Orientation and Meaninglessness

An event is a mark of where meaning takes the place. ‘The place’ can be anything, from a positive known-unknown, such as ignorance, to a negative unknown-unknown, such as a thing in-itself. These instances correspond to Badiou’s event as well as Zizek’s, respectively.

An event is a lacuna begun on one side of the sentence waiting for the other side; an event is the erasure of the lacuna, what Hegel could call a negation of negation.

Meaninglessness could likewise be understood in the same way as a lacuna. Namely, is it the substance that is supposed in the “…”, or is it more in line with Rudolf Otto’s version where the meaning is already gleaned from what came before and after?

Similarly we have our orientations:

Given an event which erupts into and or disrupts meaning: it is the difference between a sense which finds itself through presentations of words and the sorting out of what sense could be (is possible) made from the words and clauses already established — where there is a possibility of a meaning or sense which conveys to the person their own lack, incompletion, failure or stupidity, upon which then, toward either asset or deficit, one can build meaning– but then there is the case of already total sensibility that attempts to use words to convey “what already has meaning”.

The difference is in how discourse is used and is the issue more significantly than what is meant by any particular discourse. It is not about whether one is coming to conclusions prematurely or assuming what is meant compared to a thorough reading or consideration of the text — because even the deepest and most studied reading is still based in an assumed estimation; rather, it is more about the nature of the discourse in-itself, which is to say, how one is viewing the terms of the discussion that is at issue, and less what meaning one is making necessarily.

It is the difference between viewing and dealing with what is right there in front of us, and what is supposed to be lurking behind the scenes of any situation. The object itself is right in front of us; the lack is the assumption/ presumption of a deeper truth. The approach is evidenced in the difference between a science and a religion.

The Etiology of the Subject: What Matters.

The object of the subject can be said to be the working from the former Etiology to the latter. Thus then can show how mythology functions effectivly through ideology.

Less an eternal truth, any universal object is subject to the intrinsic mythlogy of the time, consciousness, or “thought activity” most often reckoning the subsuming of thought in mythology as the esssntial state from which all things are true or false (regardless of argumentation and therefore not mythological but essential and absolute): which is to say here that all things are usually and conventionally “of the subject”, that is, “brought under”.

Yet, human beings do not typically function to see themselves as brought under, but instead repeat the redundant cycles of the attempt to escape being brought under by its own subjectivity, ie ideology; spirituality ; religion.

Where as the only true “escape” is to see subjectivity as rather always involved in the mythological “subject matter”. And this means that even “context” is not an essential objective ground.

The meaning of the subject at all times is what matters, as well as “what matters?”

These always conflate meaning towards one or another direction; either toward essential and centralized meaning of usual political subjectivity (brought under), or toward “what matters” as that which is imperative to the subject (what matters most, what matters are there). One of these routes demands, and the other gives. One is fixed and assertive, the other flexible and welcoming. One contains and denies, the other is contained and accepts.

Excerpt From “The Object of the Subject: The Philosophical Hack, the Second Part”

The Modern mode is defined by transcendence. Despite the various eras of the scholarly historian, modernity is an annoyingly persistent overlying of transcendence upon existence by reason; always there is a positing of what cannot be proven onto what is apparent and what is religious in this regard is the assumption of what should be apparent by all parties. The atheist is annoyed with the theists, and vice versa. The farmer annoyed with the trader of finance, and vice versa. The regular person is annoyed with technology; the Silicon Valley tech-star cannot understand how technology is pointless. Key-shortcuts on computers are annoying and frustrating to some while wonderfully efficient to others. History was incorrect in this way, and history verifies the various points we wish to make in that way. Everywhere and at all times modernity brings in the transcendent aspect to be concerned with itself; the Wall Street wizard who relies upon her wits to make powerful business deals; the business owner who does yoga to allow him to center on what he has to do today to make and sell the best pastries; the dog walker who has to negotiate eight dogs down a busy city street and pick up after them. Transcendence brings the appearance of reality into focus by presenting us the conditions for existence, from the daily insistences and nuances of social interaction, to the great and deep physical discoveries of science, to the spiritual-magical fronts of consciousness and other planes of existence. Transcendence allows for it all to “be-there”, whether it be ‘only’ thoughts or the ‘actual’ world.

