The postmodern condition: Google is Manipulating You – Putting You in Their “Filter Bubble.

Google is Manipulating You – Putting You in Their “Filter Bubble”

Google is Manipulating You – Putting You in Their “Filter Bubble”


— Read on josephratliff.com/google-filter-bubble/

This blog, this video and the producer of the video, The fact of them now, bring up many issues, and more than whether or not Google search engine is biased and whether or not we’re being manipulated.

Let me see if I can address the issues that seem apparent to me just off the top of my head.

One. The thing that sticks out to me the most is that Jean-Francois Lyotard already told us this in his seminal essay the Postmodern Condition. And very short: the postmodern condition is where knowledge is determined by the experts. Of course he said a few things more than this but in very very very short term is this is really what he saying, significant to this post at least.

Let this sink in: for much of history humanity has thought it self as existing from some sort of open freedom, freedom, free thought, choice, free will, etc. And more recently, that we as intelligent creatures, intelligent human beings have a capacity to view things for what they are, and that we really just need to make a choice to investigate things to find out what bias is or what agenda might be inherent in any particular presentation. The postmodern condition is where that capacity or ability is commandeered, as part of a whole motion, such that this ability itself, the very idea of a sort of intelligent or free detachment from the object of our perception or conception, has already been determined by a certain set of people that we know, as an ideological disembodiment, as “the experts”. And his point in the essay is that this coincides with technology because human beings are, in our moments, a technological creature.

Now, when I hear anyone talk about postmodernism I think of Lyotard’s essay. I think of other authors to, postmodern original authors, but I do not really think about people who consider themselves “post modernist”, and when I hear other people critiquing postmodernism, most of the time from their critique I understand that they are talking about the subsequent category of authors that call themselves postmodernist. And so then I know right off the bat that the person who is staking their claim against postmodernism is really talking about something that I consider a somewhat superficial. Sure, what they have to say might be relevant in a kind of pop culture way of viewing academics and what academics do, so far as they have to be involved in making social commentary all the time, and indeed make money doing it.

So anyone who thinks they know what postmodernism through the authors Derrida, Deleuze, Guattari etc.. Really should read Lyotards essay, in my opinion, because really the essay gives everyone else teeth. I feel like the other authors talk about various aspects of this condition that Lactually defines. What he is saying in that essay basically encompasses the impetus for everyone else’s discussions. At least, as I say, that’s how I see it.

So once we understand what he saying is the postmodern condition then —

Two. What this video is saying is not new. In fact, we already knew that this is going on, and just because there is a computer program or the Internet that is making it more obvious to us does not mean that all the sudden we are being manipulated or being conned into thinking something. For the postmodern condition is that condition whereby what is considered knowledge is already determined for us through our humanity. And this is to say that what we think is free speech or freethinking, even to say intelligence, has already been determined by “the experts”.

Three. What does this mean? What does this mean that there is this person who is putting out this video to warn us about how biased Google search engine might be, as though this is something that’s coming up just in the past 10 years, say, or something that’s really becoming important just right now or in the past year because of technological capacity or ability. When we read the postmodern condition essay we should already understand technology as involved in this very human way of being to determine what knowledge is through expertise; because it’s manifesting in a particularly visible and tangible way actually shows of what the human being actually is as a universal object.

So again, what is the significance of the fact that this video has appeared right now, and really saying in the context of the post modern condition?

Just as a case in point for my post here:

Honestly, I have to ask myself while watching this video who is searching for that shit? Who is really caring whether or not googles or any search engine for that matter search engine is bias or not?

Of course, I think this is a little oblique of a question for most people, but it really goes to the fact that I don’t use Google very often to search for anything very important. And yet here is a blogger actually taking the time to produce this video to tell a bunch of people that what they think is an unbiased search engine is very biased and so people should be careful about being manipulated towards particular information.

So to my mind she is not talking about everyone, but she is only talking about a particular type of person.

And I have to go back to this question of knowledge being ordained by the experts.

The postmodern condition is something that is defined by Correlationalism, And you can Google that(lol) if you don’t know what it is or what it means because I’m voice dictating while I’m walking my dog so …

And this is to say that the condition is such that even “intelligence” is knowledge that is again defined by the experts, and if I haven’t been clear, what I’m saying is that this definition itself is biased. And involved of my point here is that the very idea of a free thought is already been determined through a biased created by expertise which is supposed to be unbiased but which really is not: The very idea of intelligence as some sort of grounding or ubiquitous aspect of being human in which freedom is likewise essentially grounded, is a manipulation.

Through this very simple analysis of the post modern condition with relevance to one of its products, the space apparent in between the truth of the matter and the real manifestation of the matter, points to a particular type of human being and not a whole category of universal species that we typically understand when we say or refer to “human being”.

Because again we have to ask what is the point of this video. I think there are two answers which really indicate again this ideological unity of the intelligent free human being:

The person who made this video obviously feels very concerned about people being manipulated against what would otherwise be free thought.

And, The point of the video is to elicit a reaction, to activate a legitimate fear, so to speak.

And I would say that these two things combine to form a certain concept of the human being that to such people that are alarmed or are supposed to be alarmed, create and antagonism with in humanity whereby if you are not alarmed then you are not ethical or not moral or are otherwise not intelligent.

And I don’t mean this in the sense of that we should not be worried about it, I mean this in the sense, in the same sense as climate change: we’ve known about this for a long time and in fact it is not something that creates a condition for us that we can make choices to not have occur. Indeed we should be concerned, but I would say in a manner that insights responsibility for what is actually occurring.

But the very fact of the video is an assumption that this kind of responsibility is not available to many if not most people. Apparently it’s not available to the person who made the video, but as well it’s not available to the people to whom the video is intended.

Now what does this mean in the context of a post modern world where everyone is supposed to have an equal and equitable voice?

In the words of Slavoj Zizek, It is a catastrophe.

So something to think about.

The New Christianity: Theological “Strawmen” and The deeper look into the Psychologist who shall not be named.

I think this will be the last energy I spend on JP. The less energy given toward his name the better, I think. But one last thing…

I think we can have little more doubt that JP is supplying a new philosophical ground for Christianity; indeed, I might say that he is a theological philosopher. And in an even more honest light, that he is the example of what I call the Postmodern Religion: the manner that religion appears today, the way it behaves for the modern state.

Peterson at Liberty University  and by the way, Liberty University is one of the largest Evangelical Christian Universities in the world (thats what the Wiki says).

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We might wish to be carefully observant.

Peterson is not really understanding the philosophy that he sounds like he is. In particular, from what I’ve listened to of him, (which is about 4 hours all together) he is not really understanding the philosophy is poses to be, despite all his rhetoric, and in particular, the main antagonist of his position,  Postmodernism. Specifically, he is taking general ideas of the subsequent postmodern distortions and stretched application and further misapplying them as he is indeed misunderstanding them. Yet, I am imagining that because he has a PhD and a nice suit, and can put sentences together about various abstract ideas to a certain sensibility, he then appears as though he is making sound judgements and assertions. In truth, though, it appears that he is overstepping his academic license in the name of the Postmodern privilege of subjective dishonesty, which he projects upon a straw man that he calls ‘Postmodernism’. He in indeed utilizing  Postmodern methods of appropriating discourse for his own agenda, the exact theoretical method that he decries as belonging to his straw man Postmodernism. He is capitalizing upon his alienation from a theoretical space, and then using a rather “sewn-together” version of half-cognized meanings to assert the truth of his subjective power (white male) as though they indeed have valid theoretical bearings. As I said in my last post, this is a particularly postmodern (in the diminished sense that he uses and understands) maneuver.

