In this episode of Literary Tales, we continue our examination of science fiction filmography and pivot into the 1990s with the paradigm shift of …
—– Pretty cool analysis.
I’m gonna make my comment to Paul right here instead of in the comments of the actual post.
There are two things that really caught my attention.￼￼
1) The evolution of technology. Specifically he says “technology drives evolution”
2) then later on, may be a few times, he talks about, if I remember correctly, that we supplicate at the altar of technology. Something like that￼.￼￼
I cannot really know if he has in mind what I’m going to talk about here, but I feel that Paul and myself have two slightly different approaches upon the same fabric of being; Perhaps one could say, to styles. Even though I think Paul is much more literate and writes way better than I do￼. 😁
It is interesting to me that he conveys this discussion about humanity’s relationship with technology in the specific manner that he does. I believe that he is very precise in how he talks about things. And I appreciate his skill in this way. ￼
First he says the evolution of technology, and then he says that technology drives evolution. These statements seem to hint at a relationship with technology that is very difficult to elucidate in our day.
I feel like it could’ve been Heidegger, one of his talks about the Greeks the ancient Greeks, who talks about technology, techne, where the feeling that I always got out of Heidegger, though he has never stated it out right￼,￼￼￼ Is that it is indeed a relationship with technology that is significant in our determination of what knowledge is and how we work with it.
Heidegger also I think was very precise in how he used words and assembled them together. For example, the work of art. He speaks about the work that is being done by art upon human beings. He thus conjures the relationship that human beings have with art, and leaves basically aside the question of human beings that produce art, of some sort of theory about the creative spirit. I feel that Graham Harmon with his object ontology picks up on this relationship. I feel that the significance of talking about objects is to indicate that indeed creativity, while perhaps the word “over rated “is perhaps too strong, indeed “too important” indicates the centralized agent of the universe that we know from history called “mankind”, or “humanity”, Is showing itself as The less important element in a series of factors which constitute being in the universe.
Here again I harken to Paul talking about how the evolution of technology is really driven by technology.￼￼￼￼￼￼￼ ￼￼￼￼ I feel that he must be indicating more the relationship that is occurring.
Then towards the end of his short talk, he talks about how humanity supplicates at the altar of technology. I like this because it appears to me to speak specifically about something that is taking place in the knowledge of humanity that occurs more as a type of religious faith than it does some sort of centralized rational agent of the universe that goes out and creates technology because it is so intelligent and smart.
Thanks Paul. I will be interested in your reply.
And I will be interested in your lecture about this relationship as it appears in the 2000s.
“The true substance of things lay in the depths, while the dramatic power of material churns and crashes like waves on the surface.”
A paraphrase of Graham Harman, I commandeer his polemic to notice a felicity to the actuality of the situation.
We are taught, both religiously and philosophically, that The truth of things lies in our subjectivity. We are taught that all the drama that’s occurring, all the argumentation￼, The passions, the perceptions And conceptions,￼￼ the interaction, is where we are to look for the truth.
We tend to ignore post-structuralism’s critique as merely another subjective argument. Namely, that post-structuralism as a philosophy appears to arise from nowhere, has no basis, ultimately having no substance that could’ve made the argument or pointed out the various things.
And everyone seems to just take that as a given. Indeed the whole comment of Post-structuralism is that subjectivity itself, while involved in these various negotiations of historical and discursive elements, is ultimately repressed by them, the truth of the very interaction repressed, is denied, is excluded from the negotiation itself￼￼ as subjectivity, the knowledge-power. The conclusion that we tend to rely on and work with is that, well, the truth of the matter must be that human beings and the world lie only in their subjectivity.￼
The radical truth which begins to describe the fallacy of orientating substance upon the exchange of materials concerns objects, and ultimately, the truth of the situation.
As this rephrase tells, true substance lay in the shadowy depths.
So ironically, it is a counseling, it is an anthropology, as I call it, which uncovers the true substance of what we’re dealing with between the Selfand the world, what true universal objects are in themselves.
Conventional Philosophy. becomes ultimately this place of politics, this place of “playing around”, at once comedic, at once tragic. We find d that a group of human beings which attempt to find itself and themselves in a substance of material negotiation – ultimately these human beings become fucked up. They don’t know how to behave. They begin to collapse in upon themselves, to create discord and problems everywhere because ultimately the source of “there being” it problematic in insubstantial￼.￼￼
The failure of the enlightenment is the victory of ideological power which subjugates human beings to its whim despite themselves.
