Growth after trauma: Post Traumatic Growth

Post-traumatic growth helps people find a new sense of personal strength and a new focus on helping others.
— Read on www.apa.org/monitor/2016/11/growth-trauma

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This morning I came upon an article in my Apple news about post traumatic growth. And it was a promotion of an article from health magazine which I don’t have a Subscription for, So I just searched, and found this link.

From a counseling perspective it is a simple matter of understanding that a traumatic event Can occur in one’s life which disrupts someone’s life, and so then there might be things that we can do to get one’s life back somewhat to how it was “before”. Yes.

Philosophically, I tend to approach it from a larger perspective, which is a stay from a causal perspective instead of a symptomatic perspective.

At some point I’ll write a paper about the differences, but for now it is a difference found in the question of “before”:

what was I like before?

Was I “not traumatized”?

And a pivotal question, how do I know this?

Psychology, and counseling as a general idea, does not approach these epistemological questions nor really philosophy in general as a way to understand a situation. As I argue in a paper that hopefully will be published soon, called “towards a unifying theory of counseling”, Psychology tends to argue backwards to justify it’s intentional thinking.

A different approach would be to see that the object of my intention towards solution is itself a symptom. Which is to say, the object that I come upon to thereby come up with some sort of solution that seems apparent to my reason, is it self addressing a symptom and not a cause. Psychology would say the complete opposite, that it is attempting to find cause through a regression of symptoms. 

Yet, my argument is not one that is discounting psychology, but one that includes psychology as a kind of approach that can help us to locate cause; just to say that psychology is a particular approach and is not really addressing the complete picture of the issue. At least so far as psychology today really is not the same type of psychology as Kierkegaard mentions in his works.

So there is a kind of non-philosophical function occurring here that if you want to get into it you can try looking back into my archives of this blog.

Ok. More in a mint…

The Conventional Limit

–from “Re-visioning psychology” by James Hillman.

The modern idea of ownership permeates into every thing that we think. This preoccupation with one’s “owned” ideas manifests world as some thing to be or to have as owned. Hence we have the eternal problem for the modern individual which shows up in one instance as rational subjective opinion in a world of argued relative opinions, and in another instance as mental illness. We might even begin to discern what mental health is by understanding how it seeks to commandeer the problematic modern individual which is — by the plain evidence of all the problem it vomits everywhere by simply being itself — ideologically and institutionally mentally ill, by placing it in a “positive spin”. For I think the most salient and pertinent issue of philosophy and not only psychology is: What exactly is mental health?

We tend to ignore this question as well as ignore the absurdity involved in the object of mental health by trying to reduce it to some physical state of brain or some organizational state of some “pure” mind, by trying to bring about various conceptual apparatuses, or simply talking about “ways” or practices that we can do to thus be mentally healthy by the doing of them. But none of these ever really tells us what mental health is except maybe a sort of stillborn fetus of modern science to poke and prod at.

And the people who are really suffering are the ones who mostly get to remain in a state of suffering overall.

Why do we continue to remain so myopic towards a problem which doesn’t seem to be responding very well to these narrow idealistic methods? 

But this is not really to make any sort of criticism against processes, interventions, and other efforts to help; for sure, we have to try.

 Here, we are taking on the interface or relationship between psychology, activity, and philosophy. 

The most pertinent philosophical discussion of modernity in this regard was made by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in their book “capitalism in schizophrenia”, but indeed their work is saturated with the attempt to come into a plural solution to the problem of the singular self. 

The issue, though, that we find permeating philosophy, or what I call conventional philosophy, can be viewed through the adjective pronoun “we”; for, what those philosophers pronounce in their philosophical works, in their psychoanalysis in one sense, is exactly “not” we, but indeed that group of people which is only able to understand humanity as a generalized and common, modern, “we”: Meaning, not the We that arises as world to form the contours of self, but indeed the modern We which is the presumed isolated self within a world of individual isolated selves “out there”, huddling in cold groups, and indeed only of beings associated with the category that we call human. The We doesn’t think of the We which involves rock formations, buildings and quarks. Anything that lives outside of this, what I call, religious and theological designation, we label and denote as ethically inferior and or in need of correction due to its epistemologically implicit error of cognition.

We might then ponder what indeed the idea of correction is manifesting around in this regard. What is this idealistic calcification attempting to protect?

*

I’ll stop there. 

Revealing the Substance of the Gap: Is the Tragedy of Peterson the Irony of Zizek ?

The Tragedy of JBP

https://evolutionistx.wordpress.com/2020/02/22/the-tragedy-of-jbp/
— Read on evolutionistx.wordpress.com/2020/02/22/the-tragedy-of-jbp/

“Come down, you distanced travelers, from your great intellectual heights, down to where we humans can meet, again, eye to eye.” –c.n.

Wow. Makes one think.

…and kinda makes one sad as well.

