Some Material for Psychology

www.researchgate.net/publication/336613223_Zizek_and_Peterson_Demonstrating_the_Importance_of_Higher_Order_Dialogue_Cadell_Last_Independent_Scholar

” To connect to this point such a pathway is a form of self-responsibility that allows us to overcome internal and unconscious pathological prohibitions. In the old traditional world we had “Master Figures” (embodying the moral superego) to tell us what to do in relation to a “Cause” which transcended pleasure. Now such “Master Figures” (embodying the moral superego) are negated. However, this negation did not open up a world of free subject’s enjoying their simply pleasures (as presupposed by 1960s counter-culture), but instead a world of self-enslaved subject’s who become frozen or static in relation to internal and unconscious pathological prohibitions coming only from their own head. Such a world can only be transcended through self- responsibility (not more rights), from becoming aligned with the inhuman Master (Death).”

And my Two Routes comment:

The significance of the Two Routes is in as much as there is one route which sees discourse as indicating specific and localized actualiities. That this one route does not encompass or tell of all there is or can be. For example: As though Zizek’s discourse is saying such and such, and means this and that, then or now — specific local identies which can be overcome through relying upon that/those identities. For example, the “master signifier” that this author uses to talk about how there is no longer an ideological “master figure” which allows us to have cogent and substantial sense of self in the social atmosphere, that its been “negated”. The author thus uses this to construct an argument to say that what is required then is we take responsibility for this dissolution of the figure, that it is or has been dissolved and no longer functions as the static signifier, that we are left with a sort of Sartrean Existential situation where we have to just make our own meaning.

Then there is the other route which would say that still Zizek’s model is operating, and indeed there is a master signifier that is drawing forth this particular essay and discourse in the sense that there is an underlying or over arcing structure through which I can understand what his essay could mean. And that at no time has what Zizek or Peterson talked about or described been overcome in any way or changed in anyway so far as it indeed is having to do with the subject that would presume to be able to overcome the discourse: the subject is indeed intact and involves responsibly; what is needed is a radical break into existential responsibility (Christ). Here discourse ‘floats’ over real things granting appearance of change through the identification with the term rather than, what I call, the truth.

This is the Laruellian issue in his non-philosophy. The way it plays out in “actuality” is that one of these routes needs to be denied in order for progress to occur, which is to say in order them for the subject to make for itself a place of identity within the ideological sphere. The issue is then just what progress occurs?

Hence again the discussion of this essay occurs along two routes that are always in play and cannot be reduced to one or the other necessarily or contingently; this is to say that the moment it is reduced to one or the other is exactly when we find out the authors’ orientation upon objects, and we find out because of the nature of choice (discussed elsewhere).

In other words, there is no “old” in the sense this author used the idea except in as much as he views himself as occurring within an ideological construct (Zizekian and Petersonian and “world state”) which has ties constructed ‘in state’ as a stable and manifested static identity or entity unto which a free or unfree subject can then enact itself in the “actual” omnipresence that is the “figured” political world.

And Zizek’s discourse replays itself as a capitalistic-Christian God-world-cross substance prefigured in Peterson’s archetypical psychology.

Responsibility can indeed take the form of centering ideologically in the capitalisitc excess of subjective agency. Or the responsibility can arise as emancipation through a radical break which allows for the embodiment of material limit.

Does the Banach-Tarski Paradox Anticipate The Two Routes Upon Objects ?


This is the best vid I’ve seen all month!

I definately am Not a mathematician, but this vid explains this paradox pretty well. And, despite the scope of his conjectures at the end, a significant philosophical question would concern whether reality presents a sufficiently able manner for conceptualization to encompass all that we are able to know?

The precipitate of this first question thus moves retroactively as opposed to redundantly:

If we can take the initial object as any real object, then we can likewise take ‘reality’ itself as an object which itself is real. If we are to understand anything, communication of reality must be involved in some manner.

The initial issue, then, is if what is proposed to have been communicated is able to be viewed and understood as not having been communicated. And then if what was not communicated is able to come through as this latter view, that is, what has not been communicated being communicated but not in the former instance and not a replacement of the former (what was indeed communicated is not nullified by the communication which was not communicated by the proposal of what should have been communicated)?

#thetworoutes.

The initial contemplations upon truth can be found in Nathaniel’s The Philosophical Hack.

