The New Philosophy

The Moment of Decisive Significance took more than 4 years to write and publish, and it still needs edits. The Philosophical Hack the first and second parts took a little less time, partly because of how Nathaniel approached it.  Actually, The Philosophical Hack is not yet complete, so all and all, for all 6 parts, will probably take even longer than 4 years — and being that Nathaniel undertakes other projects, the last 4 parts will probably come out perhaps in 2030. 🙂

This is true philosophy to me.  Yes, philosophy can be understood as a commodity, a product, a piece of consumer good, but that is not what I think good philosophy does and is in truth.  In reality maybe it appears as something different…

Philosophy takes time, it is out of time, and it is thus timeless. 

It arises in time and out of time, but through arising in this manner, it is essentially of two ontological natures.

One of the points the Kierkegaard makes in his book “Fear and Trembling” is that Abraham had a faith that is beyond him; Kierkegaard says that he could never make the move of Abraham and, basically, this is why a person is in despair, sinful, as he says, in despair to will to be oneself.  Kierkegaard thus uses the literary figure of the Biblical Abraham to show the irony involved of Being a Knight of Faith.

His point is that when one is willing to be oneself never does she have the faith of Abraham, and thus, for those who might be so inclined (but not everyone), the best someone who is willing can do is live as a knight of infinite resignation. His point is so long as one is willing, that is, is open to the possibility of being oneself, as opposed to actually being oneself, then that person lives in despair.

Indeed this is the modern dilemma of the individual.

Time Spiral


My point is that so long as one is in time, they have faith in themselves and are working towards an end which is always ethically compromised: They have faith (hope) that the world holds a place for them to Be, but they never are quite sure how they are supposed to be (how am I proposed in context is the quandary of modern mental health).  The irony, though, is that one must indeed live in time and be ethical (in the sense of Being involved with ethics), but that that this is not all that one is and does.  One does not live in a condition where she must always choose upon ethics.  This is the point that Kierkegaard makes of Abraham.

Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical? 

We find the answer through his books, and the answer is yes.  The reason for this is that Abraham’s activity was not for his time, and yet in that he was indeed there, a human being doing actions, his actions were not ethical. Indeed, the point that Kierkegaard makes is that the ethics of Abraham were vested in God, and that God thus makes the world ethical by virtue of the absurdity that is not acting in time: Abraham has faith by virtue of the absurd.

Ironically, Slavoj Zizek, a contemporary social critic and philosopher, makes the same point when he says that the subject always acts too late, that by the very ontological nature of the modern subject of ideology, action is always reactionary.  Similarly Alain Badiou says the best political move is to not act politically, to abstain from politics. The revolutionary move is thus to move out of time, and to bring Kierkegaard back in, to act by virtue of the absurd such that what is ethical arises out of the act, as opposed to the ontological act Being involved with an attempt to act ethically.

The condition which evidences this ontological contradiction is what Kierkegaard and Nietzsche as well, call angst, which was first translated into English, by Walter Lawrie, I think, as dread, but then later authors (Hong and Hong, May) call anxiety.  The philosopher who arises out of time to act finds herself in a state of anxiety because she still appears on the scene within the ethical universe, albeit, one that is being manifested by the absurd situation of her being out of time. This is particularly salient in our 21st century because we find that this is a condition of knowledge, and not a condition of every human being who thinks thoughts.

  • The question that I have been grappling with is how does one who is so out of time do the work of art (or of love, Heidegger, Kierkegaard) which is motivated through the state of anxiety? (Also see Harman’s Dante’s Broken Hammer.)
  • How does one arise in time out of time?

My next project will thus be to produce a work of philosophy which covers the whole breadth of philosophical knowledge while at once mentioning neither a known philosopher or author, nor conceptual philosophical tropes, that is, terms which have assumed (privileged) dense philosophical definition.

That is what I am going to attempt, anyways.  🙂

Good luck!


Freedom is the element of love

Søren Kierkegaard, the Danish philosopher and so-called “father” of existentialism was born today, May 5 in 1813. To celebrate, I share this essay …

Freedom is the element of love

————- After speaking with a coworker about how to deal with a patient, he replies “Is love a thing?”

Happy Birthday S.K. !

The Simplicity of Substance and the Lengthy Post

I have been re-approaching philosophical ideas that have long held a deep significance for me. Because my life has been basically informed by an incessant and consistent questioning of what I am coming up on, I am finding that I am merely continuing to be what I am, which is, for a term, in motion.

