The Simplicity of Substance and the Lengthy Post

I have been re-approaching philosophical ideas that have long held a deep significance for me. Because my life has been basically informed by an incessant and consistent questioning of what I am coming up on, I am finding that I am merely continuing to be what I am, which is, for a term, in motion.

I think this last round of doubting comes about because I am realizing that I am more concerned with actual people than I am with my ability to think great thoughts.

Now, what is strange about this is I am intensely antisocial in general while at the same time at ease with being social in a certain context or a certain framework. I generally hate people (groups) but I love and am very concerned with people (individuals). ­čîĆ

*

This is very Zizekian, from the Zizekian standpoint of media/ideological primacy:

“I do not love the world….I pick and choose who and what I love.”

So far as “the world” might be an ideological fantasy established through magical symbols, Zizek, the critical theorist/media critic-turn-philosopher states unequivocally that “love is evil.”

What he means by this is that we are persuaded by an existential anxiety which pervades the maintenance of the fantasy– that is, due to our investment in the truth-value of the fantasy (the value is gained because it prevents us from having to encounter that which we are most of afraid of: the dissolution of the fantasy, or death) — to love the world, to extend an ideological hand out into the grandiose narcissist world because the idealism inherent of the fantasy is we are ‘in this together’, so to speak, individually yet identically.

The modern individual is ethically bound to, at least, trying to love the world. But in the whole, he doesn’t have a clue how to actually love his sisters and brothers around him. The imaginary world establishes intuitive subjective barriers which serve to maintain the ideological modern identity at all costs against his neighbors, while extending out ideals to the “universe” or “the world” where we all must try to get along.

So; yet in truth he denies what is really occurring; which is, we are all being selfish and choosing certain universal things and people to love, and not really loving the world.

It is this tension of modern subjectivity we deny through the institutionally normalized and sanctioned “state of” anxiety which then in relief shows our ultimately ‘sinful’ nature: “In despair to will to be oneself” (as Kierkegaard p´┐╝uts it) ´┐╝is the condition of the modern man concept of love which avoids its true nature: hence, it is evil because it is an ideologically sanctioned “global” love that misses the intimacy that we generally misconstrue in the notion of agape, or man’s love for God. Since, God in this modern sense, is indeed a “usurper” god which takes the place of brotherly love to which agape would otherwise return to reflect in God itself, that is, in the world.

Zizek is, of course, referring to the modern ideal of love by which humanity defers itself and by which humanity is regulated to its conceptual ability.

Beyond the ideological love, by reflection, any love of a transcendent world is a narcissism, a pathological version of the human being. While within the fantasy, the narcissism is justified through the fantasy erected by trauma and told or narrated as “just human” , the “all too human” who takes on little responsibility for his actions, while erecting layers of intellectual and ideological facades in grandiose defense of them. Hence, the love that is evil is indeed, on one hand, a carnal love based in the libidinal control of the ego which then moves to impose or identify itself with the super-ego material norms: the subjective ideological identity.

Yet on the other, love is evil from the transcendent standpoint because the love I would have for the world that is my sisters and brothers, that is, not put off to a mere grand idea, is an evil and absurd activity.

So ironically, items that I pick and choose to love are in or of the reality that I cannot but be involved with– this is an evil manner of doing things. Hence, I do not love the world from Zizek’s standpoint of an ideological (media critique) analysis.

But indeed. I should not love the world in this way, so I don’t. Instead, I pick and choose to thus remain consistent and cohered to that which is the fantastic manner by which I must apprehend the ideological world.

The true love I profess is not modern, thus from the modern ideological standpoint, it is evil.

I won’t go on.

(Please don’t) ­čĹĘ­čĆŻÔÇŹ­čÜÇ

*

The Conventional Limit

–from “Re-visioning psychology´┐╝” by James Hillman.

The modern idea of ownership permeates into every thing that we think. This preoccupation with one’s “owned” ideas manifests world as some thing to be or to have as owned. Hence we have the eternal problem for the modern individual which shows up in one instance as rational subjective opinion in a world of argued relative opinions, and in another instance as mental illness. We might even begin to discern what mental health is by understanding how it seeks to commandeer the problematic modern individual´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝ which is — by the plain evidence of all the problem it vomits everywhere by simply being itself — ideologically and institutionally mentally ill, by placing it in a “positive spin”. For I think the most salient and pertinent issue of philosophy and not only psychology is: What exactly is mental health?

We tend to ignore this question as well as ignore the absurdity involved in the object of mental health by trying to reduce it to some physical state of brain or some organizational state of some “pure” mind, by trying to bring about various conceptual apparatuses´┐╝, or simply talking about “ways” or practices that we can do to thus be mentally healthy by the doing of them. But none of these ever really tells us what mental health is except maybe a sort of stillborn fetus of modern science to poke and prod at.

And the people who are really suffering are the ones who mostly get to remain in a state of suffering´┐╝ overall.

Why do we continue to remain so myopic towards a problem which doesn’t seem to be responding very well to these narrow idealistic methods? ´┐╝

But this is not really to make any sort of criticism against processes, interventions, and other efforts to help; for sure, we have to try.