The Object of the Subject

Thinking Marx Through Harvey — thru reality

Thinking Marx Through Harvey

Thinking Marx Through Harvey
— Read on syntheticzero.net/2020/01/23/thinking-marx-through-harvey/

I like it.

The only critique I would have of it is that one does not give way to the other. To give way, to choose either one or the other or to have one or the other “prove” itself to be the basis ground or ultimate truth of things as it is, is to resort to a reading of Kierkegaard that is not conventionally mistaken: it is to have faith.

We might see that the issue is not so much (or is less) that there is an idealistic Marxist realm where ideologies or abstractions usurp brute realities, and then a disillusionment that comes along that shows that such abstract realities, or theoretical systems based on abstract concepts, is an incorrect way to understand the truth of things, so to speak — but indeed such conceptual (e-)motions occur.

My critique is that the reduction to one form or another, at least in this kind of dialectical polemic, where I was incorrect before but now my idealistic version of reality has been proven incorrect– this kind of polemical thinking, this way to position myself in the world, this either/or mentality, is what is incorrect. It is not unethical; but it is incorrect with regards to what is true.

When we read Kierkegaard, we might understand that what he’s really indicating, especially in his Pivotal philosophical works “either/or, pts 1 & 2”, is it is possible that my ideological theories posing or pointing towards some truth actually does still occur as such, that is, showing truth, while yet also as I come upon the real world which discounts it and proves it to be incorrect. What occurs is that there are two correct versions of reality that do not work together nor conflate into or toward another unity, and that this is the truth that shows how our interaction with the world takes place.

I submit, arguments of what is real, or what is actually the case in the world, function As we might understand them informing us intellectually ,through a vacillation of ideological categories that function truly to establish the world, a world, the world, in exactly the way it is, and the subject mediating between those worlds as though indeed I, the subject, is changing. In the scheme, though, the world that is involved with the greatest of all categories, essentially does not change. We can even bring Slavoj Zizek’s question in here: are we able to change how we understand change?

No matter what discourse, or any other indicator, might “truly mean”, ultimately it is only indicating ideas that are attached to whatever actual world in the way that it is at that present moment. The idea that I am coming to find out what is “actually real” through any sort of theoretical mechanism or intellectual device, is ultimately based in what we would or should properly call “faith”. To resolve the either/or dilemma to one or the other “reality” requires faith.



As someone else has put it elsewhere, it is not a question of whether or not Jesus Christ was actually the son of God or not the son of God, was an actual human being, or was a God on earth, or was the son of God, or none of those things.  The more complex and significant issue is how Jesus Christ occurs in the world that I am coming upon. This last question differs substantially and is quantitatively different than the previous types of questions. 

Similarly, racism for that matter, or aliens, or The European Union, or quarks, bits or gravity, or unicorns.

To be able to weigh up sides and decide which appears the more real, to have placed the stakes within that trial, as though I am along with the world Being determined by those stakes, requires faith.



Likewise it is not a question of whether or not the brain functions in whatever way that science or neurology might say that it does or that it doesn’t, or whether or not science is correct or incorrect in its estimations. Whatever situation is occurring at the time is indeed the situation that we must deal with at the time. Yet, strangly philosophically sognificant, most often how we are thinking about it is understood to be involved with some actually true of the situation which further tends to want to avoid itself this time, wants to “prove” to not others – against, with or by others — but mainly itself how such a truth is indeed essentially true, no matter what anyone will say about it. 

A Good Synopsis Of Harman’s OOO and the Laruelle-Harman link.

www.researchgate.net/publication/320254177_Materialism_Without_Matter_The_Recurrence_of_Subjectivism_in_Object-Oriented_Ontology

How are we to take the Object Oriented Ontology of Graham Harman?

Well, any way we would like.

But the way I take it is specifically philosophical. And by this approach I mean to position my self from that of non-philosophy, which is to say, what Francois Laruelle meant as opposed to what his congregants would want him to mean; and by this I mean to say that by understanding what both these authors mean, I have the single critique against both in as much as there are people who would be non-philosophers or object oriented ontologists as a philosophical position. I am neither. But I understand both. And I propose that it is through understanding what both these authors are saying in the context of philosophy, that I am a philosopher who’s object is philosophy.