—Cedric Nathaniel, The Object of the Subject — OUT OF YOUR MIND and into you hands…SOON !!the-subject-objects-prints
{Artwork from Society6 — https://society6.com/annalynnhammond}

Reason and Emotion.part 4

OK.

The concept behind my idea of the relationship between reason and emotion is that emotion is the significant factor in what reason is able to accomplish.

We can go back to the hypothetical charting of our emotions (and Reason?) the past few days that all of us have been doing because we are so eager to pay attention to ourselves and our emotional (and reasonable ?) states. 😄. OK so we have this hypothetical chart, we’ve graphed all of our values of emotional intensity on the Y axis and the X axis is time. So we have this graph that looks kind of like a stock market chart maybe; In any case, you probably have in mind, at least, what the chart looks like, the ups and downs as the line that connects all the plot points.

Now;

How do we usually conceive reason? Correct me if I’m wrong, but when I think of reason I think of it as this kind of force for activity of myself that will shut down or off otherwise irrational surges of emotion. As we might be having emotion, reason automatically takes over to tell us why we are having that emotion, what may be good or bad or right or wrong about that feeling, as well as how to stop having that emotion. “Levelheaded” is a term that comes to mind to right now. “Rational” is generally understood as not emotional.

Even as irrationality does not necessarily have to do with passion or emotion, I think it is not too difficult to make the association that I’m trying to bring about for your reading concept. So I am pretty much also relating the term “reason” to “sanity”, and “Sensibility” Is also another concept we could lump under what reason is. The category of reason includes all these kinds of descriptors. Yet, I am also not being so general as to equate “reason” to any sort of activity of thinking or the results there of, that goes on to make a truth from subjectivity or subjective opinion or thinking. I’m not taking the postmodern kind of relative position to say that reason is just something that individual human subjects do whether or not they are rational or make sense. I am definitely using the term “reason” as the non-standardized truth of postmodern subjectivity, before reason enters into pluralist relation; likewise, this is not Kantian or Hegelian “world” Reason, here necessarily.

Reason in-itself is this thing that establishes subjective truth within a world of relativity. But also, and I think this is significant: reason is that which is denied in so much as the object called “reason” is excluded within that world of subjectivity, which is to say, as much as it is not excluded from the condition of relativity of the world. The issue involved here is what I call “the founding term”; in the usual conventional sense, the founding term is assumed to be “relativity”, whereas this discourse that we are involved with right now has a founding term of “reason”.

OK, I hope that makes enough sense to you to understand what I’m saying when I say “reason”. If I was to talk about the tree over there you would not have to ask me what I mean by “tree”; nevertheless, I believe that I have given the reader enough descriptors to understand what I’m talking about when I say “reason”. Beyond a few stray orientating questions, any other doubt would be extraneous and somehow, I feel, purposely obstinate about not wishing to understand what I’m talking about; I.e. It would be involved in establishing the One Route.

– A pertinent guiding question here: Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical?

And a tentative guiding answer: Everything you’ve been taught about Kierkegaard is wrong.

👽

All right; I’ll let you suck The juices out of that fruit for a bit. I suppose there will have to be a part five.

Emotion and Reason. Part 3

So back to my original intention behind this post that I have now divided up into three parts.

I am challenging the notion that reason is the crowning authority of human existence and consciousness. And, as a commenter on Part 2 pointed out: I do agree with the observation that what we often think is rational or reasonable is often hardly that.

But I would even counter this observation by saying that such an observation is based in an assumption of reason: it is by reason it’s self that we are able to make such distinctions.