´┐╝´┐╝ Here, we are taking on the interface or relationship between psychology, activity, and philosophy. ´┐╝

´┐╝The most pertinent philosophical discussion of modernity´┐╝´┐╝ in this regard was made by´┐╝ Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in their book “capitalism in schizophrenia”, but indeed their work is saturated with the attempt to come into a plural solution to the problem of the singular self. ´┐╝

The issue, though, that we find permeating philosophy, or what I call conventional philosophy, can be viewed through the adjective pronoun “we”; for, what those philosophers pronounce in their philosophical works, in their psychoanalysis in one sense, is exactly “not” we, but indeed that group of people which is only able to understand humanity as a generalized and common, modern, “we”: Meaning, not the We that arises as world to form the contours of self, but indeed the modern We which is the presumed isolated self within a world of individual isolated selves “out there´┐╝”´┐╝, huddling in cold groups, ´┐╝´┐╝and indeed only of beings associated with the category that we call human. The We doesn’t think of the We which involves rock formations, buildings and quarks. Anything that lives outside of this, what I call, religious and theological designation, we label and denote as ethically inferior and or in need of correction due to its epistemologically implicit error of cognition.

We might then ponder what indeed the idea of correction is manifesting around in this regard. ´┐╝What is this idealistic calcification attempting to protect?

*

I’ll stop there. ´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝

Viewing Corona: Phenomenology and Orientation.

HERE is a link to some current statistics that compare the flu and corona.

The thing I think that video in my previous post marks out is that what makes coronavirus so incredible is that we are looking at it “in just that way”, which is to say, that we are seeing something through a particular ability or manner.

I am a layman, so I could be entirely wrong in my interpretation of this, but…

´┐╝What I hear the doctor saying is that what we consider the flu is just a few instances of pathogen in a vast array of contagions that cause people sickness, either cold or the flu or various other types of illnesses´┐╝.´┐╝ Coronavirus is the name for a particular set of viruses that cause symptoms, that cause sicknesses. The reason why we often hear it called “novel coronavirus” is because it is a new mutation of a type of coronavirus. Coronaviruses are around all the time and people get sick from them all the time, it’s just that the scientific community is relatively familiar with these various types of coronaviruses, influenza, the common cold. But the one that we’re calling COVID-19 (corona virus disease discovered in 2019) is one that we’re not familiar with, a mutation that we aren’t very familiar with. We aren’t really sure what it’s going to do because it’s a new type of mutation.

But what the doctor in the video is saying, I think, is that given any cycle of various types of viruses and pathogens that cause sickness, such as respiratory sickness or digestional sickness´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝, there are thousands of such pathogens that enter the human biome and then exit the human biome, routinely.

´┐╝´┐╝The scientists monitor this cycle of growth and recession of hundreds if not thousands of pathogens all the time. During these cycle they kind of make an educated guess about which pathogens we are going to have to concern ourselves with. For whatever reason, this particular cycle had a “novel” pathogen that was taking place more than what they were counting on, what we were paying attention to, what we were expecting; the novel coronavirus fell outside of that kind of usual monitoring. So they decided to start monitoring it.

And what they found was pretty much the same as the flu. Yes it is more contagious than the flu, and is more intense, but the way that we stop spreading the virus has less to do with how contagious this is´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝ (what is inherent in itself) then it does with preventing that we get it (what we do about it). How contagious a particular pathogen is doesn’t say anything about whether or not I’m going to get it. The determinant of whether or not I’m going to get it has to do with the situation that I am being.

Nonetheless, statistically, I think he is pointing out, almost the same percentage amount of people that die from any other similar sickness are dying from the coronavirus and just as well, people that are getting it is not too much larger than any other type of pathogen of this kind. The difference is that we’ve just somehow decided to pay more attention to this particular novel pathogen in any given cycle.

I’m not sure exactly how true that may be because if people all around my neighborhood are suddenly getting sick to where they can’t go to work and function that in itself shows that there’s something slightly different going on with this one.

But from a statistician ´┐╝point of view…´┐╝

…the doctor is really saying he’s not really sure how it happened that everyone got so excited and worried about this particular pathogen because if you look at any other pathogens throughout the world they’re all pretty much doing the same thing; that is, a small percentage of people are dying from it, a somewhat larger percentage of people are getting sick from it, and a vast array of people are carrying it around, or are positive for it, but are not really getting sick from it.

And we probably need not mention Miellassoux’s remark about the reason why the world should hold together for any amount of time, for we should expect that we would be walking down the street one day and all of a sudden everything changes beyond comprehension or completely falls apart. Well, that’s kind of what happened with the coronavirus, and indeed that could happen at any moment due to the nature of nature´┐╝.´┐╝ ´┐╝

Anyways…

So, as I said in a previous post, the question really becomes about the climate. And it really begs the question of, less perception or how people’s opinions or beliefs might affect how they act, and more about how ontology, how a person’s being is in-formed by a fundamental way of viewing the world which then allows them to see what Is real´┐╝.´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝

Innoway it is more philosophical, which is to say, how being is, as opposed to religious, theological, or epistemological´┐╝, which is to say, what we believe, how we feel about those beliefs, and how we might analyze objects of knowledge that are feeling-belief.