It is not “we” that are subjects of ideological power. It is that we are involved with a faith that ideological power is synthetically a priori not only to our own very ontological substance￼￼…
….And the substance of everything in the universe￼
I am finally diving into Levi Bryant’s “Democracy of Objects”, and I gotta say, I do not know why I hadn’t looked At this sooner.
This is not a big post; I was only reminded of my position:
It is due to the current correlational episteme — not in spite of — that we have access to objects in-themselves that are not for human thought. It is due to the ubiquity of thought that we can know the object outside of human subjectivity, perception, language, etc…
The object ontologists all stake thier claim in one way or another upon correlationalism; basically that we can know of objects that exist outside of thought, or outside of the phenomenal thinker.
Again: My point is it is due to the total inclusivity of thought that we are thus able to have knowlegde of objects in themselves — contra Kant and others who pose this condition as leaving the object as a moot point, totally removed from consideration.
An event is a mark of where meaning takes the place. ‘The place’ can be anything, from a positive known-unknown, such as ignorance, to a negative unknown-unknown, such as a thing in-itself. These instances correspond to Badiou’s event as well as Zizek’s, respectively.
An event is a lacuna begun on one side of the sentence waiting for the other side; an event is the erasure of the lacuna, what Hegel could call a negation of negation.
Meaninglessness could likewise be understood in the same way as a lacuna. Namely, is it the substance that is supposed in the “…”, or is it more in line with Rudolf Otto’s version where the meaning is already gleaned from what came before and after?
Similarly we have our orientations:
Given an event which erupts into and or disrupts meaning: it is the difference between a sense which finds itself through presentations of words and the sorting out of what sense could be (is possible) made from the words and clauses already established — where there is a possibility of a meaning or sense which conveys to the person their own lack, incompletion, failure or stupidity, upon which then, toward either asset or deficit, one can build meaning– but then there is the case of already total sensibility that attempts to use words to convey “what already has meaning”.
The difference is in how discourse is used and is the issue more significantly than what is meant by any particular discourse. It is not about whether one is coming to conclusions prematurely or assuming what is meant compared to a thorough reading or consideration of the text — because even the deepest and most studied reading is still based in an assumed estimation; rather, it is more about the nature of the discourse in-itself, which is to say, how one is viewing the terms of the discussion that is at issue, and less what meaning one is making necessarily.
It is the difference between viewing and dealing with what is right there in front of us, and what is supposed to be lurking behind the scenes of any situation. The object itself is right in front of us; the lack is the assumption/ presumption of a deeper truth. The approach is evidenced in the difference between a science and a religion.
The object of the subject can be said to be the working from the former Etiology to the latter. Thus then can show how mythology functions effectivly through ideology.
Less an eternal truth, any universal object is subject to the intrinsic mythlogy of the time, consciousness, or “thought activity” most often reckoning the subsuming of thought in mythology as the esssntial state from which all things are true or false (regardless of argumentation and therefore not mythological but essential and absolute): which is to say here that all things are usually and conventionally “of the subject”, that is, “brought under”.
Yet, human beings do not typically function to see themselves as brought under, but instead repeat the redundant cycles of the attempt to escape being brought under by its own subjectivity, ie ideology; spirituality ; religion.
Where as the only true “escape” is to see subjectivity as rather always involved in the mythological “subject matter”. And this means that even “context” is not an essential objective ground.
The meaning of the subject at all times is what matters, as well as “what matters?”
These always conflate meaning towards one or another direction; either toward essential and centralized meaning of usual political subjectivity (brought under), or toward “what matters” as that which is imperative to the subject (what matters most, what matters are there). One of these routes demands, and the other gives. One is fixed and assertive, the other flexible and welcoming. One contains and denies, the other is contained and accepts.
The Modern mode is defined by transcendence. Despite the various eras of the scholarly historian, modernity is an annoyingly persistent overlying of transcendence upon existence by reason; always there is a positing of what cannot be proven onto what is apparent and what is religious in this regard is the assumption of what should be apparent by all parties. The atheist is annoyed with the theists, and vice versa. The farmer annoyed with the trader of finance, and vice versa. The regular person is annoyed with technology; the Silicon Valley tech-star cannot understand how technology is pointless. Key-shortcuts on computers are annoying and frustrating to some while wonderfully efficient to others. History was incorrect in this way, and history verifies the various points we wish to make in that way. Everywhere and at all times modernity brings in the transcendent aspect to be concerned with itself; the Wall Street wizard who relies upon her wits to make powerful business deals; the business owner who does yoga to allow him to center on what he has to do today to make and sell the best pastries; the dog walker who has to negotiate eight dogs down a busy city street and pick up after them. Transcendence brings the appearance of reality into focus by presenting us the conditions for existence, from the daily insistences and nuances of social interaction, to the great and deep physical discoveries of science, to the spiritual-magical fronts of consciousness and other planes of existence. Transcendence allows for it all to “be-there”, whether it be ‘only’ thoughts or the ‘actual’ world.