I suggest keeping in mind the idea of the Two Routes, which is an extrapolation of the non-philosophical premise of unilateral duality: by pointing something out and describing it I am not therefore suggesting that something is wrong with it nor making an argument that I have a better idea: I am simply describing a fact. If I say the tree is green and it has bark, I am not suggesting that I have a better way that the tree should be. Of course we can fall down the rabbit hole of what I call conventional philosophical speculation and consider all the probability and possibility of subjective experience of that tree. We can talk about how these subjective reality is may be true and that how our world is constituent of a plurality of subjective worlds. I am not making any argument about whether or not phenomenal subjective worlds are true or false; The veracity of any subjective opinion is absolutely up for debate.

What becomes evident by the contradiction that arises between these two types of understanding, though, is called a unilateral duality. This is to say that we take each of those two situations as situations that indeed are true, but then also note that the activity of the attempt to reconcile those two situations into a further reconciled state only speaks of the One Route. Hence what I am proposing as The Two Routes. Readers can look back at some of my posts to try and wrap ones head around this more fully, one can read Francois Laruelle’s non-philosophical books, and one can investigate what other people have to say about non-philosophy, if really need to comprehend all those details to be able to move over into the issue of an orientation upon objects. It’s OK. No shame there.

Nonetheless; The example that I’m working with here is the strange paradox that (1) reason can somehow analyze it self to say that this situation over here is not reasonable or not rational, and then this situation over there we’re going to categorize another various sort of system, and then this over yonder is what we call actual reason in comparison to these two or three or more possibilities, and then the whole thing amounts to an argument that we can negotiate over about what reason is, and (2) That reason as an object in-itself is characterized by point (1). This is an example of a unilateral duality, and it characterizes a particular manner or approach by which we can begin to understand what the human being is doing.

*

This approach is not dissimilar to the way that counseling might approach someone with, say, anxiety or depression or some sort of neurosis, to use an older term, or some pervading issue that a client may come in for psychological help.

I believe a particular theory that I am nodding toward right here is called Internal Family Systems (IFS). But there are a few theoretical approaches that incorporate a similar manner.

I think the idea is not very new: A client comes in complaining of an inability to stop Behaving in a certain manner, say for example, avoiding parties or social situations because of accute social anxiety, say. Keep in mind that I am not a practicing counselor but I’m just beginning to learn.

In any case, a possible approach to this situation is to get the client to externalize the problem. In other words, what the client is having trouble with is this whole thing that she calls her self which manifests in general as a thinking subject that is her self. The point of the intervention is to help the client see or look at the presenting issue as though it is not part of a whole system that is “her Self”, to help her to To gain sufficient distance from the issue in order to view the issue and address the issue as though it is affecting her self rather than being constituent of her singular whole person.

The issue here is not a speculation or a negotiation about whether or not there is this whole subject called the client herself. We treat the client as though she is an interrelation of various effectual aspects as the primary methodological material, as opposed to a “whole” person who is screwed up in various ways.

In reference to what I’m talking about so far as reason, or as I tend to call “philosophy” sometimes, by suggesting that the client may be affected by a problem rather than being the problem itself, I am thereby not suggesting that the problem may indeed not have to do with a whole system. Rather, I am suggesting that we can approach the whole system by viewing the system in a different manner yet while the system is still functioning and operating as a whole system, which is to say, excluding nothing.

So I will repeat; to point out the fact that reason itself is implied in the activity of indicating things that are not reasonable or indeed irrational as opposed to reasonable or rational, does not negate the fact that indeed reason is allowing for this division of itself. Developing different terms in order to compensate for this apparent paradox gets us nowhere significant into understanding what the human being actually does as it is, except that it gives us insight in that this is indeed what the human being consciousness does: A fact of the object that is the human being. Developing new terms in this way maintains and reifies the one route. Reason is not negated by describing what reason does, neither does such an honest description suggest that there is another way that reason might be operating. The conventional philosophical route Is thus characterized by a method wherein a fact can only be argued with by denying the fact itself. Hence, I say the conventional philosophical method is based in denial. Yet I am not suggesting that there is a better way, or that philosophy/reason should do or be something different. I am merely stating a fact about conventional philosophy.

