Tag Archives: object orientation



Just before I had read the comment that mentioned consumption which prompted the Comments on the Stoned Ape (the previous post), I happened to be listening to some NPR on the radio. That word (consumer, consume, consumption) was used a bunch in the story I was listening to and I began to wonder about it. The news story was interviewing someone about the US economy and he kept saying “consumers” and “consume”. Of course I knew what he meant, but I could not help ponder if indeed I consume things in the manner he was speaking.

I doubted it, and I think through this doubt I could understand that he was just using a term to describe certain aspects and functioning of analyses of the flow of products and money, and a mechanism for that flow is ‘consumption’.

But as I listened, I also realized I did not listen to what he was saying and interpret it in that way at first; I indeed listened and understood that he was talking about me, a consumer, and a bunch of people like me, who are consumers, and the economy will behave like that and that because I and other people are indeed consumers.

The point I think I came upon is that despite what term he is using for his description of his equasions, I do not consume things in the manner he is suggesting that the ‘group of people that are consumers’ do. And I don’t think anyone does, or, maybe most people do. These could be mutually exclusive categories.

Nevertheless, for one; I do not consume TV shows. I do consume food and water and intoxicants, maybe even forms of air. But I do not consume solar panels or couches. I do not consume the beach, sun, ocean and breezes. We do not. Rather, only in the context of his report and analysis does anyone consume such things. But he speaks to us as if we do, and I think one of the problems, one of the features of our type of capitalism right now could be that we default to Be what people who are presumed to know, say about us. It is possible, then, to understand that capitalism could be not so much a ubiquitous great system of the exchange of goods, and maybe a little more but not entirely a way of speaking. More significantly, it could very well be a manner of appropriating what is said; the issue could be more the manner we come upon objects in the world.

I am not saying that his analysis is incorrect, but that people tend to identify their Being human, often enough, with what (terms) people, who do various jobs or have an amount of authority, use to place the human Being into their equasion. (To live in another persons dream is a nightmare!)

Further; this seems to be a situation that the majority of individual people cannot and will not consider nor think had any significance at all, or if they do, it only has enough significance to get them to discuss something philosophical over a beer, maybe. Thus, such notice, is not the suggestion that we need to educate everyone on how they are being determined by human agencies that they are not seeing or agreeing with. Such people simply don’t care; most people simply cannot view the influences that other agencies have on their Being. If one thinks about some opinions of Chinese citizens have about their government: Despite what flaws the government might have, the general opinion is that is works pretty well.

Thus I would say that for the most part it is not our job to educate people that they are being taken advantage of, simply because those people are generally happy and do not and cannot conceive the extent that they are being manipulated. This is modern humanity, and indeed, to the sour of many modern apologists, it is humanity at all times. No matter what education is implemented, such people will only still yet be lead by what is being said. Often, no matter what one is taught, no matter what deep insight to which one thinks they are educating people, that person will most often merely understand that they have to speak in a certain manner, and that such a manner is the ‘right’ way to speak about things.

Something else is in play, then; something more that what we call ‘liberal education’.


Issac Asimov’s “Foundation” is to the philosophical issue “of the two” as Gilles Delieze and Felix Guattari metaphysics is to “the multiple”.

The distinction is the difference not only of investment, but of orientation upon objects.

Metaphysics, while definitely involved with real occurrences of political and ideological dimensions, outlining a certain real description of how institutions arrive and the consequences that entail for subjectivity and identity, is, in every case, a religious outline. D and G thus describe the course that inscribes humanity to its universal (catholic – not Christian in the narrow idea) religion as a teleological prediction to ontological surety.

” …[The] ..description and thus utilization of religious inevitability does not rely solely upon such metaphysical constraints like the adherents of congregational knowledge. Rather it arises outside of the religious function to occur within it as contradictory and heretical, as knowledge invalidated by the experts (the priests of the theological dogma). Hence, democracy finds its limit through a reflection which reveals itself but projected outward to have the world, while what is not adherent to the theology uses the reflection to determine what the democratic limits define, how the democracy is structured, and what it will be used for. ”

What we find is a difference between those who admit and acknowledge their own lack to thereby work in the mind of others, and those who uphold the certitude of their view, who only see their own mind as the unity of proper world.

Each has its own advantage, but on opposite ethical fronts.

Metaphysics is the manner of the latter, of the colonizer, the Freirean oppressor, G and D the insightful description of what happens due to this always-aggregate and indeed real popular orientation.

The Post-Human. 

“The ideal of getting beyond how humanity actually functions as a unitive category is a utopian dream. This dream is then placed in a ‘post-human’ category of (often dystopian) progress for the purpose of satisfying the failed desire of an individual identity, once again dismissing itself from itself in fantasy. It is based in a complete misunderstanding of its own theoretical base: ironically proposing nothing. The best we can do is use this aspect in discovering and admitting a true human for its universal object.”

— from My Previous Post. 

Wow! This Philosophical Hack guy is no BS. I wonder if he realizes that such a hard line has been tried before? And this is what we got: an arena (postmodern nihilistic) where no one cares. The spirit is destitute.  Trip out! Post-humanism is a fraud!   Damn. 

Gratuity. Link. ;))

Mistaken Identity: Something Other Than Human: A Reification of What it Denies?

Here is a REPOST in which there is a link the the post which has the comment quoted below that I address. Whew!

The author of the link in the repost seems to have issue with the idea of some Post-human proposals that we need get beyond the ‘human’. The question: Why does everything have to begin and end with human?