I have said elsewhere that I think Graham Harman offers us the most significant philosophy of our time.  I also argue in various places that philosophy only concerns itself. And I often use the example of walking along absorbed in your cell phone and you walk into a low tree branch. My point is that such an event is utterly impenetrable by, what I work to call, conventional philosophy.  This is not to say that I cannot have a philosophical position about what happened or what the branch is or what the gash in my forehead is or the blood, or my scratched glasses; rather, it is to say that the meaning of the event or it’s ontological status is not all there is to talk about.

As I have in an earlier post, what we are dealing with is the difference between the nothingness at the inside-end of the phenomenal reduction which is the lacuna or gap and well as the magical ‘filler’ of capitalist subjectivity, and the in-itself essence of the object that withdraws from view.

I see my hypothetical anecdote, and the conclusion I have just put forth, in line with both Laruelle’s and Harman’s philosophies.  My critique of both of them is that the way they distinguish their particular philosophies from any other is based in discursive semantic distinctions that have nearly nothing to do with reality.  This is to say, the reality that they both propose in their manners is exactly a philosophical reality that has nearly nothing to do with the branch smashing into my forehead.  It is exactly the certain kind of viewing upon their own work which allows them to be saying anything about reality, and yet never be a part of it.  This is not to say that they are wrong, but only that they do not recognize what they are doing, or if they do then they are involved with a sort of deceit (see my posts on Bad Faith which I wrote like 5 years ago).

My other proof-anecdote I have used is that I doubt that Harman goes to grab a beer with lunch and friends and sits with the server for and hour or two to make sure that everyone knows the truth of what they are getting themselves into (or whatever) by ordering food and drink, both Harman and his friends and the server, the cooks and brewmasters, etcetera, all understand the reality that they are involved with before he even starts to order.  Let alone the car (he does live in LA) and all the philosophical ideas that must go into him even starting a car.  For how could the server bring him a beer if he is not privy to same the ontological ground as Harman? How does he ever even get to the pub?

The point I am making here is exactly a non-philosophical point that Laruelle makes (and others); namely, that the idea that there is an extension of actuality beyond the argumentative motions of philosophical work is itself based in a kind of faith.  It is in no uncertain terms indeed a belief that what the thinking subject has come upon in the philosophical moment extends to include the ordering of dinner and a drink behind the scenes of the actual situation. And this is exactly what Harman talks about so far as “behind the scenes” (what I call transcendence).

Anyway. I must save the more in depth analysis of this linked essay for a submitted paper.

In short, I am a counselor and a philosopher.  The philosophy exists as a thing in-itself (ala Harman) for the knowledge which dismisses itself from itself for another object; as these objects withdraw from the scene to do their own business, they thus involve me and the other phenomena vicariously, each drawing upon the another to do their relative business in the real world: Actual non-philosophical business of dealing with real things philosophically, which is to say, completely separated from any causal linkage to the theoretical base, incidentally coincides with various Marxisms and critical theories that also have sense.

 

db91c99c4cc2a7dc47da785672b0066f_original.jpg

{artwork from the book Subjects with Objects}

 

The Philosophical Object.

Phenomenology says that we all have subjective worlds that are reflected in our opinions and views.

The Speculative Realist conference philosophers spoke to the point of how that formulation of reality leads to a closed loop of philosophical correlation. Thus, their problem has been how to find something outside of this closed system.

The concern of an orientation upon objects is how that correlation occurs outside of the talk about it, encompassing the talk about how we are to get outside of it.

The issue here then arises between an object which withdraws from view (Harman) and the subject which is never expressed or communicated (Lyotard).

The difference, I say, lay more with orientation and less with ontological ubiquity. More with the manner that the subject is able to view the world and less with how there is a “real” world that subjects can only partially view.

The difference is thus between the phenomenon and the object. Less about how we situate philosophical definitions and more about the manner of being able to see.

Philosophical Dimension.

https://soundcloud.com/usertransspace/reason-emotion-and-religion-groove-n-talk

@

it is possible to understand philosophy as having two dimensions. Non-philosophy thus is the philosophical ability to comprehend the use of the real object called philosophy.

The issue that philosophy raises against this Confinement of its resources and agency, is that philosophy seeS itself –or permits a view that is itself –as without dimension; it understands or otherwise presents reason as having a link to an infinite source, what we generally call transcendence, or what the postmodern called immanence — because what the postmoderns are really saying about immanence is that the human being is able to get a hold of transcendence entirely .

The only argument that philosophy can make against what we are beginning to understand is it’s own limitation is to merely reify it’s access to infinite reasonable adaptation.