This is why I am and have been beginning to elaborate upon the a kind of philosophical orientation which recognizes various types of philosophy. Peterson’s “type” of philosophy is one which demands that all conceptual paradigms must be able to be conceived by everyone who has a certain level of education. This coincides with his “absolutism” that seems to rise into everything he has to say; biological essentialism, nationalism,  civilization, history –everything to him has an essential and eternal basis. I question this maxim for the exact reason that I am indicating here with Peterson: It is his inability and indeed insecurity around being an academic which does not allow him to admit nor even see that he is simply not comprehending the theoretical arena that he appropriates. Again; this is exactly the situation that the Postmodern authors warned us about; in particular, Jean-Francois Lyotard, who basically gave us the term postmodern, tells us that knowledge is no longer something that raises or falls upon its own merit, but indeed, knowledge is something that the experts prop up. Implicit in this description of our situation is that experts thus demand an equivocation of knowledge to the standards defined by the experts.  Peterson, someone who has achieved the title of expert (PhD) does not have the (what one would figure accompanies advanced education, as much as it obviously does not) humility to view something he desires as outside of his conceptual register, because of the systemization of knowledge (technology).

We might look at who supports what he has to say. It appears that Nationalists, racists, white people, and hetero-normaitive Christians form the bulk of his supporters. If he is so concerned with people’s well-being, why does he decry government support for LBGTQ+ politically valid designations? Might we do well to look at what he considers “mental health” also? Reality and truth that he appears to promote likewise has little philosophical support beyond some sort of assumption of a common human who is civilized. And what history exactly is he drawing from to come to his conclusions about society and the human psyche? To me, it appears rather arbitrary and, to be frank, quite similar to the artistic latitude that Freud used for his speculations about the structure and history of the psyche, such as his infamous story of the progenitor.  Also, I think it is kind of strange, like a psychoanalytical flashback to not-so-long-ago when homosexuality was officially listed in the DSM as a mental dysfunction., that Peterson advocates so liberally for the democratic tenet of free-speech, yet while also advocating that people have “responsibility” for their lives. It seems to me there is a therapeutic inconsistency somewhere in there. Let him be so free about the possibility that what he knows so surely could be wrong; let him take responsibility for the world and not just his world. hmm? Perhaps have some therapeutic care as a psychologist? Indeed, in my profession’s code of ethics as a counselor, and probably his as a psychologist, (maybe thats why I am not a psychologist: their ethics are a bit out dated maybe, but maybe not) it says that the psychologist shall not impose his or her biases upon the client. In my profession, I am not ethically nor legally allowed to impose my religious beliefs upon the client. If I do, I can lose my license. Likewise, if I am an atheist counseling a Christian, I must not treat the client as though they are stupid or something.  And, if someone is Gay, trans or whatever, I am not to impose my sense of personal correctness, as Peterson’s “natural honesty for identity” which says that such people are being dishonest with themselves. If I do, then I can be sued and lose my license. Wow.

There are no free rides, nor simple ideological solutions — he even argues this himself !! (watch the video a few posts ago).  It appears that he is advocating the very thing he argues against.

I think his intensions are in the spirit of helping people, which is good. But, when we notice how he draws from history to construct a sensible history — which, upon scrutiny, is filled with many philosophically inconsistent holes –we might want to reference a history somewhat recent to our knowledge, that of Nazi Germany.

Now, I do not mean to be alarmist. But it is well known that Hitler and his propaganda machine drew upon a distorted version of idealist philosophers such as Hegel and Nietzsche, and used this misappropriation of ideas with a particular analysis of history which might have made sense to many people of Northern Europe who were looking for some respite from the depression of the defeat from the First World War. Hitler and his minister of propaganda, Joseph Goebbels contrived a mash-up of Aryan, Nordic, and Christian myth, which served to unite the people of Germany under a kind of mass hysteria of national pride, all the while propping up straw men under pseudo-scientific “truth” who were identified responsible for the decline of the German Nation. Jews were made to be responsible mostly, along with their “degenerative democratic” news reporting, but all sorts of people who did not fit into the propped-up mythic ideal were seen to be less than human.

Now, of course, in the small of it, this is just another philosopher speaking his philosophical wares, so hey…

But we might want to learn from the past: so many people were taken for a ride and then found themselves in a terrible space of problem that they did not even know they were supporting.

Just be aware.

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That said :

Part of the Two Routes is a suggestion that we admit that there is no common humanity, but that there is a humanity that needs such an ideal. I think perhaps Peterson is playing to this crowd. The issue , though, is to develop a philosophical understanding that understands this role, the responsibility Philosophy has to the actual truth of what humanity is by what it does: People need religion. And so the responsible thing seems to be to give it to them, but also to recognize that the religious ideas of “partial reasonings” are in the service of compassion for the common good, and less “true” about what is actually occurring. Less a patronizing, and more a recognition: most people simply do not wish to know, and to give them all the information sometimes just confuses people and makes life more difficult. I think it is possible Peterson is doing this, trying to supply a meaningful world to those who don’t want to really know, but without the awareness that this is what he is doing. We need people who are aware, not just in a power struggle for righteousness.

 

Standing in wonderment: The case against the psychologist who shall not be named (JP 😉).

I am intrigued about this Jordan Peterson phenomenon and so I’m trying to at least invest a little time into finding out what he is really saying.

So above is a little clip of him on the Bill Maher show. I got to say that Bill Maher just clicked down a few notches on my intelligence scale. I definitely liked him back in the politically incorrect days, but it seems as much as these two white men are talking about thinking, they are really not thinking it through very well. It sounds like they’re just patting each other on the back for being rich and famous. Lol.

Ok here’s what I really think.

For one, I don’t really like how they throw around the word “truth”. Now, I am appreciating what they are saying about offending someone or being disrespectful; I agree, this world has become a little bit too sensitive. But also I think it is very unthinking to go from people are just too sensitive – the universities are not holding up standards of truth – they are caught in postmodernism — etc..

Let us indeed be real here:

Who is actually the one who is being offended? Is it the Queers? Who is really being too sensitive? The Gays?

I think it is Peterson himself.

First of all, at risk of being immediately stuck into a category of postmodernist — as anyone who reads my blog knows I am critical of postmodernism — I will suggest that these two white men on this show are throwing around the word “Truth” like it is something that cannot be a problem. In the other videos I’ve watched of Peterson he likes to talk about “reality” also. In fact I think he relates “honesty” with being in tune with reality.

Now, the reason why I keep saying “these two white men” is because indeed this is what we are talking about that even the intellectualizing white men are not comprehending, it seems, or could give a damn about (hence the problem).

Really, ironically, what I’m saying is that this white man, Jordan Peterson, is offended down to his core; White men who are offended meet those who are disrespecting their rightful “reasonable” righteous whiteness with indignation. So to defend himself, he uses the quite post-modern method of twisting discourse so that no one can see that he is deeply offended; that deep offense of his whiteness he returns back to the discourse to keep what is offensive at the level of postmodern discourse. He is doing what he is arguing: exactly what he is saying he is arguing against the PoMos about. And this is to say, so he can argue against “postmodernism” as if it is this resolved and specific thing.

Further, It is interesting to me that he is a PhD in psychoanalysis, and yet he is totally blind to how he is repressing those aspects of reality that offend him, and that he is projecting the object of his offense out upon the world as if there’s nothing wrong. Reaction formation, I Think it’s really called. It is basic Freudian psychoanalysis. I think he needs to go back to his psychology school, take some classes, Maybe listen to some Zizek for a little bit. I think Perterson might need some counseling. 😀

And the thing is, if anyone were to call him out on this, he would use the very post-modern method and skill of manipulating the reality of the situation back to discursive definition to show that that is not what is occurring with him, but is indeed a defense mechanism of what is occurring for me, say . In short, he would be dishonest about what he is in countering in reality.

Shall I mention his short synopsis of Kierkegaard? (In the previous post, his little rambling long talk). Can we say “agenda-filled reading” of Kierkegaard? It is so incredibly off the mark of what Kierkegaard is really talking about, I think I’m about to cough up my pancreas.

And yet here he is in the spotlight, famous calming having a bunch of people enjoying his arguments and relating to what he has to say. Even being offered a fellowship at Cambridge. I mean, this is not just about a difference of opinion or free speech, it’s a literally about different levels of intelligence and education; it’s about different capacities of understanding what the issues are and how they are being addressed.

I mean, I think I have talked about elsewhere, somewhere in my other posts, that the issue of philosophy now is to be able to distinguish between types of philosophy. And I mean this in the sense of how philosophy is being used as though is it it is a unitive category. This to say that it is not merely epistemology or ontology or teleology or whatever sort of other ologies; wit is literally about how discourses are being used under the umbrella category of philosophy. I submit that philosophy is being used in two distinctly different ways.