Note: Im gonna be greatly confrontative, and possibly even rude, so, just take it as I expect just as much back. It seems sometimes that everyone is too civil. Maybe that’s the problem: Everyone is too comfortable. IDK. I throw a hand grenade into the room, and find out whats in there by the effects of the explosion. Often its dead people who don’t know they are dead, but sometimes there are scientists with special instruments who get some interesting readings.

O kay…

Orientation: This is an essay about identification and not condemnation.

I say such a position (reflective of the comment below) does not understand its own position. Rather, it creates a position that is naturally complicit to the state it is supposed to be critiquing. Similar to what I suggested in my POST about Anslem’s God Proof, this is to say that the position it advocates (as a critique) is artificial (as it proposes to account for all reality), and insincere, as well as in direct contradiction to the meaning it proposes to be conveying as a suggestion for…what…belief? So it is unstable in its posture. When we think about it, I think the first thing that comes to mind is How are we to take the notion “post-human/beyond human”? As a belief? A suggestion for how to organize terms? An answer to a view? As an academic position? As pure nonsense?

Can we PLEASE be honest with what we are doing? If we do not ask our selves the purpose of what we are doing, then, what are we doing?

No one is really trying are they. (Irma Dork. 1977.)

If we are to take its base (Deleuzian mythos, I ass-u-me) as cogent, which is, as representing itself in total, and not as pieces to be assembled together and applied will-nilly (despite what rebuttal would say “its all pieces to be put together as we wish” (ZZZzzzzen).); if we can get under the determination which proposes a complete view despite what it argues to the contrary (I am going to argue that the argument I make is not an argument), then we have a manner to actually see the truth of some things (this allows for two routes to become visible/knowable) We allow for the possibility, however tight and hole-proof our logic and reasonings might seem, to loosen ourselves from our own noose mythology.

The Deluezian ontological base, which supposed to remove (maybe) itself from an ontological proposal (Modernity in general) through a de-ontological definition (or even a definition that smooshes them together – the Deleuzian Zen-like ontological default), as though definition establishes a non-essential essence that destabilizes…um….more definitional essences (wait a minute), perpetually only destabilizes itself, and argues its own fantasy through an over-determination of its power and positional authority; in short, it perpetuates the same ideological form of reality that it proposes to destabilize: It argues itself as having an ability to destabilize itself through its apparent stable ideological position of de-ontology.

My question is, can we just stop with the magical thinking? Or, can writers just be forthright with what they are doing?… And Deleuze, (sorry folks) is the #1 philosopher of magical thinking (as least it appears from his proponents). I mean, I am sounding silly there, but if you really read Deleuze for what he is saying, and be honest (as opposed to wanting to be ‘seen as an intellectual’), it pretty much just repeats stuff you already know, and, it seems to me, actually says nothing (how ironic, huh?). So it is that he uses the example of him saying nothing to explain the fact of how it is that people will see him as saying something, and then spend years and years discussing it. (Wasn’t it Deleuze who said something like discussion is extraneous? I mean, wtf? )

We can use the following comment as an example of how such a ‘deontology’ falls into itself. (also note: I could be wrong in assuming the comment below stems entirely from a Deleuzian shoot, but even the employment of other theorists here move to the point of contradiction regardless.)

The difference between this older classic version of technicity and the conceptions in our contemporary speculations is this notion of supplement (i.e., prosthesis). In the old system we invented these prosthetic technologies of externalized material supplements because we lacked something essential in our own nature (i.e., the whole Prometheus/Epimetheus mythos). In our current thought following those like Deleuze/Guattari who overturned the Platonism of essentialism in which the concept of lack and deficient give was to difference and repetition; or, the notion of our unconscious as productive (Deleuze/Guattari) against the unconscious as a lack/void (Lacan/Badiou/Zizek) becomes integral.

Though I think there are some typos in there, I think we can get a pretty good idea of what is being said.

Before I get started: that last statement appears incorrect: It is lack by which subjectivity becomes infinitely productive; desire is not productive, at least as a reasonable manner (sure, we could say that using 3000 rounds of ammo to kill 50 people is productive, but…how inclusive and nihilistic do we want to be? Yeah, we could say that The Final Solution was productive, but why? ) it is fetishistic, it produces and maintains fantasy, and falls into and move toward nothing (lack). Any discourse that places these in a exclusionary framework is most probably trying to sell you something; probably a product. The historical distinction of ‘techne’ arrives through a desire, that is, a blank spot, a point of nil, so that kind of Historical Consciouses could be said to have ‘produced’ the World Wars. Also, though I agree with the synopsis of ‘techne’, I think the results he proposes do not follow in all instances, hence its overestimation.

My response is: first we have to begin to get over our want for discursive fantasies of degenerative-progress. If we hang on to our tendency to want fantastic stuff, like unicorns and Pegasus, chaotic aliens, Neuromancer bestsellers, a purpose for history, etc… then we pretty much continue to stew in our sweat, over and over. Sure, it makes for good fiction books and movies, but I doubt that such theorists are putting forth theories for the purpose of inspiring fiction; the regular idea of ‘philo-fiction’ is a misapplied “pop” excuse (but it doesn’t mean its bad, it just means that the theorists that claim sincerity in their theorizing perhaps need to reconsider their methodological base.)