And this is why we have to speak of the two routes: conventional philosophical thinking is not really grasping that it is at once an infinite resource, while at the same time able to be described to its limitation. Conventional philosophy will use the rebuttal of no predictive capacity to say that philosophy is not being defined to its limitations. And then the only response to that is that conventional philosophy is not comprehending the issue at hand. Conventional philosophy sometimes then will take that as an affront to its agency, to its eminence, to its privilege and centrality. And thus would be Because it is not grasping that to describe itself to its limitation is not an insult nor an invalidation; rather it is an invitation to its constructive use. All the while opening up an avenue for thought that it is unable to conceive or otherwise encompass.

As well, it generally cannot conceive of an act that is not involved in an assertion of power as it understands power as the ubiquitous universal underlying force. Again, this is the reason why we have to speak of two routes upon objects that do not reconcile into a further unity.

Wellness and Oppression

wellness is not about being well; unless you are already sick.

I saw this article this morning through my Apple news. my wife sent it to me; she’s definitely not caught up in this type of mind control, but I can’t know for sure that similar type of thinking and reflection don’t go through her mind at times. She passed this article along to me because she is more concerned with instruments of oppression than she is about keeping up with the Joneses.

It got me to thinking about curvy women or larger women or just whatever the correct word is for the other 99% of the real women who are not the mega media image of oppression.

By the way: I am not trying to get in an argument with people who might read this who might say that I am using incorrect terms or not politically correct or am using some terms that might offend people. I admit I don’t know all what the hell words to use so To not offend people, but I am open minded enough and intelligent and understanding enough to know that I might be using words that might bother people or that might offend them in someway, and so here I am, and I apologize if I’m not using the correct verbiage.

Ok.

So it seems to me that any non-media obsessed real woman is told that she might do better if she just accepts her body The way it is. And I don’t mean to be stereo typical to say this is women only because I’m sure there are plenty of men that obsess over making their body fit into some “accepted standard of wellness”. But I think the sane thing is that people are OK with themselves; I think that is the universal standard of being human for every aspect of being human: everyone just wants to be OK with them selves and should be, no?

I am going to get really philosophical here because I am a counselor and I am a philosopher so here we go.

The article above is a kind of critique of An oppressing discourse. It addresses what at least I see and I would imagine the author understand, as a kind of oppression that is being an acted upon people across the world having to do with body image, food, and behavior in general including reaching over into psychology. Please note;My little bit right here is not making a comment upon whether the article is right or wrong or true or false; I think it is right and I think it is true, but this post is not critiquing that article nor its methodology; I am more using it as an occasion to point out or indicate what I understand as the two routes.

The short of my position is that everyone is exactly the way they’re supposed to be. The real issue then is why people don’t feel that way or think that way about themselves. Now, also I am not suggesting that there is some sort of “actual utopian ideal human being that is totally comfortable with themselves”. Rather, I am indicating a certain manner of being that human beings are.

Everyone is exactly the way they’re supposed to be and perfect in that way, whatever it is. I think that is a good statement of really what we’re after so far is human being in the world; I think when it’s all said and done and we’re sitting there taking our bong hits or drinking a glass of wine at the end of the day, ultimately we want to be OK we want to feel OK we don’t really want to be angry we don’t want to be sad we don’t want to have to do all the myriads of negative self talk, etc.

OK, do you have that picture?

The next question is: why are we not? The real question that comes up in everyone’s mind is why am I feeling bad about myself; why do I think my large body is somehow not too “well”; why do I doubt myself?

And I think the answer to that is telling: The typical answer to that is always that something else is making me fucked up. Now, again, I repeat, I am not suggesting that we need to come to some sort of inner acceptance within ourselves. Of course, that is what we have to do, but that is not the point that I am suggesting, nor is that the medium upon which I am placing this discourse of this post right here.

Already, if you are understanding what I just wrote then you might be able to begin to understand what I mean by two routes, or, two orientations upon objects. Subjective and objective is of the one route. The idea that there is some thing that is making me do something that I would rather not do, or is making me think a certain way or behave a certain way –that is an absolutely valid and real way of understanding oneself in the world.

But I’m getting at something when I do that I feel is more significant. I was tempted there to say “more substantial”, but I try to tend away from suggesting that something is “more real” or “more true”. I am not involved in this essay right here, of the two routes, in a capitalistic frame of trying to discern what is more correct or better. I am more concerned with establishing a ground of facts.