I think this last round of doubting comes about because I am realizing that I am more concerned with actual people than I am with my ability to think great thoughts.

Now, what is strange about this is I am intensely antisocial in general while at the same time at ease with being social in a certain context or a certain framework. I generally hate people (groups) but I love and am very concerned with people (individuals). 🌏


This is very Zizekian, from the Zizekian standpoint of media/ideological primacy:

“I do not love the world….I pick and choose who and what I love.”

So far as “the world” might be an ideological fantasy established through magical symbols, Zizek, the critical theorist/media critic-turn-philosopher states unequivocally that “love is evil.”

What he means by this is that we are persuaded by an existential anxiety which pervades the maintenance of the fantasy– that is, due to our investment in the truth-value of the fantasy (the value is gained because it prevents us from having to encounter that which we are most of afraid of: the dissolution of the fantasy, or death) — to love the world, to extend an ideological hand out into the grandiose narcissist world because the idealism inherent of the fantasy is we are ‘in this together’, so to speak, individually yet identically.

The modern individual is ethically bound to, at least, trying to love the world. But in the whole, he doesn’t have a clue how to actually love his sisters and brothers around him. The imaginary world establishes intuitive subjective barriers which serve to maintain the ideological modern identity at all costs against his neighbors, while extending out ideals to the “universe” or “the world” where we all must try to get along.

So; yet in truth he denies what is really occurring; which is, we are all being selfish and choosing certain universal things and people to love, and not really loving the world.

It is this tension of modern subjectivity we deny through the institutionally normalized and sanctioned “state of” anxiety which then in relief shows our ultimately ‘sinful’ nature: “In despair to will to be oneself” (as Kierkegaard puts it) is the condition of the modern man concept of love which avoids its true nature: hence, it is evil because it is an ideologically sanctioned “global” love that misses the intimacy that we generally misconstrue in the notion of agape, or man’s love for God. Since, God in this modern sense, is indeed a “usurper” god which takes the place of brotherly love to which agape would otherwise return to reflect in God itself, that is, in the world.

Zizek is, of course, referring to the modern ideal of love by which humanity defers itself and by which humanity is regulated to its conceptual ability.

Beyond the ideological love, by reflection, any love of a transcendent world is a narcissism, a pathological version of the human being. While within the fantasy, the narcissism is justified through the fantasy erected by trauma and told or narrated as “just human” , the “all too human” who takes on little responsibility for his actions, while erecting layers of intellectual and ideological facades in grandiose defense of them. Hence, the love that is evil is indeed, on one hand, a carnal love based in the libidinal control of the ego which then moves to impose or identify itself with the super-ego material norms: the subjective ideological identity.

Yet on the other, love is evil from the transcendent standpoint because the love I would have for the world that is my sisters and brothers, that is, not put off to a mere grand idea, is an evil and absurd activity.

So ironically, items that I pick and choose to love are in or of the reality that I cannot but be involved with– this is an evil manner of doing things. Hence, I do not love the world from Zizek’s standpoint of an ideological (media critique) analysis.

But indeed. I should not love the world in this way, so I don’t. Instead, I pick and choose to thus remain consistent and cohered to that which is the fantastic manner by which I must apprehend the ideological world.

The true love I profess is not modern, thus from the modern ideological standpoint, it is evil.

I won’t go on.

(Please don’t) 👨🏽‍🚀


The Local Psyche Global. (Lacan part 2)


The question on the table is two parts:

  1. If The modern world is really the unrecognized embodiment of the reflection of one’s self, which is the the factual state of individual alienation, then what does it even mean that the alienated self-reflection is looking at cars, trees, space, planets, stars, deers, etc….?
  2.  What does this have to do with ego development, modernity, and philosophy


Of Firsts.

Philosophy can be said to be involved with a reduction which has already occurred.  What I call conventional philosophy sees the effort of philosophy to be the uncovering or discovering of the original reduction.  The word we use for this original reduction is ontology.

Philosophers love Lacan and psychoanalysis in general more than the psychologists. I asked my Theories instructor once about Lacan, and she said that she had never even heard of any psychotherapist who uses him, that his theory is very complex.  But in fact, Freudian psychotherapists in general are a minority now days, and I suspect mainly on the East Coast of the U.S and in Europe. (There is a comment to be made on this but it will have to appear elsewhere.)

I don’t prescribe to the Freudian lineage for psychotherapy.  But I do enjoy Lacan and often via. Zizek’s use of Lacan’s theory.  The question above that I pose really concerns how these two worlds might meet, or, how they interact or come together.

