaps a phenomenological theological tenet?)

The scalpel is an imprecise manner of approaching the nail. However it might “know of it” never does the nail “do” what it is by applying the scalpel. Of course, we can create any sort of meaning we want of hammer and nails and scalpels–the post-modern phenomenalist loves to come up with all sorts of interesting perceptions upon things and situations and see those as foundational to everything. But the assumption there, in a way, is that scalpels must always be able to hammer in large nails. The phenomenalist refuses to see the nail as the nail simply because he sees what he is able to view. Sure, I could use a scalpel to comb my hair with, but it is an imprecise way to comb my hair. Lol. It is not ethically wrong, it is simply a limitation that defines the objectivity of the phenomenon, in the same way a nail defines itself, and a scalpel. It is about an ability to respond.

Presently, as I have argued elsewhere, the Traditional categories and methods that we use for philosophy are no longer sufficient to grasp , contain or communicate the situation that we are coming upon so far as knowledge might relate to what the world is, or the Being of the World.

So Again, we can begin speak about the climate of world and knowledge. 

x

Here Is another flu/corona comparison article.

Secularism vs. Pluralism; a comment

I had the opportunity to participate in a live podcast episode with InkleDeux for the third time. Our topic was“Secularism vs. Pluralism.”We had a …

Live Podcast Episode: #3 Secularism vs. Pluralism

I didn’t listen to this whole podcast. But I listen long enough to have something to comment upon. I couldn’t really listen much longer than I think around seven minutes, because it had already brought up so many philosophical problems just in the introduction that I already knew pretty much what they were going to talk about, what vector they were taking.

I don’t mean that so much as a condemnation as I do really as an indication that there is a discrepancy involved with the use of the word “philosophy” that is not regularly recognized and in fact is assumed to be nonexistent in what I call a conventional philosophical Orientation upon things.

Anyways…

The point at which I stopped in the podcast was when they introduced the idea of secularism with reference to the US Constitution which guarantees a separation from church and state. Their comment upon that establishes philosophical ground as though it is common, and I’m not sure that we can assume the route that they took, even though they speak as if it is indeed a common ground, as it is indeed something that is “common sense”. And, I’m not arguing that it is something that I don’t understand or is incorrect as a line of reason; I’m not arguing against their further arguments. I’m arguing against the assumption that they make from which they build the rest of their discussion.

Nonetheless; the discrepancy that I am indicating could be located exactly at that point where I stopped listening to the podcast. The discrepancy arises where we understand the difference between extrinsic mythology and intrinsic mythology. That is, what actually occurs in the establishment of A government which runs according to our along or in correspondence to a separation of church and state, is a government which understands its own theology as implicit to what is common.

And this is to say that by that amendment we suddenly are able to point to something else as if we are not the embodiment of what we are pointing to. To me this is the significance of secularism: it is a faith which does not recognize its theological grounds. In a way, exactly the psychoanalytical “mirror stage” which leads to alienation as identity (Lacan/Zizek).

 The reader can find various comments about how I develop this philosophical theme further back in my posts on this blog.

But in short, America, if I can generalize, establishes its self as a global religion through the missdirection of calling religion as identified with something else. This goes to an evolution of the human being as indeed humans are evolving not separately from the universe, as opposed to the human being that has pretty much been the same for thousands of years and is evolving Only in some intangible manner. Indeed, the issue that they in the podcast argue as foundational to a secularism is is a foreclosure of bringing transcendence into what we can talk about. Again, with that motion it is actually bringing the transcendent into imminent conversation, or communion, as the case may be. The amendment there by establishes its own religion in distinction to other things that are basically “false religion”, basically believing in “false gods”.

It is not difficult to trace this kind of thinking back through Protestantism, but I am not arguing that America or capitalism is based in Protestant thinking. But indeed has been at least one author, weber, who argued Protestantism as a basis of a proper secular society. But that point is nearly moot.

I’ll stop there.

Perhaps some of your readers wanna listen to the whole podcast and see if they entertain or see if they’ve gone kind of the long way around to get to the same conclusion. Then maybe you could let me know.

Or perhaps you could see where their discussion comes nowhere near what I’m talking about.

I don’t know. Let me know either way OK?

