The Philosophical Object.

Phenomenology says that we all have subjective worlds that are reflected in our opinions and views.

The Speculative Realist conference philosophers spoke to the point of how that formulation of reality leads to a closed loop of philosophical correlation. Thus, their problem has been how to find something outside of this closed system.

The concern of an orientation upon objects is how that correlation occurs outside of the talk about it, encompassing the talk about how we are to get outside of it.

The issue here then arises between an object which withdraws from view (Harman) and the subject which is never expressed or communicated (Lyotard).

The difference, I say, lay more with orientation and less with ontological ubiquity. More with the manner that the subject is able to view the world and less with how there is a “real” world that subjects can only partially view.

The difference is thus between the phenomenon and the object. Less about how we situate philosophical definitions and more about the manner of being able to see.

THE MASSES AS OBJECT

WHEN MARGINALIZED RATIONALITIES REAR ITS UGLY HEAD: THE MASSES AS HYPEROBJECTS

https://thepostsecularblog.wordpress.com/2019/05/17/when-marginalized-rationalities-rear-its-ugly-head-the-masses-as-hyperobjects/
— Read on thepostsecularblog.wordpress.com/2019/05/17/when-marginalized-rationalities-rear-its-ugly-head-the-masses-as-hyperobjects/

great post!!

Yet/and… read on…

I am not sure that we need to use the term “hyper objects”. I think that term functions and works to miss the significance of objects in-themselves. if I were to use the term “hyper objects” in the context that I am understanding it, at least through this link post: It’s as though I am approaching a great significance, and as I get closer to it then all of a sudden I need to turn away and completely ignore and miss what the significance actually was and create my own subjective interpretation of what I actually never encountered. The speculative term “hyper object” is an evangelistic manner of retaining subjects under its theological dominion.

In a very real sense, it’s as though existentialism of the Sartean kind (revolting from the abyss) is in fact less a rational ontological truth, and more A functioning of religious theological dogma for the purposes of Establishing and maintaining a transcendental subject of offense (ubiquitous politics).

Nevertheless, This post link is a perfect extrapolation of the theme that Zizek mentions somewhat frequently here and there: The significance of modern critical theory and philosophy is that while it thinks it’s self as a player in social activism, it’s discourse has nothing to do with “the people”. The masses, or the people, cannot be appropriated by philosophy nor critical theory; rather, the appropriation links back to its own assertion of power, as though it is getting at something new; as I say in places and as Cedric Nathaniel will argue in his book, the world that is encompassed by modernity and postmodernity cannot even reach “the mass of people” except through denying that “the people” as a universal object actually exists in itself. This situation that philosophy/critical theory has gotten itself into is ultimately correlational unto itself. The issue thus is not how to get out of correlational existence, but how we deal with this fact.

This post is a perfect example of the motion that I just described: As soon as the people attempt to act for themselves, the agent of critical theory (and the general congregation/constituency of the theoretical religious body) have to impose and discount it, make it marketable, discount the people themselves because the people acting in themselves and for them selves actually exhibit a manner of existence which does not accord with the theological mandates of critical philosophical theory of the One Reality: The People exhibit no excess, no margin for profit. The irony of this contradictory activity is eternal, and is why we must locate such idealized activity within the envelope of transcendental law, A code of laws “given from God”.

I am excited that this post mentions GrahamHarman In what I see as an appropriate use of his philosophy in something that is not architecture — because this is the first post, even though he’s referencing an article from 2009 or something, that I’ve seen anyways, that is beginning to understand or somehow reflect upon the world as though it is filled with objects, and as well seems to be beginning to comprehend it self in the context of universal objects as opposed to a common humanity of inter-relating subjectivities. But but of course, this is not to say that there are not interrelating subjectivities, but only that The universe of interrelating subjectivities is not the only universe that can be known, and that indeed interrelating subjectivities are objects, or, is an object in itself.

The caveat to this, though, is that I fear that such theoreticians will still be involved in the attempt to reduce this kind of alterity, this disparity, to another common manner to link power to its absolute ideological object, and completely miss the significance that they almost came upon.