The reason why it is nonsensical to argue something like “everyone is being hysterical”, or “The corona pandemic is not real”, it’s because the reference of those sentences is too imprecise to really address what is occurring so far as real reactions real perceptions real occurrences in the world.

Indeed, the word “real” and “reality” necessarily designates something that must be dealt with, an imperative, something that not cannot be dismissed by a wave of the hand, Or a whim of witty intellectualist ´┐╝thinking. It is a manifestation of concrete material.

Indeed if I fall onto the sidewalk without putting my hands forward I will probably hurt my face and bleed. And even while there is no argument that can be put forth to ever prevent that same fate every time it occurs, there are ways of thinking, ways of speaking, ways of acting that could alter the situation so that the event happens at different times, more or less, or not at all. So by analogy, even while the coronavirus pandemic may be blown way out of proportion, it is indeed blown to the proportion that it is, and indeed blew the way that it did blow. ´┐╝We surely must take precautions. Just because something might be blown out of proportion, as a way of speaking or understanding the situation, does not necessarily mean that one should not take account for it and act accordingly, yet also that one should be able to make an argument for why it is not the way it indeed is. Not how it appears, as though it is an illusion. And this is exactly because it is real. The question becomes more about the tools we are using to address reality. ´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝Less about perceptions and belief.

´┐╝To address the situation as if it’s some sort of an illusion is kind of like trying to use a scalpel to hammer in a 4 inch nail. Not only is the tool (the tool we call ‘illusion’) inappropriate to the task, but also, it could work given a certain condition of application and time. These two possibilities do not really correctly reduce to one or the other because to approach the scalpel with the need of hammering in a 4 inch nail into a 2 x 4, by all reasonable and sensible standards of knowledge, amounts to nonsense, in this analogy that I’m putting forth here´┐╝.´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝ But in fact, the tool called ‘rationality’ is also imprecise to move to describe why a common occurrence could cause such an “irrational” response (along the same argument of ‘illusion’), because then we are attempting to exclude the real situation of how most people are able to see the world and their role in it, which is to say, what human beings’ purpose is in the world as a teleological signifier for what they (the individual) is and supposed to be doing. What most people ‘think’ is more like a instinct (inthinked? Perhaps a phenomenological theological tenet?)

The scalpel is an imprecise manner of approaching the nail. However it might “know of it” never does the nail “do” what it is by applying the scalpel. Of course, we can create any sort of meaning we want of hammer and nails and scalpels–the post-modern phenomenalist loves to come up with all sorts of interesting perceptions upon things and situations and see those as foundational to everything. But the assumption there, in a way, is that scalpels must always be able to hammer in large nails. The phenomenalist refuses to see the nail as the nail simply because he sees what he is able to view. Sure, I could use a scalpel to comb my hair with, but it is an imprecise way to comb my hair. Lol. It is not ethically wrong, it is simply a limitation that defines the objectivity of the phenomenon, in the same way a nail defines itself, and a scalpel. It is about an ability to respond.

Presently, as I have argued elsewhere, the Traditional categories and methods that we use for philosophy are no longer sufficient to grasp , contain or communicate ´┐╝the situation that we are coming upon´┐╝ so far as knowledge might relate to what the world is, or the Being of the World.

So Again, we can begin speak about the climate of world and knowledge. ´┐╝

x

Here Is another flu/corona comparison article.

Philosophy and Psychology as First Correlational Object

Considering the possible relation I put forward in a recent post, philosophy and psychology might define the first object to its correlational universe.

This would be in contrast to the Continental Philosophical theologians and the Religious Science congregants who perpetually wish to assert their own dominance over the object human; which is to say, an uneasy truce of individuals who all see themselves as having special privy to a part of a whole, like the fabled blind Buddhist monks experiencing pieces of an elephant.

Both are linked to higher given orders of transcendent spirit (potential hidden in everything which the thinking of agents of transcendence discovers or figures out) through which information is interpreted. Their faith thus demands them argue to the end, evangelizing all who already can ‘see the truth’ of thier orders. Both, though, participate in the same orientation upon objects and the view that should allow us a rational ‘truth-real’ coordination for thinking.

Yet the soul of things does not advocate such inspiration, and relies upon a humility of ‘being given’ without the culminating motion for rising up to the transcendent heights.

The soul of things, so to speak, might see Philosophy and psychology not only as complement to each other but actually complete each other like a two piece puzzle. The only problem is that many practitioners of either discipline see there’s as just one of a multitude of disciplines that go into what a human being is. And just speaking improvisationally, tentatively : Yes; from a phenomenological standpoint indeed a multitude of aspects can contribute to what is meaningful. But from a different standpoint indeed snow is snow. Water is water. Frozen is frozen. 32┬░ is 32┬░. Hydrogen is hydrogen and the hydrogen bond is a hydrogen bond´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝. The issue here is less meaning and more about how objects relate. Because one would have to ask silly questions like “what does snow mean?” Sure, we can come up with answers about what snow means but it really never tells us about what snow is except from the phenomenological standpoint, which is exactly the limit at which object ontology becomes an available yet distinct philosophical manner from phenomenological Philosophy as well as what we understand as science itself. Indeed probably the more difficult approach will be upon the catholic scientific faith, because, just like back in the day when Catholicism was the religion of the day, who can really say anything against it without getting their head chopped off?