Or you could tell me that what I’m saying makes no sense. If you cannot understand what I’m saying, please ask, and I’ll try to say it more clearly.

I’m sure the podcast is a good discussion because I enjoy listening to her philosophical things, even as I might disagree with them fundamentally.

But I’m short for time right now.



Thinking Marx Through Harvey — thru reality

Thinking Marx Through Harvey

Thinking Marx Through Harvey
— Read on syntheticzero.net/2020/01/23/thinking-marx-through-harvey/

I like it.

The only critique I would have of it is that one does not give way to the other. To give way, to choose either one or the other or to have one or the other “prove” itself to be the basis ground or ultimate truth of things as it is, is to resort to a reading of Kierkegaard that is not conventionally mistaken: it is to have faith.

We might see that the issue is not so much (or is less) that there is an idealistic Marxist realm where ideologies or abstractions usurp brute realities, and then a disillusionment that comes along that shows that such abstract realities, or theoretical systems based on abstract concepts, is an incorrect way to understand the truth of things, so to speak — but indeed such conceptual (e-)motions occur.

My critique is that the reduction to one form or another, at least in this kind of dialectical polemic, where I was incorrect before but now my idealistic version of reality has been proven incorrect– this kind of polemical thinking, this way to position myself in the world, this either/or mentality, is what is incorrect. It is not unethical; but it is incorrect with regards to what is true.

When we read Kierkegaard, we might understand that what he’s really indicating, especially in his Pivotal philosophical works “either/or, pts 1 & 2”, is it is possible that my ideological theories posing or pointing towards some truth actually does still occur as such, that is, showing truth, while yet also as I come upon the real world which discounts it and proves it to be incorrect. What occurs is that there are two correct versions of reality that do not work together nor conflate into or toward another unity, and that this is the truth that shows how our interaction with the world takes place.

I submit, arguments of what is real, or what is actually the case in the world, function As we might understand them informing us intellectually ,through a vacillation of ideological categories that function truly to establish the world, a world, the world, in exactly the way it is, and the subject mediating between those worlds as though indeed I, the subject, is changing. In the scheme, though, the world that is involved with the greatest of all categories, essentially does not change. We can even bring Slavoj Zizek’s question in here: are we able to change how we understand change?

No matter what discourse, or any other indicator, might “truly mean”, ultimately it is only indicating ideas that are attached to whatever actual world in the way that it is at that present moment. The idea that I am coming to find out what is “actually real” through any sort of theoretical mechanism or intellectual device, is ultimately based in what we would or should properly call “faith”. To resolve the either/or dilemma to one or the other “reality” requires faith.



As someone else has put it elsewhere, it is not a question of whether or not Jesus Christ was actually the son of God or not the son of God, was an actual human being, or was a God on earth, or was the son of God, or none of those things.  The more complex and significant issue is how Jesus Christ occurs in the world that I am coming upon. This last question differs substantially and is quantitatively different than the previous types of questions. 

Similarly, racism for that matter, or aliens, or The European Union, or quarks, bits or gravity, or unicorns.

To be able to weigh up sides and decide which appears the more real, to have placed the stakes within that trial, as though I am along with the world Being determined by those stakes, requires faith.



Likewise it is not a question of whether or not the brain functions in whatever way that science or neurology might say that it does or that it doesn’t, or whether or not science is correct or incorrect in its estimations. Whatever situation is occurring at the time is indeed the situation that we must deal with at the time. Yet, strangly philosophically sognificant, most often how we are thinking about it is understood to be involved with some actually true of the situation which further tends to want to avoid itself this time, wants to “prove” to not others – against, with or by others — but mainly itself how such a truth is indeed essentially true, no matter what anyone will say about it. 

Esoteric

The project we can generally call the Enlightenment was about including humanity is one common category. It’s economic and political arms involve incorporating difference and investing in unknowns we can call excess.

The failure of this project is actually the culmination of its effort, its fruition. Where ever difference may appear, it’s manner of viewing the universe has filled in, colonized every possibility of thinker including ways to think about thinkers and thoughts that could not think of have a thought.

The enlightenment and its project of colonialization continues because thought itself is understood commonly as a particular set of instructions and descriptions that most people are simply unable and will not ‘think’ outside of. This is so much the case, the project so solidified, that even philosophy itself thinks that it is able to overcome this ideological theological maxim.