But in the meantime, like I said, at least people are beginning to notice them selves in the context of universal objects.

*

We are just beginning to see, to actually be able to view, what human beings do. We are just beginning. This is the long game…

….But all that is for other posts.

What is a Philosophical Hack?

What is a Philosophical Hack? The answer is quite philosophical. 🙂

But in this philosophy a number of things are challenged which then indicate that the hack must arrive from an aspect or element that exists which is not philosophical.  This is a sort of truism: A thing cannot be in relation to another thing unless itself is first a thing.  This is the problem with philosophy as we know it: Philosophy depends upon as it actively re-inscribes and enforces a particular regimen of power of bringing into existence the absolute truth of the universe; namely, in this case, everything is relative. Relativity is not a natural absolute and essential

truth that we come up on through our human ability of reason, it is a particular establishment of power.

One of the first imperatives of the philosophical hack thus must outline or bring into view not merely the postmodern critique of power which then ironically replays itself to maintain the systems of modern power already in play, and at that, as it is supposed to be bringing about emancipation or a removal from of that very power-state, but more how this power itself is not an omnipresent and omnipotent aspect of a fixed and closed absolute real universe. 

Key is the disconcern the hack employs in its effort for truth.  Not merely another power play of false promises but indeed a recognizing of truth about humanity and the universe in-itself.  Indeed it is less a disruption than a revealing despite populism and identity politics.

The Philosophical Hack uses analogy with terms borrowed from what we know of science to describe the issues involved in being able to identify a thing that is called philosophy: Quantum physics is a project of physical description which does not comply nor answer to what we generally call classical mechanics.  Quantum physics is nevertheless a viable and true manner (albeit theoretical) of coming upon –and application of — the world, but indeed its methods and concepts do not fit nor concord with classical conceptions of the world, even while quantum conceptions may explain the classical in manners which classical physics cannot reconcile or even agree with; both nevertheless function and operate.

Presently, philosophy is caught in a “classical” , or what philosophers have called correlational, mode, what I have called together as a true form of subjectivity (subject-object duality) to no longer challenge and to thus identify as conventional philosophy.  The key to this move is thus to see that just as quantum physics does not negate, invalidate how classical mechanics indeed operates and functions, the identification (the operations of the hack) does not invalidate nor argue against the modes of conventional philosophy, even while it may challenge its method towards absolutism (in whatever forms its takes). Rather, the hack consolidates objects unto themselves by showing the weaknesses in the systemic facade. This move thus concerns an orientation upon objects because the hack allows conventional philosophy to be itself, as a thing in-itself to function as its does. The move is thus two-fold, unilaterally dual in its estimations and methods.

The book by Cedric Nathaniel is involved with the the first efforts to make visible what is invisible and sacrosanct to the conventional philosophical mode.

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL HACK: The Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Event.

THE SECOND PART.  Coming to a thought near you.x

Begin the Hack.

Crack the alienated philosophical subjectivity.

CLICK HERE to BEGIN THE HACK !

“…of course we can talk about snow, for example, talk about what it is, describe how it feels what it looks like, bring forth chemical structures or physical structures of snow all the various aspects of snow — but if you’ve never been to where it snows it’s all really just entertainment and speculative thinking. It’s not difficult for people to understand Phenomenalism and it’s associations with Cartesian worlds and intentionality and correlationalism in the end, because that’s right here and everyone who thinks a little bit can find that the phenomenal central thinker is right here ready at hand, as Heidegger might say. But it’s difficult for people just merely to make a jump and start talking about objects philosophically. I mean, of course we can talk about objects we see objects everywhere; it’s fun and interesting to talk about objects if only because it’s a new philosophical way to address things. But there is no philosophical way yet, none of the philosophers that are talking about speculative objects have given us a real philosophical route into why we should be able to talk about objects in these ways except that we are able to, which is not a very philosophically comforting or satisfactory answer. It’s uncomfortable for philosophers — or it should be anyways — because it’s like talking to someone who’s lived their whole life in the desert about the truth of snow. Because they’ve never seen snow, they’ve never experienced snow and not only this but they don’t know how to get to someplace where there is snow. The philosophical hack addresses these issues and ,actually, does a pretty good job at through addressing them comes up with a solution that I don’t think I’ve ever seen anyone offer yet.”