Ok…anyways…

This is why you cannot prove that whiteness is real to people who are stuck within it, and this is why I say such subjectivity is really a religious tenet. In this case, the religion asserts the privilege of being white, that you do not have to admit when you are offended and you definitely don’t have to admit to something being true if you don’t agree with it. All you have to do is yell louder and present as a white man and you are above reproach, as you refer to the religious theological ground (truth;reality).

Keep in mind, I’m not saying that there is not a truth or that there is not a reality; Rather I am saying what we are presently involved with a religious effectuation; what in the past we have called ideology, we are finding now is really a manner of coming up on reality that really has nothing to do with whether or not my thoughts equate with a sensible object, or what that means.

What we are involved with now is getting out of these limiting, correlational structures, and the opening of oneself to the possibility of other. It is not postmodernism; postmodernism is the description of the typical religious activity of thought. (I admit, there is a certain faction in the university that calls itself “postmodernism”, but this is not a religion in the sense that Peterson calls it, rather it is a misunderstanding of discourse in the Lacanian sense).

Just because you have a PhD does not mean you comprehend this aspect; in fact, all it really means is that you can use language in a particular way. What is at issue is the person that is using these methods.

There is a much deeper rebuttal to his whole presentation, but I am just voice dictating here while I’m walking my dog and so it’s hard to edit and write a whole dissertation on how Jordan Peterson philosophical position is skewed. He is unable to see the reality in front of him; what he sees is his own justification for what appears to him self reflexively as truth and reality.

To ask what this truth is that they keep throwing around as if it’s well known, is not a postmodern tactic. Of course Peterson might say it is a postmodern tactic, but that is because he is inherently caught in the postmodern manner of appropriating reality. In my previous post, in the video where he’s talking about stuff, he even pointed this out: namely, that there is some sort of dichotomy in history, some sort of polemic through which human beings are able to behave. His ground summary and resolution to this historical polemic is that in order for a person to be honest with themselves they have to say things that are offensive to other people. And then he uses the trope “postmodernism” as a Patsy to lump people who are “sensitive” into a group of people who are not being “honest”. Jordan Peterson might be being honest by being offensive, but he has no idea what he’s talking about when it comes to truth because for him truth is based in some sort of common ground of our existence I guess. All one needs to do is listen to his analysis of history to understand his orientation upon the world; he has no problem with his thinking. In fact everyone should think like him because if you’re a white Man, then you know everything there is to know about identity, biology, sex, ideology, philosophy, truth, reality… how convenient for him.

He does not see his complicity with a particular ideology of power no matter how much he wants to talk about domination pyramids. In short, he is using the post modern method of coming upon reality and being in reality as an excuse for his own ignorance. He is being manipulative and he is not being honest simply because he is not able to confront what might be some sort of truth upon his truth operating. He is utterly an example of postmodern subjectivity in the same way that Zizek has indicated Donald Trump. The only truth he sees is that which is self-evident to him. He has no conception of what correlationalism might mean, nor would any of the discussions of the speculative realist folk are talking about over in France, or even LA, have any substance for him.

In short, we can see that he is involved with a particular post- modern religious manner of coming upon the world (there is no common thing called “postmodernism”; postmodernism defines a particular paradigm of knowing and a particular paradigm of being able to come up on world) and asserting that intuitive sense as if it obviously and should be and is supposed to be everyone else’s reality. This particular manner of approaching reality is called “colonialism”. And it seems he doesn’t even know that, Or at least, in the way that he has talked about it in other places, again, He completely exclude himself from the effort of colonialism in the progress of this universal history through which reality and truth only a come about through a persons being honest with themselves he completely exclude himself from the effort of colonialism in the progress of this universal history through which reality and truth only a come about through a persons being honest with themselves. I wonder if his definition of honesty means that everyone else needs to be fucked up in the head and only people like them are allowed to be rational (wat?) .

He is caught in a confusion created by his own presence of being offended by what reality presents to him. He uses ideas and tropes that go unanalyzed and unchallenged – Indeed he uses these troops in a manner that suggests that analyzing them or challenging them is part of the fantasy or a part of not being honest– for the purpose of reestablishing the status quo, which is basically the reality And supremacy Of the white thinking man.

It is not that truth is obvious, nor is it that there is no truth. It is not even some “spiritual” truth. It is that the truth of it is not yet viewable through those routes.

The problem is not what lay at the end of Perterson’s pointing finger, as much as he likes to point at things. The problem is that the subject of this pointing finger is not being questioned; it is as if to him some sort of “spiritual – historical mandate” is being communicated from God.

Again, there is a much deeper critique of Peterson which may come out one day but, honestly, I don’t know if it’s really worth the effort because demagogues have their place too. Hence, the discussion about what humanity is by what it does by the Philosophical Hack.

The Unconscious Mind, Part 2

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Here is the link to the part one post concerning the unconscious mind.

It seems obvious. An Unconsciousness seems to be a good name for what is occurring in oneself, as a feature of the mind: There is this, in a way, Whole Consciousness which is made up of parts which are functioning at all times. There is the “aware” part (conscious), and then there is a part that is functioning as well of which we are not aware (unconscious). Maybe there is even another part which does something else (subconscious?). Freud’s idea seems to be nearly self-evident in its obviousness: There is an Ego which attempts to get what it wants through negotiating with reality, the world, social norms, etc. there is thus also the “norm” part (the super-ego) which tries to enforce ‘what is right’, and then there is this ‘animal drive’ which just plain Wants and desires things (Id). It all seems obvious and sensible. It seems to sensible that all sorts of ideas about the world and how its works and how human beings function psychologically stem from it even without having any requirement to look into ‘what it really means’. some might even ask: what do you mean “what does it mean”? Because such a organization of consciousness and the mind appears so axiomatically and reflexively obvious that we don’t even need to refer to any history or ‘proper theory’ of it, because, it seems, any intelligent person can access this structure of mind to be able to come to certain conclusions about it.

But this is where is gets…strange.

This is where we get into such idea as intrinsic and extrinsic mythology. Less ideology than philosophy, a very large problem arises for people when we come up against what we generally know as a Postmodern proposals, but which really goes back probably further than Wittgenstein, but at least with him.

The Very Large Problem of Consciousness (VLPC) is that what we seem to understand as so obvious and true of the universe and everything in it, including our own minds, is itself organized around a use of discourse which has no relation to any other discourse. A mediated and compromised version of this is in effect when we look out into history and we talk about ‘mythologies’ or ‘religions’ that thought in whatever way, or had views of the world so different than ours and we think often out loud (because its so obvious) how such people were not so smart, or didn’t know as much as we do now, as though such individuals or cultures or civiliations exist by virtue of and for the purpose of my or our personal and absolutely righteous and perfect knowledge of how the world is in its progression and development.

But I digress…

I looked back at the development of the word “unconscious (mind)” and, at least in the Western Book of Knowledge, I found that the term itself occurs first at the beginning German Romanticism; I think Wiki and various Philosophy Encyclopedias list the philosopher  Friedrich Schelling as the first to bring up the idea. But I found that Eduard von Hartmann might have a better say.

Regardless; the notion of the unconsciousness is based in a particular romantic notion that there must be a Oneness of things, that the Universe must indeed be a Whole Thing. In this Whole thing there are human beings who think, and the short of it is, because human beings are not separate from the Universe, thinking itself must be an operation of the Universe and that we should thus be able to somehow “join” with the motion of the universe in its motion.

In my feeble opinion, this is the short short short version of the entirety of Georg Hegel’s philosophy and Phenomenology in general.

Unconsciousness, then, is that aspect of what we are able to be aware of in the universe as that part of the universe that we are not readily aware of (mark Heidegger’s “readiness at hand”). Whatever part we are consciously knowing, according to this ideal of the Whole Universe From Which We are Not Separate, the unconscious mind is that which operates as that which contributes to our ability to be and know, yet in a sort of negative sense. In other words, similar to Jaques Lacan proposal that consciousness is structured like a language, the unconsciousness mind is merely a theoretical argument that behaves like a meme; discourse orders and structures reality, and the meme ‘unconscious mind’ works to support and reinforce such reality, serving as a conveyor or carrier of the truth of that reality through communication.