“Of course Catholicism is God’s ordained religion, proceeding naturally from what we can possibly know of the universe history and the human being.”

How different is this to say “of course science is the true way of things, discovering what is actually true of the universe history and the human being”.

How do you overcome that absolutely set manner of understanding reality?

Well, as I’ve talked about in earlier posts: you don’t.

Just like in race relations and Courageous´┐╝ conversations, we aren’t here to convince anyone about what is the truth. ´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝If you can pick up what we’re laying down then you might be interested; if you can’t then, hey good luck to you´┐╝.

Catholicism did not lose power because people were convinced Through argument´┐╝ that it wasn’t God’s ordained´┐╝ True religion. It lost power because it became obvious to people that it wasn’t the case.´┐╝´┐╝

Perhaps…

It would be ridiculous to try and argue that science isn’t scientific and it’s not dealing with real things. One simply cannot argue against these facts.

But just as logic is not something that finds us the truth, but is rather a tool to use upon things, so facts can be used and assembled in different ways for different uses. Presently science, as a category, is a particular assemblage of facts which gain for us a reality for a particular purpose, or use.

The Ancient Egyptian Empire lasted something like 3000 years. We know it now as bases in myth.

Modern Science has been around maybe 300. Can we prove that science is not as well a myth without merely referring to the modern ways of proof?

We ca d fullan similarly ask, can we prove the lesser status of people of color without referring to whiteness for the basis of that proof?

The Object of Counseling: The Subject of Counseling – A New Beginning.

I am working on a paper that I hope to get published somewhere.  Below is a few paragraphs from it.  Please tell me what you think!

The Subject of Counseling

“The subject of counseling is well known to trained counselors and philosophers alike.  Counseling concerns the human being and its mental or psychic aspects and how these might appear to be involved with a person or persons in the world, and to help such people.  Of course, definition of just what counseling might be involved with can be debated, but in a strict, open and obvious sense, the subject of counseling is what the counseling is about or for.  This does not get us very far, though. Counseling is often strongly associated with the discipline of psychology yet, being a young discipline, still routinely looks to its older siblings, which includes psychiatry, psychology, neurology, and social work, for its philosophical support.  However, counseling appears on the scene in its own right attempting to distinguish itself from these older family members.  This essay is a part of that effort.  The question on the table will be, what is counseling?

The first and primary issue which will be addressed throughout this essay is the problem with a usual method of approach on things which supposes to grant credential to criterion to articles and proposals which best site evidence-based research.  Note, however, before reactions are engrained, I do not suggest that such an approach is inherently incorrect or misinformed. The view upon this paper which sees an argument toward how the just-mentioned method is incorrect, is based in an incorrect manner of viewing the meaning of this paper.  Nevertheless counseling does admit it is plain that scientific research is only capable of encountering and making accurate statements upon a minority of experiential impressions and outcomes, that the outcomes by which it is able to honestly make comment truthfully amount to again only a portion of reason for why a person may or may not be behaving or expressing in the manner she does, and that such comments say less about what solutions are effective and should be applicable than they do about the purpose of the experiment.

While those so scientifically faithful will shudder at such blasphemy, we need only point to the miserable statistics representing any researched-based approach to mental health, to the effervescence of new approaches and theories of the psyche, its various ideals and healths, over the barely one-hundred-fifty year existence to understand the poverty and basic depravity involved in the continual advocation of an exclusive method called science upon a field which is so obviously resistant and generally contrary to its enforcements and lures.

 To answer this failure of myopic and stubborn assertion against the facts, this paper seeks to explore new possibility; the claim is that mental health will benefit more from a sure objective philosophical bedrock which allows for opening and honest viewing of subjects and outcomes than it has from the relative and philosophically arbitrary methodological reduction, restriction, workings of closure and career that we know of under the rubric of empirical research science.”


When we begin to admit our limitations and where we may have gone wrong or were mistaken in approach, we may wish to re-think just what kind of world we are creating for the health of what's mental in the consideration of such easy and non-reflective proposals such as we find here. imgbin-thought-philosophy-knowledge-psychology-philosopher-others-nq1r4f3xntnfmmmq6fe4xk5gx

“Emancipate yourself from mental slavery;

None but ourselves can free our minds.”

And yet, it is not the counselor’s job to move “one so enslaved” out of slavery or to emancipate such an individual from their enslavement necessarily. For indeed ideology serves a religious function and there are those for whom emancipation, as some ideal upheld by the counselor, can make no sense and cannot be implemented toward this person, This subject, this client, without imposing another form of enslavement that the client indeed can understand´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝. The presumption, in this light, by the therapist would amount to a failure of therapy, another entrapment that the client would indeed feel as a kind of imposition and react accordingly; Which is to say, stay symptomatic and stay within that field of mentality that they understand implicitly is problematic .

