On Derrida: Voice and Phenomenon

On Derrida: Voice and Phenomenon

On Derrida: Voice and Phenomenon
— Read on iambobbyy.com/2019/03/10/on-derrida-voice-and-phenomenon/

Interesting conventional small exegesis of Derrida. I think it shows where Derrida fits into time in contrast to what a subject might be doing at any time. The subject of Derrida is exhibiting a particular moment of time; he is not describing a moment which extends into, through, or as time. Where he is involved with such metaphysics, exactly there we are able to breach his proclamations and find the object.

But of course, my issue is the object, and not so much the subject. So there it is.

This is to suggest that the subject in its centrality is involved with a problem of communication. The mark of Derrida shows that he must have been of his moment; the extension which occurs through an understanding of his texts, no matter how closely we read them, is itself an exercise of not understanding what he is saying, of compensating for the centrality Of subject thought, ignoring it, and brining it into the present as though it indeed is Derrida who meant such a thing.

This shows that we are dealing with Derrida only in as much as we are dealing with a misreading of him, and as much as we do not behave as though our misreading is indeed a misreading. This contradiction thus shows us less how everything is bound in subjectivity, and more how human beings are what they do.

Begin the Hack.

Crack the alienated philosophical subjectivity.

CLICK HERE to BEGIN THE HACK !

“…of course we can talk about snow, for example, talk about what it is, describe how it feels what it looks like, bring forth chemical structures or physical structures of snow all the various aspects of snow — but if you’ve never been to where it snows it’s all really just entertainment and speculative thinking. It’s not difficult for people to understand Phenomenalism and it’s associations with Cartesian worlds and intentionality and correlationalism in the end, because that’s right here and everyone who thinks a little bit can find that the phenomenal central thinker is right here ready at hand, as Heidegger might say. But it’s difficult for people just merely to make a jump and start talking about objects philosophically. I mean, of course we can talk about objects we see objects everywhere; it’s fun and interesting to talk about objects if only because it’s a new philosophical way to address things. But there is no philosophical way yet, none of the philosophers that are talking about speculative objects have given us a real philosophical route into why we should be able to talk about objects in these ways except that we are able to, which is not a very philosophically comforting or satisfactory answer. It’s uncomfortable for philosophers — or it should be anyways — because it’s like talking to someone who’s lived their whole life in the desert about the truth of snow. Because they’ve never seen snow, they’ve never experienced snow and not only this but they don’t know how to get to someplace where there is snow. The philosophical hack addresses these issues and ,actually, does a pretty good job at through addressing them comes up with a solution that I don’t think I’ve ever seen anyone offer yet.”

Rory Andrews. Layperson thinker.

How do we go from phenomenal intention to an object ontology?

None of the speculative realist people have given us a viable route. They simply have started talking about something else, speaking in a different manner. They gave us a reason why it might be wanted, why it might be desirable and needed to start talking about the object, but they never really gave us a bridge into how we get there. Even the philosopher who coined the term, or at least made it popular, “correlationalism”,has really given us very little.

So, whether or not you’ve realized this problem and it has been nagging you for some 10 years now, or whether you just want to read an interesting philosophical book. BEGIN THE HACK.

It’s OK; no one is paying attention. In fact, most people would rather not attend to the loose ends.

CLICK HERE to BEGIN THE HACK ! The Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Event.

The Field Of Consciousness.

“To say that “consciousness knows us” is to point to a actual ‘thing’ that is outside of knowledge. It appears to me that you are saying that knowledge knows about “things“ out there in the universe that exist separate from us (the knower/thinker) and knowledge is some sort of conduit through which this thing that is me (us-thinker) knows of that other thing that is this other thing.

And so it appears that you’re saying “consciousness “ is indeed a thing like these other things that knowledge knows, but it is a thing that is outside of knowledge’s ability to know as we, say, might know a chair or a rock.

I don’t think that there is anything that substantiates consciousness. To say “brain” or “body” derives the same contradiction.

The enigma in your formulation indicates what I call a particular “orientation upon objects”.