So we might ask ourselves where the idea that I am perfectly OK comes from. And then along with us we might ask ourselves where the idea that something else is making me do something or look at myself in a way that I don’t like comes from also.

In particular I point out the part in the article above that the author points out when she finally got comfortable with eating intuitively I guess, where she just Kaina eats what she wants and doesn’t trip out on it too much, she has the same body that she has had through all her obsessing about the various diets and the binging and they’re restricting and the eating healthy and all their various facets of trying to stay skinny, I guess.

What this says to me is that however she was being, she was not being in any particular way because something else was telling her to be that way. Rather, that both of those real items were arising in existence simultaneously and conspiratorially for her being.

Now try and keep in mind the two routes as I’ve tried to describe them briefly so far in this essay as I go forward: it is not that society is erecting this image of women and people such that then people get low self-esteem and want to do terrible things to their bodies or eat only lettuce or work out three times a day seven days a week. There is no element that is causing them to behave in such a way or to think in such a way, if we can include thinking as a kind of behavior.

And to stack up on that kind of awareness, I’m going to bring in something a little more personal to me; because I am a white man, many people would probably say I’m filled with shit commenting on this kind of stuff. Which I admit maybe I’m overstepping my bounds and I am actually filled with shit, that’s OK, I’m totally open to learning where I might be failing.

My daughter died suddenly two months ago. It was a purely random event, she died of viral meningitis. Sure, we could probably sue the hospital and get to the root cause of it and get people in trouble for malpractice and stuff like that because no one diagnosed her with meningitis until it was really too late. So put that aside, that we could’ve retaliated. There is also no reason why she should’ve got it, no one we know nor no one that she has come in contact with has meningitis that we can find her that we know of. The doctors hypothesize that it was just kind of a perfect storm of infection that got into her brain.

I am dealing with it pretty well, I suppose overall. But even at times I find that suddenly I will randomly start to cry. Sometimes, or actually somewhat often, Some innocuous thought our image, like a tree or a song, will lead over into some sort of reminder that Marley is gone or some other thing that Hass to do with various things around her death, and I find myself getting emotional and getting teared up. And it is kind of interesting to me in a way that something will start that kind of cycle but then there is this also kind of sub cycle where some part of me feels like I have to continue in that cycle and ruminate and be emotional and miss her and be sad. I’m not making judgments upon myself; I’m just looking at it through an intellectual lens; I am fortunate to be studying counseling and so I had many people and do have many people that are helping me on this path.

So, of course I can say that I am grieving I am involved in the process of grieving still and that the reason why I cry at times that seem random is because, is caused by, this outside thing that is my daughter having died. There is something that occurred that is not me that is making me behave in a manner that I would not otherwise enjoy. As I said, not only do I find myself getting welled up with tears at random times, but then there’s also a further kind of talk to myself of myself that somehow feels like I should continue to dwell in these images and thoughts of loss and sadness and death and missing her, etc. it literally is as though something from the outside, something that is not me or something that I’m not in control of controlling how I am being, how I am viewing myself, how I am behaving, how I am thinking, that I really would not like to have to go through.

And yes all you psychologists out there, don’t read this as though I am in denial or I’m trying to reject my feelings or anything like that because I’m not. 🙂 I am positive that no one would choose to have to mourn for someone they loved dying. So I’m not saying anything about maybe criticizing myself about the fact that I am mourning and grieving; I am not beating myself up or trying not to grieve or trying not to feel.

OK I just had to clear that up, because this is a philosophical consideration based upon a real valid and significance experience that probably millions of people go through every day.

So if we look at the fact that I just start crying at random times. There is no immediate cause that I can really know of; of course, Though, Ido it all the time: I reflect upon myself (like I am doing here, coincidently, lol) and I can say oh it’s because I went into her bedroom which is still set up the way it was when she was alive. I can say that oh the cause that I just started crying randomly was because I brought some water into her lizard into her room. But that’s not really the cause. Maybe we could say it is a proximate cause; but I’m not getting into trying to define a system right at this moment. So if we back up, we get into the general category of grief trauma and loss and so we have to say that my behavior overall is conditioned, or caused by, the loss of my daughter.