Can we please just be honest? I know that in another arena, the author of this comment will pivot back and forth upon the concept, off Deluezian “plateaus” to say that we can speak of different ontologies through different “rhizomes”. So perhaps I am commenting more on what is implied within the quote: Not even a critique, but more a type of sense that, if we call to such “philosophics”, has nothing ‘common’ about it, but just makes sense, then a comment on any position that allies as Deleuzian could go something like this:

— {His point in the post, I m pretty sure, was that ‘human’ is just a construct that is becoming outdated. That we need begin to think away or beyond what is human. I think this is a theoretical fantasy that is more a discursive commodity than it is any type of legitimate theory. But we all know that such a distinction doesn’t matter now. (that is the postmodern condition). } —

This kind of discursive gymnastics goes back to Kierkegaard’s complaint, as well as his admitted style and ability. It is easily seen for its magical connotations, but only once we understand that we are no longer caught within the paradigm of discursive identities; such identities is but one manner (one route) of appropriating discourse (it is not wrong to take this route, but travelers along this route do tend to condemn and or discount other routes as false and wrong). Here, as an example, the author supposes to get beyond identities through defining things in different manners, at once, in some instances using Deluezian “deontological” categories to supposedly shake up ontological categories; using definition to pose a definition that is (somehow) outside of definition or indicates something outside; so easily such wizards can wield the magical terms to state their case beyond question. Off to one side, there will be a discussion about how everything reduces to an indeterminable moment wherein all past, present and future collapse into nothingness, unsupported except through some (miracle?) of (what?) discourse? Then out the other side of the polygon Janus we get some sort of ordinary Greek version of terms (of an old order)? On and on down the rabbit hole of a definition of immanence such a position will routinely grab ahold of a transcendent, only to then confound us again by telling us that “transcendent” is defined differently, or that they are not sure what ‘transcendent’ means, or what is transcendent is countered through another definition of… — why ? Because we have defined things in such a way or by a recourse to a tradition that supposedly only exists in an atemporal ‘zone’ ( I guess) that can behave in a manner that defies all notions of consistency. It seems (oddly enough) the only consistency is some sort of schizophrenic biological brain or organ or “body without organs” that is able to somehow get outside of this never-ending discursive cycle (somehow “brain” or “consciousness” or “plateau” etc.. is able to transcend the ever-recycling immanence to be able to speak of something “substantial”? Something ‘beyond this human conundrum’?). And no one look where the accusation is made toward Platonic recurrence and repetition; here we are with a Deluzian discourse entirely unable to indicate to us how it is different except by using its own scaffolding of definitions that say it is. It is different because it is putting together the terms of discourse differently? How does that accomplish any difference from the mode it is supposed to be different from? Admittedly,


this is really kind of a “Adam Ruins Everything” kinda essay. I am The Philosophical Hack. But the need is real; many people see it and it doesnt mean the end of the world, only >some people’s world, and that can be hard to swallow. These kinds of philosophy do not get us anywhere but more things to discuss; it’s a philosophy of self-fullfillment proclaimed and argued internally to apply to all human beings. Here it is, the overdeterming in application of a traditional discourse to the common category of human:

…In this sense then originary technicity states that ‘techne’ and technology were there before humans,”

On which Deluezian plateau does this “before humans” reside?

“…and in fact it was technicity that conditioned and shaped the human rather than the other way around.

How is this possible? From where is this statement gaining its veracity? Ill tell you: From the very history that the larger Deluezian slight-of-hand says is a suspended kind of ‘illusory’ trick of consciousness (oh yeah: Consciousness gets a get out of jail free card also). If its an illusion, the question becomes, then how is it possible for someone (say the author of this comment) get a hold of another author (say Deleuze) to be able not only draw upon his ideas, but to even be able to understand it to be able to agree with it? From where does the ‘illusion’ arise? At what point in history? Nevermind the extensive scheme of definition that cannot be challenged due to the ever present philosophical method of weaving and dodging that the method had prescribed through its (de-) ontology.

I know this is useless, but is anyone getting the picture?

“… And, in our time we are realizing that the human was a fiction, a transitional being for whom technicity has all along been utilizing it for its own ends and purposes. This fatalist and determinist view is not that technicity is opposed to the human, but that humans have never been human and that we are grounded in technicity from the beginning. So that in our time with the rise of the Mechanosphere (Deleuze/Guattari) we’ve come to see ourselves as part of the machinic phylum, as machinic multiplicities whose organic systems are over the coming centuries going to give sway to inorganic systems, a mutation from one material platform to another with modifications of intelligence and robotics as one pathway to this. This notion of Superintelligence is just one more technicity which is part of this conditioning process of transition.”

We should see that “we” in this context is the picture itself of the philosopher who takes himself too seriously, that is, who sees the terms that are come by as identifying ideal substrates, ideal mechanisms by which his consciousness is functioning. And this is to say that this is what consciousness does. It is not that what he is saying has any credence in my world, except as it is an aspect of my world, an identification of a process; not the process the author (or Delueze) describes, but the process that wishes to justify itself in any world, which is to say in this instance, that author’s ideal world. Human was a fiction because this agent of desire could not fulfill itself in another way than to proclaim itself over the entirety of this kind, which is, not human in an actual general sense, but merely one particular human (and maybe a few more). No matter what he argues, this ‘we’ somehow includes me only through the proclamation of his omniscience, but as well, a condition of my existence: He realized that his whole situation is equivalent with the common human, and so it must be that ‘human’ was a fiction. How is he able to understand what a human was if he is involved with a fiction? How was he Being a fiction? Its funny how such topics lend themselves to actual fictional stories. Sounds like he doesn’t want to take himself seriously.