Rory Andrews. Layperson thinker.

How do we go from phenomenal intention to an object ontology?

None of the speculative realist people have given us a viable route. They simply have started talking about something else, speaking in a different manner. They gave us a reason why it might be wanted, why it might be desirable and needed to start talking about the object, but they never really gave us a bridge into how we get there. Even the philosopher who coined the term, or at least made it popular, “correlationalism”,has really given us very little.

So, whether or not you’ve realized this problem and it has been nagging you for some 10 years now, or whether you just want to read an interesting philosophical book. BEGIN THE HACK.

It’s OK; no one is paying attention. In fact, most people would rather not attend to the loose ends.

CLICK HERE to BEGIN THE HACK ! The Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Event.

The Field Of Consciousness.

“To say that “consciousness knows us” is to point to a actual ‘thing’ that is outside of knowledge. It appears to me that you are saying that knowledge knows about “things“ out there in the universe that exist separate from us (the knower/thinker) and knowledge is some sort of conduit through which this thing that is me (us-thinker) knows of that other thing that is this other thing.

And so it appears that you’re saying “consciousness “ is indeed a thing like these other things that knowledge knows, but it is a thing that is outside of knowledge’s ability to know as we, say, might know a chair or a rock.

I don’t think that there is anything that substantiates consciousness. To say “brain” or “body” derives the same contradiction.

The enigma in your formulation indicates what I call a particular “orientation upon objects”.

It is an enigma because of the original assumption, or beginning assumption that knowledge is a process as opposed to a physical thing, to use a term. That there is something in me that is receiving knowledge or storing knowledge and then there’s something out there that gives up knowledge about it self, or something of that sort.”

And so when we say “consciousness “it is an enigma to try to find ‘what it is’ because of the assumption involved when I say “is”. The assumption here, as I say, is that things exist in this necessary manner that is assumed. This assumption brings about the enigma like we are talking about. So you say “Consciousness knows us”, because your assumption is there has to be some “thing “that is originating the knowing of some sort, so to speak.

I doubt this. I upset this orientation. This originary-essentialism.

I do not think there is anything knowable that is doing any knowing. Knowing is that through which consciousness “becomes available”. Essence is a part of the whole. It is a field.”

–Cedric Nathaniel. PH.

Consumerism.

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Just before I had read the comment that mentioned consumption which prompted the Comments on the Stoned Ape (the previous post), I happened to be listening to some NPR on the radio. That word (consumer, consume, consumption) was used a bunch in the story I was listening to and I began to wonder about it. The news story was interviewing someone about the US economy and he kept saying “consumers” and “consume”. Of course I knew what he meant, but I could not help ponder if indeed I consume things in the manner he was speaking.

I doubted it, and I think through this doubt I could understand that he was just using a term to describe certain aspects and functioning of analyses of the flow of products and money, and a mechanism for that flow is ‘consumption’.

But as I listened, I also realized I did not listen to what he was saying and interpret it in that way at first; I indeed listened and understood that he was talking about me, a consumer, and a bunch of people like me, who are consumers, and the economy will behave like that and that because I and other people are indeed consumers.

The point I think I came upon is that despite what term he is using for his description of his equasions, I do not consume things in the manner he is suggesting that the ‘group of people that are consumers’ do. And I don’t think anyone does, or, maybe most people do. These could be mutually exclusive categories.

Nevertheless, for one; I do not consume TV shows. I do consume food and water and intoxicants, maybe even forms of air. But I do not consume solar panels or couches. I do not consume the beach, sun, ocean and breezes. We do not. Rather, only in the context of his report and analysis does anyone consume such things. But he speaks to us as if we do, and I think one of the problems, one of the features of our type of capitalism right now could be that we default to Be what people who are presumed to know, say about us. It is possible, then, to understand that capitalism could be not so much a ubiquitous great system of the exchange of goods, and maybe a little more but not entirely a way of speaking. More significantly, it could very well be a manner of appropriating what is said; the issue could be more the manner we come upon objects in the world.