Yet, there is no reason that she died. Without going into all the various aspects and break down all the arguments of possibilities about why she died or the cause of this and cause of that, The very simple conclusion is that she got sick for some unknown reason, and this sickness developed until she died despite the best efforts of her doctors. But that doesn’t really give us a true cause; it satisfies a desire for reason, but only if I don’t think about it too much. 🧐

So what I’m really saying is, what I really must be saying is that the cause of my grief cannot be found. There is no reason why a cry at those specific random times; sometimes there is a trigger, other times it just pops up. Because, if I say the reason is that Marley died, and then I say that there is no reason why she died, I would kind of have to say also that the reason that I am grieving has no cause.

And so I must repeat again, here, I am not making a reduction in my thinking to justify or somehow deny the fact that I am in grief or that Marley died or that all that stuff.

This is the nature of the two routes that I’m trying to convey: The basis of the two routes is that they are mutually exclusive and do not reduce to another common unity. The fact that I can understand this ontological truth does not mean that somehow I am comforted by it or somehow I’m trying to deny the fact that my daughter died or trying to prevent myself from having to experience grief or sadness. There is no underlying psychology (Reason, cause) which links these two aspects; and this is to say that where a linking is understood, there we have fallen back into the one route. And that the distinction that I am making is the nature of the two routes, the nature the way that consciousness indeed functions: reduction is a particular function of consciousness, it does not necessary constitute consciousness toward its entire truth.

I’m saying that these events arise conspiratorially in the same sense that there is nothing wrong with my body. There’s nothing wrong with me. I am exactly the way that I am supposed to be.

And so coming back to the article that lead this post. Accepting who I am as a person with all my flaws, whether or not I’m binging and purging and doing tons of exercise every day and being on comfortable with myself and otherwise worried about people not excepting me etc., is both at once caused by other people and arising coincidently. And these two ontological situations do not indicate a further unitive cause.

And so the radical idea I think I’m trying to suggest is that me being OK with myself has nothing to do with rejecting that thing which I understand as causing me to be in a way that I would rather not be. The fighting, the rejection of that perceived outside force really, it seems to me, just reifies the fact that I am not comfortable with myself as a type of comfort. It allows me to be in this particular world that I know so well; the reduction we call “world/subject”. I call this the cosmology which positions the subject in reality.

The radical move of the two routes says that I am never removed from the struggle in reality even as I am entirely OK with myself, and at that, even as I might be totally in shambles. The world is not causing me to be any way; neither is something wrong with me. They are Co-incident, parallel. The reduction to a further “psychological” meaning is ultimately of the one route, the “real world”, the cosmological argument.

And that is not an indictment; it is simply a fact.

Emotion and Reason. Part 3

So back to my original intention behind this post that I have now divided up into three parts.

I am challenging the notion that reason is the crowning authority of human existence and consciousness. And, as a commenter on Part 2 pointed out: I do agree with the observation that what we often think is rational or reasonable is often hardly that.

But I would even counter this observation by saying that such an observation is based in an assumption of reason: it is by reason it’s self that we are able to make such distinctions.

I suggest keeping in mind the idea of the Two Routes, which is an extrapolation of the non-philosophical premise of unilateral duality: by pointing something out and describing it I am not therefore suggesting that something is wrong with it nor making an argument that I have a better idea: I am simply describing a fact. If I say the tree is green and it has bark, I am not suggesting that I have a better way that the tree should be. Of course we can fall down the rabbit hole of what I call conventional philosophical speculation and consider all the probability and possibility of subjective experience of that tree. We can talk about how these subjective reality is may be true and that how our world is constituent of a plurality of subjective worlds. I am not making any argument about whether or not phenomenal subjective worlds are true or false; The veracity of any subjective opinion is absolutely up for debate.

What becomes evident by the contradiction that arises between these two types of understanding, though, is called a unilateral duality. This is to say that we take each of those two situations as situations that indeed are true, but then also note that the activity of the attempt to reconcile those two situations into a further reconciled state only speaks of the One Route. Hence what I am proposing as The Two Routes. Readers can look back at some of my posts to try and wrap ones head around this more fully, one can read Francois Laruelle’s non-philosophical books, and one can investigate what other people have to say about non-philosophy, if really need to comprehend all those details to be able to move over into the issue of an orientation upon objects. It’s OK. No shame there.

Nonetheless; The example that I’m working with here is the strange paradox that (1) reason can somehow analyze it self to say that this situation over here is not reasonable or not rational, and then this situation over there we’re going to categorize another various sort of system, and then this over yonder is what we call actual reason in comparison to these two or three or more possibilities, and then the whole thing amounts to an argument that we can negotiate over about what reason is, and (2) That reason as an object in-itself is characterized by point (1). This is an example of a unilateral duality, and it characterizes a particular manner or approach by which we can begin to understand what the human being is doing.

