The Contradiction in the Imperative

The Mask situation has brought Some interesting philosophical issues and insights.

COVID-19, as largely an entirely random occurrence from the chaos which exists beyond our ever reckoning, is not really the philosophical issue, unless we want to speculate about the various ideological imperatives.

Science arises outside of these ideological imperatives, or rather one could say “on the threshold”, or the borderlands or — I forget the intellectual word…something that starts with an “m”, I think…On the margins, but there is a academic word for that which I’m not bringing to mind right at this moment–  Science arises in our world as half in and half out, seemingly arising from nowhere, yet somehow firmly predicting and describing our real world. At once, making no ontological sense while inscribing to us what is ontologically sure.

Nevertheless…

It is the mask which is the symbol of our time, one could say. Covid, in this way, is just an occasion to mark out a social significance.

I don’t think I am too far off the mark in describing the main issue that developed around the masks but now perpetuated in the wearing of masks is: am I protected?

I think the whole freak out and the whole big thing that arose (arises) around the masks was whether or not I will be protected from getting the novel Covid. (The conspiracy theories arise in frustration of purpose and ignorance of one’s self, I’d say).  And while this is generally ideologically proper to what is human today and now, scientifically what they tell us is that these masks are not protecting me from the virus. This is to say, I am not wearing a mask because I’m trying to protect specifically and only myself from getting the virus. The only time I’m wearing an N 95 mask is when I am having to be in close proximity to people that indeed do have the virus; the reasons to wear an N95 anywhere else verges to almost pathological. Cloth masks are not a barrier to the virus getting into me; I am not wearing my mask to protect me from you. On the contrary; they are a barrier for my saliva and particulates which are carrying the virus from getting out to you.

In other words, The reason I am Wearing masks is to protect you from me, because I could be carrying the virus and not know it, and not showing any symptoms.

I think this sentiment is largely unknown; the reason why most people wear masks is because they think they’re protecting themselves. Whereas, the only way that they’re protecting themselves by wearing a mask is to symbolize and or model to other people that’s socially it’s OK to wear a mask, because if we all wear masks then we are all protecting each other from each other — And we wash our hands and don’t touch our face.  The virus staying alive on surfaces, at least the CDC in the United States says, is not a significant factor in the transmission of Covid. Even though animals and surfaces may have Covid on them, they are not transferred well into our bodies to give us the sickness. The main source we are worried about is transmission and that Has to do from humans to other humans directly. 

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Now, here is where we get in to philosophy and the imperative.

I am consciously acting, I am consciously wearing a mask for the purpose of protecting you, of protecting other people. I have no concept that I carry within my mind or reasoning that tells me that Covid is going to be prevented from getting in me by wearing a cloth mask; there is nothing about my wearing a cloth mask which involves my knowledge, which makes me feel secure, which makes me feel protected from getting the novel Covid. I mean; It can make me feel protected, of course…

Hence by extension philosophically, one Could say that I do not differentiate things that I do upon a level or unitive ontological platform; i am able to do things socially for different reasons, for example, for my own good consciously, and then for other peoples good consciously, to help myself as opposed to others, or to help others as opposed to myself, but that is not upheld in that I might choose to do one thing altruistically. If I am choosing, then I have really chosen only for my self intrest with what I am able to view as other’s choices.

Indeed in so much as I might have the idea that I am partially protected from wearing a cloth mask from Covid and partially also protecting other people, we might say that I hold on to this unitive platform from which I occur or as which I occur as a subject in the world, as a human being as opposed to the world that I walk upon or in. In this frame I have all sorts of motivations at all sorts of times, from selfish to altruistic whether I’m alone or with other people. Yes.

On the other hand, once I understand that in no way am I wearing a mask to protect my self at all, but only for the sake of protecting someone else from me having the virus unknowingly, which is to say, that I am not having a pretense about other people wearing masks, even though the idea is that if we all wear masks then we are all safe, then I am able to differentiate what is in truth social and what is in truth the activity of myself. In short, AI am able to discern the truth of the matter that rises above relative opinion (that I ought to have chosen be-cause…)

The imperative here is that there is nothing that I am doing for myself socially.  What I am doing for myself socially is ultimately what I am doing for other people. If I choose, then I am choosing for other’s benefit.