In this light there is a discernment between ideologues. ´┐╝´┐╝ This is an important point because it distinguishes the object of counseling from various theories of how to counsel by the fact that it does not tell the counselor how to proceed in session, or what the purpose of the therapy should be, or in what idealistic identity the client should find itself in order to be healed.

The object of counseling thus is not another theory of counseling, not another idealism, ´┐╝´┐╝but is rather a theory of how to organize what is already there as the object of counseling. ´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝ ´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝

Does the Banach-Tarski Paradox Anticipate The Two Routes Upon Objects ?


This is the best vid I’ve seen all month!

I definately am Not a mathematician, but this vid explains this paradox pretty well. And, despite the scope of his conjectures at the end, a significant philosophical question would concern whether reality presents a sufficiently able manner for conceptualization to encompass all that we are able to know?

The precipitate of this first question thus moves retroactively as opposed to redundantly:

If we can take the initial object as any real object, then we can likewise take ‘reality’ itself as an object which itself is real. If we are to understand anything, communication of reality must be involved in some manner.

The initial issue, then, is if what is proposed to have been communicated is able to be viewed and understood as not having been communicated. And then if what was not communicated is able to come through as this latter view, that is, what has not been communicated being communicated but not in the former instance and not a replacement of the former (what was indeed communicated is not nullified by the communication which was not communicated by the proposal of what should have been communicated)?

#thetworoutes.

The initial contemplations upon truth can be found in Nathaniel’s The Philosophical Hack.

The Object of the Subject

Thinking Marx Through Harvey ÔÇö thru reality

Thinking Marx Through Harvey

Thinking Marx Through Harvey
ÔÇö Read on syntheticzero.net/2020/01/23/thinking-marx-through-harvey/

I like it.

The only critique I would have of it is that one does not give way to the other. To give way, to choose either one or the other or to have one or the other “prove” itself to be the basis ground or ultimate truth of things as it is, is to resort to a reading of Kierkegaard that is not conventionally mistaken´┐╝: it is to have faith.

´┐╝We might see that the issue is not so much (or is less) that there is an idealistic Marxist realm where ideologies or abstractions usurp brute realities, and then a disillusionment that comes along that shows that such abstract realities, or theoretical systems based on abstract concepts, is an incorrect way to understand the truth of things, so to speak — but indeed such conceptual (e-)motions occur.

My critique is that the reduction to one form or another, at least in this kind of dialectical polemic, where I was incorrect before but now my idealistic version of reality has been proven incorrect– this kind of polemical thinking, this way to position myself in the world, ´┐╝this either/or mentality, is what is incorrect. It is not unethical; but it is incorrect with regards to what is true.

When we read Kierkegaard, we might understand that what he’s really indicating, especially in his Pivotal´┐╝´┐╝ philosophical works “either/or, pts 1 & 2”, is it is possible that my ideological theories posing or pointing towards some truth actually does still occur as such, that is, showing truth, while yet also as I come upon the real world which discounts it and proves it to be incorrect. What occurs is that there are two correct versions of reality that do not work together nor conflate into or toward another unity, and that this is the truth that shows how our interaction with the world takes place.

I submit, arguments of what is real, or what is actually the case in the world, function As we might understand them informing us intellectually ´┐╝,through a vacillation of ideological categories that function truly to establish the world, a world, the world, in exactly the way it is, and the subject mediating between those worlds as though indeed I, the subject, is changing. In the scheme, though, the world that is involved with the greatest of all categories, essentially does not change. We can even bring Slavoj Zizek’s question in here: are we able to change how we understand change?

´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝No matter what discourse, or any other indicator, might “truly mean”, ultimately it is only indicating ideas that are attached to whatever actual world in the way that it is at that present moment. The idea that I am coming to find out what is “actually real” through any sort of theoretical mechanism or intellectual device, is ultimately based in what we would or should properly call “faith”. ´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝To resolve the either/or dilemma to one or the other “reality” requires faith.

´┐╝´┐╝

As someone else has put it elsewhere, it is not a question of whether or not Jesus Christ was actually the son of God or not the son of God, was an actual human being, or was a God on earth, or was the son of God, or none of those things. ´┐╝´┐╝ The more complex and significant issue is how Jesus Christ occurs in the world that I am coming upon. This last question differs substantially and is quantitatively different than the previous types of questions. ´┐╝´┐╝

Similarly, racism for that matter, or aliens, or The European Union, or quarks, bits or gravity, or unicorns.

To be able to weigh up sides and decide which appears the more real, to have placed the stakes within that trial, as though I am along with the world Being determined by those stakes, requires faith.