*

I believe by this line of reasoning I have come up with a second fact of the phenomenal subject. I think I came up with a first fact a year or two or so and you would have to look in my past posts for it. I think the first fact is that a phenomenal subject is bounded by nothing. But I could be wrong. Lol. Actually, with these two facts in place we could thereby come up with a third fact of the phenomenal subject that we have been calling “correlationalism”. Science is based on an honest acceptance of the facts, even while the facts might be tested.

OK. Well it looks like I’ve gotten done with part three and I still haven’t gotten to the original intention behind the whole post so it looks like there’s going to be a part 4

👾

On Derrida: Voice and Phenomenon

On Derrida: Voice and Phenomenon

On Derrida: Voice and Phenomenon
— Read on iambobbyy.com/2019/03/10/on-derrida-voice-and-phenomenon/

Interesting conventional small exegesis of Derrida. I think it shows where Derrida fits into time in contrast to what a subject might be doing at any time. The subject of Derrida is exhibiting a particular moment of time; he is not describing a moment which extends into, through, or as time. Where he is involved with such metaphysics, exactly there we are able to breach his proclamations and find the object.

But of course, my issue is the object, and not so much the subject. So there it is.

This is to suggest that the subject in its centrality is involved with a problem of communication. The mark of Derrida shows that he must have been of his moment; the extension which occurs through an understanding of his texts, no matter how closely we read them, is itself an exercise of not understanding what he is saying, of compensating for the centrality Of subject thought, ignoring it, and brining it into the present as though it indeed is Derrida who meant such a thing.

This shows that we are dealing with Derrida only in as much as we are dealing with a misreading of him, and as much as we do not behave as though our misreading is indeed a misreading. This contradiction thus shows us less how everything is bound in subjectivity, and more how human beings are what they do.

For Under the Holiday Tree..

Two ground breaking philosophical books would be an excellent present for your curious minded philosopher !

The descriptions of the books online are not very good, so here are some better descriptions:

“Non-philosophy and Philosophy” is a short essay that speaks to the simplicity of the philosophical underpinnings of a few big-names in Western philosophy. It suggests that authors are not so much arguing various points as they are indicating a particular experience that I call ‘the philosophical revolution’.

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“The Moment of Decisive Significance” is an alternative journey through the Gospels.

What the Introduction calls an ‘object oriented’ reading of the Gospels beckons to Graham Harman’s Object Oriented Ontology or Object Oriented Philosophy but is more an indicator of a difference in approach, what one could call a non-conventional or un-traditional approach.

Bringing in authors from Kierkegaard to Harman, Kant to Laruelle, Feuerbach to Zizek, Plato to Badiou, the use of philosophical discussion is not viscous. This book goes straight through the story in the Gospels explaining and detailing how the pieces and events of the Gospels can adhere in a manner that appear cogent and sensible apart from the explanation that relies upon a theological Oneness. And yet, the book is not an argument against religion; it suggests that there are ‘two routes’ upon objects that do not reduce to anihilate each other, even if one of those routes always works toward annihilation.

This essay is not saying very much about religious belief or an ability to have faith; rather, it suggests that Jesus is speaking to a small minority of people who are having a particular experience of world. By this revelation, it suggests that the Gospels, and indeed the Bible, is saying something much larger and much more significant than another proposal about God; The Story of Jesus exemplifies and reveals how the human being functions by giving us a view into not only the variety of experience that consciousness allows for, but actually into a particular mythological moment that is kept shrouded by the idea of religion, indeed beyond esotericism, albeit, for the purposes of having a particular kind of world. It is thereby a discussion about what philosophy and religion do, and as well an exploration of consciousness itself.