It is an enigma because of the original assumption, or beginning assumption that knowledge is a process as opposed to a physical thing, to use a term. That there is something in me that is receiving knowledge or storing knowledge and then there’s something out there that gives up knowledge about it self, or something of that sort.”

And so when we say “consciousness “it is an enigma to try to find ‘what it is’ because of the assumption involved when I say “is”. The assumption here, as I say, is that things exist in this necessary manner that is assumed. This assumption brings about the enigma like we are talking about. So you say “Consciousness knows us”, because your assumption is there has to be some “thing “that is originating the knowing of some sort, so to speak.

I doubt this. I upset this orientation. This originary-essentialism.

I do not think there is anything knowable that is doing any knowing. Knowing is that through which consciousness “becomes available”. Essence is a part of the whole. It is a field.”

–Cedric Nathaniel. PH.

Another stab at: What is Philosophy? A non-philosophical concise definition.

Finally a Concise Definition of Philosophy.

Cedric Nathaniel

Regis University

{KEYWORDS: concise, definition, non-philosophy, orientation, philosophy, reality, route}

Finally a Concise Definition of Philosophy.

Continental philosophy has become a caricature of itself.  Its intensions found lacking, every definition philosophers have given over the decades have left many of us in a virtual state of trauma.  We wonder; does philosophy require such a verbose and convoluted definition which basically becomes a philosophical enigma itself?  While many of us thought we had come across the answer in the book length definitions, upon a second look, we now realize that it was really smoke and mirrors, and in the end, a religious fantasy of philosophical fiction.

Philosophy is, at root, the application of reason upon a field of data.  Reason is understood here not to be a stable category, not so much grounded in an immanent knowledge of intuited transcendental truths, but is indeed the field that is defined by the philosophical process itself.  Logic is a tool; the human being is a conditional state, and reality is a particular coupling of logic and reason toward ontological certainty.  What this says then, is that philosophy is involved in an orientation upon reality.  The two possible routes of philosophy are thus toward ontological certainty, or a conditional state.  These routes are mutually exclusive, since to reduce certainty to a condition results in a certain state that we call ideology in one instance, and religion in another.  We thus are speaking of coming to terms with what philosophy is able to do.  The definition of philosophy thus refers what is commonly understood as ontological certainty to the conditional state; or more precisely, philosophy as a method reduces conditions to real ontological certainties, and as a practice destabilizes ontological certainty towards a realization of it’s conditional state.

published on Academia.edu

december 2018

Power and other Unfashionable Philosophical Questions.

Due to the question of philosophy’s Being moved to the margin for the sake of human necessity, some questions arise, likewise, necessarily.

acquiescence

In the determination of Being, what is Being left out?

Is the knowledge of things determinable?

Is there an obligation in the knowledge of Being?

Does history convey a requirement in the designation of Being?

Does a correct history equate to true Being?

Is doing universal, or momentary? Primary or subsequent?

Is knowledge of doing possible?

Can one speak to the future? the past? without a present comprehension?

Must power be recognized?

Does ethics demand a question of power?

If power is not recognized, is a condemnation of Being in order?

Is the questioning of authority, under its authority, possible?

How can the righteousness of doing be ascertained?

At certain times, is it moral to allow authority to remain unquestioned?

Is nothing part of knowledge?

or a place holder for knowledge?

Must I acquiesce to every condition?

under what condition?

Am I responsible?

For Under the Holiday Tree..

Two ground breaking philosophical books would be an excellent present for your curious minded philosopher !

The descriptions of the books online are not very good, so here are some better descriptions:

“Non-philosophy and Philosophy” is a short essay that speaks to the simplicity of the philosophical underpinnings of a few big-names in Western philosophy. It suggests that authors are not so much arguing various points as they are indicating a particular experience that I call ‘the philosophical revolution’.

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“The Moment of Decisive Significance” is an alternative journey through the Gospels.

What the Introduction calls an ‘object oriented’ reading of the Gospels beckons to Graham Harman’s Object Oriented Ontology or Object Oriented Philosophy but is more an indicator of a difference in approach, what one could call a non-conventional or un-traditional approach.