The concept behind my idea of the relationship between reason and emotion is that emotion is the significant factor in what reason is able to accomplish.
We can go back to the hypothetical charting of our emotions (and Reason?) the past few days that all of us have been doing because we are so eager to pay attention to ourselves and our emotional (and reasonable ?) states. 😄. OK so we have this hypothetical chart, we’ve graphed all of our values of emotional intensity on the Y axis and the X axis is time. So we have this graph that looks kind of like a stock market chart maybe; In any case, you probably have in mind, at least, what the chart looks like, the ups and downs as the line that connects all the plot points.
How do we usually conceive reason? Correct me if I’m wrong, but when I think of reason I think of it as this kind of force for activity of myself that will shut down or off otherwise irrational surges of emotion. As we might be having emotion, reason automatically takes over to tell us why we are having that emotion, what may be good or bad or right or wrong about that feeling, as well as how to stop having that emotion. “Levelheaded” is a term that comes to mind to right now. “Rational” is generally understood as not emotional.
Even as irrationality does not necessarily have to do with passion or emotion, I think it is not too difficult to make the association that I’m trying to bring about for your reading concept. So I am pretty much also relating the term “reason” to “sanity”, and “Sensibility” Is also another concept we could lump under what reason is. The category of reason includes all these kinds of descriptors. Yet, I am also not being so general as to equate “reason” to any sort of activity of thinking or the results there of, that goes on to make a truth from subjectivity or subjective opinion or thinking. I’m not taking the postmodern kind of relative position to say that reason is just something that individual human subjects do whether or not they are rational or make sense. I am definitely using the term “reason” as the non-standardized truth of postmodern subjectivity, before reason enters into pluralist relation; likewise, this is not Kantian or Hegelian “world” Reason, here necessarily.
Reason in-itself is this thing that establishes subjective truth within a world of relativity. But also, and I think this is significant: reason is that which is denied in so much as the object called “reason” is excluded within that world of subjectivity, which is to say, as much as it is not excluded from the condition of relativity of the world. The issue involved here is what I call “the founding term”; in the usual conventional sense, the founding term is assumed to be “relativity”, whereas this discourse that we are involved with right now has a founding term of “reason”.
OK, I hope that makes enough sense to you to understand what I’m saying when I say “reason”. If I was to talk about the tree over there you would not have to ask me what I mean by “tree”; nevertheless, I believe that I have given the reader enough descriptors to understand what I’m talking about when I say “reason”. Beyond a few stray orientating questions, any other doubt would be extraneous and somehow, I feel, purposely obstinate about not wishing to understand what I’m talking about; I.e. It would be involved in establishing the One Route.
– A pertinent guiding question here: Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical?
And a tentative guiding answer: Everything you’ve been taught about Kierkegaard is wrong.
All right; I’ll let you suck The juices out of that fruit for a bit. I suppose there will have to be a part five.
So back to my original intention behind this post that I have now divided up into three parts.
I am challenging the notion that reason is the crowning authority of human existence and consciousness. And, as a commenter on Part 2 pointed out: I do agree with the observation that what we often think is rational or reasonable is often hardly that.
But I would even counter this observation by saying that such an observation is based in an assumption of reason: it is by reason it’s self that we are able to make such distinctions.
I suggest keeping in mind the idea of the Two Routes, which is an extrapolation of the non-philosophical premise of unilateral duality: by pointing something out and describing it I am not therefore suggesting that something is wrong with it nor making an argument that I have a better idea: I am simply describing a fact. If I say the tree is green and it has bark, I am not suggesting that I have a better way that the tree should be. Of course we can fall down the rabbit hole of what I call conventional philosophical speculation and consider all the probability and possibility of subjective experience of that tree. We can talk about how these subjective reality is may be true and that how our world is constituent of a plurality of subjective worlds. I am not making any argument about whether or not phenomenal subjective worlds are true or false; The veracity of any subjective opinion is absolutely up for debate.
What becomes evident by the contradiction that arises between these two types of understanding, though, is called a unilateral duality. This is to say that we take each of those two situations as situations that indeed are true, but then also note that the activity of the attempt to reconcile those two situations into a further reconciled state only speaks of the One Route. Hence what I am proposing as The Two Routes. Readers can look back at some of my posts to try and wrap ones head around this more fully, one can read Francois Laruelle’s non-philosophical books, and one can investigate what other people have to say about non-philosophy, if really need to comprehend all those details to be able to move over into the issue of an orientation upon objects. It’s OK. No shame there.