Or I am not. Where I might decide wheather what I do is in my intrest or another’s, there am I invested in what Kierkegaard calls the ethical-universal. It is not that I am unable to arise outside of this universe, but that if I do then I exist by an absurdity, which is determined in my choosing, or what is called the choice that cannot be made.

Somehow, This can sound eerily similar to mid 20th century existentialism, but I would say that the difference is that the imperative carries only to the parameter where what is ideologically social stops enforcing its dictates upon what truth is able to be, which by all ethical standards, never happens.

For agency is ideological, but ideology is not informing a total occurrence of being.

The Imperative is irony. What never happens is happening. The question now, is then, can you see it?



x

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Emotion and Reason. Part 5

I got this from Philosophics Blog who was commenting on my series of post.

lets see if i can get to my point of all this.

In Parts 1 and 2 I posed an exercise of monitoring and then graphing ones emotional intensity over a period of time. Then I pondered if it would be possible to develop a similarly construed graph of Reason intensity. I received a number of comments from friends and readers about this. And the issue was all the same: How could we graph an intensity of Reason ? Some asked or attempted to grapple with such a monitoring and scaling and others wanted a definition or are trying to find a definition by which we could then appraise Reason graphically.

^

I was not trying to trick anyone. I honestly was wondering what people thought about it. It just crossed my mind that we so easily could make a chart of emotional intensity over time regardless of what the emotion was — could we do the same with reason?

I guess the answer is apparently not.

The graph above I think came close to what I was formulating in my mind about how, if I could rate an intensity of Reason, how emotion might relate to it.

I was also thinking quite similar to:

However, I think my original idea behind this series was more about how inseparable Reason and Emotion is; less polemical and more correspondent.

The reason I was asking folks to think of charting emotional intensity was for a setting up of a different model for how Reason and emotion relate, one where Reason is not a mitigating or taming aspect of emotion but rather the converse.

So let’s use the hypothetical graph.

As an instructional analogy, I suggest that Reason is that part of human consciousness which is the graphed line, and emotion the space below the line. Instead of taming or stifling or controlling emotion, Reason rides the line of emotional intensity usually exhibiting an unaware and incognizant state of awareness–while regularly dismissive –of its emotional affect: The thing we usually understand as Reason is when consciousness is not acknowledging the emotional state involved with its operating, which is to say, Reason is seen, viewed or understood as by definition not being influenced by emotion — or at least this is a common idealized goal for “being reasonable”. This seems to be such an ideal mandate that where we might conflate Reason declares Reason as a flat exemption from emotion such that “what is able to see truth” has been compromised and thus develops a compensation for its (reason’s) own lack called irrationality, say, and as though Reason has stepped out of the picture in the being able to identify the irrational and the rational state.

{I advise one take counsel from the non-philosophical idea of unilateral duality, which I have talked about often in my posts recent and long past.}

Reason thus may identify a particular manner by which consciousness establishes the human being in the world as indeed an object which has only reasonable connections with the universe. And this is to say, the polemic such as the figures above could represent what is able to arise once Reason is picked out, so to speak, to distinguish the human being as special and self-evidently separate from the universe, that is, except along those specific junctures that reason dictates or reflexively understands of itself or allows for such an understanding, those junctures by which the human being may or is permitted to know of her interaction with the operating universe. Such Reasonable manner can be said to be inherently disembodied knowledge.

This could explain why so many people, perhaps especially in the West, have a low “emotional intelligence”, difficulty understanding emotional connection, as well as how emotion can be involved in how one is able to perceive (know) the world. As well, my explanation could make a contribution to explaining why the modern human being is involved with a world which seems to be responding negatively to human activity despite our best intentions: Becuase our reasonable intentions are necessarily disembodied, the knowledge which is produced through such a naive reasonable state is necessarily maladaptive to the problems it perceives; in other words, the problem itself is already formulated in a mistaken manner of coming upon the true universe.

Ok. Let’s munch on those cookies for a second.

Reason and Emotion.part 4

OK.

The concept behind my idea of the relationship between reason and emotion is that emotion is the significant factor in what reason is able to accomplish.

We can go back to the hypothetical charting of our emotions (and Reason?) the past few days that all of us have been doing because we are so eager to pay attention to ourselves and our emotional (and reasonable ?) states. 😄. OK so we have this hypothetical chart, we’ve graphed all of our values of emotional intensity on the Y axis and the X axis is time. So we have this graph that looks kind of like a stock market chart maybe; In any case, you probably have in mind, at least, what the chart looks like, the ups and downs as the line that connects all the plot points.

