Current Deontology

When we do not suppose that morality is created by thoughtful humans, as opposed to existing in-itself, then it becomes possible to read Kant’s categorical imperative (or his basis of deontology) as meaning that which can occur in no other way than it does. This reading seems to deny the traditional reading which sees deontology as having to do with an the morality of the doing of the act, as to choice.

The question that I have yet to see be held against this latter sense arises when we find that we are using hypothetical reason to address the categorical imperative, or, that what Kant proposes as Pure Reason answering to the Practical. The question should be: why?

When the other why question is never addressed to the categorical imperative involved in the practical thinking approach to pure reason, then we have a deontology which contradicts is own meaning by answering to whether any act is justified morally in-itself, and we view Kant as suggesting that a categorical imperative has to do with an ought. Which is to say, ethics and morality are imperative to human existence.

As a side, Kierkegaard already questions this: what the attempt to iron out self-contradictory motions of reason implies (or at least the half he was able to see given the ideological conditions of his moment).

Yet, when we understand pure reason, as a thing that exists, as really having nothing to do with morality in the first place (morality is something that can be accounted for by the imperative rather than a by-product [Nonphilosophical unilateral duality]) then we can understand what Kant is really saying about the categorical imperative. Namely that it is a thing, an act that is existing or that exists, that occurs in no other way than it could, A thing which is consistent with its category, a thing which cannot occur except how it is. It is a category which occurs the only way it can, and thus affords no purchase by the practical; that is, except in as much as the practical or hypothetical is already being understood through its own imperative of Being, which is to say, as the ubiquitous and proper way of Being, which denotes a proper way of seeing, thinking and understanding, as this proper way axiomatically excludes the act of thought by its definition. 

Wiki says that deontology derives from the Greek deon which means obligation. That’s cool and all. But I also like de-ontology. In the same way I like to use intension (in tension) when speaking of phenomenology and such, as opposed to intention.

We are able to see what we are able to think, but also vice-versa — and not simultaneously.

Have we yet begun to think?

{for those who read the unedited typo version previous to this post: I have no idea where the last comment, which is now deleted, came from.}. 👨🏽‍🚀

The Last Rock and Roll Band.

Album Notes

These recordings were made over 2016-2017 at Great Faux Studio, Louisville, Colorado.
Mixed and
Mastered by No One 2017
To my life and family.

“In 1991, the music world was in turmoil. The last of underground possibility was disappearing fast, being replaced by the ambiguity of commercial acceptance. Bands which up till then had tried to retain some artistic integrity changed their tune, and they themselves became the new standard for artistic integrity. Mayhem prevailed. Noone could sell out any more; the whole idea of selling out had sold out.
Amidst this ridiculousness, one band made a stand. The Covert Sound Philosophy was born. They had risen from the depths of rock star wannabe to the epitome of rock star irony. Everyone knew the songs; everyone wanted to get to their shows. But where were they?
Many knew, but none told. It was a true religion carved from the insides of psychedelic comedy, CSP had remained true to integrity, and their fans did too. Some of the most famous songs of the late 20th century were written by CSP, but they didn’t want credit, they were too cool. And that’s what made them the coolest band the world has ever seen. Anyone who had seen them would not admit it, and those artists who played the CSP songs vowed not to reveal who actually wrote the songs.
Topping the Sex Pistols’ hardly ironic and blatantly spiteful “The Great Rock and Roll Swindle”, CSP had succeeded where others had failed. This is why they had achieved a legendary status that no one could talk about.”
Now, the Covert Sound Philosophy has broken that silence. We have for your inspection and commercialization, “The Clausal Proof”. 

Clausal Proof. by The Covert Sound Philosophy.
vocals, guitar: Lance Cares
drums, vocals: Sparkle Brips
Bass, vocals: Charles Barmup
Beat Programmer, synth, guitar: Peter Smithers.

The Object of Counseling: The Subject of Counseling – A New Beginning.

I am working on a paper that I hope to get published somewhere.  Below is a few paragraphs from it.  Please tell me what you think!