But here is the kicker: Delusional Guitar Player (Delieuze and Guittari) says nothing less. This is an example of a self-fulfilling aspect of consciousness, such that it defines a moment as that moment extends out beyond itself. It is indeed a proposal of unconsciouness based in –not merely any desire –but the desire that is overcome by its lack, which is, namely, the author that subscribes to such a philosophy as though it actually describes what has, is and will occur. The point is that such philosophical analyses reveal their own bias within the asserted encompassing context itself.

And the extra-point: This whole ideal is based upon the founding term of “human” as an essential and common thing in-itself, a basic premise that underlies the whole motion that desire wishes to accomplish: attain the Subject as a valid and real identity. This is why these folks must come up with “post-” human things: because they have found that their “humanity” is lacking. This is why “before” techne meant something –what? –better ? or just indicated an organization that was different than what (should be?). Such that now we should or are going to have a different (better?) relationship with technology. Of course! My failure at fulfilling myself as a human (in the attempt to ‘fill’ my desire with the ‘substance’ of discursive and non-discursive ‘things’, I ended up with nothing) means that ‘human’ was a fiction, and that this thing that ‘humanity’ made (this thing that I made that was unfulfilling for my desire for it to fill me) will surpass what is human, to thereby justify my empty Being of desire by being that which is ‘after’ what was once human (that ‘thing’ that I believed in which failed me). Frankestien’s Monster! What a novel analysis! But wait; didn’t Mary Shelly tell us this very same thing like 300 years ago? Oh yeah; NOW things are really going to hit the shit fan. Finally. Boy, thank God for us modern theorists. I would have never known that we are going to have a ‘new’ relationship with technology. Genius!

Nevertheless: The world and technology may indeed occur through the author’s analysis: The real world is the world of desire. Post-human ideals will have repercussive effects in meaning, but first ‘post’ would need to depart from regular analysis to exit from the historically progressive fantasy. The point here, then,  is that such an analysis does not concern every human being, and thus is not speaking to what may actually come to pass as “post-human” because there is no True category for which ‘human’ can be exceeded or surpassed; there is no effective unitive category called ‘human’ that can be overcome or gotten past. Indeed, it is the epitome of a basic misreading of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard to suggest that there is anything “beyond” or “post” but a fantasy made out of the desiring machine that is over generalized into “human”. Once such a desire is understood for what it is, then the world changes because the fantasy is dispelled. Yet, the Subject of traumatic unfulfilled desire (or the Subject of imposed trauma) becomes a “post-traumatized” so long as the Subject still identifies with the fantasy. There is no ‘post-human’ reality except in as much as the Subject is still attempting to justify itself in the same metaphysical space. Our relationship with technology is the same: We always use it as a prosthetic of some sort, despite what definitions are in place. We are always human, even if I become a car; even if I am Robocop. The ideal of post-human is another fantasy of desire, based in the lack of fulfillment of that desire, or the relative fulfillment of repeating defacement.

The ideal of getting beyond how humanity actually functions as a unitive category is a utopian dream. This dream is then placed in ‘post-human’ category of (often dystopian) progress for the purpose of satisfying the failed desire of an individual identity. It is based in a complete misunderstanding of its own theoretical base: ironically proposing nothing. The best we can do is use this aspect in discovering and admitting a true human for its universal object. 


See, though, that my critique is an identification. My intent is to show where and how particular philosophies operate, and not so much that what it proposes is incorrect. It is a description of the dynamic and universally ingenious manner that consciousness “creates worlds”. Similar to Graham Harman, here I using a foundational term “consciousness” to delimit what is most universal of universal objects; I could have said “rock”, and then we could speak about all the aspects of “rock”. No longer are we concerned, then, with “rock-ness”, because we already find that “rock-ness” is already encapsulated in the Being expressed as itself a rock. It manifests rock as rock and is in this way impenetrable as a subject of discourse: Discourse reveals in one way or another everything there is in relating to the Being-there of the rock…

This resonates with the author’s statement “…that humans have never been human and that we are grounded in technicity from the beginning.” But with a caveat that is not included in the phenomenal mode of such desiring-subjectivity; namely, that we have never been human in as much as we adhered to human as an aspect that my consciousness has access to in-itself, as a universal object that has properties that are uniquely human, that is to say, that only we perceive things, only we create ideologies, and have political identities. It becomes obvious that this is not the case, once we get over the phenomenal obsession with identity. The question of how we could know this is made once we realize that the entirety of our Being is contained in the objectivity of being human; not so much in the interrelatedness of the common category called human, but in the objectivity of universal Being, not as a known ‘consciounsess’ of cosmic proportions, but as a relation of the unity that always withdraws from view. The parameters of subjectivity have been laid out; we have only to fill them in with whatever real situation presents itself, which are eternally diverse as they are manifested through consciousness functioning. This is nearly concordant with the statement, that we are determined by objects, subjectivity being the ‘empty place’ of conflation of effective objectivity. But the phenomenonal intension behind the statement will exclude itself (will withdraw) from the more generalizing universal mode for the purpose of, again, establishing its ‘world’ as an all inclusive ideal. The irony only ends when we allow it, that is, when weve had enough of it. This doesn’t  mean that it ends or the world ends, or humanity fades away with its own creation. It means that humanity will always be humanity despite what terms we use to define it. And this will be proven 200 years from now to those who read this essay (under certain conditions). 

The production of desire abhors a vaccum, and due to its desiring machinery will fill the hole with evidence of a world that is vacant, or in time, becoming vacant –of what? Of that which the desiring philosophical agent cannot achieve in its fulfillment: a filling of what is void: desire itself: the world. Hence, the meaning of such historical analysis will always yield a fading of humanity. Under every sort of definitional scheme, whatever was of a ‘history’ will be absorbed into the empty space of desire, discourse will coalesce around this ‘cognizant space’ to manifest the emptiness, the nihilism as an actual true basis of world.

