A Phenomenological Critique of Object Oriented Ontology

HERE is a recent published journal paper critique of OOO.

I think of the most salient issues that forms the divide between these issues, these ideas, is: Is though sufficient in-itself to achieve the object of argumentation?

The answer, I feel, forms the pure reason which makes to divide substantial. I enjoyed where this author ended.

Here it is at ResearchGate.

Here is another comment on the situation.

Read: The Philosophical Hack

Oh Kaay!

I finally took a minute and got some things in order.

THE OBJECT OF THE SUBJECT : The Second Part of the Philosophical Hack  is available in EPUB HERE. 

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                 and in paperback HERE.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL HACK: The First Part is available HERE in paper back.

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“The Philosophical Hack a hack into philosophy. A hack in one sense is someone who knows how to use the technology but nevertheless assembles useful objects in non-conventional manners. A hack is someone who adeptly utilizes standard methods but is not employed to make marketed products. Yet in another sense, a hack is a repeated application of a specific yet broad algorithmic protocol upon a closed problematic space. The role of the hack is at once to disrupt and to consolidate. The hack is a check on the security of closed functional systems, as well as the impetus for its growth. Defining this problematic space through a careful assault on weak points in the philosophical facade, Nathaniel offers us a way into a “science of philosophy”.  Mr. Nathaniel is writing to a wide intelligent audience. It is written in such a way that the philosophical mind will not be ostracized but will indeed be challenged. It is indeed a philosophical hack.”

 

Using Slavoj Zizek’s EVENT! as a platform, Nathaniel moves us beyond Zizek’s more political subjective confines into an object orientation.  Graham Harman, of noted Object Oriented Ontology, posits that knowledge either speaks to what a thing is made of or what it does, and that while we need knowledge to exist and to thrive as human beings, cognition is not exhausted by knowledge.  Objects, in this sense, exist at once as present and withdrawn.

Further, he suggests that philosophy is not only about knowledge, not only about what what objects do and what they are made of, but about the love of wisdom. 

He also tells us that Object Oriented Philosophy includes the human being as an object, what Nathaniel calls a universal object.

Setting up a few steps back from Harman’s front, and in Harman’s terms, the Philosophical Hack sets up the contours of a philosophy as an effort of love toward or involved with wisdom. Nathaniel thereby begins to lay the groundwork toward a hopefully more substantial and meaningful practical philosophy for mental health and counseling.  In this new understanding, the conventional and traditional modes of human Being, such as science, biology, psychology, religion, and spirituality, as well as the traditional philosophical theoretical (as many we know) constitute contributing components of the object that is the subject.

The Philosophical Hack is the beginning of a philosophy which includes other disciplines to form a more coherent and seamless cognition of what the human being actually is as a universal object infinite in its involvement with other objects, as opposed to what the human Being is able to be as a transcendental and special phenomenal subject limited in its ideological nothingness.

This new way is to retain everything, as opposed to excluding.

#mentalhealth, #objectorientationcounseling, #truth, #loveofwisdom

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The Philosophical Object.

Phenomenology says that we all have subjective worlds that are reflected in our opinions and views.

The Speculative Realist conference philosophers spoke to the point of how that formulation of reality leads to a closed loop of philosophical correlation. Thus, their problem has been how to find something outside of this closed system.

The concern of an orientation upon objects is how that correlation occurs outside of the talk about it, encompassing the talk about how we are to get outside of it.

The issue here then arises between an object which withdraws from view (Harman) and the subject which is never expressed or communicated (Lyotard).

The difference, I say, lay more with orientation and less with ontological ubiquity. More with the manner that the subject is able to view the world and less with how there is a “real” world that subjects can only partially view.

The difference is thus between the phenomenon and the object. Less about how we situate philosophical definitions and more about the manner of being able to see.

Emotion and Reason. Part 3

So back to my original intention behind this post that I have now divided up into three parts.

I am challenging the notion that reason is the crowning authority of human existence and consciousness. And, as a commenter on Part 2 pointed out: I do agree with the observation that what we often think is rational or reasonable is often hardly that.