Now;

How do we usually conceive reason? Correct me if I’m wrong, but when I think of reason I think of it as this kind of force for activity of myself that will shut down or off otherwise irrational surges of emotion. As we might be having emotion, reason automatically takes over to tell us why we are having that emotion, what may be good or bad or right or wrong about that feeling, as well as how to stop having that emotion. “Levelheaded” is a term that comes to mind to right now. “Rational” is generally understood as not emotional.

Even as irrationality does not necessarily have to do with passion or emotion, I think it is not too difficult to make the association that I’m trying to bring about for your reading concept. So I am pretty much also relating the term “reason” to “sanity”, and “Sensibility” Is also another concept we could lump under what reason is. The category of reason includes all these kinds of descriptors. Yet, I am also not being so general as to equate “reason” to any sort of activity of thinking or the results there of, that goes on to make a truth from subjectivity or subjective opinion or thinking. I’m not taking the postmodern kind of relative position to say that reason is just something that individual human subjects do whether or not they are rational or make sense. I am definitely using the term “reason” as the non-standardized truth of postmodern subjectivity, before reason enters into pluralist relation; likewise, this is not Kantian or Hegelian “world” Reason, here necessarily.

Reason in-itself is this thing that establishes subjective truth within a world of relativity. But also, and I think this is significant: reason is that which is denied in so much as the object called “reason” is excluded within that world of subjectivity, which is to say, as much as it is not excluded from the condition of relativity of the world. The issue involved here is what I call “the founding term”; in the usual conventional sense, the founding term is assumed to be “relativity”, whereas this discourse that we are involved with right now has a founding term of “reason”.

OK, I hope that makes enough sense to you to understand what I’m saying when I say “reason”. If I was to talk about the tree over there you would not have to ask me what I mean by “tree”; nevertheless, I believe that I have given the reader enough descriptors to understand what I’m talking about when I say “reason”. Beyond a few stray orientating questions, any other doubt would be extraneous and somehow, I feel, purposely obstinate about not wishing to understand what I’m talking about; I.e. It would be involved in establishing the One Route.

– A pertinent guiding question here: Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical?

And a tentative guiding answer: Everything you’ve been taught about Kierkegaard is wrong.

👽

All right; I’ll let you suck The juices out of that fruit for a bit. I suppose there will have to be a part five.

Emotion and Reason. Part 3

So back to my original intention behind this post that I have now divided up into three parts.

I am challenging the notion that reason is the crowning authority of human existence and consciousness. And, as a commenter on Part 2 pointed out: I do agree with the observation that what we often think is rational or reasonable is often hardly that.

But I would even counter this observation by saying that such an observation is based in an assumption of reason: it is by reason it’s self that we are able to make such distinctions.

I suggest keeping in mind the idea of the Two Routes, which is an extrapolation of the non-philosophical premise of unilateral duality: by pointing something out and describing it I am not therefore suggesting that something is wrong with it nor making an argument that I have a better idea: I am simply describing a fact. If I say the tree is green and it has bark, I am not suggesting that I have a better way that the tree should be. Of course we can fall down the rabbit hole of what I call conventional philosophical speculation and consider all the probability and possibility of subjective experience of that tree. We can talk about how these subjective reality is may be true and that how our world is constituent of a plurality of subjective worlds. I am not making any argument about whether or not phenomenal subjective worlds are true or false; The veracity of any subjective opinion is absolutely up for debate.

What becomes evident by the contradiction that arises between these two types of understanding, though, is called a unilateral duality. This is to say that we take each of those two situations as situations that indeed are true, but then also note that the activity of the attempt to reconcile those two situations into a further reconciled state only speaks of the One Route. Hence what I am proposing as The Two Routes. Readers can look back at some of my posts to try and wrap ones head around this more fully, one can read Francois Laruelle’s non-philosophical books, and one can investigate what other people have to say about non-philosophy, if really need to comprehend all those details to be able to move over into the issue of an orientation upon objects. It’s OK. No shame there.