But the Truth of the situation is that subjectivity is filled infinitely with many things; it is not empty. The idea that there is no existential ground meaning nothing, that all is void and meaninglessness is a particular take upon terms, a particular orientation upon things that amounts to a twisting of desire into its want: the empty subject, nothing. It is not sad that there is no Subject; it is amazing because such a statement means that we get to look at what the subject actually Is. The point of the existential as well as a few of the postmoderns is that this fullness is not illusory, but rather that it cannot be communicated sufficiently. It is not that there is nothing or that all is meaningless. It is that nothing is still something, and meaninglessness still contains meaning. But for many f not most, this fact is never communicated, indeed, cannot be communicated in its Truth.

We can then re-approach the whole of Western philosophy under a different light, and begin to understand the meaning of Hiedegger’s proclamation that “the spirit is destitute”. It is not that we are left to a dystopian future; it is that this is just a moment that marks a significance, and it is not that we ‘lose’ our humanity to some machine A.I or any manifestation of technology that commandeers the meaning of human for another essentiality….

Post Script:

In his book “Dante’s Broken Hammer, Graham Harman appears (half way through the book) to make an argument against a formalist ethics, and toward a materialist ethics (again, Im only half way through the book, so my opinion may change).

In short, he says that Dante is more interesting and actually more intellectually stimulating because he deals with ethics within a sectional and progressive scheme of value, and that Kant’s ‘formal’ view of ethics is rather dry, and actually accounts for why we ned get over Kantian idealism.

In a way, this is what I am pointing out of the Deleuzian form: It is a kind a materialist ideal of graduation of experience, and inclusion of all possible experience of Being into a explanatory text (metaphysics; he does say he is a metaphysician; no irony there). But this this is why Graham must situate his Object Ontology as a proposal of polemical ideals: Because it is more interesting. Personally I think it is more interesting when we see the issue itself concerns an orientation upon objects, over the strict ideological proposal of an Object Ontology. I have said elsewhere that the reason why he must be ‘speculative’ is because in order to do anything progressive within the institution, one must adhere to traditional memes (in the original sense). One has to tow the line. And strangely enough, I am saying that this kind of line towing tends to argue against itself: Regardless of what Harman might say that has significance, it kind of loses its punch when we have to recourse to the traditional lineage: Its as if I present you with a wonderful brownie, but then when you go to eat it, it is switched for a carrot. Still good to eat, but the brownie seems much more interesting in the actual reckoning of experience. Once presented with the carrot to eat, yeah, carrots are ok, and they are good for you, but its still a carrot, and Im still thinking about that brownie.

I am not saying that Kant’s ideal formalism is correct necessarily, but more that despite what was presented, the meaning gets dilluted and too often becomes an argument of how good it is instead of the goodness that was innate in the idea itself. Materialism can be formal, and it is this kind of delineation, to “human defined essences” (conditions that human are able to not only define for themselves, but actually come to understand an interact with them as indeed universal essences), that reveals to us the extents of colonialization as a human aspect, a manner by which humanity behaves in the creation and establishment of worlds. It is not bad, it just is. And, it is only through the same kind of redundant institutional posture that we can have a ‘materialism’ that is in opposition to a ‘formalism’: the very idea that there can be a distinction is itself a ‘formal’ distinction. This is why we say postmodernism is a kind of religious apologetics: because we are not concerned here with various ideological manifestations, but their scientific application, which is to say, their control. One does not discover and or create an atomic reaction due to the politics of its use; these are segregate and independent aspects that only fall into a common praxis under the imposition of a unitive politics. Both may be involved with a situation, but not in actual simultaneity.

We cannot have an individual that recourses their behavior at all times to a fact that, for example, their freedom is not really free, but only defined as such. This simply does not happen, and the rationale that arises to ‘explain’ freedom in this way does nothing to impose itself upon daily activities and affairs, that is, except as one sees such metaphysical proposals as ‘always’ enacted and occurring even when not under the specific conditions of its activation; which is to say, only under the presumption of a religious truth. We find this very thing in contemporary China, where the issue of freedom is not regularly applied to the transparency for government, but is more understood as an actual lived experience.


Dante may be more interesting, and more juicy, but then when we start to talk about how this is the case, we automatically entered into a formalist state, even as we attempt to argue away from it through the definitional disclaimers. It appears, all to regularly, as a false dichotomy.

Something else is occurring in philosophy that tries is damnedest to stay hidden. 

Analogue vs Digital Philosophy.

Sound and Philosophy.
I am a music producer so I have some knowledge about sound and signal. If you are interested in what sound processing entails as a block of concepts, I imagine I might do a little bit on sound and philosophy in a post later. Or you could look on line.

But here’s just an intro into how sound and knowledge might be similar.


The issue of communication is not merely a conceptual exercise. It is an actual lived experience that has been conveyed into philosophy with an interesting outcome: Some sort of communication is occurring, but in particular instances, it is difficult to tell just what kind. In some instances A is being communicated as A, and in other more usual instances, A is being communicated as B C or D…, depending on who you talk to, but with an odd sort of occasion where the ‘receivers’ of B,C,D still think they have been communicated A. This phenomenon is similar to what Zizek calls “changing the past”.