Bringing in authors from Kierkegaard to Harman, Kant to Laruelle, Feuerbach to Zizek, Plato to Badiou, the use of philosophical discussion is not viscous. This book goes straight through the story in the Gospels explaining and detailing how the pieces and events of the Gospels can adhere in a manner that appear cogent and sensible apart from the explanation that relies upon a theological Oneness. And yet, the book is not an argument against religion; it suggests that there are ‘two routes’ upon objects that do not reduce to anihilate each other, even if one of those routes always works toward annihilation.

This essay is not saying very much about religious belief or an ability to have faith; rather, it suggests that Jesus is speaking to a small minority of people who are having a particular experience of world. By this revelation, it suggests that the Gospels, and indeed the Bible, is saying something much larger and much more significant than another proposal about God; The Story of Jesus exemplifies and reveals how the human being functions by giving us a view into not only the variety of experience that consciousness allows for, but actually into a particular mythological moment that is kept shrouded by the idea of religion, indeed beyond esotericism, albeit, for the purposes of having a particular kind of world. It is thereby a discussion about what philosophy and religion do, and as well an exploration of consciousness itself.

The book is written for the layman and scholar alike.

I hope these less haughty descriptions will entice your curiosity.

Free Speech is Downstream from Territory. 

REBLOG HERE.

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I have pondered for a while what Soren Kierkegaard talks about. We can talk about his points elsewhere, but, as I have said elsewhere, my first concern with him was how what he wrote was so obvious to me right off the bat. Then subsequent to my first encountering him, I found that the general opinion is that his works are not very easy to understand; this perplexed me.

After grappling with the possibility and significance of this apparent direct and unclouded communication, I began to consider that this was not a universal human situation. What I mean is, when I spoke about this strange situation with other people, it likewise became obvious to me that they did not have the same experience with the text. It was not that they necessarily misunderstood K, or had a different opinion, rather, it was that I could tell that they had come to these understandings of K by a different manner than I did, a different route, and because of this different manner, they were evidencing, what I saw, as a basic misunderstanding of him; the understanding I had was somehow and oddly different. It was as if in considering a table, they were taking the veneer of wood grain as the truth of the material of the table, whereas the table was made of plastic; somehow I already knew the table was plastic covered by a coating made to look like wood.

Nevertheless, and despite the route and substantive meaning, I did find that a few people understood what I was coming to see: That this feature of Being human that K seems to strike so resoundingly, is not founded in a common human sort, but indeed must have arisen with a particular manner of knowing things; in order to understand what he is saying (that the table is plastic, not that he is describing the ‘plasticity’), one must have already had a sort of “informing primer”, so to speak. But this is not some academic educational listing of bullet points or necessarily involved study of the object-terms and definitional clauses of his essays; one must have had been informed underneath his awareness that certain things were the case, certain organizations of clauses, particular formations of of conceptual cement, if you will, that went into the kind of semantic scheme that one uses to even be able to understand anything at all. This must be the case because of the particular kind of event that must have been at work as the impetus for his work; for all his works talk about the same thing. I hypothesized that Kierkegaard’s writings are the product of a particular cultural manifest, and that part of this manifest is two ways of coming upon real things, that the manner that consciousness deals with the particular cultural appropriation of objects is to develop a bifurcated possibility of choice.

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When we get round the possibility that Kierkegaard himself is accessible through a consideration of all of his expressions taken as objective representations of his inner self, that someone we may get to know K’s inside from the outside, then we may begin to consider a different manner of understanding worlds. When we understand this is not merely a subjective manner of individual and separate brains coming upon an objective universe through different semantic organizations, but more a psychoanalytical situation, then we can also appreciate this post of the LINK above.  We can begin to see that cultural appropriation of objects is the common manner of consciousness operating; the various manners of maintaining of subject-object duality for the sake of an inclusive foundational category (human, world, universe, etc…) is but one manner of staking out territory for the purpose of speaking about things in a particular way. For the issue concerns when we might find and actual ground of universal scientific objectivity, against which humans have historically merely been in a “conceptual superstition”.