The book is written for the layman and scholar alike.

I hope these less haughty descriptions will entice your curiosity.

Free Speech is Downstream from Territory. 

REBLOG HERE.

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I have pondered for a while what Soren Kierkegaard talks about. We can talk about his points elsewhere, but, as I have said elsewhere, my first concern with him was how what he wrote was so obvious to me right off the bat. Then subsequent to my first encountering him, I found that the general opinion is that his works are not very easy to understand; this perplexed me.

After grappling with the possibility and significance of this apparent direct and unclouded communication, I began to consider that this was not a universal human situation. What I mean is, when I spoke about this strange situation with other people, it likewise became obvious to me that they did not have the same experience with the text. It was not that they necessarily misunderstood K, or had a different opinion, rather, it was that I could tell that they had come to these understandings of K by a different manner than I did, a different route, and because of this different manner, they were evidencing, what I saw, as a basic misunderstanding of him; the understanding I had was somehow and oddly different. It was as if in considering a table, they were taking the veneer of wood grain as the truth of the material of the table, whereas the table was made of plastic; somehow I already knew the table was plastic covered by a coating made to look like wood.

Nevertheless, and despite the route and substantive meaning, I did find that a few people understood what I was coming to see: That this feature of Being human that K seems to strike so resoundingly, is not founded in a common human sort, but indeed must have arisen with a particular manner of knowing things; in order to understand what he is saying (that the table is plastic, not that he is describing the ‘plasticity’), one must have already had a sort of “informing primer”, so to speak. But this is not some academic educational listing of bullet points or necessarily involved study of the object-terms and definitional clauses of his essays; one must have had been informed underneath his awareness that certain things were the case, certain organizations of clauses, particular formations of of conceptual cement, if you will, that went into the kind of semantic scheme that one uses to even be able to understand anything at all. This must be the case because of the particular kind of event that must have been at work as the impetus for his work; for all his works talk about the same thing. I hypothesized that Kierkegaard’s writings are the product of a particular cultural manifest, and that part of this manifest is two ways of coming upon real things, that the manner that consciousness deals with the particular cultural appropriation of objects is to develop a bifurcated possibility of choice.

*

When we get round the possibility that Kierkegaard himself is accessible through a consideration of all of his expressions taken as objective representations of his inner self, that someone we may get to know K’s inside from the outside, then we may begin to consider a different manner of understanding worlds. When we understand this is not merely a subjective manner of individual and separate brains coming upon an objective universe through different semantic organizations, but more a psychoanalytical situation, then we can also appreciate this post of the LINK above.  We can begin to see that cultural appropriation of objects is the common manner of consciousness operating; the various manners of maintaining of subject-object duality for the sake of an inclusive foundational category (human, world, universe, etc…) is but one manner of staking out territory for the purpose of speaking about things in a particular way. For the issue concerns when we might find and actual ground of universal scientific objectivity, against which humans have historically merely been in a “conceptual superstition”.

I was brought to Kierkegaard here because K speaks about such conventional territory as itself a territory where human beings are allowed only to think (or speak) about things in a particular manner, referencing particular and common ways of understanding objects: Belief and faith are the real operational manners through which a human being is supposed to present herself: We should be free and territorialized; but Kierkegaard seems to be speaking toward the out side of this kind of freedom. We can also find Delusional Guitar Players here (Delueze and Guattari –lol) with their de-ontology and de-territorial proposals. But the problem is then further aggravated when such “de-” is taken in stride to indicate a territory that is not territorialized (we could get into Francois Laurelle here); instead of describing a territory by which we inscribe ourselves as another unitive (albeit schizophrenic) entity, Kierkegaard perpetually places us in an authority that is again retracted from its (existence/post-modern) mechanistic horrifying present zen future modern human projection. The Delusional Guitar Players was describing a state that would quickly find itself, ironically, deterritorialized in its foundations, to be, basically, anachronistic except as a modern religious apology. Sure, sometimes we should be polite and mind our manners…

We are indeed still modern after all….