Since the mid-19th century we have found that there is an attempt to communicate something and that this attempt is not always successful, but again in an interesting manner. In the 1960’s Martin Heidegger spoke of this peculiarity in a series of lectures made into a book called “What is Called Thinking“. There he speaks of thinking in terms of a progress that is not made in time; that is, the progress that is the successful consummation of this philosophical communication does not occur as a proper historical phase, but rather involves a moment of thought. The theme is this book is “what is most thought provoking is that we are still not thinking”. It is interesting to note that this occurs after World War Two, because before the event of the engagement with the Nationalist Socialists, it was thought that this “thinking” was indeed linked with a historical progression of the likes of Hegelian “Historical Consciousness”. Now, in 1965, Heidegger is telling us that he (and many philosophers as well as a kind of cultural knowledge) was wrong.

But this somehow has not deterred people from thinking that they have begun to think, as a historical motion. We find traces of this in the Frankfurt School (the final solution has not arisen yet and, in one manner of looking at it, they were pondering what could have gone wrong in the “historical consciousness” that lead to WWI, attempting to find out what had been misapplied), and then Sartre, and Foucault, then the postmoderns, Lyotard, Derrida, and Delusional Guitar Player (Deleuze and Guattari). Then we find it in, what we could call the ‘post-Postmoderns’, Zizek, Badiou and Laruelle. Of course this list in not exhaustive, but there is seems to be something at work that has allowed those authors to be listed primarily, even if it is a presumptuousness on my part. All of these authors come about within a context of not still not thinking, for they indeed have begun to think. Graham Harman, I think, finds a significance of which Im not even sure he himself put his finger on particularly, namely, that while all these thinkers may have begun to think, and are thus involved with a certain (out of time) historical movement, Heidegger was at least correct in as much he noticed a problem against which he could not help but hold out hope for. This hope that extended from at least Nietzsche, had brought him to have to say that we have still not yet begun to think, even as those who would want to think that they are thinking by “…offering an overall exposition” of Nietzsche’s work . Harman has the philosophical acuity and balls to realize that “we” will never begin to think. We can find this implication in the assertion he made in the Harman/Zizek Duel-Duet, that we have always been dis-enchanted. The point here being that indeed the reality has been that the enchantment that Heidegger was involved with in his “still-yet” was exactly that: a fantasy.

But this fantasy in not what one would think. lol. The significance of this fantasy, this enchantment, is that it is never communicated in its truth. This could be said to be what the Frankfurt School was just beginning to notice back then, and after a time, this is what why the issue of communication came up with the postmoderns, because the fact is that such enchantment occurs, people do begin to think, but the truth of the Same (Heidegger) is lost in the attempt to communicate; this is an apparent fact. This fact is what brings the post-Postmoderns: Zizek with his complete capitulation to the paradox; Badou pointing out the issue of the two: Laruelle holding firm in the historical consciousness as a communicable situation.

There is a reason why I call Deleuze and Guattari “Delusional Guitar Player”: While the Frankfurt School was trying to make sense of what this ‘saturation of the signal’ was exactly, Deleiuze and Guattari 25-some years later mark a point when the ‘distortion’ of the ‘philosophical analogue’ (see below) signal was noticed as distortion but likewise being taken to be readable (see above video), such that whatever would be communicated as the distorted signal would be accounted for as indeed part of the communication, as accounted for in their philosophy: This is enchantment par excellence, and is why we have all the subsequent run-off Deluezian philosophies that have eroded more or less into “philosophical fictions” at one end and pure admitted fantasy at the other. (Laruelle’s version has likewise been commandeered by such ‘distortions’) with some people in the middle still debating over what is really going on.

We find this because we should not rub it in; we cannot continue to yell at people, like Nietzsche, anymore; its like beating a dead horse, we need let it be.

The continued attempt to communicate how what withdraws from thinking which then gives something worth thinking about might be communicated is failing, indeed has failed. This is the significance of Harman’s move (and perhaps the Speculative move in general) into the Object. A completely new way to speak about the situation at hand without having to retread over and over what had already been retreaded so many times and will continue to be. A clean break was called for. And even still, a divergence.


The noise made by this event thus brings me to think (lol) about analogue and digital communication. The significance of digital (it seems) is that it can communicate accurately over long distances. Perhaps, what is being communicated through time that is actually outside of time, is something that is being communicated “digitally”, where as conventional philosophy is more like “analogue” communication, where to longer the distance traversed by the signal when the signal is read, the more distorted the signal.


Post Text:

When are we still not yet thinking? This is what the whole thing pivots apon, yes? For we know Heidegger; he loves a turn pf phrase. All along we will have been thinking, yes, what I quite bit of thought to ponder, this “still not thinking” as the most thought provoking thing. But it is! For everyone is obsessed with thinking; who is thinking best, who is helping the most people with their thinking, who is making the most money… So ti is that we might have bank of ideas that we disseminate to the students. But Heidegger’s teacher does nothing of the sort; all these thinkers thinking about the food for thought that is not thought provoking, but is merely thought promoting! Thought is that which is central to man, and man cannot be anything but the center of the universe in the many possibilities of ideas and concepts.

So it is that what is most thought provoking is that we still are not thinking…for we are not thinking at all. 

It is the distortion that is thought. In all its precision and ability to choose on various things to talk about and how to talk about them. We can’t undo this. The signal itself, though…well; that might be another matter entirely.

The Perfect Crime: Enchantment as Vehicle of Subjective Purpose. 

Comment on this REPOST..

I’m not very familiar with this B guy philosopher that I hear a lot of here and there. (sorry I’m voice dictating and I didn’t really feel like going back and finding out exactly how to spell boy do they really lard lol) .