I am not saying that his analysis is incorrect, but that people tend to identify their Being human, often enough, with what (terms) people, who do various jobs or have an amount of authority, use to place the human Being into their equasion. (To live in another persons dream is a nightmare!)

Further; this seems to be a situation that the majority of individual people cannot and will not consider nor think had any significance at all, or if they do, it only has enough significance to get them to discuss something philosophical over a beer, maybe. Thus, such notice, is not the suggestion that we need to educate everyone on how they are being determined by human agencies that they are not seeing or agreeing with. Such people simply don’t care; most people simply cannot view the influences that other agencies have on their Being. If one thinks about some opinions of Chinese citizens have about their government: Despite what flaws the government might have, the general opinion is that is works pretty well.

Thus I would say that for the most part it is not our job to educate people that they are being taken advantage of, simply because those people are generally happy and do not and cannot conceive the extent that they are being manipulated. This is modern humanity, and indeed, to the sour of many modern apologists, it is humanity at all times. No matter what education is implemented, such people will only still yet be lead by what is being said. Often, no matter what one is taught, no matter what deep insight to which one thinks they are educating people, that person will most often merely understand that they have to speak in a certain manner, and that such a manner is the ‘right’ way to speak about things.

Something else is in play, then; something more that what we call ‘liberal education’.

Clean Shave, by CSP – and other postmodern avoidance.

clean shave CSP logo 2_Fotor

What is the relationship between art and philosophy?

That is the issue I treat.

In “The Postmodern Condition”, Jean-Francois Lyotard speaks of this dichotomy in terms of ‘narrative’ and ‘scientific’ discourses. Emmanuel Kant speaks of the difference between Practical and Pure reason. And others also divide essential Being into dichotomous factions and never seem to approach the ‘final frame’, as Slavoj Zizek might (maybe) call it. While they are all most commonly understood to be speaking of different aspects (all of them) of reality or whatever, the significant issue involved with all of them is that they are really using different terms to characterize and position the same thing, the same aspect of being itself (that which is being itself). This is the issue that Francois Laruelle attempts to show us, that philosophy, what we might call ‘conventional’ philosophy, understands these divisions, these decisions, as indicating essentially real and localizable essences, what we may now call ‘objects’, but also a condition that no human being can get out of (No Exit).

The conventional philosopher sees terms as identifying actual distinct and segregate idealized (there is not situation that escapes what is of an idea) situations as these situations are indeed thus due to the manner by which clausal arrangements are made: Discourse determines reality because that is what has been argued successfully, and this argument thus can no longer be questioned without determining reality in a manner whereby reality is thus determined. This is called idealism: The idea is transcribed into reality because the idea is that the idea is able to be transcribed into reality intact (is the idea itself real?) But again, conventional philosophy cannot admit this generalization, or will vehemently as casually set it aside (whatever works), and will then move to discount its idealist situation by defining further terms and clausal arrangements. They simply cannot stop seeing ‘more things’, or simultaneously ‘the comparison of things’ in their use of discourse as these lineages of meaning are understood to extend through an essential temporal substrate. 

See, though, that of course, this is not incorrect. It simply locates, evidences and positions a particular kind of thinking and the method that supports that thinking. The ability to find this philosophical situation thus, at once, understands that conventional philosophy views itself as a kind of essentialist science through its ability to situate itself above and around every assertion that is made upon it, to thereby deny that it is an idealism (religion); this type of maneuver once noticed cannot escape its scientific attitude, an attitude that ironically denies that it is any sort of science.