´┐╝´┐╝

Likewise it is not a question of whether or not the brain functions in whatever way that science or neurology might say that it does or that it doesn’t, or whether or not science is correct or incorrect in its estimations. Whatever situation is occurring at the time is indeed the situation that we must deal with at the time. Yet, strangly philosophically sognificant, most often how we are thinking about it is understood to be involved with some actually true of the situation which further tends to want to avoid itself this ´┐╝time, wants to “prove” to not others – against, with or by others — but mainly itself how such a truth is indeed essentially true, no matter what anyone will say about it. ´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝

Colonialism, Evangelism and The Intellectual Left

Some Problems with The Intellectual Left

https://jonathanhockey.wordpress.com/2019/11/20/some-problems-with-the-intellectual-left/
ÔÇö Read on jonathanhockey.wordpress.com/2019/11/20/some-problems-with-the-intellectual-left/

I think this post actually describes the situation at hand. He calls it the “political left”, but it really has to do with liberal philosophical intellectualism in general.

When we look at topics like colonialism, capitalism, religion, evangelism, and philosophical topics such as Heidegger’s Dasein and the later existential and postmodern philosophies of the continental tradition, one should not help but be struck by the significance of the meanings of this philosophical traditional lineage. We can even extend this trend back all the way to Kant through phenomenology.

It has been my repeated assertion (or at least insinuation) ´┐╝that phenomenology, as a cannon, is not ´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝ describing the human being as a general category; it is describing specific instances of being human. In fact Cedric Nathaniel in his book the philosophical hack´┐╝´┐╝ will talk about how there is a failure of communication across a common category.  What he means by that is, on one hand, what Jean-Fran├žois Lyotard calls the postmodern condition: There is no communication taking place despite that human beings simply will not understand the limitation of their own subjectivity, and that technology is a kind of ‘magic’ or fetish which represents the human being seeing itself as indeed communicating with other beings that are not itself (as I extrapolate and make arguments about that elsewhere).

The more pertinent example, on the other hand, is what the author of this linked post, what his essay is saying about a certain type of intellectualism that we generally can associate with academia in general and a kind of Continental tradition or adherence to a kind of philosophical dogma, or dogmatic reading, of Kant and the subsequent lineage of philosophers over the next 200+ years.

When we understand what they are saying and actually apply it to our situation, that is, our own situation, the situation of myself as a thinker, as someone who is using intellect, ´┐╝we may come to a more Kierkegaard understanding like that of the contemporary prophet (see: the philosophical crumbs), as opposed to an enlightenment thinker who is involved with progress. ´┐╝This is to say that the misreading of phenomenology is that what they (The traditional phenomenological authors) ´┐╝are describing cannot possibly be what is occurring in me (The academic or intellectual left Philosopher) ´┐╝as I am reading their philosophy: I am unable to really understand what they are saying because it offends my sense of being human; I thus displace the true meaning and invent a ‘subjective’ meaning, my own meaning. 

This is indeed why Kierkegaard critique still holds true today, and I would submit, why very few authors who consider themselves philosophers today, or critical theorists, will refer to Kierkegaard: because Kierkegaard’s philosophy sticks a spear through the gut of their critical theory. ´┐╝´┐╝ This ‘other meaning’, the meaning that I ‘make up’ to account for the true meaning which I cannot seem to make fit into the position that I indeed find myself in and against my contest of world, is the basis for Marxist materialist critique and the further critical theorists such as the Frankfurt school.  This ‘other meaning’ which appears to oppress me is indeed the basis for the Real misinterpretation that is the foundation of ideology and political power.

The kind of incredulity, the blatant denial and active assertion of disbelief, is what is actually informing what I see as this author of the linked post´┐╝ is calling “the political left”, yet the author keeps it grounded in the real polemical ideology. He says it very well — I wonder if he really realizes what he’s talking about philosophically, lol — ´┐╝

— but if I can reiterate:  It is basically that these (what i will call) ‘non-reflective’ intellectuals do not feel that they are a part of the same category of people that they critique. And this to say that their intellectualism insulates them from being part of their own critique,  from being subject to their own critique, and thus from being an intimate part of the world, even while they would use such intellectual ideas to argue that they are a part of the condition.  That is, so far as these philosophers want to draw upon the Continental or phenomenological philosophical lineage as well as the lineage of critical theory to support their political claims´┐╝. It is the true irony that many completely misinterpret the texts that they will forever site to support their own position, which is to say their “intellectually left” position. ´┐╝ it is not merely that, say, the right is not looking honestly an opening or not being able to see the truth of larger significant issues, it is that the left is also in the same position. What we come up on then it’s just different examples of singular phenomenological activity, placed into a common category that is not communicating across its breadth. It is not communicating because this common category has found it self face-to-face with its own political truth. This is basically what Zizek has been saying about Trump and the American left.´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝ in order to have a left, there must be an equally formidable and true right which allows for the position to be valid. While philosophically we can uphold a transcendental encompassing category which contains both the left and right´┐╝´┐╝ as aspects of this totality, there do we have avenues of negotiation and compromise. But we can also not hold philosophically complex or investigative activities apart from the rest of the world as though they have nothing to do with any other human involvement. At least one Philosopher has talked about how Philosophy always concerns the past even while it wants to speak of the future´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝. In this sense, a philosophy that informs politics this accounts for the end run of left and right sides, self and other conceptual idea logical side, finding it self having no real transcendental ground, or at least to say, so much as Philosophy. is understood as getting somewhere, as finding something substantial, which, in the end we have found that there’s nothing substantial, that only nothing is substantial´┐╝. This proves to be a psychological hindrance for individuals that want to be founded in a Substantial´┐╝world´┐╝. It is indeed Kierkegaard despair rising up within the individual, who then searches his mind and uses his “intellectual ability” to figure out with the bigger more thorough mines have come to the conclusion, in order for this individual to be able to function effectively in the world to do something with purpose´┐╝. Following these lines of flight the individual has nothing left but to ground truth, ground its own substance in a truth of its own making, a pure ideological sense. But in the end we find that that’s all it is, and in order to have this pure ideological sense there has to be a corresponding “substance” which allows my truth to stay in place. Hence our current world political situation that we find in various intelligent arenas.´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝

While these intellectuals might point to others’ inability to see past the end of their nose towards larger issues and more significant realities, the fact is these non-reflective intellectuals are indeed doing the same exact thing as the people they condemn: not seeing past the end of their own nose. ´┐╝

Thier intellectualism, though, their ability to use discursive gymnastics and believe their own scripts, allows them to proceed into life as from a “true” place of privilege from which they suppose they are critiquing “out there” issues; one could even suggest that their idea of self-critique is a self-fulfilling prophecy, at root in matters of systemic oppression (think L. Ron Hubbard and the ‘technology’ he used on himself, while also using it to mind-control and manipulate thousands of people for his benefit). Never do they want actual solution to the problems they find everywhere; never are they able to apply it to their own view, their own perception, their own method of coming up on the world, indeed they will bring out arguments from this phenomenological lineage as if to prove to everyone else how their “Intellectual left” view upon the world is actually seeing things more correctly.

This is not a straw-man argumentative gambit; it is actually describing the situation at hand. “They” indeed function in this manner, as do I.  Yet, the category –the category which is at work in the appropriation of this text , the category where by opinion and subjectivity are suspended in a transcendent ether or “cloud of unknowing” , does not communicate due to the method by which I am able to view the world and things in it; this is the issue at hand: Is there a sure ontological unity that we call “humanity”?

´┐╝ This goes back to the first point, the first meaning of Lyotard’s postmodern condition: There is no communication taking place.  The rebuttal to this is simple denial through the self-proclamation of intellectualist-historical privilege; this is a simple fact of the phenomenon of being human that is completely denied by certain facets of the intellectual left for the sake of their intellectualism.

For example: “There is communication taking place, but it only appears as though none is taking place, so let me describe to you how intellectually we can create new definitions of ‘communication’ for the purpose of making progress over this apparent subjective limit.”

One could go so far as to say that this is the mistake, in a kind of Lacanian reading, which is contributing to our World political climate. This also contributes to why in some posts I have made in the past couple years I have referred climate change to the question of “just what climate is it that is changing?”

We might be able to glimpse what is occurring at multiple nodes of intersection where this lack of communication is coming together in significant moments´┐╝ of our environment.

Those I am going so far as to indicate as the non-reflective intellectuals (what even Zizek will point out as the “left”) ´┐╝are so quick to move on to the next thing (post-human; post-capitalism, etc…) the next intellectual ‘craze’.  In other works I hope to show how the “philosophical turns” might actually arise at the moment when the intellectualism, as a defining motion, begins to reflect upon itself and its limitations, that the coming into its own limitation automatically eschews reflection ‘out’ and thus as the world to thus retain a certain sense of subjectivity and excess so as to further allow the exploitation of materials it sees fit to use under its purview of self-righteousness. I submit that such ‘turns’ function through ontological denial and work to establish cosmological constants, or categories which do hold potential to communicate across their domains, for the purpose to feeding the capitalistic engine of consumption.

The philosophical turn of our time, toward objects, is due to the stalemate that has arisen by the phenomenological subject coming once again upon its limitation to point to how it is only encountering itself, and then the real ideological denial of that reasoning, that infallible logic, so to speak. The turn is indeed like Moses when he comes upon the burning bush, he turns away, but in our case, human beings turn away “not to see” what this fantastic thing is standing in front of us.´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝ Moses turns “into” that which challenges his ontological status; modern human (philosophically mistaken left) beings turn away and deny the truth for the purpose of creating their own world, and thus create infinite problems through which to establish and justify thier real being.

Hence, the denial of oneself (lack of reflection; in despair to be oneself, as Kierkegaard has termed it) for the purpose of a real intellectual subjectivity is the system of oppression that has been feeding itself with the value of disposable others which it turns into valuable commodity through ignoring ontological validity, or what we loosely call equity.  The true goal should be liberation.  Yet, the modern intellectual subject (left) is inherently an unethical subject simply because it refuses to apply its own standards to itself and its behavior: It understands itself within the context of a privileged synthetical a priori, intellectually removed from a necessity to apply its own ethical formations — which it flings righteously onto others — to itself, to exclude itself from its own practicality for the purpose of bringing about its own utopia (subjective authenticity) further through communion with the immanent/transcendent ‘other’ which is perpetually placed out of critical reach through the assumption of its own proper critical methodology.