*

This approach is not dissimilar to the way that counseling might approach someone with, say, anxiety or depression or some sort of neurosis, to use an older term, or some pervading issue that a client may come in for psychological help.

I believe a particular theory that I am nodding toward right here is called Internal Family Systems (IFS). But there are a few theoretical approaches that incorporate a similar manner.

I think the idea is not very new: A client comes in complaining of an inability to stop Behaving in a certain manner, say for example, avoiding parties or social situations because of accute social anxiety, say. Keep in mind that I am not a practicing counselor but I’m just beginning to learn.

In any case, a possible approach to this situation is to get the client to externalize the problem. In other words, what the client is having trouble with is this whole thing that she calls her self which manifests in general as a thinking subject that is her self. The point of the intervention is to help the client see or look at the presenting issue as though it is not part of a whole system that is “her Self”, to help her to To gain sufficient distance from the issue in order to view the issue and address the issue as though it is affecting her self rather than being constituent of her singular whole person.

The issue here is not a speculation or a negotiation about whether or not there is this whole subject called the client herself. We treat the client as though she is an interrelation of various effectual aspects as the primary methodological material, as opposed to a “whole” person who is screwed up in various ways.

In reference to what I’m talking about so far as reason, or as I tend to call “philosophy” sometimes, by suggesting that the client may be affected by a problem rather than being the problem itself, I am thereby not suggesting that the problem may indeed not have to do with a whole system. Rather, I am suggesting that we can approach the whole system by viewing the system in a different manner yet while the system is still functioning and operating as a whole system, which is to say, excluding nothing.

So I will repeat; to point out the fact that reason itself is implied in the activity of indicating things that are not reasonable or indeed irrational as opposed to reasonable or rational, does not negate the fact that indeed reason is allowing for this division of itself. Developing different terms in order to compensate for this apparent paradox gets us nowhere significant into understanding what the human being actually does as it is, except that it gives us insight in that this is indeed what the human being consciousness does: A fact of the object that is the human being. Developing new terms in this way maintains and reifies the one route. Reason is not negated by describing what reason does, neither does such an honest description suggest that there is another way that reason might be operating. The conventional philosophical route Is thus characterized by a method wherein a fact can only be argued with by denying the fact itself. Hence, I say the conventional philosophical method is based in denial. Yet I am not suggesting that there is a better way, or that philosophy/reason should do or be something different. I am merely stating a fact about conventional philosophy.

*

I believe by this line of reasoning I have come up with a second fact of the phenomenal subject. I think I came up with a first fact a year or two or so and you would have to look in my past posts for it. I think the first fact is that a phenomenal subject is bounded by nothing. But I could be wrong. Lol. Actually, with these two facts in place we could thereby come up with a third fact of the phenomenal subject that we have been calling “correlationalism”. Science is based on an honest acceptance of the facts, even while the facts might be tested.

OK. Well it looks like I’ve gotten done with part three and I still haven’t gotten to the original intention behind the whole post so it looks like there’s going to be a part 4

👾

One More Z/P Goodie: Nature, Culture, and the Displacement of Time

On Slavoj Zizek and Jordan Peterson: Nature, Culture, and the Displacement of Time

On Slavoj Zizek and Jordan Peterson: Nature, Culture, and the Displacement of Time
— Read on iambobbyy.com/2019/04/27/on-slavoj-zizek-and-jordan-peterson-nature-culture-and-the-displacement-of-time/

It appears that the people who really do use their thinking skills took a little longer for their comments. Here is another goodie. Bobby gets a little deeper into the various philosophical authorial substrates, and a couple play by plays from the debate.

*

Bobby points out one of the significant parts of the debate that I forgot about; namely, that Peterson definitely sees a kind of progress of history, sees history as a ground outside of human cognition, and then that cognition indeed is able to perceive this ground and make analyses of it. Then; Zizek’s rebuttal to this kind of suggestion is, basically, that though it is possible to perceive some sort of progressing lineage, the lineage itself is articulated at the same time as these articulations disrupt the continuity of the scheme, and at that, at a notably random times.

Bobby has a better version of what they actually said, and then goes into the various philosophical ideas around this idea, for example, Derrida’s trace and erase.

*

I Am digging his approach, but I depart from Bobby’s analysis in a couple of ways.