Preliminary thoughts on the parameters of determination: Phenomenology and Object Orientation.

We already know how reality proceeds; there is no mystery about the mysterious part. We love mystery. We love figuring things out and we love not knowing; every time we come to know of something, then something else catches our attention. This is no mystery.

The Why of this process we also love to get into. We love to always withhold something or have something be withheld; that is what profit is, as well as magic, as well as the object of science. Even as we try to disclose everything, we always leave something out, and we love to find out what is it so we can have something else left out, to find that out. This also is no mystery, it happens all the time, everywhere.

Yes, the contingency of reality is why we live; we look into something, and everything changes . Despite my depressions and frustrations with how reality may be for any moment, these insecurities is indeed why I continue. They are not what I am attempting to overcome, they are the roots of the insecurities itself; a depression is weather; my insecurities inseparable from the realization of happiness except as we might speak of different centralized systems of motion ; they are what I withhold while I propose to be looking into them. As soon as I find a way to relive myself of the insecurity, another one pops up.

The manner, order and cause of these psychic contingencies occupy the totality of my concern; they inform to where my attention is focused. I may look outside these psychic events to events that are not psychic, and even though I may be the mediator and arbiter of such events and such objects, I am able to consider these occasions outside of the notion that they are occurring in my psyche. What this means then, is that such occurrences are not occurring as psychic events, but are indeed occurring as objects independent of the psychic occurrence. This means that to tie such moments together, the event of an object that is entirely of my psyche, and the event of the object that has nothing to do with my psyche, in a causal relation is problematic at least. As Saint Anslem: This is an unstable condition. We begin to understand how the philosophical turn that saw ‘language/discourse’ or ‘meaning/semiotics’ or ‘phenomenon’ as some sort of temporal historical stage, can itself be based in a misunderstanding of the issue involved with those very categories, and likewise how the turn to the object is most probably, by many, also misunderstood in its bases.

We might find the misunderstanding is founded in the “either/or” relation of reductive philosophy. Exactly how do we determine phenomenology from the rest of the western philosophical discourse is extending back to Spinoza or Locke or something ? We do it by ignoring the phenomenology of the situation and particularizing things that are phenomenon with other things that somehow fall out of the category of ‘phenomenon’ that we have to find arbitrarily along a continuum of traditional semantics . Likewise the idea that if we don’t adhere to this traditional lineage and don’t fall into the abyss of Progressive discursive formations then we are talking about nothing, that which has no definition at all: That resultant idea is an either/ or proclamation that excludes the phenomenon of its situation: It proclaims itself in a causal relationship of psyche and object, that this causation is necessary and determined by some as yet discovered “great power“; it is this put off great power that is being negated in the resultant default to nihilism, not the object-universe and definitely not humanity and most likely not civilization: It is entirely evidence by which we can describe what is occurring “Of the psyche”, which is to say phenomenologically. The former phenomenological derivations were or are not, in fact, speaking necessarily to nor about ‘original experiences’ that may be talked about in a unitive and omnipresent “greatest category” field which holds room for such ‘subjective reckonings’, wherein everyone gets to discover all the differences of personal experience. Indeed, in the field of social justice and politics, we do get to discover what has been hiding behind my own inherent prejudices and limitations I didn’t know existed, or perhaps I did but could not alleviate them, and so I get to work on them . But the event of the phenomenon is not based in such subjectivity, and the reasoning that says such discourses as pointing to some psychic event of individual experience is/was a misunderstanding of the notion of what the phenomenon might be. Hence, likewise, an inherent misunderstanding of what Object Orientation might entail.

