This essay is an exploration into the limits of materialist philosophy.
“When one speaks about a thing, she does so vicariously.”
—- Cedric Nathaniel.
I think I’m just naturally rebellious. I’m not at heart a joiner.
I can, though, be a team player. In fact, I love where I work primarily because we have such a great team. However, I feel that a team is a group of people who all have a common goal, even while they may not have a common general philosophy behind what we do as a team toward that goal. We definitely do not share a similar ideology or belief about what it is we are involved with or what it means. Quite remarkably, we share a common purpose as a motion of what we are doing. We work well as a team because we share the common bond of what we do together.
I’d have to say that a team is the name for a motion of a group of people who feel a sense of camaraderie around a purpose. Even if that purpose is philosophically indistinct.
My Issue with Society, or the Ideal of the Social
I am, somehow, involved with society and social things, even as I would say I’m not a very social person. My therapeutic work as a counselor has something to do with society, as a sort of underpinning, only spoken in certain context specific to the client, primarily concerned with the person or people in front of me and not theories or ideologies.
Yet, my philosophical work is not social, neither is it about a person, the person, or people. I have to use these words and indeed I talk about them and they are involved with my work; however, I feel if I use these words or invest myself too much into the objects that these words are supposed to be indicating as a substrate (subjects), I cannot help but to feel naturally resistant.
That is the critical posture despite belief.
I feel that being human, being part of society, dealing with people and the world, it’s just some thing that happens. It is a kind of given that has nothing to do with whether or not I’m using words about them or making theories, asserting my agency about how they might fit together, what they are, or what we’re supposed to do about them.
Does God Exist?
Reference my approach on the issue of God‘s existence.
Recently, I was come upon by a person and a discussion with them that comes every once in a while, but routinely.
The question that will come out is, “Do you believe in God?” Or similarly, “Do you believe that God exists?”
My answer was met with a blank stare and look of confusion from the other person.
My answer: “ The existence of God has nothing to do with any effort I make. God‘s existence has nothing to do with my belief. Belief, I feel, is overdetermined. I use the word ‘belief’ very intentionally, in the sense that “I believe I might play guitar today”, or, “I believe that this coffee is too cold”. I do not use the word ‘belief’ as indicating anything that has to do with the truth of some thing, some supposed or proposed object of the question. For example, I do not believe that the chair exists. But likewise, any discussion about the theory of existence does not require my belief. Rather, I would believe something within the discussion with reference to the discussion that already exists or is existing by virtue of the fact that we’re having the discussion.
So it is: I do not believe that God exists.
But if I say that to a person that’s asking me whether I believe that God exists or whether or not I believe in God —which I see is basically the same question despite philosophical dissections — what will happen is that the person will routinely misunderstand what I’m saying. I
So, in my effort to try to be clear to this person about what I’m saying, I simply tell them that I have no belief about god whatsoever, simply by virtue of the fact that God‘s existence has nothing to do with whether or not I believe in it (him,her). And I might add, in the same way as your existence has nothing to do with whether or not I believe that you exist.
If we understand anything about what people have said philosophically over the years, it is a plain fact that I have to somehow deal with the categories that are already there. It has nothing to do with whether or not I believe they exist; it has more to do with whether or not I feel that those categories are accurately representing the situation in which I find myself.
Note: The categories have to do with the situation in which I find myself.
This is different than what I see is most philosophers discussing. Most philosophers, most essays books treaties arguments speak of categories as if they exist independent of other things. And so the discussion or the argument revolves around a very subjective, phenomenal existence: the phenomenal agent is able and is justified in distinguishing things in themselves apart from other things. This despite what argument they might be making or what category to which they apply themselves.
So it is that in dealing with this situation, I find difficulty at every turn calling myself a philosopher. My assertion mostly fails at every juncture. I understand intuitively what I mean, but as I go to engage philosophically with what society or the larger group of people who are supposedly involved with Philosophy understand as Philosophy, I find myself at an impasse. I find myself unable to move. I feel it in a very regular way, as I put it, probably because I’m not a joiner. Idealism is not really my thing.
I have to find someway to identify what it is that I’m involved with. I find most of the given philosophical categories are so well assumed, that I am excluded, in the Kantian scheme, a priori and synthetically.
I am involved with knowledge. No matter what else is going on, everything has to pass through knowledge. It doesn’t matter so much whether that is a phenomenon; indeed I would have to say it is indeed a phenomenon, but then also we’ve already found out everything there is about the logic of phenomenal existence as a category. If you would say we haven’t then I would say you are either just beginning or missed something. Then perhaps we should have an discussion. I’m not sure…
Nonetheless, epistemology would be the usual way that I might identify myself. But I also find that if I start saying ‘epistemology’ there is a whole set of presumed and assumed history about what I’m talking about and what I’m doing.
I am going to try and use a new term:
This has to do with everything that can possibly exist, be talked about, be known, and must arise in knowledge and discourse truly. ￼
As well, because I think when we start to talk about “philosophy of…” some thing interesting, we have necessarily fallen into a discourse and understanding that already exists, and thereby excludes what we’re really talking about as a subject of knowledge. So, what an Epistemist deals with is truth Philosophy.