I question this model this model of the unconscious mind.

Stephen Hicks: Cool Dude, but…

Responding to Stephen Hicks and the Criticisms of “Postmodernism”

Responding to Stephen Hicks and the Criticisms of “Postmodernism”
— Read on iambobbyy.com/2019/03/03/responding-to-stephen-hicks-and-the-criticisms-of-postmodernism/

Glazing over his two hour lecture, I’d say this guy represents a good position against Postmodernism. I like it: It is an excellent showing of how conventional philosophy is indeed following it’s inevitable course, doing what it is supposed to do.

But Of course, he is probably a PhD in philosophy so my opinion probably weight Zero against him.

Nevertheless: Postmodernism is only to be positioned against inso much as the strong motivational impetus, or perhaps, the significant force by which such a title is confined to an identity is denied. This is to say, Kant’s synthetical a priori is alive and well as the Holy Ghost of conventional thought.

It is thus this kind of institutional denial which locates the religiosity of the motion, such as Hicks represents. Hence, for example, the same kind of motion derives denominations of Christianity which only have meaning in the political-religious sphere, even while the (again) impetus which animates such differences is suspended to be denied for the sake of identity (i.e. Christianity is Christianity despite the internal theological debates).

One need only ask what truth is being presented to then be able to distinguish the complicity of modern faith with its Postmodernity: Hicks is indeed involved in an intra-religious dialogue with fellow congregants, parishioners, and most of all, fellow clerics.

It is not true that reality arises as a negotiation of subjective worlds (politics), rather it is theologically dogmatic. What is true is that human beings behave in a certain way…

It is inevitable…

…to the things in-themselves!!!

The route of the Postmodern religion is the speaking relative-critical terms which are always oriented upon the (obvious) a priori political motion, as though politics gives as not only the indicated but also the indicating element to which all philosophy points (nowhere?). It thus plays a shell game of terms so that no one ever is even tempted to look behind that curtain. It’s language is that of no in-itself thing, of the methodologcal commandment of shifting reduction to distance and impersonality.

Commenting on a Philosopher without giving him more undue celebrity.

I had an opportunity this morning to confront one of my biases. This one was about THe-Philosopher-Who-Will-Not-Be-Named (TPNN for short).

Look in the comments of my pervious post about Derrida for a short video of a piece of one of his talks.

I historically disliked TPNN Becuase I feel he is missing a key component of what he generallzes as Post Modern. HERE is someone who took the time to take apart another one of TPNN talks. Yet, I am not sure my disquiet about TPNN falls into that his idea of PM appears incomplete or that he does not address deeply the PM position, and then as well that his generalization is that PM is about the infinity of subjective interpretive possibility. So I have had an opportunity to look more thoroughly into my biases about TPNN.

I think my offense comes from that he only has only intellectually appropriated a general PM tenet, and thus, of course, at once misses vital elements of subjectivity as well then indeed suggests by his presence a faulty ideal of ‘going backwards’ to a Modernist position. He definitely says in that short video that the postmodernists are wrong.

One of the subtleties of my work is that I tend to stick with the argument that Graham Harmon makes in his book “Tool Being”, that it is not a power-play of one against the other. It is not that modernism was incorrect and that postmodern pointed out all the problems with Modernity and so offers a more true way of coming up on the situation, and thus we have now to show how PM is wrong. That is a philosophical naive way of viewing the situation.

Also, Zizek’s psychoanalysis does not confirm Peterson’s psychological approach either.

It seems that Jordan Peterson failed to read the authors that came out of the speculative realism conference 10 years ago, And particularly has failed to understand what Quinten Miellassoux termed “Correlationalism”.

TPNN is what I could call an overt advocate for religious reality, which in itself is not an incorrect position to be an advocate. Yet, One of the paradoxes about being in the religious mindset is that while being religious may not be an inherently incorrect or improper way of having a reality to deal with, the developed analyses and The reactionary politics that such kinds of analyses often rely upon if they do not explicitly elucidate them in initial parts of the analysis, Often show that they are not having the awareness that religious allowance does not necessarily convey or have to fall in line with a particular religious truth.

We find in our current democratic system that we can speak about God and we can allow people to have their religious beliefs as an ideal for a good society without having to advocate for the truth any one of those particular religious institutions. TPNN Tends to argue that we must adhere to a particular religious institution if we are saying that the religious view is allowed, but he is using intellectualism as a way to argue for his dogma. In short, he is misappropriating Postmodern thought towards his own ontological argument.

Philosophical Construction.

One can always tell when there is a religion in place in two ways:

1) The person will declare what they are and what they believe through a Name. For examples; Christianity. But also, Realist. On one hand we have Baptist; and on the other hand we have Existentialism.

The second way you can tell if a religion or religious belief is in place is that they will deny that it is religious.

This is where we find “philosophy” becoming a kind of religious faith. Through not witnessing its own operations honestly. Through the contradiction involved with a particular manner of coming upon reality.

In general, philosophers wish to retain the title or the name “philosophy” to mean Deconstruction, which is to say, to indicate pure process as opposed to any set of dogmas. Philosophers as a contemporary or modern sense (in the least philosophical meaning possible) speak of this pure process as a way to decode what is otherwise dogma or what we have found in the past 40 or 50 (80?) years as ideology encoded into discourse, but as well a name for a particular type of thinking (let us philosophize about religion; and or, the philosophy of computer programming; etc…)

But I ask, where did we get these ideas about what philosophy is?

The answer of the latter ‘kind’ of thinking is just a label for The kind of thinking that moves more deeply into a subject matter.

Of the former, The typical answer would be a kind of historical library of authors’ works. … actually I’m not sure. And this is exactly what I mean to indicate so far as philosophy becoming a kind of religious faith: There is no reason why we are currently involved in a “post truth” situation – the reason is because that’s what the theorists say. And I’m going to say something that I’m sure will arouse immediate disclaimers, whether it be in the philosophers mind only, or whether people actually say something about it (I will bet it will only occur in peoples minds, because in the same way that Christians are confined to interpreting the Bible is specific ways, so it is with conventional philosophy; the faith involved with philosophy will not allow them to make a comment upon it; one can only dismiss it) —

The reason why we might be In a post truth situation of reality (or whatever) is because the ‘clergy’ of modern philosophy have told us how dogma is to be assembled in order to create a proper meaning for reality. Much as the Scholastic of the Medieval period did for Christianity.

Yet there is a problem with the method…

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We find a bookend to this faith with what we know as postmodernism. The whole idea behind postmodernism is that it argues it self into perpetual opening. After postmodernism no one is allowed to identify that which is being identified.

But i’m just about to stick my fist up into that opening (screw the hammer!😝):

Typically, we use the term “post modern” to identify a particular set of authors, a particular psychological mode, a particular set of ideas, a particular period in intellectual time, amongst other ideas. But all of these post modern ideas function together so that no one can ever say that ” post modern” is a set of beliefs for method. They can be identified to individual discourses which loosely (arguably) fall under the rubric of PM, but never as the definition of how theory must function as a methodology.

It’s fundamental and contradictory premises are involved in the assertion of it being a critique of what is modern. But I would submit that regardless of such fictional postures, the postmodern is intimately intertwined with modernity and at that, to establish for us a set of instructions by which to know what is real. In fact, I would say if you read a few of the well-known postmodern authors, this is exactly what they’re saying .

Nevertheless, This is what philosophy has become; no longer can you identify philosophy along a particular agenda because the postmodern sense of philosophy will immediately disrupt that conceptual territory, to thereby throw off any assertions that it is indeed developing into a dogmatic religion. It’s exactly like if you are not Christian and you argue with a Christian about the meaning of the Bible; you can’t get anywhere because they already know what the Bible means, And will assert that meaning at every corner and claim that you are not understanding what the Bible really says and will assert that meaning at every corner and claim that you are not understanding what the Bible really says.