Nonetheless; The example that I’m working with here is the strange paradox that (1) reason can somehow analyze it self to say that this situation over here is not reasonable or not rational, and then this situation over there we’re going to categorize another various sort of system, and then this over yonder is what we call actual reason in comparison to these two or three or more possibilities, and then the whole thing amounts to an argument that we can negotiate over about what reason is, and (2) That reason as an object in-itself is characterized by point (1). This is an example of a unilateral duality, and it characterizes a particular manner or approach by which we can begin to understand what the human being is doing.

*

This approach is not dissimilar to the way that counseling might approach someone with, say, anxiety or depression or some sort of neurosis, to use an older term, or some pervading issue that a client may come in for psychological help.

I believe a particular theory that I am nodding toward right here is called Internal Family Systems (IFS). But there are a few theoretical approaches that incorporate a similar manner.

I think the idea is not very new: A client comes in complaining of an inability to stop Behaving in a certain manner, say for example, avoiding parties or social situations because of accute social anxiety, say. Keep in mind that I am not a practicing counselor but I’m just beginning to learn.

In any case, a possible approach to this situation is to get the client to externalize the problem. In other words, what the client is having trouble with is this whole thing that she calls her self which manifests in general as a thinking subject that is her self. The point of the intervention is to help the client see or look at the presenting issue as though it is not part of a whole system that is “her Self”, to help her to To gain sufficient distance from the issue in order to view the issue and address the issue as though it is affecting her self rather than being constituent of her singular whole person.

The issue here is not a speculation or a negotiation about whether or not there is this whole subject called the client herself. We treat the client as though she is an interrelation of various effectual aspects as the primary methodological material, as opposed to a “whole” person who is screwed up in various ways.

In reference to what I’m talking about so far as reason, or as I tend to call “philosophy” sometimes, by suggesting that the client may be affected by a problem rather than being the problem itself, I am thereby not suggesting that the problem may indeed not have to do with a whole system. Rather, I am suggesting that we can approach the whole system by viewing the system in a different manner yet while the system is still functioning and operating as a whole system, which is to say, excluding nothing.

So I will repeat; to point out the fact that reason itself is implied in the activity of indicating things that are not reasonable or indeed irrational as opposed to reasonable or rational, does not negate the fact that indeed reason is allowing for this division of itself. Developing different terms in order to compensate for this apparent paradox gets us nowhere significant into understanding what the human being actually does as it is, except that it gives us insight in that this is indeed what the human being consciousness does: A fact of the object that is the human being. Developing new terms in this way maintains and reifies the one route. Reason is not negated by describing what reason does, neither does such an honest description suggest that there is another way that reason might be operating. The conventional philosophical route Is thus characterized by a method wherein a fact can only be argued with by denying the fact itself. Hence, I say the conventional philosophical method is based in denial. Yet I am not suggesting that there is a better way, or that philosophy/reason should do or be something different. I am merely stating a fact about conventional philosophy.

*

I believe by this line of reasoning I have come up with a second fact of the phenomenal subject. I think I came up with a first fact a year or two or so and you would have to look in my past posts for it. I think the first fact is that a phenomenal subject is bounded by nothing. But I could be wrong. Lol. Actually, with these two facts in place we could thereby come up with a third fact of the phenomenal subject that we have been calling “correlationalism”. Science is based on an honest acceptance of the facts, even while the facts might be tested.

OK. Well it looks like I’ve gotten done with part three and I still haven’t gotten to the original intention behind the whole post so it looks like there’s going to be a part 4

👾

Reason and Emotion part 2: A reason scale?

In part one of this post I ended with the idea of making a kind of “emotion scale”.

In thinking about finishing the post that I started, the one that I am chopping up in to different parts right now, it crossed my mind: I wonder if we could make a “reason scale” similar to how we could chart emotions, as I suggested.

It seems so obvious to me that we would be able to chart intensity of emotion regardless of what emotion is being felt. I think everyone with little difficulty could understand how they could rate a feeling of emotional intensity on a scale of 1 to 43, 43 meaning that you can no longer function and you will have to be committed. 😁

This morning, though, I was wondering if we could do the same with reason. Would it be possible to get people to rate her some quantity of reason that they might be noticing of them selves at any moment of the day?

I don’t know. Today I think I’m going to go along and there times of the day I’m going to try and gauge myself on a scale of 1 to 43 how reasonable I’m being.

Perhaps where zero on the rreason scale would mean that you are acting so unreasonably that you would have to be committed. 🤪

Maybe you readers might want to try and do the same, just as an exercise.