But I would even counter this observation by saying that such an observation is based in an assumption of reason: it is by reason it’s self that we are able to make such distinctions.

I suggest keeping in mind the idea of the Two Routes, which is an extrapolation of the non-philosophical premise of unilateral duality: by pointing something out and describing it I am not therefore suggesting that something is wrong with it nor making an argument that I have a better idea: I am simply describing a fact. If I say the tree is green and it has bark, I am not suggesting that I have a better way that the tree should be. Of course we can fall down the rabbit hole of what I call conventional philosophical speculation and consider all the probability and possibility of subjective experience of that tree. We can talk about how these subjective reality is may be true and that how our world is constituent of a plurality of subjective worlds. I am not making any argument about whether or not phenomenal subjective worlds are true or false; The veracity of any subjective opinion is absolutely up for debate.

What becomes evident by the contradiction that arises between these two types of understanding, though, is called a unilateral duality. This is to say that we take each of those two situations as situations that indeed are true, but then also note that the activity of the attempt to reconcile those two situations into a further reconciled state only speaks of the One Route. Hence what I am proposing as The Two Routes. Readers can look back at some of my posts to try and wrap ones head around this more fully, one can read Francois Laruelle’s non-philosophical books, and one can investigate what other people have to say about non-philosophy, if really need to comprehend all those details to be able to move over into the issue of an orientation upon objects. It’s OK. No shame there.

Nonetheless; The example that I’m working with here is the strange paradox that (1) reason can somehow analyze it self to say that this situation over here is not reasonable or not rational, and then this situation over there we’re going to categorize another various sort of system, and then this over yonder is what we call actual reason in comparison to these two or three or more possibilities, and then the whole thing amounts to an argument that we can negotiate over about what reason is, and (2) That reason as an object in-itself is characterized by point (1). This is an example of a unilateral duality, and it characterizes a particular manner or approach by which we can begin to understand what the human being is doing.

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This approach is not dissimilar to the way that counseling might approach someone with, say, anxiety or depression or some sort of neurosis, to use an older term, or some pervading issue that a client may come in for psychological help.

I believe a particular theory that I am nodding toward right here is called Internal Family Systems (IFS). But there are a few theoretical approaches that incorporate a similar manner.

I think the idea is not very new: A client comes in complaining of an inability to stop Behaving in a certain manner, say for example, avoiding parties or social situations because of accute social anxiety, say. Keep in mind that I am not a practicing counselor but I’m just beginning to learn.

In any case, a possible approach to this situation is to get the client to externalize the problem. In other words, what the client is having trouble with is this whole thing that she calls her self which manifests in general as a thinking subject that is her self. The point of the intervention is to help the client see or look at the presenting issue as though it is not part of a whole system that is “her Self”, to help her to To gain sufficient distance from the issue in order to view the issue and address the issue as though it is affecting her self rather than being constituent of her singular whole person.

The issue here is not a speculation or a negotiation about whether or not there is this whole subject called the client herself. We treat the client as though she is an interrelation of various effectual aspects as the primary methodological material, as opposed to a “whole” person who is screwed up in various ways.

In reference to what I’m talking about so far as reason, or as I tend to call “philosophy” sometimes, by suggesting that the client may be affected by a problem rather than being the problem itself, I am thereby not suggesting that the problem may indeed not have to do with a whole system. Rather, I am suggesting that we can approach the whole system by viewing the system in a different manner yet while the system is still functioning and operating as a whole system, which is to say, excluding nothing.