What we call ‘Esoteric’ is that manner of coming upon the universe which, for any group of human beings, cultures or “religions”, is unable to be communicated to the aggregate of constituents.

Confusion arises in the world, dissolution of group coherence, when everyone one is assumed to be party to all ability of knowing and thinking in potential. Individual withdraw into subjectivity, the atomization of the human group, the dividing or separating of things along “improper” junctures, causes demoralization in the groups constituents and an ability for large exploitation of those individuals due to the conceptual excess which arises from the ‘fission’ of people who would otherwise see themselves as a whole being intimately involved with a coherent and meaningful group.

Religion and Spirition and mental health

Religious and Spiritous.

I am not sure what would qualify a general category of people who are not religious, or who claim they are not. But if I may call upon that general category, I’ll say that they would take issue with the following:

Without religion, mental health as a description or indicator of a group of bodies that functions well individually and together, regardless of the details of that function, deteriorates.

And id say that the first defensive posture would say something to the effect about the “history of religion” and corruption and “what God?” and all those young adult arguments that we all have been over so many times.

so.

I must thus qualify that.

I elaborate upon what I mean by ‘religion’ elsewhere. But likewise, philosophically, I don’t really enjoy the idea of ‘spirituality’ as a counter position to religion; the two polemics seems to me to miss a valid point about being human, again as I elaborate elsewhere.

So perhaps a way to skip the longer discussion and get to the meat and starches of the table, is to draw a parallel between the conjugates: religion and spirition, and religious and spiritous, and rephrase to say without spirition the group and individual deteriorate. And this also conveys a deterioration of world.

In very short short, the orientation upon what we could call empirical facts as a means or true substance to draw the individual in a world misses a significant and necessary element in being human for the establishment of a healthy individual and society, and thus world.

That is, to reduce the human to the physical-empirical (and I might add as much as it tends to signify the same absence: political), defies that the physical-empirical contains any significant meaning. Hence, the deterioration of the world.

Spirition. I like that.

Triggered

www.dailytexanonline.com/2018/01/29/triggered-is-more-than-a-buzzword-should-not-be-freely-trivialized

Once again, The strange disembodied “social mind” has commandeered a meaningful term in the effect of deconstruction and dissolution of the human being. Quite an invocation of Marxist capitalism, we find this kind of deconstructing of legitimacy in many terms; for example as I have talked about here and there: The term “radical” and even “existential” or even “identity” has been ripped from its thoughtful accessible substance and reflective anchors into an eternally social deconstructed nothingness of popular meaning.

In this light, it might not be too difficult to see how, from the standpoint of institution, governments are indeed being/becoming corrupt and failing at their task on one hand, and individuals are plagued with all sorts of crisis of mental health on the other.

Definition, by its very nature, is something that is taken away from Being to become “ideology”, like an idea (Idealica) but where the idea loses its ideal, or abstract, sense and becomes something that is projected out into the world as a sort of real thing that affects us from the outside, which is the basis of current capitalistic global state, And the reason that Cedric Nathaniel discusses conventional philosophy in the sense of religion, or, something that requires faith in order for it to operate or otherwise have effect on the individual person. Effect, here, is taken as the meaning where intellectually we may understand something but where the very understanding of something is shaped around something that is effectively denied; that denied object I offer from a psychological perspective is emotion. (and then see my post about the poly vagal theory).  For example, a quite Zizek type of view: if I have no worry about paying off my credit card debt, the latter about consolidating my debt has no effect upon me. The confidence of the existence of my debt has no relation to any worry that is often supposed in the offers to be rid of the debt, that is, as though the letter to relieve my debt should necessarily cause me concern about my debt if I am sane.

Starting from the simple description of how the word “triggered” has been molested and commandeered for socially ideological purposes, we might begin to understand how ideology itself is a facet in the creation of mental disorder. For one would be ultimately lead to ask is why should I give any sort of credence or acknowledgment to this more popularized form of “triggered”, say? And why should I have any sort of reaction to the fact that these terms such as “trigger” might be being used in a way to dismantle or otherwise discredit the validity of the individual human being? In the sarcastic popular use of the term “triggered”, has occurred with the popular term “rad” (radical) as another word to mean “cool”, but also in the same way as “existential ” is now used to mean concerning anything that might feel uncomfortable about living life (as though any feeling that might deviate from the feeling of comfort is inherently part of some existential crisis that a person is having). The actual occurrence of the human being is downplayed and dismissed with reference to the ideological social truth, or what is supposed of truth, due to the effect of the emotional component that is being denied in the act of making intellectual sense of the event. 