Can you?

Think about it. Just using this instruction: go through your day and periodically rate you’re reasonable Ness or your reason on a scale of 1 to 43, 1 being low intensity of reason.

What difficulties are you having with this instruction?

What is easy?

Reason and Emotion. part 1

As a budding counselor philosopher I find myself pondering what reason and what emotion might actually be in the determination of the human being in the world.

I might be wrong, and please, anyone who knows any authors or has any suggestions– I don’t think the idea of “reason” has been parsed out. Even when I am writing about reason, I am relying upon two different ideas of what reason is. In general, though, in my philosophy I don’t really have a requirement for the discernment that I’m making right here, because of the way that I address the topic.

But it when it comes to actually applying the practicality of counseling upon a truth of philosophy, I am noticing that I just might have to try and make a distinction.

Of course we have the Kant Kind of reason which really echoes out into time and tradition in both directions of past and future from his point but also in the continuing reverberations as we have supplied for as now I think of him and the reason and the like.

The distinction I’m thinking about — and I’m just kind of playing around with ideas here, kind of using this as a workspace, and if people want to help me with this – totally welcome. There is the kind of philosophy “reason” that we, I think we, think of when we talk about reason philosophically; I think this kind of reason is the thing that most philosophers are considering when they talk about the phenomenon or phenomenology or reflection or any of the kind of continental authors. It is against this philosophical reason that people come to spiritual ideas such as transcendence or “one consciousness” or some sort of universal truth in which we are spiritually a part of or something like that, like a sort of “one spiritual fulfillment of emptiness”. But also the Judaic “unknowable God”. Or the mystical “veil-cloud of unknowing”. As though Reason is “full” existence, and without reason we have what is left: spiritual nothing.

But also just philosophy in general: reason is taken as that mode which is going into philosophical treaties (sp) while also being the object of its reflection, that is the topic of whatever piece. Personally, I think we’ve figured out what this “philosophical reason” is, would it produces, what it does, all that stuff. (but showing this is also part of my work). It may have taken us 250 years or something like that or 2500 years, or 25,0000, depending on what people wanna argue, but I think we have a pretty good picture, a pretty good workable picture. And of course people will continue to say that no we haven’t and so here we going to talk about it some more. I definitely see this “talking about it some more” as a from a Kierkegaard perspective and ask “where is everyone going”? And then I sort of Mark that place of departure where people continue past, and I call that “conventional philosophy”, that philosophical area which “has gone past”.

My work involves establishing parameters to some thing which is understood to not have parameters.

So: reason.

Or: that which has parameters beyond which is not knowable.

The first definition of reason I would say is the philosophical one that I tried to lay out above. It imposes, rejects, reduces, denies and enforces, amongst other matters of discernment. And through those operations allows for ethical choices.

The second definition of reason I would put more as something that I am not doing right now. And I say this in the sense that of course I am using reason right now, but also something else is going on. It is a philosophical non-Sequitur to reduce everything to the sort of physical empirical true one unitive universe that human beings have access to through cognitive ability, for a term. Butt, and I say this as your ass: I am not arguing that there is not such a unitive real universe.

I am not arguing a metaphysical truth. I am looking at what is. Of course there are papers to be written and I’m sure I will write them one day and publish them.

For now what is, what is being, I just go with the phenomenal subject: for another term: Dasien (and sure people can argue all they want that this is not the same as the phenomenological reduction and they can argue all the distinctions between the various ways that authors want to put things. And I concede to that method, and I say that it is not incorrect and that I am not attempting to prove that that method of coming up on real things or discerning real things is somehow false or incorrect. I am simply talking In a different manner, using, what I call, a different method-o-logical basis.)

I just go with it. I understand it as a thing in itself, in the sense of Graham Harman’s object oriented philosophy. You can go read some of his stuff and figure that out. 😜

And for all you phenomenologists out there, the question of how we get outside of the phenomenal correlation, Cedric Nathaniel discusses that in his book “the philosophical hack: the concluding unscientific postscript to event”. And you can buy the first part for three dollars right now! 👽

So likewise I understand reason as a thing in-itself, an object. And then I ask myself what is this reason doing and then I attempt to find out what it actually is by what it is doing. I do not attempt to make an argument about what it is through what it might actually be; like I said go read Graham Harman, my approach is not very dissimilar to what he lays down. (But I don’t think he would say we can find a thing by what it does.)