I’m only going off of a quote that’s on the link of the link. So I could be completely wrong and what the conclusion really is that this guy says be on the excerpt.

From what I’ve gathered from B it seems that he’s kind of a complainer. This excerpt in the link talks about some sort of lamenting that we’re no longer in the sacred zone or something like that. Hey saying like oh nothing is sacred any longer because now everything is a commodity everything has been flattened so we have no sense of the sacred. 

I think he is representing and immersion within transition. The From and the Where To don’t really matter in as much as the expression is one that goes along with transition, and this is to say the feeling that goes along with an attachment to what is seen of the past as good or somehow quality and a perceived future or even present situation that is indicating a future that is not as good or somehow lacking in substance.

Now, when  we are able to get beyond such lamenting transitions, we might then see clearly that we have not lost the sacred but we have merely moved the blocks around; the sacred is still there. The terms have changed but they indicate the same situation. The question is do I still have a sense of spirit to spite what I think the world is doing? And, is the world ever a holy and sacred place? What am I depending on when I say that we have lost a sense of the sacred? 

I would say that “we” have not lost anything, And that the people who love a sword of doom and gloom philosopher of a bleak future are ” optimists”, because they hang onto a static and stable sense of the past and or their central sense of being projected into a future hope that more and more never comes to pass. I, on the other hand, am a sort “pessimist ” because I see each moment as full of potential as I try not to project my resentments out upon the world to cloud my view. They of course are a certain kind of Realist because in reality everyone has all sorts of opinions and attitudes upon situations and their outcome, and of course their presence in the world is very serious matter. 😄

 So it is that B evidences a type of human moment that sees words as indicating actually true essences of being, such that the larger conflation of these essences show them reflexively and automatically a bad end. 

Yet, When we discover what an object is, we are no longer are caught in that kind of limited paradigm, no longer caught in reliving the past as a present identity toward the future;  which is, as many have said, death. Hence the lament. 

The perfect crime is that B himself has committed the crime but is putting it off into something else so we all look over there and not at the actual culprit. 

The manner of Being enchanted follows the rationale behind Plato’s Allegory of the Cave. The Allegory itself is an enchanted image of realty where people are existing in various roles and stages in a progressive march of the human species into the future. 

So it is that when we can see B as merely   expressing a particular mode of Being a human in history, then B can appear to resound with the meaning of Graham Harman’s “always been disenachanted”. If we understand that the human being is always (as a general and common condition) caught ‘in the middle’, seeing no correspondence of their Being with any being that is outside the human correlation: The evidence of other human beings correlated with ‘the only Being’ allowed, as a thoughtful excersizing, presents an axiomatic limitation in all a thinker can know. This limit thus supplies the necessary catalyst for displacement of Self in order for it to commune with a transcendent ‘other’ that confirms its exceptional placement in the universe, but also an exceptional role whereby such Being can have an effect upon the ‘separated’ and functioning world. This displacement thereby allows such human Being to understand its alienation within a context of purpose, which manifests as (probably) one of three Selves: The Colonizer who speaks the future as a ‘good’ Being as The Soveriegn whereby all others gain their purpose; the Colonized who speaks the past to bring about a ‘good’ future; the Complainer who speaks the future as the ‘good’ past. But in fact, all three are caught in what Paulo Freire called “the game of the oppressor”. These are thus subjects of enchantment, or for another term, Enlightemnent, as each plays their role in the respective world of progress. 

We find that human beings have always been dis-enchanted when we start to understand consciousness through what it does rather than by what it processes, as a universal object before a centralized thinking subject. We find that the Allegory of the cave, while an enchanted idea, nevertheless always finds itself as describing a relational situation wherein the (conventionalized, normalized) point of the Allegory withdraws from view to allow for what Badiou might call ‘the beginning of the count’. 

The Issue of the Orientation Upon Objects.

The significance of the Harman/Zizek “Duet+Duel” discussion.

The Irony of Biology and the Ontological Problem with Philosophy.

We are biological creatures. If we are anything more than biological creatures, then we have a problem, as Slovoj Zizek say, ‘something terrible happened’. Implicit to all philosophy is this disaster: Consciousness. To be absolutely proper, the issue of consciousness is transcendence, because without transcendence, nothing else appears. We can have no argument about what is true or more true, we cannot have issues over the use of discourse, we cant have humans making models that are only human models, we cannot have an essentially unknowable universe, we cannot even have immanence. The first problem of philosophy, the problem upon which all other philosophical problems exist, is the problem of transcendence. There must be something more than the human thought in order for there to be anything at all. This is the disaster.

When we grab hold of this, when we really absorb what this is meaning as we come across it, then we do find what is disastrous, because then we have to come clean and admit some stuff. We have to admit that the history of philosophy has been a coming to terms with transcendence, for one. It is not so much a coming to terms with immanence because, again, if we are truthful, the plight of all human endeavor has been a concern with getting things right, and immanence is an issue, a solution, about discrepancy, or disparities. If we like to think by an historical sensibility, transcendence must be prior to immanence, or, immanence was the state of thinking that was consistent with what we cannot know without the dependent transcendent clause. Perhaps it was ‘animal’, but even that is a transcendental thought.