In my second book “the moment of decisive significance: A heresy”, I approach this dilemma.

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We even use the definition of religion to keep philosophy from being labeled as a religion. In general we identify religion as a set of beliefs and a set of practices. And then somehow philosophy avoids being a set of practices accompanied by a specific set of beliefs.

And yet I have identified philosophy just now. For, what is a set of beliefs? It is ideas accompanied by behavior. And what are practices but things that we do that are accompanied by a set of ideas?

It seems to me that our definition of religion speaks for itself but we don’t want to admit, as philosophers, that philosophy indeed answers to this very criteria, this very definition of religion. Postmodern is a set of ideas which motivate as they support a set a practices: Philosophy upholds a certain set of ideas set down in “scriptural” canon which proscribe how not only the philosopher – as a cleric of the religion of the true – but how now everyone is supposed to see and behave in reality. It’s PM theology has come true!

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But we can go even further. I would submit that there is a reason why continental philosophy is generally centered around French thinkers: Freedom.

It is the French, not the Americans, but the French who tore down previous aristocratic structures and have ever since been attempting to justify existence in the context of an absolute freedom. And this is the context and justification of (ontological) philosophy now: it poses as though it is saying something, but what it is talking about no one can say.

If that isn’t another way of describing an Absolute Ineffable God — I mean. Come on.

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We find it able to be identified as a system of beliefs and practices due to the bookend that we call Postmodernism.

And, my upcoming book “the philosophical hack: the concluding unscientific postscript to event” goes even further:

It is not that PM is wrong or incorrect. It is not even to argue that religion is a bad or incorrect manner or function. To suggest that identifying Philosophy as a religious effort is not indicting it as wrong or as something that needs be corrected; such a suggestion would be merely to suggest we need a better religion. Rather, we are concerned with it’s opposite: By the ability invested of itself to define subjects to specific parameters, it allows for a definition where by a science of philosophy may be determined.

Thanks for listening.

Anslem’s Argument for the Proof of the Existence of God, the Disruption of Time, and the Categorization of Philosophical Behavior.

I seem to have found a significance for Anslem’s proof. It may be that it is not significance for whether God might exist, but, as I have said, significance for how I present ideas.

We will start with the rendition from Princeton’s site. I think they have a pretty good rendition there.

Without all the strict logical hoopla, I think the simple way to put Anslem’s idea is that God exists because we can think of It.

The significance of this notion appears to disrupt what we generally consider of time, it’s ‘natural and directional’ progress.

The Princeton site says that Anslem was addressing a particular issue that, actually, we still find totday in atheism. Basically, Anslem is confronting two ideas:

1.He understands the claim that God exists.
2.He does not believe that God exists.

Now, I have done only the most preliminary research into Anslem and his ideas. I am just taking the very popular simple version, and considering these two situations. There is no ‘hidden’; whatever Anslem’s results most probably are quite apparent, and the ones that are not – well, what point am I trying to make here? I have already said in my earlier post that there is no logical argument that sways me in any direction or causes me to believe something I didn’t before. So any extension of argument must be involving something else; perhaps I am attempting to get at what this something could be.

I think the main point Anslem makes is that, as Princeton puts it, this is an inherently unstable condition of being. What we might call the ‘founding essence’ can be understood to be responsible for this instability. Somewhat similar to a ‘thing-in-itself’, this founding essence would be a kind of gravity well, if you will, of mental activity. The instability arises because of the knowledge (the known-ness) of what something is able to be. The question arises: How can I know what something is if it doesn’t exist? The basic assumption in this question, what philosophers tend to lump into the category called ontology, is that existence is, that there is no need to discern what existence is because to argue for or against the being of existence does nothing to displace the argument except as much as it merely denies existence. The point of saying something exists thus should equate with what can be known, and so the instability of the situation is found in the human ability to choose on whether what exists is actually true. In this case, though, Anslem is dealing with the basis of all that exists as a category, namely, God; God, in this sense, as we cannot but apply our modern sense to consideration of it, is merely the name of the category that contains all that can exist as an active element, the element by which all else can be said to be. The extension in time to Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time’ can be understood as a factual description of this situation, and thus, rather than an opening up unto Being, ironically as a closing of Being unto itself and thus a factual description of what human beings do: The identification of the in-itself of human Being. More on that elsewhere.

The resolution that Anslem posits of this unstable situation occurs because of the foundational nature of the knowledge itself. In this Medieval Christian context (which I argue is still a modern context), the resolution (the clarity, the definition) that must be referred to must be understood in a context not so much of mind, but of the essential God-inundated mind that is able to uphold and entertain knowledge, which for our context might be the mind that exists. In short, the condition of knowledge is/was such that all things referred or otherwise are established in existence due to an absolute situation, a situation whereby all things gain their status in the universe, what we usually index by the idea of an absolute ethics, in a manner of speaking. In this condition it thus appears that a reflective mind will naturally be drawn into the the contradiction involved in making a choice as to the (true or false) existence of something that (already) exists (in essence), and will therefore correct (or become the correction) the instability by virtue of their own existence (in the absolute universe, or the universe that is indexed by absolution). The question of whether something actually, or physically, biologically exists, such as a race of human beings that live in the midieval antipodes, e2c1fd0e8fc468d9d55d018231578e47

unicorns, dragons, spirits, extraterrestrial aliens, etcetera, has no baring upon existence because of the absolute reference and access of mind to God (existence). What can be incorrect of knowledge as to what is true of existence finds its resolution in the posited (assumed) basis of existence. 

The Medieval as well as Modern mind is consistent in this ideal of progressive understanding of the universe. What is significant of this orientation upon progress is the mind’s innate access to what is true of the universe with reference to an assumed basis of that truth, what we can say is an assumption of stability unto which all knowledge will inevitably resolve; despite whether we posit that there is no actual resolution or that everything is flux, or whatever conditional conditions we define, the result of any positing is always toward ends, toward a resolution. Even if we say that the universe and the knowledge of that universe is completely and utterly contingent, this contingency must be absolute; hence we say that the effect of such terms within any scheme of knowledge or organization of definitions is what we can call a “founding term”. 

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Oddly enough, we are able to find purchase into understanding what human beings do by looking at what philosophy does. Not, as Graham Harman might have it, that everything we might do automatically falls into a subjective appropriation of semantics that defies our attempt to locate such philosophical behavior. Rather, at some point we should be able to locate a mark by which we are able to be dismissed from this correlational philosophy that wants to avoid any critical gaze upon its method.

Once we find this mark (which I do not go into here), we can extend this situation (of existence and deferment) to apply to everything that might exist: Within this situation, a person can understand and then decide upon it. There is no thing that escapes this formula, and Anslem is making an accusation about it: It is unstable, and it will eventually resolve itself to the conclusion that the thing in question exists, in his Medieval case, God, and in our Modern case, perhaps, the object of empirical physics.

The point he relies upon is the idea that God is the greatest being or thing that can exist, for, so long as we can conceive of something greater, then that is not God. Similarly, we can use this conversely and say that because we can conceive of ‘that which nothing is greater’, this greatest thing exists as a foundational ontological ground of Modern effort as well: The ‘greatest’ thing is the most substantial. 

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What interests me is that this simple notice occurred late in the 11th century. Here, already, is a situation made notice that no one noticed until very recently, like 10-20 years ago with the philosophers such as Alain Badou, Francois Laruelle, an then for the younger folks (of the time), of the Speculative Realist Conference. In particular, the idea is that there may be something that exists outside of our knowledge (not necessarily our ability to know), and as for in this situation, that which is greater than the greatest thing we can know. This category has brought modern philosophy (again) to consider things like voidnothingnesschaos and such things, and the corresponding ideal that whatever works to create identity is all good. But if we are honest, we might be able to glimpse the same ruminations of Scholasticism (St. Anslem is said to be one of the founders of the Medieval Scholasticism), occurring in our Modern philosophies, but under different terms. Indeed; I argue (along with Jean-Francois Lyotard apparently) elsewhere that Postmodern scholarship is really a religious apology for Modernity.