When we locate this situation, oddly enough, we have found an opening that places philosophy as an object; we are able to ‘see’ it as an object, and once an object can be located and defined for what it does (is something more than it does? IS more than AM? ), it becomes an object of science. This means that people are going to get nervous (isn’t this what we are already seeing?) . While philosophy will continue on in its conventional manner, there will be (is) another kind of philosophical manner that cannot help but supersede what has been traditionally the jurisdiction of philosophy as a whole kind of endeavor. This philosophy that moves beyond philosophy can therefore be called a kind of ‘science of philosophy’ and works to be able to define humanity in a manner that is better able to control and or first describe, then predict the outcomes of humanity even while humanity denies that it is being determined. The irony of this latter situation is that such control is not subject to the fears of totalitarianism or dictatorship (but neither democracy or communism) because such an understanding does not occur within the purview of real estimations; what falls into its purview will be checked by the regular political mechanisms which are around for any moment.

What in the past has been called ‘religious’, and then soon after ‘esoteric’, and then soon after ‘heretical’, now changes the stakes of the game. What has been the arena that these terms denoted has been dispelled (the term no longer ‘denotes’) in all effective ways save the enforcement of the meaning of the term itself: There is no ‘effective’ esoteric occasions but those which are defined within the general political arena as another political case, another political identity. What goes on behind closed doors is subject to the same rules as any other ‘closed door’ policy.

Due to this ideological upset that the concept of science brings about (along with its appropriate narrative support), the human situation is turned on its head and reality, by virtue of its ubiquity and omnipresence, becomes a religious institution. Once this happens, everything remotely ‘spiritual’ goes out the window into the the bin of science, yet even while it retains an effectivity within the meaning of the transcendental clause by which narratives afford, convey and maintain real worlds. What occurs then, is what otherwise would have been classified as ‘esoteric’ by modern analysts becomes the effective means to define parameters upon the human creature in such a fashion which moves beyond the ability for the real narrative to keep up with; power is enacted which does not fall into the modern ‘structural-Marxist-humanist’ designations for how power is supposed (proposed) to be used. As we have just said, what does fall into the lap of such analysts, regardless of what it means to such analysis, nevertheless functions to acquiesce data which is thus used to support the determinate scientific use of power upon reality. This is to say that what has been the problem of modern philosophy, that of what to make of essential difference and its interface, interaction or intersection, has been solved, albeit in a manner that leaves a particular mode of philosophical knowledge playing in the white wash despite its best efforts to paddle out into the monsters of Mavericks. Philosophy (conventional) becomes the means to make sense of what is already occurring, a manner to keep everyone calm and centered upon the practical business of living life, understood in the context of tradition though contingency, randomness, and the vicissitudes of free will. Religion is indeed the opiate of the masses, but to the extent that, as Giles Delueze might argue, knowledge of how this might be the case cannot and does not allow us to avoid its satiating glamour because within each attempt to overcome the oppressive and limiting aspects of our Leviathan, humanity functions to sedate itself through the very terms of its systemic freedom.

What is left is enacted by a contingent that, while recognizing the limits imposed and demanded, does not, as Zizek makes sense of the Buddhist philosophy of detachment, after all, totally comply with those limits, and indeed, lives a double life. Yet this one is not the conned apathetic agent of futility and happiness; on the contrary, it is the engaged and living aspect of the limitation itself.

There is a point, a moment, where Philosophy is split: one Philosophy continues in its traditionally real ontological approach and will see every discourse as a sign to be placed back into the correlational  (real) limit; the other Philosophy sees philosophical statements as the material of a science, as it begins to show what philosophical statements establish, what they do as objectival acts, as things in themselves, behaving in characteristic manners to establish typical situations, that can be identified and predicted along certain lines of purpose. 

This type of knowledge is deemed invalid in the narrative of reality despite every effort to validate it in narrative (the philosophical science is negated in the act of narrative) and so occupies a kind of knowledge that is usually categorized and classified as esoteric, but indeed is a science that is offensive to real agents of transcendence, which is to say, to practical reason. 

This situation always is the case (see my book “The Moment of Decisive Significance” for the description example) as history may be discerned along lines of the relationship of this polemical constant over the motions of ideological climate and of their reactionary politics.