1) I am not sure that there is any argument that can be made which overcomes the presentation inherent of the debate. And, what I mean by this is that when we understand, say, Derrida, then there is a further development philosophically that shows us that there is no “proper truth”, As though By virtue of what Derrida proposed the nature of human existence demands that there is no historical ground that human beings can cognitively know in the manner Peterson stakes his position. I describe this particular situation and I am indicating right here some of my earlier posts, perhaps from a year or two ago; I will not rehash them here. If we understand Derrida, then much of what he says is like the wind — “the wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth…”

2) It is sufficient to say, that the argument (as a form) has only a particular bearing upon truth, and that Francois Laruelle’s non-philosophy has basically disrupted the idea that there is some sort of unity of truth that human beings can be suspended within to thereby exist in a argumentative reality. The suspension is itself, as I say, real, but not true.

In my work, I try to show how this particular method, this particular way of coming by or upon reality, that I call the “conventional method”, is but one manner, The One Route of the Two Routes. Further, these two routes do not further indicate a “reasonable or rational” route as opposed to and “irrational” route, but that this kind of argumentative way of establishing truth is indeed one “rational’ manner of coming upon objects. The routes are mutually exclusive in a non-philosophical manner, not complimentary as the early 20th century Existentialists would want people to believe: Belief is required first for the compliment to be realized.

In short, I am saying that all Bobby really does is kind of lean on supporting what Zizek is reputed to argue in relation to a traditional lineage of authorial representation. And that’s ok.

And –

My take is that there is no reduction of this sort possible once we understand what Laruelle is saying; and indeed, this is what I think Zizek was relying upon, as it indeed accounts for why he did not plow into Peterson.

My position is that these two men represent The Two Routes upon objects. These routes do not further reconcile to another unitive, and a singular route. And this is to say that what the debate shows is that these two routes function together without necessarily reducing to either, nor to another further unity.

Indeed Petersons argument is valid by the mere fact that people — regardless of what argument I want to make to pronounce upon such ‘other people’ — indeed can and do experience and encounter reality in exactly the way that Peterson is philosophically describing in his solution. And that this particular way, or route, is not false by virtue of the fact that I may come up with an argument against what they are saying. These people are not wrong or somehow have some sort of invalid way of understanding the truth of reality. The way they (those who understand an objectively knowable history) understand it is indeed True. And this truth, while perhaps in communication with me nevertheless does not fall into falsity due to my points, nor theirs due to mind. And, our existence is not relative nor reductionary to either that or this. It is true. Period.

Objects do not require my acknowledgment or permission to be true, or otherwise have or hold truth.

Also,

And whether or not Peterson understands technically what is going on philosophically in this ‘larger’ sense, Zizek nevertheless does understand and that is why (I submit) he didn’t plow into Peterson about his ignorance, to show how ignorant Peterson might be upon these philosophical intricacies and subtleties.

(See my earlier post about what Peterson might actually be involved with.)

We can find evidence everywhere in his talks and writings that Zizek Understands what I’m talking about: when he talks about “naïve”, he is talking about that particular kind of existence which does not answer nor even fall into the category of the philosophy he proposes by his analyses as a sort of categorical imperative. The ‘common people’ do not answer to his kind of philosophy, and indeed exist outside of it in an essential sense, even to the extent that those people’s reality (truth) has nothing to do with what analysis he is making upon them. This is the nature of his philosophy and it forms a foundational ground that most people seem to miss or are unable to reconcile with their experience.

*

If you are interested in The exploration of the two routes, please check out The Philosophical Hack: The concluding unscientific post-script to event, by Cedric Nathaniel.

It is crazy inexpensive.

The Principle of Two Routes .

The Principle Of Two Routes upon objects:

“…the key is not excluding myself or including the exclusionary clause in statements about truth.

…I am not claiming that “constructing wholeness” is not an opinion, only that it’s exists within two frameworks that are reconciled by moving to one side, by ‘believing’ that one of the ‘sides’ is the truth. But ‘in truth’ they do not reconcile.

Science makes no exclusionary claims on what is true of existence. It makes claims about what reality is doing. But this claim, of science not making exclusionary ontological claims, is true.

We thus may have found another fact of how consciousness is functioning.

Such a proposal includes phenomenal reality in its description without relying upon its ability to totally inscribe a subject. ”

–Cedric Nathaniel. Granary Collage. 1/23