The reader should understand that it is always possible to come up with a theory about what the material is we deal with in mental health and how we treat it which will work or produce good mental health outcomes. Though Freud was the first popular psychotherapist in the sense we think of it now, very quickly his theory about ‘what and how’ stopped holding water for the treatment of patients and clients (medical doctors, neurologists and psychologists usually treat patients, while counselors more often treat clients). Freud, and the psychodynamic psychologists who followed him, believe in a very elaborate structure of the mind which functions primarily through various polemical psychic situations and motions involving an invisible energy.  Psychic energy was posed without any actual evidence of such energy. We are able to produce electricity, measure it, and put it to use in predictable ways, and Freud was speculating that we would be able to find the same things with psychic energy, but he could not, nor anyone since then.  But the system sounded really good; when you get into it, it does appear to have some sensibility to it.  But, like Freud, when we take that idea too far and attempt to use the model to fill in more and more evident holes, the more elaborate structural interactions required to account for the new issues simply become so vague and involved that what ever at one time appeared like some sensible dynamic of structure, fails. That is, unless you are really sold on the beauty of the simple beginning theoretical structure.

I would say then that the reason why philosophy like psychoanalysis but Lacan so much is that it begins pretty good.  Freud’s theory appears really nice in the beginning and seems to make sense.  So without having to actually observe anything beyond the initial evidence, Freudian psychoanalysis is fabulous, and philosophy that likes Lacan is usually about first or reduced things: Ontology is about what things truly are, how they are first;  epistemology is about how thought must first be in order for everything else to be able to be thought. So, the Freudian structure of the mind The Super-Ego is the rules or norms; the ID,  involves the ‘unbound’ instinctual drive which produces libidinal energy, and the Ego is that which harness both  extremities: the philosophical ratio, or the Rational Mind, so to speak; this fits very well into methods that involve first things: 1,2,3…presto!  It is simple and it makes a lot of very easy sense without having to think about it too much.  It also, quite coincidentally, reflects the philosophy which was arising around the same time as industrial science of the 19th century: Hegel, Marx, Freuerbach and many Enlightenment others basically were already philosophizing around these very same ideas.  But as I have said a few times already, when we apply them to any world that we actually encounter, this ‘philosophical mind’ falls quickly short of accounting. And this is to say, like I said above, unless you are really sold on the theory.

The philosophical question here, then, becomes whether or not we are fitting reality into the theory, or developing theory from what is being observed?

Enter modern capitalism.

I submit, that most conventional Western philosophy suffers from the attempt of fitting what is observed into the theory.  Hence, the reason(s) why philosophy often enjoys a psychoanalytical involvement with philosophy.

So it is that I came across our question above: Why should alienation have anything do with the world we are coming upon? In what way does the “mirror stage” of Lacan have anything to do with modernity beyond the theorizing?

I submit, that the reason is because if indeed we make an ontological theory of what is observed, actually form or develop a theory upon what is being presented to sense, then the Self no longer appears alienated from the world.

Some may know that Lacan said something like “the mind is structured like a language”.  This is because he was making a comment upon what is inherently problematic about modern subjectivity.  This is, the subject is always in context, but the nature of the operating psyche is that is does not function as though it arises in context, but rather as though it arises indeed from nothing.  This is to say that the modern subject understands and thus operates itself as not a true subject (arising always in context) but as indeed a subject only in a thoughtful reflection of itself, as though the thinker itself exists outside of the world and as indeed the essential nature of Being is dichotomy: object and subject.

So, the next question (#1), is what this has to do with the presence of the parents for the development of the ego, and why does this have anything to do with actually being in the world?


A common and modern belief is that the ego is not a modern ideal but a human one.

Reality, philosophy and science: How do they relate to establish World?

I think what this guy is saying is really crucial.

HERE Terrence Blake has some comments.

Unless I am mistaken, he is giving us an example of how view overtakes an ability to see and how that seeing is implicit to every knowable aspect of world.

Again: What is the climate that is changing?

How — logistically speaking — is this change coming about?

Like that old 1960s Star Trek episode where they goto the old west!

The salient question is: Could the landing party convince themselves that the bullets were not real without Spock’s mind meld?

The answer is no. So the bullets would have remained absolutely effective.

So it is with Lyotard’s dicussion of “The Differend”

Namely: could a person make a case to a court that was unable to hear the evidence of the plaintiff’s case? And, what would the judgement of the court be based upon?