It doesn’t take very long to come to the borderlands of a conclusion which understands ideology as less something that we can somehow deconstruct, or find out any encoding meanings about, overcome any power plays inherent in the use of various terms; rather, we begin to contemplate if the very idea of ideology, as currently portrayed, is itself a symptom of mental illness. 

Heresy and Sin: Into the Mouth Of Madness

When we remove the ideal of Providence and communion from the experience of the Being Of Human, we are left with the realization that, often enough, an idea of a particular author was not unique to him or her. What arises is the awareness that what they had come upon was already there for anyone to see, suspended, if you will, in the conditions that are present at every moment.

One might then understand that the only force which is (1) preventing everyone from seeing it, (2) allowing or creating a condition of seeing that an idea should be credited to a particular author as though that author’s being and therefore thought processes are unique, (3) presenting ideas which are “built” off of previous (temporally past) ideas, is that force which arises in the idea of such real-true organization of things. It is the conditioned idea which develops an individual to view Itself within certain lines of causality that are drawn by ideologically implicit limits, or “prohibitions” which derives the modern subject as such, and not ideas as the mind might be naturally or intrinsically inclined to have or be able to work with.

This presentation can be verified by the very notion which understands any idea as not conditioned by the conventional organization of prohibitions, “commandments” and “sacraments”; to wit, the default against which a natural and fully available idea might exist means nothing or otherwise occupies a space within the conditioned ideology as a blank spot, a nothingness, whereAs in actuality the non-conventional thought has the larger explanatory, as well as effective power.

The discrepancy thus defines what modern subjectivity is as a cosmological player-piece, against what the human being actualy is as a universal object. Forever protecting its ideal freedom, it misses that which is of its self which is causing the inherent problems of the world being. It is making a mistake in conceptualizing freedom along and either or fulcrum, as though to give up ones freedom somehow a person then becomes powerless as well.

We thus might then be able to understand that capitalism is less a political or ideological space than it is the name of a certain type of mythos which is operative presently in the formation of reality.

The example of this is found when one notices any disjuncture in understanding of known things. For example: the hitting of my thumbs upon a flat plastic/glass rectangular face has no connection to the the key strokes used to write an application by which people discuss ideas. Another example is spreading peanut butter on bread. Or jelly. Or a Lyft and an Uber.

All that is needed is an awareness of a possibility of disconnection where continuity is assumed as given and solute; there we have the manner by which the human being may fit in the universe with every other being that exists, as opposed to every being having to be subject to the Being that is human which thinks.

What is most difficult to imagine is how indeed human beings continue and indeed thrive outside of or despite the network of connections that arise within the capitalistic mythos (for another term: religious cosmology) of reality.

We might even contemplate how a universe Omni-connected through the thinking human being and only due to its presence has effected the human world in a less-than-positive manner. Think war,addiction, mass-shootings and climate change. The question is not ability, it is responsibility.

We need to be responsible in how we view ourselves and the world to not adhere to limits just because what lie beyond them is offensive to our sense of freedom.

Thought is not Thinking: A critique of philosophy.

Much like “the history of consciousness” is not about an essential attribute of the functioning brain, like, we might associate consciousness with psyche, but is rather about the analysis of an appearance of what it is to be human in the world, so “thought” Is likewise not about what might be occurring in the gray matter, so to speak, but is more about what appears as human in a general sense and under a certain light.

The reason why I point out this distinction has to do with my reading various philosophical texts and beginning to really understand what I (seemingly) naturally reject in my coming upon philosophical texts.

I think the shadowy-gray area, the area that people get all up in arms about when we try to define or locate the object of philosophy, is found because people equate “thought” with “thinking”. Philosophers tend to read other philosophical texts– no matter from what era — as though thought and thinking are reflecting the same essential substrate which is inherently and absolutely attached to the human being in the world, which is to say, the phenomenological subject.