So I will repeat; to point out the fact that reason itself is implied in the activity of indicating things that are not reasonable or indeed irrational as opposed to reasonable or rational, does not negate the fact that indeed reason is allowing for this division of itself. Developing different terms in order to compensate for this apparent paradox gets us nowhere significant into understanding what the human being actually does as it is, except that it gives us insight in that this is indeed what the human being consciousness does: A fact of the object that is the human being. Developing new terms in this way maintains and reifies the one route. Reason is not negated by describing what reason does, neither does such an honest description suggest that there is another way that reason might be operating. The conventional philosophical route Is thus characterized by a method wherein a fact can only be argued with by denying the fact itself. Hence, I say the conventional philosophical method is based in denial. Yet I am not suggesting that there is a better way, or that philosophy/reason should do or be something different. I am merely stating a fact about conventional philosophy.

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I believe by this line of reasoning I have come up with a second fact of the phenomenal subject. I think I came up with a first fact a year or two or so and you would have to look in my past posts for it. I think the first fact is that a phenomenal subject is bounded by nothing. But I could be wrong. Lol. Actually, with these two facts in place we could thereby come up with a third fact of the phenomenal subject that we have been calling “correlationalism”. Science is based on an honest acceptance of the facts, even while the facts might be tested.

OK. Well it looks like I’ve gotten done with part three and I still haven’t gotten to the original intention behind the whole post so it looks like there’s going to be a part 4

👾

Drawing Lines at Proper Junctures.

Drawing an “Eliminativistic” Box Around Cognition

http://josephratliff.com/eliminativistic-cognition/
— Read on josephratliff.com/eliminativistic-cognition/

Between Ratliff and Bakker, we seem to have the makings of a debate that I think do well it’s showing us the issues involved on the front lines of philosophy.

Bakker has his blog “3 pound brain”; you can look it up because I’m not having the patience to put in the hyperlink while voice dictating on my phone here.

I think both sides have good and valid points, but I think together they make an even better point.

The way I see it, the occasion of philosophy that brought about the speculative realist conference and I think the most poignant of those Graham Harmons “object oriented ontology” or object oriented philosophy depending on when and where you read it, is, as Ratliff might put it, the issue of the wide open field of cognition. In my mind this is the issue of phenomenology. Indeed is a very difficult situation to get beyond once you have realized what it entails and what it’s really saying. In short it says that everything that can occur does so in the field of cognition and experience, and that this field is so wide open it becomes difficult to logically draw any boundaries around it.

On the other side, again as I see it, we could have bakers blind brain theory and heuristic neglect theory. Baker tries to draw a line around the open field, or through it as the case may be or to somehow define subsections of the field that are legitimate with the field. The basis of his theories, as he says, his biology or neuroscience, or basically the empirical sciences of how the brain and body functions (Baker please correct me here if I’m totally off the mark).

The issue that Ratliff has with this is that his theories appear to be arbitrarily drawing lines that really have no linkage today already substantiated and well known phenomenological field. The linkages that Baker wants to argue appear even as they argue it as founding themselves in, basically, mere assertions. And then the rebuttal to that he might be putting forth just assertions, really come out of a theory again that have no linkage, only have an asserted or an appearance of been asserted linkage to the phenomenological field. Basically Baker says “biology” and anyone with any sort of sense of reality cannot deny that there is a sort of physical/empirical biological neurobiological actual however you want to put it aspect of this existence. But the problem philosophically is how to justify it, And the arguments, not only with Baker but with many people that tend to see something as obvious and then try to talk about it in mind of thephenomenological field, Tend to fall short into mere assertion.

This happens all over the place. And the thing about phenomenology is that a lot of smart people a lot of intelligent people learn about Kant And all these continental philosophers and and and things like that and all these ideas and they understand it, all the postmoderns and stuff, and I understand it and because the field is so wide open, the field that the understanding grants in the theory in the meaning of the text , that they then use that at every turn, as the criterion to which every discussion of philosophy must reckon.

Yet, when we understand what Soren Kierkegaard is really saying and what he’s really doing in his works, if we are sensitive to ourselves and what we are doing in light of what Kierkegaard tells us, Then we might be able See that sometimes we are being argumentative for that sake of being argumentative.

Wait!

More in a mint…

Preliminary thoughts on the parameters of determination: Phenomenology and Object Orientation.