I was brought to Kierkegaard here because K speaks about such conventional territory as itself a territory where human beings are allowed only to think (or speak) about things in a particular manner, referencing particular and common ways of understanding objects: Belief and faith are the real operational manners through which a human being is supposed to present herself: We should be free and territorialized; but Kierkegaard seems to be speaking toward the out side of this kind of freedom. We can also find Delusional Guitar Players here (Delueze and Guattari –lol) with their de-ontology and de-territorial proposals. But the problem is then further aggravated when such “de-” is taken in stride to indicate a territory that is not territorialized (we could get into Francois Laurelle here); instead of describing a territory by which we inscribe ourselves as another unitive (albeit schizophrenic) entity, Kierkegaard perpetually places us in an authority that is again retracted from its (existence/post-modern) mechanistic horrifying present zen future modern human projection. The Delusional Guitar Players was describing a state that would quickly find itself, ironically, deterritorialized in its foundations, to be, basically, anachronistic except as a modern religious apology. Sure, sometimes we should be polite and mind our manners…

We are indeed still modern after all….

Preliminary thoughts on the parameters of determination: Phenomenology and Object Orientation.

We already know how reality proceeds; there is no mystery about the mysterious part. We love mystery. We love figuring things out and we love not knowing; every time we come to know of something, then something else catches our attention. This is no mystery.

The Why of this process we also love to get into. We love to always withhold something or have something be withheld; that is what profit is, as well as magic, as well as the object of science. Even as we try to disclose everything, we always leave something out, and we love to find out what is it so we can have something else left out, to find that out. This also is no mystery, it happens all the time, everywhere.

Yes, the contingency of reality is why we live; we look into something, and everything changes . Despite my depressions and frustrations with how reality may be for any moment, these insecurities is indeed why I continue. They are not what I am attempting to overcome, they are the roots of the insecurities itself; a depression is weather; my insecurities inseparable from the realization of happiness except as we might speak of different centralized systems of motion ; they are what I withhold while I propose to be looking into them. As soon as I find a way to relive myself of the insecurity, another one pops up.

The manner, order and cause of these psychic contingencies occupy the totality of my concern; they inform to where my attention is focused. I may look outside these psychic events to events that are not psychic, and even though I may be the mediator and arbiter of such events and such objects, I am able to consider these occasions outside of the notion that they are occurring in my psyche. What this means then, is that such occurrences are not occurring as psychic events, but are indeed occurring as objects independent of the psychic occurrence. This means that to tie such moments together, the event of an object that is entirely of my psyche, and the event of the object that has nothing to do with my psyche, in a causal relation is problematic at least. As Saint Anslem: This is an unstable condition. We begin to understand how the philosophical turn that saw ‘language/discourse’ or ‘meaning/semiotics’ or ‘phenomenon’ as some sort of temporal historical stage, can itself be based in a misunderstanding of the issue involved with those very categories, and likewise how the turn to the object is most probably, by many, also misunderstood in its bases.

We might find the misunderstanding is founded in the “either/or” relation of reductive philosophy. Exactly how do we determine phenomenology from the rest of the western philosophical discourse is extending back to Spinoza or Locke or something ? We do it by ignoring the phenomenology of the situation and particularizing things that are phenomenon with other things that somehow fall out of the category of ‘phenomenon’ that we have to find arbitrarily along a continuum of traditional semantics . Likewise the idea that if we don’t adhere to this traditional lineage and don’t fall into the abyss of Progressive discursive formations then we are talking about nothing, that which has no definition at all: That resultant idea is an either/ or proclamation that excludes the phenomenon of its situation: It proclaims itself in a causal relationship of psyche and object, that this causation is necessary and determined by some as yet discovered “great power“; it is this put off great power that is being negated in the resultant default to nihilism, not the object-universe and definitely not humanity and most likely not civilization: It is entirely evidence by which we can describe what is occurring “Of the psyche”, which is to say phenomenologically. The former phenomenological derivations were or are not, in fact, speaking necessarily to nor about ‘original experiences’ that may be talked about in a unitive and omnipresent “greatest category” field which holds room for such ‘subjective reckonings’, wherein everyone gets to discover all the differences of personal experience. Indeed, in the field of social justice and politics, we do get to discover what has been hiding behind my own inherent prejudices and limitations I didn’t know existed, or perhaps I did but could not alleviate them, and so I get to work on them . But the event of the phenomenon is not based in such subjectivity, and the reasoning that says such discourses as pointing to some psychic event of individual experience is/was a misunderstanding of the notion of what the phenomenon might be. Hence, likewise, an inherent misunderstanding of what Object Orientation might entail.