Lyotard says that the judgement is always based on “facts” which are missing the evidence and so offers restitution which is always short and fails to compensate for the true damage.


Peace be with you. x

A Phenomenological Critique of Object Oriented Ontology

HERE is a recent published journal paper critique of OOO.

I think of the most salient issues that forms the divide between these issues, these ideas, is: Is though sufficient in-itself to achieve the object of argumentation?

The answer, I feel, forms the pure reason which makes to divide substantial. I enjoyed where this author ended.

Here it is at ResearchGate.

Here is another comment on the situation.

Retrieving Reason Episode 4: Common Ground

Retrieving Reason Episode 4: Common Ground

Retrieving Reason Episode 4: Common Ground
— Read on

First I will say that I totally love this series. 


In counseling we are taught to engage openly, to question in a manner that elicits a response from clients that is more than just yes or no.

One of the ways that we can do this is to try not to exacerbate feelings in the client which cause her to repel or reject or “fall back” into her self, basically, we try to interact with the client to create a welcoming space, a space where she is accepted for who and what she is.

And one way to do this arises When we come upon a very typical situation where the client is presenting about themselves something with just obviously contradictory, something which is yet upheld there in equal forms by the client but yet to the counselor are obviously contradictory. Basically, for something that the client is not seeing of herself we do not engage the client, or we are not encouraged to engage the client, by suggesting that they are wrong or incorrect necessarily. And we can do this by not saying “but”, as in “you did a good thing but then you were wrong”. The conjunction “and” is more effective at carrying on a therapeutic discussion because it points to the legitimacy of the being of the client in exactly the way that she is presenting.

And so to this particular podcast about common Ground, about philosophical common ground in particular, I say that I totally love this particular episode…and…

It is filled with so many assumptions of common ground that it nearly contradicts itself in the proposal that she makes over the 20 minutes. But honestly I don’t have time nor the energy right now to pick apart the podcast.

And you should remember that I said I absolutely love what she is saying. And not because I think she’s wrong. But because what she is saying is correct and has been shown to be highly problematic.

Was it Nietzsche or Wittgenstein Who said that we climb the ladder only to throw it away.

(Perhaps I am misquoting )

Yet — I didn’t say “but” lol — I use an analogy which brings up a more current philosophical Point,  namely, that philosophy extends no further than itself.

In order to conceive of this point one might take it Just as an analogy and not as a definitive argument. So here it goes and then I’ll shut up for a while.


Excellent music can be learned and played without any knowledge of the theory of music. One does not need to know, say, keyboard theoretical logistics, or various ways to move the hands over the keyboard of a piano in order to make excellent music. One does not need to know the names of the notes. One does not even have to play the piano “correctly”. And yet the music resonates, people listen to it and love it, the musician plays the music, all of which occurs completely absent of any philosophy of reason or knowledge.

Hence, when we talk of common ground in philosophy we are basically setting aside the “musical aspect” of philosophy itself for the sake of an assumption that there indeed exist something that is common or that can be common as a ground.

Now, this is not the same as what Dr. Fitzsimmons proposes as rebuttals to what she saying. For example, this is not asserting a contradiction or denying identity. By her estimation, I am having no integrity by my suggestion; but I submit that I am. I am engaging in good faith: I am simply saying that what is dialectical is the effort to find common ground. And I would submit that the assumption of a philosophical common ground which is stretched back thousands of years, like a thread that links all of humanity, is it itself and ideological power-play. But this is not to say that there is no thought or that thinking is bad or that logic is bad Or reason doesn’t exist or that we are not reasoning or that Dr. Fitzsimmons post is incorrect.

But what it does suggest is that something else is going on that has to do with Philosophy, that Philosophy itself is missing something through a certain appropriation of what philosophy “already is”.

I feel the first question for philosophical common ground, a question that is routinely set aside and basically ignored, is: for what purpose are we working philosophically?

This — I feel might be the case — is the question which moves us out of the general phenomenological metaphysical ontological proposals into the question of object ontological orientation.

OK. So that’s enough for me for a while. Hopefully I will only be re-posting other peoples posts without any further commentary.

Thank you for being. 

Knowing and Philosophy: View

Does meaning mean anything? What is the meaning of meaning?

In what way or when can a computer know something?

We can start anywhere. We can start in an arbitrary middle and find the modern subject.

…and thats fine.

Or we can start with something specific that is immovable and not relative.

We can start by saying that a computer does not know anything;

and, what are we trying to accomplish when we argue that a computer can know something?