The Subject of Counseling

“The subject of counseling is well known to trained counselors and philosophers alike.  Counseling concerns the human being and its mental or psychic aspects and how these might appear to be involved with a person or persons in the world, and to help such people.  Of course, definition of just what counseling might be involved with can be debated, but in a strict, open and obvious sense, the subject of counseling is what the counseling is about or for.  This does not get us very far, though. Counseling is often strongly associated with the discipline of psychology yet, being a young discipline, still routinely looks to its older siblings, which includes psychiatry, psychology, neurology, and social work, for its philosophical support.  However, counseling appears on the scene in its own right attempting to distinguish itself from these older family members.  This essay is a part of that effort.  The question on the table will be, what is counseling?

The first and primary issue which will be addressed throughout this essay is the problem with a usual method of approach on things which supposes to grant credential to criterion to articles and proposals which best site evidence-based research.  Note, however, before reactions are engrained, I do not suggest that such an approach is inherently incorrect or misinformed. The view upon this paper which sees an argument toward how the just-mentioned method is incorrect, is based in an incorrect manner of viewing the meaning of this paper.  Nevertheless counseling does admit it is plain that scientific research is only capable of encountering and making accurate statements upon a minority of experiential impressions and outcomes, that the outcomes by which it is able to honestly make comment truthfully amount to again only a portion of reason for why a person may or may not be behaving or expressing in the manner she does, and that such comments say less about what solutions are effective and should be applicable than they do about the purpose of the experiment.

While those so scientifically faithful will shudder at such blasphemy, we need only point to the miserable statistics representing any researched-based approach to mental health, to the effervescence of new approaches and theories of the psyche, its various ideals and healths, over the barely one-hundred-fifty year existence to understand the poverty and basic depravity involved in the continual advocation of an exclusive method called science upon a field which is so obviously resistant and generally contrary to its enforcements and lures.

 To answer this failure of myopic and stubborn assertion against the facts, this paper seeks to explore new possibility; the claim is that mental health will benefit more from a sure objective philosophical bedrock which allows for opening and honest viewing of subjects and outcomes than it has from the relative and philosophically arbitrary methodological reduction, restriction, workings of closure and career that we know of under the rubric of empirical research science.”

When we begin to admit our limitations and where we may have gone wrong or were mistaken in approach, we may wish to re-think just what kind of world we are creating for the health of what's mental in the consideration of such easy and non-reflective proposals such as we find here. imgbin-thought-philosophy-knowledge-psychology-philosopher-others-nq1r4f3xntnfmmmq6fe4xk5gx

“Emancipate yourself from mental slavery;

None but ourselves can free our minds.”

And yet, it is not the counselor’s job to move “one so enslaved” out of slavery or to emancipate such an individual from their enslavement necessarily. For indeed ideology serves a religious function and there are those for whom emancipation, as some ideal upheld by the counselor, can make no sense and cannot be implemented toward this person, This subject, this client, without imposing another form of enslavement that the client indeed can understand. The presumption, in this light, by the therapist would amount to a failure of therapy, another entrapment that the client would indeed feel as a kind of imposition and react accordingly; Which is to say, stay symptomatic and stay within that field of mentality that they understand implicitly is problematic .

In this light there is a discernment between ideologues.  This is an important point because it distinguishes the object of counseling from various theories of how to counsel by the fact that it does not tell the counselor how to proceed in session, or what the purpose of the therapy should be, or in what idealistic identity the client should find itself in order to be healed.

The object of counseling thus is not another theory of counseling, not another idealism, but is rather a theory of how to organize what is already there as the object of counseling.  

Counseling and Philosophy

Counselors are not the scientists. The scientists are the psychologists, neurologists, social workers and psychiatrists. These latter tend to defer to the numbers into the Givens with Little question.

The counselors are the ones that acknowledge science can at best account for only a small portion of the human experience and why anyone may behave in the way that they do. 