The question always concerns thus if the authors which proclaim such philosophical categories themselves are misunderstanding their own position, and how that might be possible. We then come to what real motivators for identification of objects might say about the world we live in and even, indeed, if “we” live in such a world. Further, the very idea that arises when such ‘unfounded’ divergence from the ‘traditional’ narrative occurs is if such dichotomy of existence is a true situation that we then have to question; if the various notions that arrive for methodological procedures are really addressing valuable issues; how it is possible that we might be able to decide to dismiss an object sufficiently from the psychic occurrence, etc….

More later…

 

 

The Soul: Bifurcation and Fracturing of Being, since we got Time as well Cause for a Valid Ontological Identity: Suspended in Contradiction to Avoid Collapse.

Something is incredibly wrong with Katrina Burtch, but I love it.

Its sounds eerily like Disembodied Poetics.

If we can think it, then why not?  Even if it is a higher development of Modern religious apology. Perfectly valid.

It’s disturbing.  Lol.

But we barely even started to find out what religion is.  Where are we going?

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What do I mean by Modern Religious Apology ?

Referring to my previous post about Plotinus: A justification for the placement of the soul (for any term, as in this case, a situation of ‘thought’) into a discursive scheme or scaffold.

Once we depart from a necessity for an  essential and central thinker, we are allowed through historical semantic scaffolding into thinking apart from thought. We are able, for a term, to break from the unitive paradigm.

The question should be how is this allowed? What mechanisms are in place, what joints and beams lay to bring about a meaning that supposed its ability to ‘remove itself from itself’ ? And we come to types. 

But other questions are allowed, as Katrina shows. The reason why it is allowed, thus, should have nothing to do with any discursive scaffolding, but only because something has occurred to create a blind spot, so that we can now see objects and relations without having to reconcile the scaffolding to a causal scaffold: The reason we are allowed to move on before explicitly discovering how we are able to move on is embedded in the assumption involved with the new reasoning itself. 

This process of modern-post-modern modes replicating itself, we call ‘apologetics’, and reproduces the same mechanisms we find in the early Christian church fathers and the eventual Scholasitcs, which is to say,  “post-Event”; the reduction to a common human experience allows specific occurrences to be generalized, extended out from their proper sphere, as they are encoded to thus be found or dis-coded (discovered) by the intrinsic mythology. Anything ‘post’ is understood to be dissimilar to its object and indeed progressed away from it even as it inscribes itself exceptional through what is common (irony/contradiction avoided and or suspended). 
With discourses such as Katrina’s, we able to frame for understanding the issue of the three as multiplicity forms it’s justiciation for inclusion in the Valid reality: The proper placement of the soul.

With the philosophical death of God, the soul was displaced. Indeed, the Western Enlightened mind thought it could achieve ‘God’ (for a term) through the ‘divinely inspired’ (or whatever we want to call it) thinking, What we typically call “Modernism” was the last call for heroics, the last phase of the project of establishing ‘God’s world’. But counter-point to this great idealism was the rebuttal of such a project, what came to be known, again in its end, as post-modernism. If anything, post-modernism is at root the attempt to inject the fallacy of the soul into the project of Progress without the implied and inherent oppressive Modernist agent. Yet, what it achieved was merely the dissolution of itself, which in the end, was found to be merely a Modernist ploy; the strategy of Modern is to place itself as the scapegoat, too there by use irony to indicate a patsy. The use of this patsy can never be found: was it the Western Colonialism, Capitalism, Christianity, Masculinity, Industry — we could go on — that was to blame? For, every time an accusation is made, a justification through the accusatory critique is found to have just as much credibility from an argumentative  standpoint: The method of argument constitutes what may hold veracity. What occurred through post-modern, how ever we want to define it, was indeed a humanity without a soul. Anyone now can use any justification into its own identity of soul; this fact denies a unitive category that we can know as ‘soul’, that is, unless we are able to define things outside of definition, or a definition that reaches ourtside of itself. 