It does not propose a philosophy of truth, because it is already dealing with everything that can be exist by virtue of the fact of addressing knowledge truly.
A chapter published in Phenomenology and Educational Theory in Conversation, P. Howard, T. Saevi, A. Foran, and G. Biesta, eds. NY: Taylor & Francis, 2020. One pedagogical value of phenomenology is its conceptual and methodological power to help
— Read on www.academia.edu/38299258/_Awakening_to_the_World_as_Phenomenon_The_Value_of_Phenomenology_for_a_Pedagogy_of_Place_and_Place_Making_2020_
Be Your Own Rock
Sometimes I feel that I am being drawn forward. And other times I am just making my Way, doing what I do because that’s what I’m doing.
Presently I am going through a phase of the latter.
I am not sure that I ever construct meaning intentionally. I never purposely sit down and make meaning from things.
Rather, I might be perplexed, or feel out of sorts, even lost, at times.
Sometimes I do ponder things like dreams, and a meaning will show itself.
Other times I’m not thinking about anything. And meaning still shows itself…
Such is the case when I opened my WordPress reader 5 minutes ago.
The beginning of this post shows the titles of the first three posts that were in my Reader.
Naysayers and reductionist psychological Science congregants may point to all the studies about how the mind will make meaning out of anything.
And yet, the conclusion of those kinds of studies never tell us how we are able to come to that conclusion, nor why that conclusion should be any less random than the meaning that the subject gained from a series of random images or words.
If a person has faith enough to set aside the psychological proof that a mind is just assembling random meanings into a string of meaning at all times, then I really have nothing to say to them philosophically, because they have not looked deep enough. They have only stopped where it suits them, as I say, for their faith. I have no criticism or argument to give them; for why would I critique or bombard someone’s faith?
Nonetheless, If I wish to take those psychological studies for what they’re really telling me, which is to say, where I do not hold back, I do not stop at my faith in what I already believe that I’m coming upon, then I might ask further:
What series of random events has coalesced in such a way to allow me to be presented to that particular arrangement of phrases or pictures that we are deciding is random?
Against what sense of truth are we deciding that any arrangement of pictures or phrases or words is random, such that the meaning that I am making (in that case) has no real basis? And is thus meaningless?
I could go on.
What these kinds of questions tell us is that science is not giving us truth of the universe. Rather, what science is likely giving us is merely a reflection of our culture, of our ideology, of an ability of mind, and not the mind itself nor the universe that arises in truth.
I say this not to resort back to relativity or mirror (or mere) opinions, or subjective perception. I say this to point out that if we reject all those routes into reality, we must find that indeed reality did not disappear, but that there is a truth which can be known which does not reduce to real faith, as I say, To the religion of modern ideology.
Again and again as I said elsewhere, I’m not saying that faith and religion is inherently bad or that it needs correcting. I am merely suggesting that this is the way that consciousness functions. When a person comes upon the truth of how consciousness is indeed functioning, what is able to happen is that the way we participate in the real ideology changes.
It is then possible that it is not so much that we make meaning, but that meaning is what we are. And further, that what we are is not separated from the universe in which we arise to meaning. A reduction to individual brains is able to be come upon and is indeed able to derive necessary reason and rationales. However, An opening of that same system reveals that there is a truth beyond that kind of limited orientation upon things – but a truth that the orientation upon brain/mind religion implicitly rejects. The religion of the scientific mind rejects any knowledge that itself does not support. That is why it is a religion: Becuase there is other rational and knowable knowledge that does not adhere to its cosmological mandates.
Again: this is not to say that reality and knowledge about it is not real or does not function; rather, it is only to say that it is indeed real and refers to real things, but not true.
One of the problems surrounding Mental health is the weighing of solutions upon the primacy of empirical science and physical health.
A good example of how this is an improper manner to approach solutions is the issue of climate change.
Take the example that this post exhibits. We have known for years and years that these sorts of issues are going to happen. And yet our ability to take action based only upon the empirical ideal is not effective to bring a solution change.
Thinking and proof are not sufficient to constitute the truth of the matter. Something else is going on. The reality is that climate is changing, but the reality of our knowing and thinking about it and doing anything about it does not accord with the truth of it, so far as what is considered a sensible response is not taken.
This is why we need consider that the truth about this situation is not being understood. The truth is what is happening is something else than the reality.
How we approach mental health is similar to what we are seeing of our environment. Mental health suffers when we base healthy interventions weighted too heavily on empiricism and without considering and applying solutions out of what else is happening in the situation.
(Note: Subjectivity and it’s accorded phenomenological analysis is empirical.)
Now, keep in mind, I’m not necessarily saying that the people who have not agreed with climate change or what it means are wrong. I’m not putting up that kind of polemic to say that, oh, a smart people over here know the truth, where as the ignorant people over there are false.
That’s not what I’m saying.
I’m saying that given as a category there is this creature called the human being, and that most human beings, as they are concerned with in the industrialized globe, defer to empirical science to assess what judgments they should make. I’m saying that this manner of understanding the truth of the situation it’s not effective when we think about mental health problems.