“Thought” is not thinking; but “thought” can indeed be thinking under certain conditions; there is no philosophical text that is doing any thinking nor reflecting anything about what thinking might be , or, Perhaps the more precise formulation is under what conditions can we be speaking of thinking, and under what condition are we speaking of thought. Philosophical text often reflects thought, in the same way as “the history of consciousness” is reflecting the intellectual academies’ version of history. But The history of consciousness is not talking about human beings in their actuality; On the contrary, the confusion I see popping up everywhere in philosophy — which is the reason why I think many things that are included in the discipline or activity of philosophy should be more properly referred to as “critical thinking”– Is because philosophers often enough, it seems, think that once we enter into a domain that talks about “thought” they automatically associate a constellation of ideas as rotating or orbiting some essential object, but without recognizing that it is indeed an object that they are referencing; in fact they denying the existence of such an object by an activity of focusing on what The satellites are doing, focusing on manipulating the orbits of such satellites.

Philosophers tend to read philosophical texts without actually understanding often enough what the texts might actually be about because of this implicit assumption that goes in to viewing the text. In many instances, philosophy is founded on a decree of unrecognized doublespeak, at once speaking of an undisclosed object about how there is nothing undisclosed but that which is encoded in the speaking (discourse). What?

This assumption amounts to or can be analogous to a black hole when we look out into the sky and space; how long did it take astronomers to actually find and identify and locate an actual black hole? I don’t really know, but I do know that the reason why it was even hypothesized was because astronomers could infer the existence of a black hole by referencing a movement of bodies.

The problem with philosophers, though, is they are identifying with Being a satellite; philosophers identify themselves through the motion of being a satellite as an essential and central universal component. This is the meaning of speculative realist authors’ idea of correlation, as they embrace the idea of “the Copernican revolution” that displaced the earth as the center of the universe.

Many philosophers see their activity as involved in manipulating orbits (Marxist ideology) instead of understanding how the physical mechanics, as an analogy, of orbiting satellites-ideas function. And they do this so well as to create an impression that there is no way to be able to understand how the satellites have their orbits.

The reason why I associate conventional philosophical activity with religion is because of what is apparent about what is in effect, what is occurring by the evidence of (a certain method) of philosophy. And this is to say that if one understands this kind of reference, this picture that I’m putting forth, then one might be able to see how philosophers are implicitly rejecting certain semantics, certain organizations of meaning along typical fronts.

These fronts become camouflaged by the arguments that are contained within the closet structures of the argument itself. But, like I said, once one begins to understand this picture, one can begin to see a routine and typical rejection that occurs at the same place, along the same contours of meaning in a large swath of philosophical discussion. I call this typical rejection “offense”, and I define or I refer to religion in general, what we know of religion and what we associate with religious ideas, groups, cosmologies, as “concerning offense”. And this is to say, similarly or as an analogue, that it is possible to associate Christianity, for example, and into different types of Christianity, different denominations, by how they understand sin.

And I think the most notable and significant factor of religion is its method of trying to apologize for that which it is implicitly rejecting.

And this is to say that when I talk about philosophy and I bring my various discussions about what is occurring within a particular text, I routinely get objections to what I’m saying is if my discussion is suggesting something about the other author’s or philosopher’s argumentative position, namely, that their philosophy their ideas are wrong or incorrect in someway because I’ve pointed out this aspect of their discourse. And so what I routinely get back is an argument about how I am incorrect, and usually by that point I have to tell them that I actually agree with what they’re saying but I’m actually more pointing out what is occurring through their text, rather than discounting their text by pointing out what it is doing.

My usual analogy is a tree. It is as if me and a friend or a colleague are standing in front of a tree and I am describing the tree to the other, e.g. it is a Pinetree, it has long thin green needles, it has brown pinecones that are sharp, it has bark, it stands 40 feet high — but then my colleague comes back at me and says “I don’t think that’s green”; “what do you mean by 40 feet?”

My point with the whole thing is: what is the point of us arguing over the green Ness of the Pineneedles whether or not they’re green or not, whether or not they’re sharp, whether or not they’re short or long, or what criteria we use for those designations?