We should always look for the solution to any real problem in two places: The first place is in social appearance. What we have in this solution is a distilment of the soul-less human being toward the assertion of its soul-full-ness, These various assertions that find ‘actual’ culprits as they manifest as real antagonists for the sake of the asserted soul. Donald Trump in the US, and congress, the governing body that negotiates, who can’t get anything done, the threat of Catalan succession, the unstable Euro-Union, North Korea, the Balkans of a couple decades ago, Ruwanda, the Cold War; we could go on. Likewsie, The idea that we are leaving and coming into various significant and large phases that take place within lifetimes in the growth of the species Homo sapiens is actually a microscopic view of what is more properly a galactic motion; a century of turns all take place within the same scheme or mode or argument such that decades of ‘new’ ideas really don’t move us very far conceptually, yet even as they are are seen to, due to the current imperative to develop  ‘conceptual products’, which is the real imperative: Create, assert, establish and demand identity. These amount to real social manifestations of philosophical solutions to the problem of having no soul. These solutions are based in an individual’s orientation upon the True Object of ideology, of seeing such solutions as having value. But of course, we are not arguing that they don’t; that is what is significant about a divergent philosophy: It’s value, with reference to the identity driven real commodities of thought, is not real.

The other place we look for a solution is less immediate. This second kind of solution takes place somewhere ‘outside’ the political realm. Feminism, at least the kind that Katrina os evidencing here,  proposes to be able to bridge this ‘somewhere else’ and the political realms: she indicates this Abstract position through the term “Xeno”. (I think Terrence over at Agent Swarm might have something to add about this.) Such philosophical-critical discourses depend upon an anchoring that extends outside but is not accounted for in the political realm. Like a ship: The rope disappears into and beyond the surface of the water into the depths; what occurs down there from the perspective of the ships crew is only surmised from the effect the anchor has upon the ship, but then only when the rope is viewed and contemplated upon. Otherwise, the crew and passengers of the ship see itself as moving forward, towards its destination of adventure and exploration, the final destination only speculated about. Indeed Katrina says that we can look at her project has a type of Platonism. 

The ‘soul’, for any term, whether we call it ‘thought’, psyche’, inner world’, spirit, nothingness, chaos –Im sure we could come uno with many more, and despite what we want to define of the term itself — is what is beyond the surface of the water. Feminism thereby gains its stature through a stabilized antagonist that we could call “the (masculine/male)  ship”. It seeks to organize the ship to its anchor, through various incarnations of the soul. And yet, on board ship, we have all sorts of people and ideas, about the ship, what its doing, what the anchor is, what its doing. Katrina’s discourse thus must posit itself in the contradiction that is inherent from the perspective of the ship’s passengers and the assertion that comes from the view that supposes itself of the anchor itself. Such feminism (Katrina’s) cannot thus continue to argue about where the rope actually goes, or how far down it falls into the ocean, or what it is attached to, because from the perspective of the ship, no one has an ability to know what is beyond the surface. So with Object Orientation Philosophy, the strategy is merely now to work with what they have on board, to organize a common manner of ‘ship’ with reference to the again common ‘unknown’ that is the anchor, but without having to attempt to convince the people what the anchor might actually be or be doing under the water. Such feminist proposals thus exist and gain their veracity by virtue of the contradiction inherent of their discourses, but now with out having to justify them with reference to what may be outside or not taking place on the ship. Such proposals must suspend the contradiction inherent by the implication of origins in the proposal itself, and because it is most probable that feminism would not suggest there is anything ‘outside’ (philosophers only speculate on what could be outside, and thus do not have to admit to anything) we would then have to understand that such proposals not only must carry on “as if”, but indeed, carry on in total ignorance of the fact, and again, despite what anyone would want to argue.

…as an opening into her “types”: We are able to begin to find out what human beings (consciousness)- philosophy does.

Brilliant.

Its all unfolding perfectly. Totally love it.

Listen to her music and then listen to this album. 30 years apart. Am I too far off at hearing a relation? 

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…And a coincidental posting this morning at ALTexploit