In this post I confront the veracity of some of our current philosophical modes and arguments by asking what seems to me to be a most obvious and significant question, a similar question that Graham Harman asks of Heidegger’s “tools“: Why did no-one  notice what Anslem had opened up until now, some 1000 years later? We are able to understand Anslem’s argument to this day; no one proposes that the thinkers 1000 years ago were any less astute than our thinkers today. Why is it only now that we are addressing the possibility of what might be ‘beyond’ or ‘at root but not part of’ (Badou’s consideration of set theory) knowledge? And then we might even ask more confounding question if we find that philosophers during the interim of the thousand years also considered the same question over and over. 

I submit for consideration that we have gotten not very far in philosophy. We might begin to understand the vastness of time and how slowly and incrementally human beings, as a group, accomplish knowledge, and how it is much more like a science than philosophers are capable of arguing. Indeed, if we think into this situation, we can then find often the situation that we have already come across elsewhere; namely, that on one hand philosophy is the way we situate the conditions of our times, how we work out logistical problems of being in a semantic world, and on the other, merely reflections of people (the authors) in-themselves. But if this is all philosophy does and is doing, then we also might see that we are actually merely re-contextualizing not what what has already been contextualized (as thus a re-contextualization), but in actually what we’ve already done, making the same arguments over and over but under different terms. We are reminded of Shakespeare’s “a rose by any other word…“.

Upon this conclusion, we are careful to not move too fast as we might then jump to the conclusion that such an idea should negate the ontological status of what I am calling conventional philosophy, as though such a proposal should then move beyond what we have and what we get through philosophical method. This is not the case. It seems near ridiculousness to figure that we can commandeer reality by a stroke of the pen (or a keystroke) except that we might be involved in such philosophical endorsement; we should then ask how is it that am I to get beyond it merely saying something in a particular manner? No. We cannot ‘turn’ the truth of the matter; we have but to see the power that is invested in the leviathan of religious interests, of maintaining a particular formation and method to know that, as the philosophers have argued, I cannot escape it unless I wish to perform some magic, perhaps some discursive slight of hand. We should ask if we can be done with all this trickery of the ontological police. Then, all we have to do is speak of facts instead of the essential Being of things, to speak teleologically instead of ontologically. We can argue the conditional nature of real essence for the rest of eternity and never get anywhere further than circling back and forth away from and back into Medieval type scholarship. And thats fine, and thats the point: This is the factual nature of reality, the impossible aspect of what we have to deal with in reality. Of course there will be those who will argue that what the philosophers are doing now days is not Scholasticism and who will produce all sorts of argumentative and ultimately circumstantial evidence to support their claim. Great! Perfect! Does this sway me to believe something that I don’t already know?  The proper response, in this case then, is that this is not a proposal toward any popular or social change, and in fact it has little to do with how political ideology might be at any moment; we can of course use it for such purposes (identifying our moment from the past conditional moments of history, for example, etcetera…), thats what Badiou and Zizek tell us…

We are not so much learning anything new as much as we are justifying our limited manner of Being in the world, and this is an end in itself that should be heeded but not as a call for change, as though we can somehow transcend what we are — we can only transcend was we identify with as political and ideological subjects. Rather, we should see this situation as a mark of what is true of being human, as a mark of significance, which is to say, a mark of fact. So another of my indictments of philosophy: Despite all the great discursive gymnastics and the twistings of subtle argumentative semantic juxtapositions, philosophy works to avoid having to look at itself as a human behavior. Conventional philosophy refuses to allow itself to be seen as an indicator of behavior, perpetually argues itself as an exceptional incarnation of divine intuition and inspiration, a blank spot of Being, and then uses this fact as a means to absorb all activity under its purview back into the real political and ideological limit — to say that this is all there is. I see the constant and basically automatic referral of all things ‘thought’ back into this kind of philosophical pond is self defeating to the effort of progress, even as progress itself is routed back into this (touted) ‘speculative’, or ‘realist’, or  ‘post-post-modern’ maxim. It is no wonder outside of capitalism is so difficult to think!

As Amoreinblog has argued somewhere, perhaps anthropology is the way out of this philosophical conundrum; despite all the philosophical misappropriations of ideas involved with the AIME (An Investigation into Modes of Existence) project of Bruno Latour (even by Latour himself, lol), his book can be read as an argument for the need to open up a space (perhaps, in his terms, create a pass) whereby we can avoid this modern philosophical whirlpool that we have been involved with for at least 1000 years. It seems that only now, with Postmodernism, but as of late Post-postmodnerism (must we find a Post-Post-Postmodernism also?) do we really get an idea, but also an actual way to understand and realize what human beings are doing.

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Time itself may be the issue that is involved with Modernity invading as it usurps all discourse into its machinery. The issue that opens up after Postmodernism (but is not itself Postmodern scholarship) is the break from Enlightenment Ontology. So it may not be so much that we have to philosophically get out of this temporal mode — that kind of move would be philosophy attempting to avoid itself through arguing itself out of itself, redundantly, establishing as it maintains reality for everyone. It may be as simple as admitting that there is no escaping the philosophical limit, and realizing a kind of anti-Husserlian manner: Of finding the independent object in the bare fact that we know that there is an independent object, and perhaps that we need not speculate about how it can be so in order for it to be so. Of course we can discuss how it can be so…and indeed we will, but that does not mean that we cannot stay where we are at and let the pagan-Christian rollercoaster come around again and again.

Maybe we need to make a clean break.

Materialism And Nihilism. (or: What is Philosophy?)

We have to be careful when mining resources from traditional discourse. I have proposed here and there that we need to clean up philosophical discussion, and so I’m going to give an example, a brief and not exhaustive nor rigorously thorough, rendition of what I mean when I say we have to clean up philosophy.

Check out this post on materialism.

From a certain perspective, this ( the link) approach is not incorrect. The basis of his argument and indeed what he is saying is not incorrect in itself, which is to say, the content of his argument is not what is at issue here (though you can see my questions upon the content in the comments of his post). We might recall from an earlier post of mine I suggest there are two routes upon objects; the issue with today’s philosophy is really about one’s orientation upon objects. His argument is in good form in the content that is assumed of some sort of traditional heritage, in this case Wiki as a sort of base from which to place his discussion, is used as a sensible base today to make further statements. The Wiki reference to materialism might be a philosophically established definition, but it doesn’t take into large account that even the idea of materialism is debated as to what it’s really talking about. We might even be tempted to ponder how we are even able to come up with a category that is common enough to call materialism.

Let’s take a look at the opening statements of the wiki entry on materialism:

Materialism is a form of philosophical monism which holds that matter is the fundamental substance in nature, and that all things, including mental things and consciousness, are results of material interactions.

Materialism is closely related to physicalism, the view that all that exists is ultimately physical.

Keep in mind that I’m not suggesting that this entry does not make sense. At least, it does have a certain sense so far as it may reference other ideas to other wiki entries and generally goes on to discuss various ideas around let materialism may be.

First, the simple question has to be “what is materialism?” Then, there are two routes to go in finding out what ‘materialism’ might mean. One route is to do a Google search (above) or go to a professor of philosophy or critical thoery and ask all these places or look up in these places, “materialism”. And you get the usual type of philosophical answers. This route is so common that it is never even questioned; in fact, I would venture to say that it is usual and of course not to question this route, but more, that the contents of the search is likewise not questioned for what it contains (as a discursive form), but the only valid manner of questioning is upon meaning of the content as if the syntax is automatically correct as a (redundantly) syntactical form that conveys direct and equivocal meaning (that can be reduced to common) .

This may sound as if we are rehashing old postmodern modes, but it is distinctly modern in the sense that the reader cannot dismiss herself from that fact that is taking place at this moment: This moment is modern. Even if we were to attach some theoretical qualifiers to define this moment as post- modern (or post-post modern, as I like to call it), the manner by which we are able to come to the idea that this particular reading is postmodern is a modern manner. The segregating present modes or forms into categorical definitions is a modern form. The theoretical denial of this fact allows us to come to certain sensibilities about what is occurring in this moment, that is, the moment of this reading (now – are you dismissing yourself from your reading! you are reading this right now. Not in the present: Only in this moment, this modern moment) which we will not go into detail here.