It is plain despite the faith in science that psychiatry and such would invest in the scientific/medical model of mental health, that while the bones and organs can fit into such a organ->problem->symptom scheme of disease, the mind and mental issues do not fit simply into such a model of brain. That anything which has to do with the psyche, mind and health must necessarily concern philosophical foundations of knowledge, and not merely scientific appearances.

Which God(s) do you (not) believe in? An interview with Christopher Watkin, Journal of Baudrillard Studies

Which God(s) do you (not) believe in? An interview with Christopher Watkin, Journal of Baudrillard Studies
— Read on

I think the third option he misses for the sake of thinking is the basis of his thinking. As in my post before this one, he avoids the fact of the application of his critique can be applied to the very act of his proposal through proposing it. In other words, by making his proposal he is not only reifying that it is belief which constitutes the question of veracity of God and his theocratic histories, but also relying upon the obscurity gained through the reorganization of terms and phrases to denote an argument about whether any form of God may or may not exist. He is, in essence, saying either we believe or don’t believe because there is an either/ or problem to force one to believe or not believe, Or, that Becuase there is no clear way to discern whether or not whether we should believe, we thus need not put the term religion within bounds to believe or not believe, which by that ordainment of reason thus forces us to believe or not believe in the arrangement of terms and phrases.

In short, it’s a very erudite circle jerk of masturbating intellects which appear to give us something…

but really give us, once again in the very very modern-post-modern sense Nothing as if this nothingness has substance.

In other words, in order for his discussion or argument (the link) to have any meaning whatsoever, in light of what I’ve just pointed out about it, One must have faith, one must view it through a certain orientation, a certain manner of appropriating what reality exactly is — but not in a subjective phenomenal sense where any meaning is allowed, but indeed a particular and specific manner — at that, not only for the thinker herself but for all of humanity.

That is religious by any definition, the Godhead implied in the structure of the method (dishonesty if intentional or a mistake if not noticed) as opposed to naming it what it is (scholasticism).

Still we have to ask Heidegger’s question:

Have we have yet begun to think ?

Some Material for Psychology

” To connect to this point such a pathway is a form of self-responsibility that allows us to overcome internal and unconscious pathological prohibitions. In the old traditional world we had “Master Figures” (embodying the moral superego) to tell us what to do in relation to a “Cause” which transcended pleasure. Now such “Master Figures” (embodying the moral superego) are negated. However, this negation did not open up a world of free subject’s enjoying their simply pleasures (as presupposed by 1960s counter-culture), but instead a world of self-enslaved subject’s who become frozen or static in relation to internal and unconscious pathological prohibitions coming only from their own head. Such a world can only be transcended through self- responsibility (not more rights), from becoming aligned with the inhuman Master (Death).”

And my Two Routes comment:

The significance of the Two Routes is in as much as there is one route which sees discourse as indicating specific and localized actualiities. That this one route does not encompass or tell of all there is or can be. For example: As though Zizek’s discourse is saying such and such, and means this and that, then or now — specific local identies which can be overcome through relying upon that/those identities. For example, the “master signifier” that this author uses to talk about how there is no longer an ideological “master figure” which allows us to have cogent and substantial sense of self in the social atmosphere, that its been “negated”. The author thus uses this to construct an argument to say that what is required then is we take responsibility for this dissolution of the figure, that it is or has been dissolved and no longer functions as the static signifier, that we are left with a sort of Sartrean Existential situation where we have to just make our own meaning.

Then there is the other route which would say that still Zizek’s model is operating, and indeed there is a master signifier that is drawing forth this particular essay and discourse in the sense that there is an underlying or over arcing structure through which I can understand what his essay could mean. And that at no time has what Zizek or Peterson talked about or described been overcome in any way or changed in anyway so far as it indeed is having to do with the subject that would presume to be able to overcome the discourse: the subject is indeed intact and involves responsibly; what is needed is a radical break into existential responsibility (Christ). Here discourse ‘floats’ over real things granting appearance of change through the identification with the term rather than, what I call, the truth.