Biology, even, is likewise a grounding that is based in transcendence; this is the irony of having human beings be first a biological creature. We must first be able to view ourselves as an object that is not exactly the special intelligent thinking being. Graham Harman solves this, or makes an approach upon this, by saying that human beings are not alone in their qualities of Being (ontological qualities), that we are having this problem not because we are undergoing some sort of test of progress, but because this is simply what universal Beings do, human beings are universal objects, and that all objects ‘think’ and ‘have sense’, and basically do all the things that human beings consider unique to themselves. And the significant aspect of all objects is that they withdraw from view.

This is the irony that philosophy has been dealing with since the dawn of reflective critical thought. In one way or another, philosophy has been attempting to nail down what thought is reflecting. Martin Heidegger comes to near the end of this effort when he asks us to ‘think what must be thought’. Like his tools, that which must be thought is the beginning of thinking and yet in the attempt to think this, itself withdraws. Harman caught onto this for his work, and it is this withdraw that forms the core of my work.

The problem with the Being-ness of philosophy, the ontology of philosophy itself, is that if pursued with unrelenting honesty, it brings itself to this cliff. We find ourselves at a point of fracture, a point when words leave us; if we are calling up the history of this event, and we consider historical events as indicators, informers, of this furthest event, then it often seems that we find ourselves not at a cliff so much as a crossroads.

There are many possibilities involved with what occurs, but perhaps the most significant for philosophy is the confrontation with transcendence. Whether it be logos, the unknowable absolute transcendent YWYH, spirits, devils or other supernatural entities, all must qualify as apsects of knowledge that arrive from what is ultimately foreign to us, to interact and allow us knowledge from that land beyond. Nevertheless, as philosophers of truth, we find that all these emanations of transcendence must be dissolved.

The problem behind these visitors is the sign, because the sign always points to what is beyond what is occurring. The sign typically and commonly takes what is actually occurring and displaces it such that what is actually occurring, what is occurring as and in knowledge, indicates something occurring elsewhere, for a larger purpose, significant in the Big, Big picture. We are not here to question if what we might find is true or false, but for philosophy, this following of the signs eventually leads to the place where the largest and most significant indication of beyond can no longer be displaced, no longer be held out for faith to apprehend and appropriate us to go somewhere else. For philosophy, we find that the most significant place to which the sign leads us is ironic.


This ironic place has, in our modern times, meant nowhere and nothingness. But what do we know of irony? What do the philosophers as old as Plato tell us of irony? They tell us that irony marks a significance of spirit. It is no wonder, then, that 3000 years after Plato that Heidegger talks about the destitution of spirit. This is because the crossroads of this moment no longer refer us to something ‘more true’; no longer do we get to sit comfortably in what is removed. We must confront our addiction to displacement.

We must accept that we are biological creatures.

Yet, then arriving here, we are left with a strange situation where what is innately transcendent in its operation has let us to knowledge of our own objectivity; we have been lead in a circle with definite conclusions that indicate something greater is at work. Where do we stop? Again: How do we know?

Philosophers call this kind of disappointment ‘disenchantment’, and Graham Harman makes a startling statement about this: He says we have always been disenchanted, that ‘history’ has not been moving progressively ‘toward anything.


Zizek and Harman “Duel+Duet”.)

I am not too sure exactly what he means by this, but I think if he means anything else, it should be that there is no progress in the sense of getting anywhere that we have brought about. What this means, then, is we have to re-approach what Heidegger says of technology (this could be why Harman has moved over to SciARC, an architecture school, that area between technology and subjectivity); it is not a s simple as talking about our relationship with technology as though we wouldn’d have to have a relationship with it in some manner. It is more a manner of accepting our relationship with it, of understanding how philosophical concepts are perhaps not so much technological tools to use, as distant objects to be ‘put to use’, but then also seeing that such a conceptual approach never occurs. Then the problem again reverts back to itself: This is exactly what will happen (displacement; changing the past) Human beings will take the ideas and put them to use as if they have been bestowed upon them from a transcendent ‘giver’ (who gives us what is philosophically given). We therefore cannot advocate some sort of progressive knowledge, cannot then say, with honesty, that we can have a discussion about what this means or what we should do with it: To do so makes a noticeable mark. And this is what is meant by disenchantment: This occurs all the time, at all times, we never get anywhere, and are not ‘learning something more’ about ourselves to thereby be able to move beyond (transcend) ourselves. No. We are merely doing what humanity does. Individual human Beings must necessarily transcend their situations all the time and they must see their subjective investment in terms of a larger progression that will pay off, even while we philosophers (as a minority group) with longing and forlornness must stay put, for, such individuation of meaning does not transcribe into a Hegelian History. We (as the larger group) are always positing  a progress and even its fulfillment, but it never gets fulfilled, never comes to pass, yet always gets renegotiated in the context of passing, of fulfillment. But at the same time, we cannot stand this condition, and so, we ultimately forget about it, and behave as if we are moving in some direction, indeed; we appropriate the terms of discussion to indicate that we have a say in our future, and that this future is necessarily better, a progression, from where we were. We get what is discussed and use it to ignore what is happening at this moment for the sake of the teleology that is invested in the ontological act, the event of Being. We erect a condition that is problematic, and we move into the problem for the purpose of its own meaning. Then, whatever occurs, we create meaning around the event to justify ourselves as thoughtful and respectful agents of transcendence, regardless of what occurred. This is the meaning of ‘changing the past’ that Zizek talks about.

It is by this situation, the situation into which we have been lead philosophically, that we find, suddenly, out of nowhere, that we have the autonomous universal object in front of us. And due to this lack of conceptual reduction, the inability to apply what should be a necessary progress in knowledge that argues no progress being made, we have a necessity for two routes: The question that prompts “know thyself” that is at the heart of Philosophy.