I decided that I’m just gonna post the comment that I put on the original post:

“Damn. Makes one wonder about celebrity. You know, I thought he had a pretty good point, I think Peterson has a pretty good point to make so far as psychology and mental health, and then some of his philosophical support I think it’s pretty good but it just goes to show that the kind of continental intellectual left… I mean, if I can say “we“, we’re kind of mean sometimes.

But I always thought Peterson was making a good point from a mental health standpoint. But it seems nowadays especially since Zizek. That a whole intellectualized group of people are really unthinking when it comes to their assertion of theory and what should make a proper argument and things like that.

When you look at the debate between Z and P. I really think that Zizek saw this of Peterson and was kind of giving him a break. People saw this is kind of like a sucky debate, but I think it was a really good debate because Zizek had the good sense to be able to see there was no point in him unloading all his theoretical BS upon someone who could give a shit about it; which is to say, and I have made this argument too and some of my posts — and I even sent Peterson a letter of what is this debate about really, but I didn’t insult him in it — that Peterson really doesn’t understand what Zizek And the generalized Continental force is really saying Nor what it’s really doing. And I have made arguments other places in my blog that I’m not really sure that the Continental’s, and the generalized group of people that support that kind of intellectualism, I.e. the Fans, really know what they’re talking about either, but they’re vicious, they really don’t think about humanity as this thing that they are a part of as a group. It appears sometimes that the Continental Intellectual Fans behave as though everyone needs to be ultra rational and that this rationality supersedes any sort of compassion or considerations of what the being of human actually is.”

…And honestly, I wonder if that is the present Continental philosophical conundrum aggravated and expressed as phenomenalist correlationalism: the frustration  involved in not being able to breach what is correlational in their existence thus being forced out, or projected, upon the object of their frustration: Peterson and his ‘weak’ philosophical-intellectualism. Yet, ironically, when you take away his Christian motif, what is left so far as a psychological approach is really the problem of ideological correlationalism,  so it would seem that Continental Philosophy. is exactly the problem Peterson psychology is aiming at. 

Peterson asks how can we use reason to make these large jumps to great ideological structures in which we are encompassed if we don’t first come to terms with who we are as being, who we are as essentially a human entity, so to speak?. He suggests that the kind of philosophy that finds the subject within these ideological structures and then attempts to solve the problem of subjects interacting according to these ideological structures, are itself the manifestation of a psychological mental health problem.

Then he further suggests that the solution of this problem is to be found within oneself, to look and see what people (we, me, I) are doing when they are using these ideas, these ideologies, to situate people in structures of power. That the solutions to our current world problems are not to be found in trying to manipulate ideological structures that influence what the subject is within this ideological space. That the ideological space is indeed the problematic space. Rather, if we want to find a solution to the problems of our world we need to get honest with ourselves and start with ourselves as the fundamental philosophical problem.

And indeed, while everyone loves to read Zizek as talking about politics only, Zizek really is indicating nearly the same thing when you begin to understand and take ownership of what is occurring as discourse, within the material world, so far as we are subjects within it. But Zizek tries to imply this kind of situation, Attempts to show the problem involved in ideological situations such that the only way to solve this problem is come back to the original source, the Hegalian-Lacanian historical consciousness, so to speak.

The “parallax gap” is that fundamental space that is left out of political focus: the subject. The Lacan angle thus shows how ideological posture function through a basic historical trope that is the ‘other end’ of the Master Signifier; the ‘petite subject a’ and the ‘barred subject’ are aspects of the discursive symbols for what is imagined to be substantial, or the ‘big other’.

Lacan says that consciousness behaves like discourse, but this is to say that the problem begins in the psychoanalytical mirror stage where the child identifies with the image and thus becomes ‘castrated’ to him or herself to become indeed the ideological subject, the basic and fundamental mistake as the heart of all political struggle.

But no one desires to realize the truth of what we are dealing with, hence what is Real is always held at bay, so the subject of this initial trauma (of constantly being confronted with a truth of the reflection it has identified with) replays the event through this post-traumatic fantasy which keeps the subject limited by a freedom of the image. Emancipation is thus always recouped by the political ideology to manifest as the mechanisms for capitalism.

Recalling the Zizek/Peterson debate, we can see how both were centered upon the same problem, working together in a dialectical manner in the effort of revealing the oppressed subject which lay at the center of the ‘mistaken’ views upon the ‘material’. One one hand Zizek playing from the ‘negative’ , and on the other Peterson playing from the ‘positive’ iterations of the emancipated subject.

Wow. Thanks for your little research on Peterson because actually just the other day I was wondering what he was doing. I figured he just kind of settled back into his academic career and was kind a like a, well that was interesting. But it kind of seems like it really affected him, and not in a good way.”