We already know how reality proceeds; there is no mystery about the mysterious part. We love mystery. We love figuring things out and we love not knowing; every time we come to know of something, then something else catches our attention. This is no mystery.

The Why of this process we also love to get into. We love to always withhold something or have something be withheld; that is what profit is, as well as magic, as well as the object of science. Even as we try to disclose everything, we always leave something out, and we love to find out what is it so we can have something else left out, to find that out. This also is no mystery, it happens all the time, everywhere.

Yes, the contingency of reality is why we live; we look into something, and everything changes . Despite my depressions and frustrations with how reality may be for any moment, these insecurities is indeed why I continue. They are not what I am attempting to overcome, they are the roots of the insecurities itself; a depression is weather; my insecurities inseparable from the realization of happiness except as we might speak of different centralized systems of motion ; they are what I withhold while I propose to be looking into them. As soon as I find a way to relive myself of the insecurity, another one pops up.

The manner, order and cause of these psychic contingencies occupy the totality of my concern; they inform to where my attention is focused. I may look outside these psychic events to events that are not psychic, and even though I may be the mediator and arbiter of such events and such objects, I am able to consider these occasions outside of the notion that they are occurring in my psyche. What this means then, is that such occurrences are not occurring as psychic events, but are indeed occurring as objects independent of the psychic occurrence. This means that to tie such moments together, the event of an object that is entirely of my psyche, and the event of the object that has nothing to do with my psyche, in a causal relation is problematic at least. As Saint Anslem: This is an unstable condition. We begin to understand how the philosophical turn that saw ‘language/discourse’ or ‘meaning/semiotics’ or ‘phenomenon’ as some sort of temporal historical stage, can itself be based in a misunderstanding of the issue involved with those very categories, and likewise how the turn to the object is most probably, by many, also misunderstood in its bases.

We might find the misunderstanding is founded in the “either/or” relation of reductive philosophy. Exactly how do we determine phenomenology from the rest of the western philosophical discourse is extending back to Spinoza or Locke or something ? We do it by ignoring the phenomenology of the situation and particularizing things that are phenomenon with other things that somehow fall out of the category of ‘phenomenon’ that we have to find arbitrarily along a continuum of traditional semantics . Likewise the idea that if we don’t adhere to this traditional lineage and don’t fall into the abyss of Progressive discursive formations then we are talking about nothing, that which has no definition at all: That resultant idea is an either/ or proclamation that excludes the phenomenon of its situation: It proclaims itself in a causal relationship of psyche and object, that this causation is necessary and determined by some as yet discovered “great power“; it is this put off great power that is being negated in the resultant default to nihilism, not the object-universe and definitely not humanity and most likely not civilization: It is entirely evidence by which we can describe what is occurring “Of the psyche”, which is to say phenomenologically. The former phenomenological derivations were or are not, in fact, speaking necessarily to nor about ‘original experiences’ that may be talked about in a unitive and omnipresent “greatest category” field which holds room for such ‘subjective reckonings’, wherein everyone gets to discover all the differences of personal experience. Indeed, in the field of social justice and politics, we do get to discover what has been hiding behind my own inherent prejudices and limitations I didn’t know existed, or perhaps I did but could not alleviate them, and so I get to work on them . But the event of the phenomenon is not based in such subjectivity, and the reasoning that says such discourses as pointing to some psychic event of individual experience is/was a misunderstanding of the notion of what the phenomenon might be. Hence, likewise, an inherent misunderstanding of what Object Orientation might entail.

The question always concerns thus if the authors which proclaim such philosophical categories themselves are misunderstanding their own position, and how that might be possible. We then come to what real motivators for identification of objects might say about the world we live in and even, indeed, if “we” live in such a world. Further, the very idea that arises when such ‘unfounded’ divergence from the ‘traditional’ narrative occurs is if such dichotomy of existence is a true situation that we then have to question; if the various notions that arrive for methodological procedures are really addressing valuable issues; how it is possible that we might be able to decide to dismiss an object sufficiently from the psychic occurrence, etc….

More later…