It is colonialism justified through intellectual denial, and it is evangelism, again denied, through the critical theoretical lineage. An ideal, a cosmology for the creation of an elite individualism of the few, at the cost of expendable multitudes.

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AND, when all this is said and done, we should see that what I am talking about is not another proposal of ethical impropriety which needs to be overcome through more intellectualism, more argument for solution which never desires for the solution to come about and be realized.

ON The CONTRARY: What I am proposing is that indeed this offensive situation is what the human being has been doing since its inception, that it will always do this, that it operates in this manner.  And, that due to this feature of the human being, as we are able to describe, now, without the inherent subjective bias, what the human being actually does, and thus, bring out to view the truth of what we can call the object of the subject: the universal object that is the human being.

Note: The categories “left” and “right” are as ambiguous as they are almost useless to use for any sort of absolute reference. They are terms to describe the activity of polemical negotiation. But when they become understood as actual identifiers, actual ideological sets, this is where we find the problem of “the end”. ´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝

 

 

Aliens and Knowledge

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This was in my Apple news this morning.

I wonder what your reaction is to it.

I have to admit, my first reaction was, people are gonna think she’s nuts. My reaction was not, that’s bullshit; we don’t know if aliens exist.

.And that kind of struck me as odd but at the same time reassuring and philosophically salient, so far as we are coming to understand what the actuality of our existence may be through an object orientation´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝.

When you think about what this woman is saying, one almost Hass to come to the conclusion that aliens must necessarily exist, and that they are probably on earth right now. ´┐╝ and the reason why these are the conclusions is, as she says, the universe is so unfathomably large. But not only this; if if one then thinks about what might be outside of the universe, and then contemplate just what we mean by the universe, the sheer possibility involved in the limitation that goes on in our capacity to think and understand things points to the fact that our knowledge is drastically small and myopic.

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And this is what 000 says which shows that the philosophical interest it’s really about orientation upon objects, so far as it has to do with human beings, and not so much about what human beings might think ontologically, which is to say in our cosmological and bias founded “Knowledge”. And when we think about science, from my Lehman on scientific understanding of what science gets us: Science just gets us what we can use, it just scrapes A sufficient amount of understanding from any object in order to get some use out of it, while the majority of the substance of that object lay totally out of reach and uninvestigated. ´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝´┐╝

Read: The Philosophical Hack

Oh Kaay!

I finally took a minute and got some things in order.

THE OBJECT OF THE SUBJECT : The Second Part of the Philosophical Hack  is available in EPUB HERE. 

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                 and in paperback HERE.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL HACK: The First Part is available HERE in paper back.

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“The Philosophical Hack a hack into philosophy. A hack in one sense is someone who knows how to use the technology but nevertheless assembles useful objects in non-conventional manners. A hack is someone who adeptly utilizes standard methods but is not employed to make marketed products. Yet in another sense, a hack is a repeated application of a specific yet broad algorithmic protocol upon a closed problematic space. The role of the hack is at once to disrupt and to consolidate. The hack is a check on the security of closed functional systems, as well as the impetus for its growth. Defining this problematic space through a careful assault on weak points in the philosophical facade, Nathaniel offers us a way into a “science of philosophy”.  Mr. Nathaniel is writing to a wide intelligent audience. It is written in such a way that the philosophical mind will not be ostracized but will indeed be challenged. It is indeed a philosophical hack.”

 

Using Slavoj Zizek’s EVENT! as a platform, Nathaniel moves us beyond Zizek’s more political subjective confines into an object orientation.  Graham Harman, of noted Object Oriented Ontology, posits that knowledge either speaks to what a thing is made of or what it does, and that while we need knowledge to exist and to thrive as human beings, cognition is not exhausted by knowledge.  Objects, in this sense, exist at once as present and withdrawn.

Further, he suggests that philosophy is not only about knowledge, not only about what what objects do and what they are made of, but about the love of wisdom. 

He also tells us that Object Oriented Philosophy includes the human being as an object, what Nathaniel calls a universal object.

Setting up a few steps back from Harman’s front, and in Harman’s terms, the Philosophical Hack sets up the contours of a philosophy as an effort of love toward or involved with wisdom. Nathaniel thereby begins to lay the groundwork toward a hopefully more substantial and meaningful practical philosophy for mental health and counseling.  In this new understanding, the conventional and traditional modes of human Being, such as science, biology, psychology, religion, and spirituality, as well as the traditional philosophical theoretical (as many we know) constitute contributing components of the object that is the subject.

The Philosophical Hack is the beginning of a philosophy which includes other disciplines to form a more coherent and seamless cognition of what the human being actually is as a universal object infinite in its involvement with other objects, as opposed to what the human Being is able to be as a transcendental and special phenomenal subject limited in its ideological nothingness.

This new way is to retain everything, as opposed to excluding.

#mentalhealth, #objectorientationcounseling, #truth, #loveofwisdom

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