And once I detach myself from this thing called reason to be able to see this object, this universal object, called reason, Then I am able to notice that it indeed is not a crowning head of human consciousness in a Kabbalistic , Tree of Life, kind of fashion. Like I said, for sure it is, but I’m not talking about it from that standpoint right now.

And so, if reason is not some transcendental-immanent Universo-Hegelian historically real aspect that I can Will or make myself become in alignment with through any sort of the use of reason, then I have to ask myself : what is reason involved with, what is it dependent on in order to achieve this status that appears to everyone as sacrosanct human subjective consciousness?

OK.

So here’s what I’m pondering.

Let us say there was some sort of instrument that we developed to measure emotional states, like a quantitative assessment that we could take a group of people and get data from them, numerical data, as to, say, intensity of emotion in a general sense. Maybe they carry around an app and at various times of the day and they would just rate themselves, say, on a scale of 1 to 43. Of how intense their emotions are at any particular time in the day. It doesn’t matter necessarily what emotion it is; maybe we could even put something in the app about what emotion they think they’re feeling and the intensity, but really we could , I’m just thinking of emotional intensity.

So and then we chart this, we graph it. And we get this chart that has varying numerical representations of the feeling or the intensity of feeling of any emotion over a period of time.

Maybe I’ll leave it here. And do a part 2

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=82cJgPXU-ik#dialog

Another stab at: What is Philosophy? A non-philosophical concise definition.

Finally a Concise Definition of Philosophy.

Cedric Nathaniel

Regis University

{KEYWORDS: concise, definition, non-philosophy, orientation, philosophy, reality, route}

Finally a Concise Definition of Philosophy.

Continental philosophy has become a caricature of itself.  Its intensions found lacking, every definition philosophers have given over the decades have left many of us in a virtual state of trauma.  We wonder; does philosophy require such a verbose and convoluted definition which basically becomes a philosophical enigma itself?  While many of us thought we had come across the answer in the book length definitions, upon a second look, we now realize that it was really smoke and mirrors, and in the end, a religious fantasy of philosophical fiction.

Philosophy is, at root, the application of reason upon a field of data.  Reason is understood here not to be a stable category, not so much grounded in an immanent knowledge of intuited transcendental truths, but is indeed the field that is defined by the philosophical process itself.  Logic is a tool; the human being is a conditional state, and reality is a particular coupling of logic and reason toward ontological certainty.  What this says then, is that philosophy is involved in an orientation upon reality.  The two possible routes of philosophy are thus toward ontological certainty, or a conditional state.  These routes are mutually exclusive, since to reduce certainty to a condition results in a certain state that we call ideology in one instance, and religion in another.  We thus are speaking of coming to terms with what philosophy is able to do.  The definition of philosophy thus refers what is commonly understood as ontological certainty to the conditional state; or more precisely, philosophy as a method reduces conditions to real ontological certainties, and as a practice destabilizes ontological certainty towards a realization of it’s conditional state.

published on Academia.edu

december 2018

Climate Change and Pascal’s Wager.

In this Era of Prehistory, everything gets turned on its head, just like in the Pirate’s of the Caribbean movie…

As I have put forth in various places a “turned on its head” version of faith in the spirit of Kierkegaard (somewhere in my posts Im sure Ive spelled it out, but I surely address it in my book The Moment of Decisive Significance); I am applying Pascals Wager to the issue of climate change.

The deep adaptation that I have a link to in my previous posts signals more than drastic political and financial maneuvers, and more than ideological change; maybe I’ll write about that kind of depth in a post to come.

For right now, perhaps as a way to begin to chart the depths we can meet at the crossroads of the wager.

In the original wager, Pascal places what what can occur against what will occur. For example, what can occur is God’s existence, and our ability to believe, and what will occur is ‘nothing’. This is to say that the Wager is balanced upon what is removed from the possibility of it being removed., that if God does not exist, what will occur no matter what we believe is nothing. Yet, what can occur if God exists against our belief is that either we will be eternally damned or we will be saved.

So the turning on it head of climate change in this regard is placed in this framework:

What can occur:

  • the world only changes a little bit, not drastically different than any other change, big or little, in respect to our ability to live through it and adapt: This is to say, the world keeps changing.
  • Humans still exist and deal with the universe.