This is the Laruellian issue in his non-philosophy. The way it plays out in “actuality” is that one of these routes needs to be denied in order for progress to occur, which is to say in order them for the subject to make for itself a place of identity within the ideological sphere. The issue is then just what progress occurs?

Hence again the discussion of this essay occurs along two routes that are always in play and cannot be reduced to one or the other necessarily or contingently; this is to say that the moment it is reduced to one or the other is exactly when we find out the authors’ orientation upon objects, and we find out because of the nature of choice (discussed elsewhere).

In other words, there is no “old” in the sense this author used the idea except in as much as he views himself as occurring within an ideological construct (Zizekian and Petersonian and “world state”) which has ties constructed ‘in state’ as a stable and manifested static identity or entity unto which a free or unfree subject can then enact itself in the “actual” omnipresence that is the “figured” political world.

And Zizek’s discourse replays itself as a capitalistic-Christian God-world-cross substance prefigured in Peterson’s archetypical psychology.

Responsibility can indeed take the form of centering ideologically in the capitalisitc excess of subjective agency. Or the responsibility can arise as emancipation through a radical break which allows for the embodiment of material limit.

Does the Banach-Tarski Paradox Anticipate The Two Routes Upon Objects ?

This is the best vid I’ve seen all month!

I definately am Not a mathematician, but this vid explains this paradox pretty well. And, despite the scope of his conjectures at the end, a significant philosophical question would concern whether reality presents a sufficiently able manner for conceptualization to encompass all that we are able to know?

The precipitate of this first question thus moves retroactively as opposed to redundantly:

If we can take the initial object as any real object, then we can likewise take ‘reality’ itself as an object which itself is real. If we are to understand anything, communication of reality must be involved in some manner.

The initial issue, then, is if what is proposed to have been communicated is able to be viewed and understood as not having been communicated. And then if what was not communicated is able to come through as this latter view, that is, what has not been communicated being communicated but not in the former instance and not a replacement of the former (what was indeed communicated is not nullified by the communication which was not communicated by the proposal of what should have been communicated)?


The initial contemplations upon truth can be found in Nathaniel’s The Philosophical Hack.

The Object of the Subject

Thinking Marx Through Harvey — thru reality

Thinking Marx Through Harvey

Thinking Marx Through Harvey
— Read on

I like it.

The only critique I would have of it is that one does not give way to the other. To give way, to choose either one or the other or to have one or the other “prove” itself to be the basis ground or ultimate truth of things as it is, is to resort to a reading of Kierkegaard that is not conventionally mistaken: it is to have faith.

We might see that the issue is not so much (or is less) that there is an idealistic Marxist realm where ideologies or abstractions usurp brute realities, and then a disillusionment that comes along that shows that such abstract realities, or theoretical systems based on abstract concepts, is an incorrect way to understand the truth of things, so to speak — but indeed such conceptual (e-)motions occur.

My critique is that the reduction to one form or another, at least in this kind of dialectical polemic, where I was incorrect before but now my idealistic version of reality has been proven incorrect– this kind of polemical thinking, this way to position myself in the world, this either/or mentality, is what is incorrect. It is not unethical; but it is incorrect with regards to what is true.

When we read Kierkegaard, we might understand that what he’s really indicating, especially in his Pivotal philosophical works “either/or, pts 1 & 2”, is it is possible that my ideological theories posing or pointing towards some truth actually does still occur as such, that is, showing truth, while yet also as I come upon the real world which discounts it and proves it to be incorrect. What occurs is that there are two correct versions of reality that do not work together nor conflate into or toward another unity, and that this is the truth that shows how our interaction with the world takes place.

I submit, arguments of what is real, or what is actually the case in the world, function As we might understand them informing us intellectually ,through a vacillation of ideological categories that function truly to establish the world, a world, the world, in exactly the way it is, and the subject mediating between those worlds as though indeed I, the subject, is changing. In the scheme, though, the world that is involved with the greatest of all categories, essentially does not change. We can even bring Slavoj Zizek’s question in here: are we able to change how we understand change?