And by this question I am not saying that it is wrong to go about that method. I am not saying, “what is the point” as an expression of futility or condemnation; rather, I am actually asking into what is the purpose of proceeding in that way.

So, I am saying that we should be able to distinguish what we are actually doing when we say that we are philosophers or that we are doing philosophy. And I say this because if I am standing at the tree describing the tree and then my colleague next to me is just sitting there questioning the categories I use — to me, while we both might be doing philosophy, we will never get anywhere because we are doing two different activities.

And I think my biggest gripe is with this is the kind of deconstructionist or whatever philosophy that likes to lay claim over the entirety of what philosophy can be, as if merely asking questions into definitions holds the entirety of valid philosophy wherever the word is spoken — I think this does not strengthen philosophy as a human endeavor but actually devalues and weakens it. Such a method that claims philosophy at the expense of any other type turns it into something that’s pretty much useless except to accel the person that can claim their superior intelligence because they can ask more questions then the other person is willing to define, as if at that final moment when the other person gives up with trying to find out that this “deconstruction-definition” person Can as last claim the superior argument. It is so utterly capitalistic that it kind of defeats the point of the word “philosophy” itself.

But I’m not saying again that such a method is incorrect or invalid or wrong. But I am saying that we should notice that that particular type of way of doing philosophy is a particular type and is not “philosophy” as a whole category that it assumes and imposes it itself to be.

Socrates was not about shooting down his opponent. What is dialectical is the effort to come to a consensus. I think the mass amount of a certain kind of intoxication of our societies has led philosophers to a certain type of self aggrandize, self interested, thought-capital oriented “thought producer” Who has appropriated and conceived what is Socratic in a kind of disgustingly misinformed and misunderstood manner.

My point is simply : let us identify this kind of conventional, critical thinking based, philosophy as what it does so that we can put it to proper use, use which is best fitting to what it able to do.

And then retain the term philosophy for the actual human-universal questions of significance. Perhaps we could begin this new philosophical enterprise with discussing perhaps we could begin this new philosophical enterprise with A discussion about just what is honesty. What is it to be honest?

Before this blog was called “the philosophical hack” it was called “constructive undoing”.

And perhaps some of you readers may be able to make a correlation there.

😉

Consider this: by the very term “speculative realism” the authors are hedging their bets.

If anyone was there when or after the speculative realism conference occurred and then the few years after: what we saw was a bunch of people , the audience, all of a sudden getting very hopeful, but then as those authors continued to produce their various ideas on philosophy, the interest in them faded quickly. And that is because they had something very powerful to say, but then they either backed off or didn’t really understand what they were onto.

Why?

The answer goes to why I think Graham Harman has the strong position.

Philosophical Dimension.

https://soundcloud.com/usertransspace/reason-emotion-and-religion-groove-n-talk

@

it is possible to understand philosophy as having two dimensions. Non-philosophy thus is the philosophical ability to comprehend the use of the real object called philosophy.

The issue that philosophy raises against this Confinement of its resources and agency, is that philosophy seeS itself –or permits a view that is itself –as without dimension; it understands or otherwise presents reason as having a link to an infinite source, what we generally call transcendence, or what the postmodern called immanence — because what the postmoderns are really saying about immanence is that the human being is able to get a hold of transcendence entirely .

The only argument that philosophy can make against what we are beginning to understand is it’s own limitation is to merely reify it’s access to infinite reasonable adaptation.

And this is why we have to speak of the two routes: conventional philosophical thinking is not really grasping that it is at once an infinite resource, while at the same time able to be described to its limitation. Conventional philosophy will use the rebuttal of no predictive capacity to say that philosophy is not being defined to its limitations. And then the only response to that is that conventional philosophy is not comprehending the issue at hand. Conventional philosophy sometimes then will take that as an affront to its agency, to its eminence, to its privilege and centrality. And thus would be Because it is not grasping that to describe itself to its limitation is not an insult nor an invalidation; rather it is an invitation to its constructive use. All the while opening up an avenue for thought that it is unable to conceive or otherwise encompass.

As well, it generally cannot conceive of an act that is not involved in an assertion of power as it understands power as the ubiquitous universal underlying force. Again, this is the reason why we have to speak of two routes upon objects that do not reconcile into a further unity.