But more so, similarly to the global environment￼￼￼￼￼, this empirical approach to try and convince people of through evidence and guilt tripping and appealing to some “common human intelligence” is insufficient to bring about the change needed, or at least the change that is advocated for addressing climate change, just as it is appearing I’ll-suited to the task of addressing mental health.
I think this is strangely ironic when we consider that philosophy itself is considered a “sufficient” philosophy, Meaning that our ability to reason upon things is sufficient to excel the human being progressively through history. It is this type of philosophy to which I associate empiricism And phenomenology. If we look back, phenomenology is a type of empiricism, and indeed propagated or at least coincided with the prominence of the ideal (idea) behind “empirical science”￼￼￼￼.
Apparently and obviously it is not as Objective as it would like to pose and present upon.￼￼
So it is that our current understanding of climate change must be incorrect. Both of the people that talk about the empirical science and things that we should do to address climate change, but as well as the naysayers.
This is a radical form of understanding and this is why I say that I am addressing truth, not merely the negotiated reality of proof and attempt to convince through argument.
I am talking about objects in themselves, truth as truth.￼￼￼￼￼￼￼ what is actually occurring.￼
Wonder fills the soul Just days away – the first handfod.NL event – #hNL21 ‘Phenomenology In Practice’ workshops with Professor Cathy Adams and …
Edmund Husserl’s theory of phenomenology proposes that belief posits the reality of its object. Through this assertion, he announced something …
— This is put together so well, I had to repost it.
Intension never finds, and individuation is never found:
The Master Signifier?
The Process of Awareness.
HERE is a recent published journal paper critique of OOO.
I think of the most salient issues that forms the divide between these issues, these ideas, is: Is though sufficient in-itself to achieve the object of argumentation?
The answer, I feel, forms the pure reason which makes to divide substantial. I enjoyed where this author ended.
I finally took a minute and got some things in order.
THE OBJECT OF THE SUBJECT : The Second Part of the Philosophical Hack is available in EPUB HERE.
and in paperback HERE.
“The Philosophical Hack a hack into philosophy. A hack in one sense is someone who knows how to use the technology but nevertheless assembles useful objects in non-conventional manners. A hack is someone who adeptly utilizes standard methods but is not employed to make marketed products. Yet in another sense, a hack is a repeated application of a specific yet broad algorithmic protocol upon a closed problematic space. The role of the hack is at once to disrupt and to consolidate. The hack is a check on the security of closed functional systems, as well as the impetus for its growth. Defining this problematic space through a careful assault on weak points in the philosophical facade, Nathaniel offers us a way into a “science of philosophy”. Mr. Nathaniel is writing to a wide intelligent audience. It is written in such a way that the philosophical mind will not be ostracized but will indeed be challenged. It is indeed a philosophical hack.”
Using Slavoj Zizek’s EVENT! as a platform, Nathaniel moves us beyond Zizek’s more political subjective confines into an object orientation. Graham Harman, of noted Object Oriented Ontology, posits that knowledge either speaks to what a thing is made of or what it does, and that while we need knowledge to exist and to thrive as human beings, cognition is not exhausted by knowledge. Objects, in this sense, exist at once as present and withdrawn.
Further, he suggests that philosophy is not only about knowledge, not only about what what objects do and what they are made of, but about the love of wisdom.
He also tells us that Object Oriented Philosophy includes the human being as an object, what Nathaniel calls a universal object.
Setting up a few steps back from Harman’s front, and in Harman’s terms, the Philosophical Hack sets up the contours of a philosophy as an effort of love toward or involved with wisdom. Nathaniel thereby begins to lay the groundwork toward a hopefully more substantial and meaningful practical philosophy for mental health and counseling. In this new understanding, the conventional and traditional modes of human Being, such as science, biology, psychology, religion, and spirituality, as well as the traditional philosophical theoretical (as many we know) constitute contributing components of the object that is the subject.
The Philosophical Hack is the beginning of a philosophy which includes other disciplines to form a more coherent and seamless cognition of what the human being actually is as a universal object infinite in its involvement with other objects, as opposed to what the human Being is able to be as a transcendental and special phenomenal subject limited in its ideological nothingness.
This new way is to retain everything, as opposed to excluding.
#mentalhealth, #objectorientationcounseling, #truth, #loveofwisdom
Phenomenology says that we all have subjective worlds that are reflected in our opinions and views.
The Speculative Realist conference philosophers spoke to the point of how that formulation of reality leads to a closed loop of philosophical correlation. Thus, their problem has been how to find something outside of this closed system.
The concern of an orientation upon objects is how that correlation occurs outside of the talk about it, encompassing the talk about how we are to get outside of it.
The issue here then arises between an object which withdraws from view (Harman) and the subject which is never expressed or communicated (Lyotard).
The difference, I say, lay more with orientation and less with ontological ubiquity. More with the manner that the subject is able to view the world and less with how there is a “real” world that subjects can only partially view.
The difference is thus between the phenomenon and the object. Less about how we situate philosophical definitions and more about the manner of being able to see.