What will occur:

  • nothing.
  • The world’s end.

My point is that if the world as we know it ends, then there is no amount of believing or behaving that will have had any effect. So, it is better to keep on as we have, as though the world, ourselves, and the climate is changing.

Extension, and perhaps a little more philosophical:

The idea that we will have to adapt deeply regardless of what happens with the climate, coincides with the climate despite what activity we will write papers about or the scientific studies about the Earth. The basic question which stabs at the heart of this whole issue is that if indeed the world beyond a doubt, scientifically, will end, then why are we still arguing about it? Why, if it so certain, must we still try and effect some sort of human business in any way?

I submit, it is because all of it is a human organization. Not an overdetermined basis of utopian solution, not an underdetermined basis of nihilism (or a overdetermined nihilism or underdetermined utopia).

My wager is that the Earth’s climate is changing, but human Beings (as a generality to indicate what ideological Being is) want desperately to keep the climate of knowledge the same even as they might argue drastic change is needed; as Zizek has formulated, their argument is to enact drastic change within the normalized field wherein change is able to be reckoned as change (Postmodern expertise). In other words, keep the basis of knowing of such thing, how the human Being shows up the its world, the same, without the human Being actually having understand it self and the universe in a different manner, which is to say, in the actual manner. My wager is that human Beings will indeed survive to thrive, that the climate will change and will continue to change with human Beings involved with it.

And I argue that this ‘same way’ is Enlightened Reason: The special universal case of the modern manner through which human Beings shows up in the world.

#theactualendoftheworld

#prehistory

(Not-so?) New Hypothesis:

Reason is subordinate to emotion. Emotion determines the capacity of reason to apprehend the world. Emotion manifest either as a static state or a fluid state; typically what we associate with Emotion is the fluid state; we notice that when emotion is not fluid that reason as a neutral and uninhibited Avenue towards true things can function As indeed it sees itself : with no irony intended: Reason indeed sees, it views, it’s self as and unaffected identity, it axiomatically and reflexively sees its view as an un-inhibited clear vision.

My hypothesis is that the static state of emotion represents aspects of the world that are offensive to ones being; The shape or condition where the fluidity of emotion rests to thus attain relative stasis gives reason the platform to function, gives reason its field of data as well as its capacity to mean. This is to say that reason only is able to process the view that is allowed by the manifestation or state of emotion that exists for the individual.

The clarity it sees is but the clarity that is allowed by the emotional terrain, The emotional geography, if you will.

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This is completely opposite of our traditional model of reason. But it could explain why the world manifests in the way It does, particularly in light of how we might be able to view scientific facts.

Philosophy and Racism.

The other day, I commented on a post over at Larval Subjects.

Someone replied to my last comment:

Racism is socially constructed. Just like gender. They are just signifiers without a signified. Now how do you think you can explain and convince someone who doesn’t even know this kind of thinking exists?

This is a damn good question, so I am offering my take here.
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While I disagree with the general form of a “signifier without a signified”, nevertheless
another way of putting her question is “How do I break into the game?”

The short, short answer is, you don’t.

I will try to not make this answer the very involved answer because if I were to do that I would be merely still playing the game, and part of the answer to her question is, indeed, that we are already playing the game. And besides, I could probably write a book answering just this question.

In the short, short answer, and without going into all the verbosity of metaphysical ins and outs, Lacan and Zizek psychoanlysis calls this game the “The Master Signifier”.

The problem with a question such as hers is, as I just said, you , we, are already playing the game. You are already part of the game of the Master Signifier.

It is not “All Good”. Zizek somewhere lately has said (had been saying) that the problem with what he calls “the Left” is that it has no balls; it is disorganized and it is failing because it has no ground, that is, because its members cannot agree on the ground. The problem is inherent to this manner. The problem, basically, is that I can have my “good” morals, but everyone else is allowed to also have what is ‘good’ for themselves: It bends both ways, and then both ways again, and then back upon itself. In short, there is no strict philosophical reasonable manner to overcome this dilemma because what I call conventional philosophy is already a part of the Master Sginifier.

I will try to show what I mean by this through an analogy.

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Addiction.

How many of you have ever watched the show “Intervenion”?

Go watch an episode, or one of that type, or go find a freind who is addicted to something. You probably have a friend who is addicted in a bad way, or likely, at least, a freind of a freind.