The question on the table is “what is materialism”? Where do I look for this answer is the next question, the supporting question. Then, for this route that we are shedding light upon (a light that many are ((color)) blind to), the next question is: What am I trying to accomplish by taking this route? I think this is really the fundamental philosophical question involved in everything that we call philosophy; but as well, it is a question that philosophy in general, I think, largely ignores. So I can say this in the original sense of postmodern, a sense that is not the common sense of our day’s view. It is a different sense that few people care about because its basis of value is different. What is the purpose I am fulfilling or attempting to complete through taking this route? To answer ‘to gain information’ is too vague, and too redundant, but if you are OK with that answer then perhaps it is not philosophy that you are involved with (hence another reason why I say we need clean up philosophy).

The first answer to the first question shows what is involved with philosophy. If my first answer is to seek the answer somewhere else, then we already know about a certain orientation upon things, and we need not look anywhere else: This route is the route which places modernity within a prior structural situation by which the agent of that structure lives out her days. This is found because the first answer is not so often: I already know what materialism is. The answer to the first question is: Materialism is a philosophical category that is defined by or otherwise associated with material. If this question is not asked and answered first, then we have a particular kind of philosophical undertaking that yields a particular kind of philosophical answer. When this is asked and answered first, then the next question becomes: What is material? And the answer again comes automatically to sense: It is the stuff that things are made out of or otherwise constituent of.

Now; lets look at a simple definition of ‘material’ without all the previous hoopla:
{Btw: I have not yet looked it up; the definition I am putting here is after I wrote this promt. So lets see:}

– Material. “The matter from which a thing is or can be made”

So now:
– ‘matter’: “That which occupies space and has mass”

OK:
– ‘space’: (we will forego the strict mathematical definitions that are given first):
“An extent or expanse of a surface or three-dimensional area”

– ‘Mass’: “1. a coherent, typically large body of matter with no definite shape. 3. physics
the quantity of matter that a body contains, as measured by its acceleration under a given force or by the force exerted on it by a gravitational field.”

I don’t know about you, but there is no definition here, in this series, that is anything unexpected forme. I bet I could go on defining the various terms, in a plain an uncomplicated manner, and never encounter a meaning that I didn’t expect (even though with physics I would probably begin to encounter definitions that I don’t immediately understand, in particular, if they began to use mathematical symbols to denote the specific meanings).

So I will ask the same question I asked at the beginning, again: What am I trying to accomplish, not only by asking the question, but by taking the route to find the answer?

*space-supernova-hd-wallpaper1

The problem I am seeing must take into account that there are different levels of learners, and that when doing a blog, I must consider the possibility that people are of various stages in their learning, but are coming across (online; through text) with a strong sense of assertion and propriety, like they have been taught to act like (sometimes, I do come across people who are humble enough to admit to their shortcomings, and that is a breath of fresh air, because then I get to learn in a whole new way also). What I mean is, while online I tend to take everyone on the same level, and deal and treat them as equals, the facts tend to show themselves to the possibility that many people are actually somewhat, either, immature in their thinking, or representative of a certain type of thinker. It is this latter that brings me to consider why we need to clean up philosophical discussion: We are not only talking about different things, we are indeed using different methods to come to various answers. But because no one has delineated or come up with a way to distinguish these types, everyone takes philosophy as a general category in which everyone participates in a sort of common arena of ideas. I am saying that there is no such common arena, or, that the common arena is an assumption that is not, or becoming, no longer a valid assumption. The common arena is not only assumed, but enforced.

It is not merely that people are in various stages of learning or in different departments, different philosophical aspects, such as epistemology or ontology, nor the worn-out continental and analytical traditions. It is that there are two different manners of enacting, appropriating and elucidating philosophical problems as well as solutions, and the assumption that these two arenas can cross-communicate is creating a situation of philosophy that we can rightly call miscommunication, or just plain, no communication. (see Leotard, Badiou and as well as a few others who grapple with this same problem, but who were, frankly, not able to enact or accompany the ‘impossible’ solution. Laruelle may be the only one who actually takes a chance – but there are probably others). The assumption that the discrepancy can be overcome is a categorical error that is enacted due to the traditional modern mode of philosophcial thinking, what we can loosely call Enlightenment thinking – but we might also loosely categorize these thinkers as those who view the failure of this Enlightenment to equate to The failure of civilization. And, in so much as we can also rightly understand modern and postmodern as complicit in the maintenance of a particular program of Enlightenment, it is then not too far off the mark to call the perpetuation of this enterprise post-postmodern, or just get un-theoretically honest, and call it Neo-modernism, a type of ages old effort of declining civilizations to rehash, and reinstate a dying ‘realism’ of yesteryear, a ‘return to the good old days’ of definite real truths (Realism).

But did we ever really stop moving forward ? Re-read (or read) “The Postmodern Condition” again and tell me if Lyotard was not situating things in light of techne. Is it any wonder that a certain Realist has attempted a discussion about over- and under-determinations? Over and under – mining ? Despite how short those discussions may extend, various truths about the ability and function of human consciousness must always show itself in time even if through different frequencies and angles. We are caught in a technical motion that has little to do with how we constitute our state of Being: The State is known, that is how, logistically, we are able to interact with technology the way we do. The various issues of consciousness are now inseparable from our technical world (if they were ever understood as separate). Any argument to the contrary is nearly superfluous (if not different).

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This is not bleak; it is not an apocalyptic prophecy. Such gloom and doom are from the “prophets of the old Testament” projecting their dismay on the manner by which they only have to make a (dishonest) living (in the production of “honest” theory). They misunderstand reality; they are caught in a kind of upside-down ‘hope’ (faith), a kind of transcendental yearning for a ontological justification of a religious affect. 

In a way, we could see this effort (here, behind this essay) is the uprooting of the whole discursive paradigm by which we come to not only traditional philosophical conclusions, but indeed the manner that the tradition remains intact as a common method. By this, I mean to alarm the philosophical police, those philosophers that Slavoj Zizek mentions in his book “Event”. The philosophical police are on guard for philosophical statements or proposals that would seek to undo all our social political and ideological structures; basically, the philosophical police are the clerics of our current religious ideology (reality).

We have to ask what exactly these philosophical police might be on guard against, because so many of the philosophical police don’t even know that they’re working for the department; they naturally uphold a traditional sense of rationality and reason without even contemplating or being able to approach the idea that the sense that they have of rationality is itself an actual religious attitude. In short, what the philosophical police do is look for nihilism. They look for philosophical statements that represent or argue for, to them, nothing (good), and then basically assert their religious identity upon that which otherwise appears to them as chaos, anarchy or just plain nonsense (they have no criterion by which to discern real nonsense from logical nonsense: Real nonsense makes no sense to the practical and actual living that occurs in the real world; logical nonsense has no sense and cannot be made to have sense). They are apparently incapable of understanding what nihilism means without the context of their traditional religious dogma. The content of nihilism to them is effective negation of their belief system, or what should be more probably called a real religious scaffolding of meaning, even extending into the philosophical metaphysical justifications. Indeed; we only use the term to indicate where it lacks.

But we already know, if we understand what Jean-Francois Lyotard said in The first chapter of his essay “The Postmodern Condition”, what happens to people that are attempting to develop a discourse of the content of what is traditionally known as nihilism: They are ignored, de facto; they are unheard and they are automatically and axiomatically excluded from what is already understood – through the modern religious dogma (if I may be so bold) – as knowledge. Those who would discuss the content of what has been X’d-out and marked off on the map of real and valid knowledge as “monsters be here” are unheard.

So it is with this small and quick primer that I say as soon as someone said the word ‘materialism’, 150+ years or so ago, to continue along various definitions of how that materialism may be wrong in its definition or this materialism is a more proper way to situate it, the basic problem has been that these subsequent authors, the subsequent religious philosophers who basically are unable to consider their position as a religious position due to the same phenomenon that I’m talking about with materialism, founded nihilism – where such philosophers, who want to argue against and improve upon the definitions of fundament or and establish terms (what are they doing?) cannot bring themselves to understand the nihilistic intention behind the term itself, there do we have (do I have to really say it), the philosophical police. We then need to reflect upon where my capacity as a philosopher is breached. We have to consider that what I understand as true is different from what is real (has differentiated), and we have to consider the fact that I am able to make sense out of it that is communicated in one moment, and not in another.