The question always concerns thus if the authors which proclaim such philosophical categories themselves are misunderstanding their own position, and how that might be possible. We then come to what real motivators for identification of objects might say about the world we live in and even, indeed, if “we” live in such a world. Further, the very idea that arises when such ‘unfounded’ divergence from the ‘traditional’ narrative occurs is if such dichotomy of existence is a true situation that we then have to question; if the various notions that arrive for methodological procedures are really addressing valuable issues; how it is possible that we might be able to decide to dismiss an object sufficiently from the psychic occurrence, etc….

More later…

 

 

The Soul: Bifurcation and Fracturing of Being, since we got Time as well Cause for a Valid Ontological Identity: Suspended in Contradiction to Avoid Collapse.

Something is incredibly wrong with Katrina Burtch, but I love it.

Its sounds eerily like Disembodied Poetics.

If we can think it, then why not?  Even if it is a higher development of Modern religious apology. Perfectly valid.

It’s disturbing.  Lol.

But we barely even started to find out what religion is.  Where are we going?

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What do I mean by Modern Religious Apology ?

Referring to my previous post about Plotinus: A justification for the placement of the soul (for any term, as in this case, a situation of ‘thought’) into a discursive scheme or scaffold.

Once we depart from a necessity for an  essential and central thinker, we are allowed through historical semantic scaffolding into thinking apart from thought. We are able, for a term, to break from the unitive paradigm.

The question should be how is this allowed? What mechanisms are in place, what joints and beams lay to bring about a meaning that supposed its ability to ‘remove itself from itself’ ? And we come to types. 

But other questions are allowed, as Katrina shows. The reason why it is allowed, thus, should have nothing to do with any discursive scaffolding, but only because something has occurred to create a blind spot, so that we can now see objects and relations without having to reconcile the scaffolding to a causal scaffold: The reason we are allowed to move on before explicitly discovering how we are able to move on is embedded in the assumption involved with the new reasoning itself. 

This process of modern-post-modern modes replicating itself, we call ‘apologetics’, and reproduces the same mechanisms we find in the early Christian church fathers and the eventual Scholasitcs, which is to say,  “post-Event”; the reduction to a common human experience allows specific occurrences to be generalized, extended out from their proper sphere, as they are encoded to thus be found or dis-coded (discovered) by the intrinsic mythology. Anything ‘post’ is understood to be dissimilar to its object and indeed progressed away from it even as it inscribes itself exceptional through what is common (irony/contradiction avoided and or suspended). 
With discourses such as Katrina’s, we able to frame for understanding the issue of the three as multiplicity forms it’s justiciation for inclusion in the Valid reality: The proper placement of the soul.

With the philosophical death of God, the soul was displaced. Indeed, the Western Enlightened mind thought it could achieve ‘God’ (for a term) through the ‘divinely inspired’ (or whatever we want to call it) thinking, What we typically call “Modernism” was the last call for heroics, the last phase of the project of establishing ‘God’s world’. But counter-point to this great idealism was the rebuttal of such a project, what came to be known, again in its end, as post-modernism. If anything, post-modernism is at root the attempt to inject the fallacy of the soul into the project of Progress without the implied and inherent oppressive Modernist agent. Yet, what it achieved was merely the dissolution of itself, which in the end, was found to be merely a Modernist ploy; the strategy of Modern is to place itself as the scapegoat, too there by use irony to indicate a patsy. The use of this patsy can never be found: was it the Western Colonialism, Capitalism, Christianity, Masculinity, Industry — we could go on — that was to blame? For, every time an accusation is made, a justification through the accusatory critique is found to have just as much credibility from an argumentative  standpoint: The method of argument constitutes what may hold veracity. What occurred through post-modern, how ever we want to define it, was indeed a humanity without a soul. Anyone now can use any justification into its own identity of soul; this fact denies a unitive category that we can know as ‘soul’, that is, unless we are able to define things outside of definition, or a definition that reaches ourtside of itself. 