No matter what discourse, or any other indicator, might “truly mean”, ultimately it is only indicating ideas that are attached to whatever actual world in the way that it is at that present moment. The idea that I am coming to find out what is “actually real” through any sort of theoretical mechanism or intellectual device, is ultimately based in what we would or should properly call “faith”. To resolve the either/or dilemma to one or the other “reality” requires faith.

As someone else has put it elsewhere, it is not a question of whether or not Jesus Christ was actually the son of God or not the son of God, was an actual human being, or was a God on earth, or was the son of God, or none of those things.  The more complex and significant issue is how Jesus Christ occurs in the world that I am coming upon. This last question differs substantially and is quantitatively different than the previous types of questions. 

Similarly, racism for that matter, or aliens, or The European Union, or quarks, bits or gravity, or unicorns.

To be able to weigh up sides and decide which appears the more real, to have placed the stakes within that trial, as though I am along with the world Being determined by those stakes, requires faith.

Likewise it is not a question of whether or not the brain functions in whatever way that science or neurology might say that it does or that it doesn’t, or whether or not science is correct or incorrect in its estimations. Whatever situation is occurring at the time is indeed the situation that we must deal with at the time. Yet, strangly philosophically sognificant, most often how we are thinking about it is understood to be involved with some actually true of the situation which further tends to want to avoid itself this time, wants to “prove” to not others – against, with or by others — but mainly itself how such a truth is indeed essentially true, no matter what anyone will say about it. 

Read: The Philosophical Hack

Oh Kaay!

I finally took a minute and got some things in order.

THE OBJECT OF THE SUBJECT : The Second Part of the Philosophical Hack  is available in EPUB HERE. 

Screen Shot 2019-08-29 at 7.15.12 PM

                 and in paperback HERE.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL HACK: The First Part is available HERE in paper back.


“The Philosophical Hack a hack into philosophy. A hack in one sense is someone who knows how to use the technology but nevertheless assembles useful objects in non-conventional manners. A hack is someone who adeptly utilizes standard methods but is not employed to make marketed products. Yet in another sense, a hack is a repeated application of a specific yet broad algorithmic protocol upon a closed problematic space. The role of the hack is at once to disrupt and to consolidate. The hack is a check on the security of closed functional systems, as well as the impetus for its growth. Defining this problematic space through a careful assault on weak points in the philosophical facade, Nathaniel offers us a way into a “science of philosophy”.  Mr. Nathaniel is writing to a wide intelligent audience. It is written in such a way that the philosophical mind will not be ostracized but will indeed be challenged. It is indeed a philosophical hack.”


Using Slavoj Zizek’s EVENT! as a platform, Nathaniel moves us beyond Zizek’s more political subjective confines into an object orientation.  Graham Harman, of noted Object Oriented Ontology, posits that knowledge either speaks to what a thing is made of or what it does, and that while we need knowledge to exist and to thrive as human beings, cognition is not exhausted by knowledge.  Objects, in this sense, exist at once as present and withdrawn.

Further, he suggests that philosophy is not only about knowledge, not only about what what objects do and what they are made of, but about the love of wisdom. 

He also tells us that Object Oriented Philosophy includes the human being as an object, what Nathaniel calls a universal object.

Setting up a few steps back from Harman’s front, and in Harman’s terms, the Philosophical Hack sets up the contours of a philosophy as an effort of love toward or involved with wisdom. Nathaniel thereby begins to lay the groundwork toward a hopefully more substantial and meaningful practical philosophy for mental health and counseling.  In this new understanding, the conventional and traditional modes of human Being, such as science, biology, psychology, religion, and spirituality, as well as the traditional philosophical theoretical (as many we know) constitute contributing components of the object that is the subject.

The Philosophical Hack is the beginning of a philosophy which includes other disciplines to form a more coherent and seamless cognition of what the human being actually is as a universal object infinite in its involvement with other objects, as opposed to what the human Being is able to be as a transcendental and special phenomenal subject limited in its ideological nothingness.

This new way is to retain everything, as opposed to excluding.

#mentalhealth, #objectorientationcounseling, #truth, #loveofwisdom