So; if I am in to remain in good form, as form is form despite what tradition might say, then I can no longer take the term materialism and add or subtract something to it, like Badiou talks about. The addition and subtraction of term identities must occur in an arena that is different from that which posits the ordinary definition.

*

Then all the alarms go off with this one. If my readership goes down to zero then I know I have succeeded in offending religious sensibility. (Just kidding! Please keep reading.) Getting back to the question: Is there any part of the definitions above that indicate or inherently and automatically attaches to a referent? An imperative where things in-themselves are automatically and mutually excluded from the thoughts about them? From where does such an exclusion take hold and for what purpose? What is offensive or incorrect in the statement “Only material exists”? Material is that which we deal with. It is that which we deal with always and at all times. It is ultimately and always discursive, and any reference of discourse to something outside or beyond discourse is automatically discursive. The proof is found in the question: If there is something outside of discourse? What is it? Can you tell me without using discourse? Can discourse refer to something that is not discursive? These questions are foundational and pivotal to discerning what philosophy is able to do and what it is allowed (permitted) to do.

I see nothing in this which contradicts any of those extsnsions of definition above. Yet, once we understand this, once we see that there are indeed people who will have issue with this, then we can begin to notice where people, philosophers in general, are being somehow deceptive or at least being or carrying on a certain incognition about the state of affairs; and we have to ask them: For what purpose? I call such people ‘real philosophers’, or philosophers that are concerned with reality. Nothing wrong with that; just there is discussion that is as valid and pertinent to what is occurring that those kind of philosphers will not consider. This is not an accusation; it is a mere fact of what occurs. Am I ‘incorrect’ or am I accused because I have breasts? This is also a foundational and pivotal type of question.

*

To wrap this little ditty up, to really nail it home and sew it up tight, we must bring in Lyotard postmodern condition again and point out how so utterly honest and true his statements were: The state will be no longer of concern and eventually will be left behind all together.

Damn. What the hell was I talking about?

Bye.

The Matter At Hand, Part 1: Post-Modernism, Artificial Intelligence, the Conventional Limit, and Object Oriented Ontology.

From reading an essay a few days ago, I was reminded of The Postmodern Generator. You can go read a good essay at:
http://www.elsewhere.org/pomo/

Now when I say ‘good’ I mean it can make sense. If you have never heard of it, or didn’t read the very end of the page, the PM Generator is a program that generates essays. Click the link again and it will produce another one. They are completely false.

I was reminded of the PMG after reading a ‘actually legitimate’ essay that made a certain amount of sense but that I really could gain no baring upon what it was addressing or really saying. Of course, though, we must acknowledge that there are types of privileged discourse that have to do with production niches. Computer code may appear like nonsense to the layman, but the meaning of the code is easily identified to its object, whether it be origination, such as the direct meaning of commands and their ordering to the machine, or their destination, the effect or running operation of the code’s incorporation as an application. The ground and purpose of the code, though confusing to the layman, can be easily explained. Yet, in philosophy and theoretical discourse, we have a different situation. If I had gone into the essay (the ‘legitimate’ one I read) with a sense that it must have relevance and be based in a certain potential for truth, then I might have read it more than twice and made a good effort to find out what it meant, including following references to other essays that might be in its genre, and concluded that it had something significant to offer. But I didn’t. I saw — for sure after the second read — that, for one, it was purely privileged in its bearings, but privileged in a different way than computer programming; which is to say, the meaning and point it addresses is proposed and suspended in a cohortive discursive base that is taken as relevant merely because there are people in positions of authority and or respect who are speaking in such a way. But then also, for two, that not only was it probably important merely because certain people have developed an investment arena for meaning, but more so, the arena was merely that: The arena allowed for a fabrication (without grounding) to appear as if it had significance in deep human roots, socially ideological and or political, of a kind of substantial innately human kind and pertinence, and due to this fabrication of meaning caused a series of human efforts of various vectors (political, economical, ideological, artistic) to be based in the arena solely for the purpose of inflating the identity capital of the people involved in the fabrication of the arena. But it it is just this kind of insubstantial rhetoric that post-modernism allows to be true, for it makes itself true by it being a product of human sensibility, but of an insensible sensibility that is the egocentric transcendent that has gotten us exactly to the place of reasoning that sees world destructing activities, such as global warming or climate change, democratic-capitalistic support of aristocratic development, two-faced power structures that advocate equal access while being allowed for through an inherent subordination and oppression of designated marginalized segments of society, ideological disclaimers for ‘naturalized’ inequality and oppression, etcetera.

The point, I suppose, I am trying to make is that it is not that the PMG is writing nonsensical pieces of theory. The defenders of the significance of ‘real’ theory is the disclaimer that …” The Postmodernism Generator was written by Andrew C. Bulhak using the Dada Engine, a system for generating random text from recursive grammars, and modified very slightly by Josh Larios (this version, anyway. There are others out there).” They point at the ‘random’ and ‘recursive’ elements of the generation and exclude what other theory may be made by humans. And, this is not to say that human generated theory itself is also random and nonsensical at root. Maybe this is so, but then we have only enacted an eternal irony for which the argument is but a point of contention (perhaps a kind of ‘the’ point of contention whereby the individual is marked off to his her identity), and then one might be better suited to a religious monastery.

I am more concerned with how real theory is distinguished from PMG theory, because, for one, if we are indeed moving to the inception of a true artificial intelligence, we need encounter and identify the limits of human conscious effort and not only how human consciousness may operate as a real item, but also how this real item functions as a item of what is true of the universe in which reality is formed. We need encounter that aspect of being human that gains reality by its offense, that is, in the effort to create identity against the bare fact of its existence. We may have realized what it means to exist, but we have have not encountered how we react to such a sentence; we have only reacted to the truth, we have yet to reveal what occurs when such a moment of truth is come upon. If we allow ourselves as human beings to be able so easily fall prey to discursive ploys of fabricated meaning, should we not realize that an artificial intelligence will be able to notice this human tendency, this weak spot, and take advantage of the flaw in the fabric that is and has been causing our essential lack in potential? Should we think any less that an artificial intelligence of our own making will be an intelligence nonetheless not human intelligence ? The question must be: Can we program our lack as an inherent limit of artificial intelligence? Are we able to do this, or is the fact of the possibility of a true AI a harbinger an indication that our lack is indeed a lack of being human and not of our creations’ ? This is the issue of the point of contention: What is contingency and cause?

Because this is to say that the flaw is exactly the reassertion of essential Will that gains its force through meaning based in a universal maxim of segregation and the exploitation of blind spots inherent to such segregation, that this is a human mode, and that if a human as itself may see this flaw — shall we be so arrogant as to presume an intelligence of our making will necessarily be a human intelligence ? Indeed, would not an ‘artificial’ intelligence have at least an equal probability to have capacities that arise in the blind spot of human intelligence in so much as the likes of Graham Harman shine light into the regions of the universe that have intelligence (being) regardless of what human beings regard as such? The Frankenstein’s monster of human creation is not that humans let it get away from human control, but that humanity itself was already beyond its own control. Is not this the evidence that what we would consider an artificial intelligence actually more likely to be an intelligence that offends us, our ability to be sensible? Such that a true artificial intelligence would then actually be an intelligence that overlaps what is being (Dasein) as our mode of corresponding intelligence with what is intelligence proper, as modes of being of an actually more true universal reality? ‘Artificial intelligence’ thus might be that intelligence that evidences to us how our transcendental mode is actually merely one type of mode of being, A.I. then the revealing of the limit that is the transcendental thought by its actually arising partially within the (non-ethical) universal paradigm, straddling, if you will, the willed and the non-willed. Would human intelligence as a conventional red herring be able to stand up to a mode of intelligence that understands itself as a determined mode of activity, that is to say, determined by objects ? Nietchze might say that it should be able to.

For what are we seeing with the PMG? And what is the reaction against?

Shall we see in Part 2 ?