Psyche-logic

—excerpt from Healing Fiction by James Hillman. c.1983

The question implicit of the object of the subject is not, like the usual phenomenologically subject-based philosophy, meaning; rather, the question is to what use is philosophy put? For what purpose is the Being of philosophy? Cedric Nathaniel puts this juxtaposition of view in terms of how philosophy understands itself automatically with the Being that is necessarily established through the human Being such that this conventional philosophical effort always must be asking and answering the being of itself in as much as it’s manifestation is assumed implicit to every and any other kind of Being, that is, as though the human being is the sole arbiter of the universe.

Once such reductive pattern and method is accepted for what it is, it likewise can no longer be doubted that what it is is what it is doing. It is this move that removes us from the phenomenological correlation by accepting that such correlation can ever be avoided in philosophical reckoning that is involved with time, tradition and history, but as well, then, such a notice does not suggest that something is wrong with those constants.

No longer involved directly with making arguments of ontology, the effort concerns thus the teleology of Being.

—ibid. p.97

“Faith Turned on its Head”

Choosing Belief with Kierkegaard

https://notentirelypyrrhonian.wordpress.com/2019/09/06/choosing-belief-with-kierkegaard/
— Read on notentirelypyrrhonian.wordpress.com/2019/09/06/choosing-belief-with-kierkegaard/

This linked post is a great case by which to begin to understand the parameters of the conventional philosophical orientation upon things.

*

I disagree with the writer: the leap of K is the absurd situation of already having occurred. It is not “into a choice” of faith, rather, such a choice is evidence that faith is already there.

Sartre, as I see him, misunderstood K and posited a free choice in light of the absurdity of brute existence, as S might have been reacting to the reality of the Final Solution and World War 2. But in his bewilderment of such atrocity, as with others of his time, like Fankl and May, his reading of Kierkegaard was produced in his (Sartre’s) astonishment, where as Kierkegaard was not astonished, or, he was more astonished that the brute reality of existence was/is missed so thoroughly by most (the crowd, or those oriented in such a way for their identity).

I see Sartres existentialism as a complete misreading of K. But that’s not to say that S did not have good insight given the condition of his moment.

However, the trauma (ww2) limited his ability to view; it refined his view such that the tiny pin hole he was looking through appeared to grant focus to the “whole”, perhaps like a small apperature of a photographic lens has a longer depth of field.

But we know now with trauma, the tiny view just takes over the field rather than representing it truly.

The traditional conventional readings of Kierkegaard routinely misrepresent his works (or thinks only inside the close reading of his words rather than the whole meaning of all his works — that is, philosophically rather than psychologically . Many of Ks works are indeed called by himself “psychological” btw.) Hence in order to render the meaning of his works properly for our time, one must turn thier idea of faith on its head, turn it upside down.

K’s reprimand is of the “inauthentic” individual who simply is always in despair to will to be oneself. Such individuals, ironically, 😘 find and found solace in Sartre’s existentialism because Sartre and his peers (and others) were shook by the apparent inhumanity that humanity would be party to — and such individuals understand the view from despair (the view that despair brings about) as indeed the true view, the viewing of the true existence, but it is the distortion. I call this distortion the “real” view, because it is the view that must be reckoned with first, in reality. So, in a way, Sartre was actually giving a sort of psychologically compassionate statement by his philosophy.

Like the analysis of Trauma, the view that is true of the situation is not found in the reasonable conclusions gained in the traumatic coming upon such brute force. Rather, distance allows the true picture to come into focus without restimulation.

From the brute existence already having been forced and come to terms with The reading of events is no longer informed through the “post-traumatic” apprehension-reaction against a circumstance of things; the person no longer involuntarily enacting actions and views from the still resonating “close-range” and the re-encountering of the traumatic stimulus. Or, in Sartre’s way: The encounter with the abyss of freedom is traumatic, hence one revolts from it, rejects it in order to reshape one’s own life through choosing it out of the chasm of nothing upon which identity is based.

What Kierkegaard already had processed and viewed truly was already lost, as we see in K’s reprimands of Christianity. What Sartre “rediscovered” was a reading of Kierkegaard through the lens of deflowered ignorance: In despair to will to be oneself. Hence Sartre’s Existentialism just posits that one can will to be oneself through the free choice to no longer be in despair. This reading, while good for the modern citizen who is already in despair merely tells everyone it is ok to live in ignorance of oneself through choosing to deny thier despair through the free act of choice.

Judge Wilhelm (in Either/Or part 2) describes the condition of those who would wish to “join in love” with that which is apparently unknowable, and hence the ground of ethical choice that is despair.

While such a reading can be therapeutic considering that most of society citizens do their best to try and avoid their brute existence, the reading, such as evident in the linked-post (as well as the scholarly reports) nevertheless is opposite of what K was saying.

Ks use of the trope “Christianity” often throws off interpretation, as we see with Sartre; for who could still think God was in history after the Holocaust? Sartre’s whole philosophy is informed by active trauma: the trauma of having the very human force of belief confronted at its core, that is, as an actual force connected with causality.

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Read more insights into philosophy in THE SECOND PART of The Philosophical Hack: The Object of the Subject.

The Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Event.

Coming to mind whether you want it to or not.