Tag: phenomenalism

Harman’s Folly.

I submit that Harmans OOO is concerned with philosophical objects, and due to this focus, understands reality is hidden behind a screen of sense. We can begin to see that Harman’s real objects reflect that he sees himself as dealing with thought as the foundation of everything else, Becuase obviously he is using his proposal in a field of other equally valid proposals of thoughts, the actual object they talk about, then, withdraws from the discussion. In this way. Harman’s proposal falls flat so much as it indeed might have to do with real things.

I am skeptical of the kind of hinting that uses thought as unapproachable while foregrounding the discourse as though he is not merely using sleight of hand to not be using his centrality of thinker position, a specifically phenomenal and postmodern tack. Despite his speculative realist claim.

Even so, his does have use. As we see, and discuss elsewhere.

Algorithms and institutional isomorphism: A Call for a more Philosophically Comprehensive Theory Of Counseling.

Algorithms and institutional isomorphism

Algorithms and institutional isomorphism
— Read on markcarrigan.net/2019/03/10/algorithms-and-institutional-isomorphism/

This is quite interesting.

It resonates with ideas I have been throwing about. For example, the way that I use the term religion in my work seems consistent with the way that internet platforms are homogenizing corporate identities, as this summary (the link) might suggest. Less about what corporate activity, ability, or work that they do or products they make, the platforms through which they present such corporate subjectivities not only limit their ability to be viewed but indeed function as a space of reflexivity which thereby allows them to view themselves as a unique and valuable contribution to the socially economical universe, Even as this universe is contracting in its ability to grant universal value beyond its domain.

Also, as I suggest in The Philosophical Hack, what is significant is our relationship with technology. Less our subjective meanings and relative interpretations of our thoughts and feelings that we have about our relationship (which are indeed valid, if overworked and often understood as substantially ubiquitous), the relationship has more to do with how such subjectivities manifest as the relation. For example, how technology tends to allow us to think our meaning is unique and individual all the while confining that presentation to specific technological items.

We might then see through the lens of counseling, as counselors, that subjective issues may find more resolution by the smaller possibility for explanation rather that a wider one. The more possibility is understood for a context of therapeutic help, perhaps the less individual help will be achieved.

Hence, I might hypothesize that a more coherent and less divisive ideal for therapeutic help is indicated. Less assertions of various conventional scientific methodological truth( this method is more correct that that) as argument (less acceptance of universal subject-relativity and individual argumentative validity) and more theoretical philosophy which might function to supply a model which contains, explains and addresses the phenomenal possibility for therapy.

In other words, less client choice in therapy and less Counsellor self-righteousness about appropriate treatment options, could lead to a more effective therapy as a whole movement and client responsiveness to treatment.

Because it seems right now, on one hand the client has so many choices for therapy that they don’t even know what they might be choosing, and on the other hand counselors as such might be so self righteous and myopic in their theoretical basis that they are asserting a particular type of methodological solution up and against the larger arena of counseling which posits that there could be many effective treatments. I am proposing that if the theoretical basis of counseling is it self limited within a larger explanatory philosophy rather than granted in infinite relativity, then the client might feel like they are actually getting significant help even before the therapeutic process begins.

Navigating Climate.

Navigating Climate Tragedy – via Jem Bendell

Navigating Climate Tragedy – via Jem Bendell
— Read on syntheticzero.net/2018/10/04/deep-adaptation-a-map-for-navigating-climate-tragedy/

My comment:

“…That synthesis leads to a conclusion there will be a near term collapse in society with serious ramifications for the lives of readers. The paper reviews some of the reasons why collapse- denial may exist, in particular, in the professions of sustainability research and practice, therefore leading to these arguments having been absent from these fields until now.”

Denial of the collapse due to climate change.

I know you do not claim to be a philosopher. So I bare that in mind.

We have to ask what terms refer to. Say, for example ‘society’. Just as a thought experiment, what is that term referring to. Put it in you mind.

Can you tell me or refer me to what society is without using discourse?

Ok. Hold that feeling, that answer.

Now, what is ‘climate’? Again, apply the same questions.

In the philosophical discourse of climate change we have to consider all the possible meanings of climate which still refer back to this term/idea and recognize what occurs as I attempt to tell you or refer you to the climate aside from discourse. Which is to say, the assumption that is at root in the use of discourse to answer those above questions. Can you be explicit as to what such terms refer to without the assumption?

I ponder if at some point of noticing this phenomenon of communication one must admit that given a particular clause or phase or organization of phrases if it can be referring to more than one instance of an object, which is to say has more than a single referent? That is, and mean exactly the ‘same thing’ using the same Clausal structures and subsequent avenues of explanation?

So again: what climate is changing? Is it an ‘out there’ object to which the discourse refers, or is it the ‘climate’ of the discourse itself which is changing?

In mind of this thought experiment, the question Becomes a logistical question: How do you know?

Is it ‘obvious’? Is it because others are confirming to you what you understand ? Are you seeing what you want to see? When or where does culture come in?

Again: How do you know?

If we understand 20th century Western philosophy, The question must to be: to what universe are we referring to when we say that the climate is changing?

As I think you yourself have referenced,

How am I distinguishing what, say, a “philosophical world” is compared to an ‘actual world”? What is a ‘world-language’?

All of these questions inform the situation at hand.

So it is interesting to me that you are referring to an essay that is talking about people that are trying to conserve the climate, to perhaps somehow allow the climate to not change so drastically because this change in climate has been reported by people to mean that society is going to be disrupted or somehow damaged. And the abstract even references how are we to deal with people that are in denial of this climate change.

So it is interesting to me that it appears that you are referencing the fact that you call climate change, and you are asking or you are referring to that particular essay that is addressing people that are in denial of this climate that is changing.

And, what I thought was interesting, that in response to your comment on the other blog, (Xenogothic on patchwork subjectivities) I spoke about the situation of denial so far as the difference between language and discourse.

So this juxtaposition of apparently two different discourses within the same instance of use of language brings me to ponder what is being conserved and what society is at risk?

Of course these terms most often refer to something that is obvious, something that appears to obviously extended throughout the human condition that every individual human being should be able to conceive of and know of.

.And I say yes, language is able to refer to these various types of specific situations that are assumed for the common humanity as a common object that we call the universe and its various manifestations, that we affect by doing various things in good and bad ways. I am not arguing against this and in fact agree with that very conception and organization of thinking.

But at the same time, I understand that discourse itself organizes peoples ontological existence to refer to specific understandings of these concepts. These understandings are assumed to spill over into, onto or unto other human beings and reflect upon themselves for that particular being in existence automatically such that they cannot be ‘proven wrong’. This is to say, that there is a massive coincidence of climate, and so it is possible that when people talk of climate change, they are referring to this kind of climate (the “objective” kind) automatically and inherently, But then due to the denial involved with the phenomenological intensional being, many people attempt to control or otherwise prevent this type of climate change through effective denial of the relationship of their self, discourse and the world that is operating regardless of intention.

It is that’s possible that the discrepancy involved in the human being being involved with the universe in this manner, which is to say in denial of such climate changing, is in fact what contributes to the climate that changes.

Does that help?