Nonetheless; The example that I’m working with here is the strange paradox that (1) reason can somehow analyze it self to say that this situation over here is not reasonable or not rational, and then this situation over there we’re going to categorize another various sort of system, and then this over yonder is what we call actual reason in comparison to these two or three or more possibilities, and then the whole thing amounts to an argument that we can negotiate over about what reason is, and (2) That reason as an object in-itself is characterized by point (1). This is an example of a unilateral duality, and it characterizes a particular manner or approach by which we can begin to understand what the human being is doing.
This approach is not dissimilar to the way that counseling might approach someone with, say, anxiety or depression or some sort of neurosis, to use an older term, or some pervading issue that a client may come in for psychological help.
I believe a particular theory that I am nodding toward right here is called Internal Family Systems (IFS). But there are a few theoretical approaches that incorporate a similar manner.
I think the idea is not very new: A client comes in complaining of an inability to stop Behaving in a certain manner, say for example, avoiding parties or social situations because of accute social anxiety, say. Keep in mind that I am not a practicing counselor but I’m just beginning to learn.
In any case, a possible approach to this situation is to get the client to externalize the problem. In other words, what the client is having trouble with is this whole thing that she calls her self which manifests in general as a thinking subject that is her self. The point of the intervention is to help the client see or look at the presenting issue as though it is not part of a whole system that is “her Self”, to help her to To gain sufficient distance from the issue in order to view the issue and address the issue as though it is affecting her self rather than being constituent of her singular whole person.
The issue here is not a speculation or a negotiation about whether or not there is this whole subject called the client herself. We treat the client as though she is an interrelation of various effectual aspects as the primary methodological material, as opposed to a “whole” person who is screwed up in various ways.
In reference to what I’m talking about so far as reason, or as I tend to call “philosophy” sometimes, by suggesting that the client may be affected by a problem rather than being the problem itself, I am thereby not suggesting that the problem may indeed not have to do with a whole system. Rather, I am suggesting that we can approach the whole system by viewing the system in a different manner yet while the system is still functioning and operating as a whole system, which is to say, excluding nothing.
So I will repeat; to point out the fact that reason itself is implied in the activity of indicating things that are not reasonable or indeed irrational as opposed to reasonable or rational, does not negate the fact that indeed reason is allowing for this division of itself. Developing different terms in order to compensate for this apparent paradox gets us nowhere significant into understanding what the human being actually does as it is, except that it gives us insight in that this is indeed what the human being consciousness does: A fact of the object that is the human being. Developing new terms in this way maintains and reifies the one route. Reason is not negated by describing what reason does, neither does such an honest description suggest that there is another way that reason might be operating. The conventional philosophical route Is thus characterized by a method wherein a fact can only be argued with by denying the fact itself. Hence, I say the conventional philosophical method is based in denial. Yet I am not suggesting that there is a better way, or that philosophy/reason should do or be something different. I am merely stating a fact about conventional philosophy.
I believe by this line of reasoning I have come up with a second fact of the phenomenal subject. I think I came up with a first fact a year or two or so and you would have to look in my past posts for it. I think the first fact is that a phenomenal subject is bounded by nothing. But I could be wrong. Lol. Actually, with these two facts in place we could thereby come up with a third fact of the phenomenal subject that we have been calling “correlationalism”. Science is based on an honest acceptance of the facts, even while the facts might be tested.
OK. Well it looks like I’ve gotten done with part three and I still haven’t gotten to the original intention behind the whole post so it looks like there’s going to be a part 4
On Derrida: Voice and Phenomenon
Interesting conventional small exegesis of Derrida. I think it shows where Derrida fits into time in contrast to what a subject might be doing at any time. The subject of Derrida is exhibiting a particular moment of time; he is not describing a moment which extends into, through, or as time. Where he is involved with such metaphysics, exactly there we are able to breach his proclamations and find the object.
But of course, my issue is the object, and not so much the subject. So there it is.
This is to suggest that the subject in its centrality is involved with a problem of communication. The mark of Derrida shows that he must have been of his moment; the extension which occurs through an understanding of his texts, no matter how closely we read them, is itself an exercise of not understanding what he is saying, of compensating for the centrality Of subject thought, ignoring it, and brining it into the present as though it indeed is Derrida who meant such a thing.
This shows that we are dealing with Derrida only in as much as we are dealing with a misreading of him, and as much as we do not behave as though our misreading is indeed a misreading. This contradiction thus shows us less how everything is bound in subjectivity, and more how human beings are what they do.