We should always look for the solution to any real problem in two places: The first place is in social appearance. What we have in this solution is a distilment of the soul-less human being toward the assertion of its soul-full-ness, These various assertions that find ‘actual’ culprits as they manifest as real antagonists for the sake of the asserted soul. Donald Trump in the US, and congress, the governing body that negotiates, who can’t get anything done, the threat of Catalan succession, the unstable Euro-Union, North Korea, the Balkans of a couple decades ago, Ruwanda, the Cold War; we could go on. Likewsie, The idea that we are leaving and coming into various significant and large phases that take place within lifetimes in the growth of the species Homo sapiens is actually a microscopic view of what is more properly a galactic motion; a century of turns all take place within the same scheme or mode or argument such that decades of ‘new’ ideas really don’t move us very far conceptually, yet even as they are are seen to, due to the current imperative to develop  ‘conceptual products’, which is the real imperative: Create, assert, establish and demand identity. These amount to real social manifestations of philosophical solutions to the problem of having no soul. These solutions are based in an individual’s orientation upon the True Object of ideology, of seeing such solutions as having value. But of course, we are not arguing that they don’t; that is what is significant about a divergent philosophy: It’s value, with reference to the identity driven real commodities of thought, is not real.

The other place we look for a solution is less immediate. This second kind of solution takes place somewhere ‘outside’ the political realm. Feminism, at least the kind that Katrina os evidencing here,  proposes to be able to bridge this ‘somewhere else’ and the political realms: she indicates this Abstract position through the term “Xeno”. (I think Terrence over at Agent Swarm might have something to add about this.) Such philosophical-critical discourses depend upon an anchoring that extends outside but is not accounted for in the political realm. Like a ship: The rope disappears into and beyond the surface of the water into the depths; what occurs down there from the perspective of the ships crew is only surmised from the effect the anchor has upon the ship, but then only when the rope is viewed and contemplated upon. Otherwise, the crew and passengers of the ship see itself as moving forward, towards its destination of adventure and exploration, the final destination only speculated about. Indeed Katrina says that we can look at her project has a type of Platonism. 

The ‘soul’, for any term, whether we call it ‘thought’, psyche’, inner world’, spirit, nothingness, chaos –Im sure we could come uno with many more, and despite what we want to define of the term itself — is what is beyond the surface of the water. Feminism thereby gains its stature through a stabilized antagonist that we could call “the (masculine/male)  ship”. It seeks to organize the ship to its anchor, through various incarnations of the soul. And yet, on board ship, we have all sorts of people and ideas, about the ship, what its doing, what the anchor is, what its doing. Katrina’s discourse thus must posit itself in the contradiction that is inherent from the perspective of the ship’s passengers and the assertion that comes from the view that supposes itself of the anchor itself. Such feminism (Katrina’s) cannot thus continue to argue about where the rope actually goes, or how far down it falls into the ocean, or what it is attached to, because from the perspective of the ship, no one has an ability to know what is beyond the surface. So with Object Orientation Philosophy, the strategy is merely now to work with what they have on board, to organize a common manner of ‘ship’ with reference to the again common ‘unknown’ that is the anchor, but without having to attempt to convince the people what the anchor might actually be or be doing under the water. Such feminist proposals thus exist and gain their veracity by virtue of the contradiction inherent of their discourses, but now with out having to justify them with reference to what may be outside or not taking place on the ship. Such proposals must suspend the contradiction inherent by the implication of origins in the proposal itself, and because it is most probable that feminism would not suggest there is anything ‘outside’ (philosophers only speculate on what could be outside, and thus do not have to admit to anything) we would then have to understand that such proposals not only must carry on “as if”, but indeed, carry on in total ignorance of the fact, and again, despite what anyone would want to argue.

…as an opening into her “types”: We are able to begin to find out what human beings (consciousness)- philosophy does.

Brilliant.

Its all unfolding perfectly. Totally love it.

Listen to her music and then listen to this album. 30 years apart. Am I too far off at hearing a relation? 

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…And a coincidental posting this morning at ALTexploit