Anyways,
After the set up and the slice-of-the-day-in-the-life-of-the-addict, the Interventionalist comes in and sits down with the family and loved ones of the addict. What does the Interventionalist do or say everytime? What is the point of meeting with the group of loved ones?

Often, the family is a mess also, over their loved one being an addict and all the nonsense they do. So the Inteventionalist tells them right off that this is not the place to argue among youselves. And then she says that you will not engage with the addict in argument, that this is not the place to deal with whatever direct issues are going on between you and the addict.

The point of the intervention is to disrupt the fantasy in which all the family and loved ones are involved. This is also why if one of the (interventioning) family members has issues like drugs or drinking also, or codependacy, or anger problems, then the Interventionalist will offer help to them also. The point of getting together with the famlily is to get them to behave as if from outside the Master Signifier. The way you do this is to consider the whole situation, not just the ‘subject’ or the addict in this case, and stop interacting in that situation.

While this analogy can only be taken so far, It has some good uses for our philosphical/critical race theory uses. The main thing to notice is that interaction does not cease; only interaction with a certain dynamic. Conventional philosophy would have it that everything is contained under the one rubric of infinite possibility and that this is the domain of philsophy: Everything it sees fit to call unto its own. I generalize this motion into indicting its reason, but again, with the caveat (similar to the family/interventionalist/addict situation), that I am not speaking about a category in which all human beings participate at all times.

The point is not that somehow I get to or am able to get outside of a Master Signifier; that idea merely retains the fantastic frame of the Master Signifer itself, though using the parameters of the fantsy to contruct a fantasy about getting outside of it. The main issue is reason. Here, the reason in question is the crowning government of a body of generalizable anarchists.

Just as a manner of speaking, you cannot make an argument about the problems with anrachy using the terms of anarchy and you likewise cannot effect the anarchists from being chaotic by imposing a ‘sensiblity of government’. Both manners simply play into the scheme of signification that is already occurring. The anarchists will hear such anarchistic rhetoric as supporting thier cause, and they will hear the plea to order as the reason thier ideals are founded in a ‘more correct’, manner of appropriating the situtation.

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Catherine Malabou might be onto something with her ‘passionate enagement’ and ‘plasticity’, and even ‘climate change’.

Why do you think the family in the intervention gets all emotional in following the instructions that the interventaionlist gives them? That is, that they must not engage in argument with the addict, that they must have a bottom line beyond which they will not relent?

The intervention is not an arguement with the addict; it is not an attempt to convince through reasonable discussion that addict to get treatment. It simply places boundaries against which the addict is thus able to view the situation that is outside of the fansasy. This outside is ultimatly still part and portion of the Master Signifier, but what the intervention allows for, in L-Z psychanalytical terms,  is a viewing of the Real object. Of course, this object is not some sort of “real real object”. It is that object which the Master Signifier signifies to be the impossible case of any condition; these impossible cases are ‘suspended’ in every situation. What the intervention does is allow for a stable platform, a butress perhaps, a wall, against which the addict is able to view the impossible sitation that arises outside of the codependent and fantastic family dynamic.

The family is crying because they too are part of the fantasy of the Master Signifier and they are being asked to stop playing in it. Or rather, to bring about by Being actual subjects the Real object in the play of all possible outcomes, which is to say, “in the last instance”. They themselves must, in effect, lie. In order to be fidelitous to the truth of the situation, they must not tell the truth, which is to say, the ‘truth’ of how they see it, the ‘truth’ of how pissed off they are and why, the ‘truth’ of all the things they ‘know’ and ‘feel’. They must take on faith what the interventionalist is saying to do will reveal the truth of the situation of the fantasy to all participants. They are told to simply talk about the facts, how it used to be between them, how much fun they had together before the addiction, how they love them, and how they will not interact with them at all if they do not walk into the space of the unknown that is being opened for them at this moment.

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Again, this analogy only goes so far. But we cannot abide someone destroying our house simply out of love for them. At some point we just accept the facts of the situation despite what argument may ensue about whther or not they are the facts, or what constitutes facts. Indeed, we do not shut them down if they wish to continue in thier way; they can do what they want. But once the facts have spoken, then things becomes really real.

We cannot convince racist or sexist people that their practices are racist or sexist if they are not willing to at least take a step into the unknown. But we also do not simply accept the repercussions of thier destructive activity.