What we try to accomplish by saying that a computer does not know anything is to make a parallel ontological move instead of a causal or vectoral ontological move. A move that is upon or to something that is not itself, as different than a move that remains itself, only moving; a calculus rather than an arithmetic.

It is to say that the human being is able to exist as an ontologically equitable object with a computer. Which moves tells us which ‘knows’. Where is the center? Is the sun moving?

Is thought moving?

We can thus say that a human being does not know anything, but more precisely as analogous to what a computer actually does — it does do stuff — that the human beings’ knowledge is a result of operation.

A computer does not know what is programmed or coded. It cannot know or conceive of what or how coding occurs. It is entirely unable through any of its processes, no matter what is programmed or coded, to know or conceive of what or how the coding comes into being or even what the code might actually be; any knowledge of such coding is ultimately merely an operation and not actual knowledge of the coding. The computer only knows what it does, and at that, in as much as what or how it does anything is entirely outside of its ability to know.

The human being is able to do things which appear to other human beings as though it is knowing something outside of its operation. Even while the first human is not knowing anything at all.

At all times no illusions exist.

A single human being is likewise able to think it knows something of itself.

But it is possible that what that person knows is entirely false, that is, unknowable.

The actualization of knowing only what another person (or thing) allows to appear cannot be communicated along a vector of knowing which understands self-knowledge as a kind of knowledge which everyone has access to or that occurs in every human being. For, it is equally possible that self-knowledge is a kind of knowledge for which only the other allows.

In other words; there is two kinds of knowledge which do not communicate accross a common category.

Philosophy exhibits these two routes at the same time, parallel in nature.

The question of change is: what happens when the manner by which change is able to change itself is changed? If the manner by which one understands change is itself changed, can the person see this change ?

The operative question is thus:

can you see it?

Revealing the Substance of the Gap: Is the Tragedy of Peterson the Irony of Zizek ?

The Tragedy of JBP
— Read on

“Come down, you distanced travelers, from your great intellectual heights, down to where we humans can meet, again, eye to eye.” –c.n.

Wow. Makes one think.

…and kinda makes one sad as well.

I decided that I’m just gonna post the comment that I put on the original post:

“Damn. Makes one wonder about celebrity. You know, I thought he had a pretty good point, I think Peterson has a pretty good point to make so far as psychology and mental health, and then some of his philosophical support I think it’s pretty good but it just goes to show that the kind of continental intellectual left… I mean, if I can say “we“, we’re kind of mean sometimes.

But I always thought Peterson was making a good point from a mental health standpoint. But it seems nowadays especially since Zizek. That a whole intellectualized group of people are really unthinking when it comes to their assertion of theory and what should make a proper argument and things like that.

When you look at the debate between Z and P. I really think that Zizek saw this of Peterson and was kind of giving him a break. People saw this is kind of like a sucky debate, but I think it was a really good debate because Zizek had the good sense to be able to see there was no point in him unloading all his theoretical BS upon someone who could give a shit about it; which is to say, and I have made this argument too and some of my posts — and I even sent Peterson a letter of what is this debate about really, but I didn’t insult him in it — that Peterson really doesn’t understand what Zizek And the generalized Continental force is really saying Nor what it’s really doing. And I have made arguments other places in my blog that I’m not really sure that the Continental’s, and the generalized group of people that support that kind of intellectualism, I.e. the Fans, really know what they’re talking about either, but they’re vicious, they really don’t think about humanity as this thing that they are a part of as a group. It appears sometimes that the Continental Intellectual Fans behave as though everyone needs to be ultra rational and that this rationality supersedes any sort of compassion or considerations of what the being of human actually is.”

…And honestly, I wonder if that is the present Continental philosophical conundrum aggravated and expressed as phenomenalist correlationalism: the frustration  involved in not being able to breach what is correlational in their existence thus being forced out, or projected, upon the object of their frustration: Peterson and his ‘weak’ philosophical-intellectualism. Yet, ironically, when you take away his Christian motif, what is left so far as a psychological approach is really the problem of ideological correlationalism,  so it would seem that Continental Philosophy. is exactly the problem Peterson psychology is aiming at. 

Peterson asks how can we use reason to make these large jumps to great ideological structures in which we are encompassed if we don’t first come to terms with who we are as being, who we are as essentially a human entity, so to speak?. He suggests that the kind of philosophy that finds the subject within these ideological structures and then attempts to solve the problem of subjects interacting according to these ideological structures, are itself the manifestation of a psychological mental health problem.

Then he further suggests that the solution of this problem is to be found within oneself, to look and see what people (we, me, I) are doing when they are using these ideas, these ideologies, to situate people in structures of power. That the solutions to our current world problems are not to be found in trying to manipulate ideological structures that influence what the subject is within this ideological space. That the ideological space is indeed the problematic space. Rather, if we want to find a solution to the problems of our world we need to get honest with ourselves and start with ourselves as the fundamental philosophical problem.

And indeed, while everyone loves to read Zizek as talking about politics only, Zizek really is indicating nearly the same thing when you begin to understand and take ownership of what is occurring as discourse, within the material world, so far as we are subjects within it. But Zizek tries to imply this kind of situation, Attempts to show the problem involved in ideological situations such that the only way to solve this problem is come back to the original source, the Hegalian-Lacanian historical consciousness, so to speak.

The “parallax gap” is that fundamental space that is left out of political focus: the subject. The Lacan angle thus shows how ideological posture function through a basic historical trope that is the ‘other end’ of the Master Signifier; the ‘petite subject a’ and the ‘barred subject’ are aspects of the discursive symbols for what is imagined to be substantial, or the ‘big other’.

Lacan says that consciousness behaves like discourse, but this is to say that the problem begins in the psychoanalytical mirror stage where the child identifies with the image and thus becomes ‘castrated’ to him or herself to become indeed the ideological subject, the basic and fundamental mistake as the heart of all political struggle.

But no one desires to realize the truth of what we are dealing with, hence what is Real is always held at bay, so the subject of this initial trauma (of constantly being confronted with a truth of the reflection it has identified with) replays the event through this post-traumatic fantasy which keeps the subject limited by a freedom of the image. Emancipation is thus always recouped by the political ideology to manifest as the mechanisms for capitalism.

Recalling the Zizek/Peterson debate, we can see how both were centered upon the same problem, working together in a dialectical manner in the effort of revealing the oppressed subject which lay at the center of the ‘mistaken’ views upon the ‘material’. One one hand Zizek playing from the ‘negative’ , and on the other Peterson playing from the ‘positive’ iterations of the emancipated subject.

Wow. Thanks for your little research on Peterson because actually just the other day I was wondering what he was doing. I figured he just kind of settled back into his academic career and was kind a like a, well that was interesting. But it kind of seems like it really affected him, and not in a good way.”

Current Deontology

When we do not suppose that morality is created by thoughtful humans, as opposed to existing in-itself, then it becomes possible to read Kant’s categorical imperative (or his basis of deontology) as meaning that which can occur in no other way than it does. This reading seems to deny the traditional reading which sees deontology as having to do with an the morality of the doing of the act, as to choice.

The question that I have yet to see be held against this latter sense arises when we find that we are using hypothetical reason to address the categorical imperative, or, that what Kant proposes as Pure Reason answering to the Practical. The question should be: why?

When the other why question is never addressed to the categorical imperative involved in the practical thinking approach to pure reason, then we have a deontology which contradicts is own meaning by answering to whether any act is justified morally in-itself, and we view Kant as suggesting that a categorical imperative has to do with an ought. Which is to say, ethics and morality are imperative to human existence.

As a side, Kierkegaard already questions this: what the attempt to iron out self-contradictory motions of reason implies (or at least the half he was able to see given the ideological conditions of his moment).

Yet, when we understand pure reason, as a thing that exists, as really having nothing to do with morality in the first place (morality is something that can be accounted for by the imperative rather than a by-product [Nonphilosophical unilateral duality]) then we can understand what Kant is really saying about the categorical imperative. Namely that it is a thing, an act that is existing or that exists, that occurs in no other way than it could, A thing which is consistent with its category, a thing which cannot occur except how it is. It is a category which occurs the only way it can, and thus affords no purchase by the practical; that is, except in as much as the practical or hypothetical is already being understood through its own imperative of Being, which is to say, as the ubiquitous and proper way of Being, which denotes a proper way of seeing, thinking and understanding, as this proper way axiomatically excludes the act of thought by its definition. 

Wiki says that deontology derives from the Greek deon which means obligation. That’s cool and all. But I also like de-ontology. In the same way I like to use intension (in tension) when speaking of phenomenology and such, as opposed to intention.

We are able to see what we are able to think, but also vice-versa — and not simultaneously.

Have we yet begun to think?

{for those who read the unedited typo version previous to this post: I have no idea where the last comment, which is now deleted, came from.}. 👨🏽‍🚀