The “End of History” and the Renegotiation of the Subject.

With the deafening thunder of Napoleon’s canons filling the air at Jena, the romantic story goes that a middle-aged university professor and …

Kojève, Herder, and the “End of History”

—– I have not reas Kojeve or Herder, so the following goes off of only
Heaiods essay.

What we are seeing, what we are involve with, is the realization of what the human being is. The end of history as either a “happy” or “united” end is less the significant point than it marks or identifies a oarticular Kind of human being, one that sees itself in the context of either a “whole” of creatures that we call human, or one that understands that “human” defines a particular subset of this whole as to what is included and excluded in this “people” group.

Yes. The end of history may be about consumerism, but only in so much as there is an ideal effort which sees the whole through the exclusion. That is, “the whole” is allowed to be consumers, but it is only really about those who are indeed able to participate as this implied consumer. It is really only the people who do indeed prosper who are included in this ‘whole’. The rest are, by linguistic default, ‘not people’, they are something else that is excluded by the category itself, similar to trash that we deny by our consumerism. Think of recycling.

This secret ideological “ol’ in out, in out, know what I mean, know wheat I mean” motion of language is generally invisible to those people who are invested in the ‘truth’ of the linguistic category (think capitalism). The use of the idioms contained in every expression work to hide the ‘actual’ discursive functioning and reference which supports and justifies the user (subjectivity). Yet, it is not “those people” as much as it is indeed, ironically, all people who are included.

Hence, what we are really seeing now, what we are involve with, is the transition between ethical paradigms in how we deal with the whole through the part, and not so much how we include everyone or what that means. It is the investment of language “of the whole” which understands a modern perpetual ‘end’ in the various ways that we have seen argued over the past 200 years. We are seeing a renegotiation of the subject.

For, the more thoroughly we are invested in the topical use of language, the more we speak to ideology and its power to orient and fixate the subject in the world. Therefore, it is not so much “the content” of discourse that is significant to philosophy, as much as the significance lay and how we are oriented upon discourse and what it does. And this is to say that where the subject is not centered by ideology, but only uses ideology for its own subjective teleology, there we find the subject in a relationship of integrity with itself, for then it takes responsibility for the ideology which comes about through its own purpose. 

It is only there that we stumble upon the irony which traverse is the modern use of language to thereby be able to enact ones world consistently with ones form, for now we see that the very term that we understand as agency, the very power and force through which ideology subjects human beings, is just another enforcer of ideological placement by which the individual faces the paradox of choice.

For ultimately there is no choice to be made at every point, but only one choice which begins at every moment we use language.  Yet less how will we use language, and more what is informing that use.

x

More on (Moron ?) reference.

Another thing that I struggle with is the idea of having to refer to someone to gain validity or credence in what I might say.

Typically we refer to other authors of the modern era Or contemporary authors, because we are in the process of developing a kind of argumentative community, towards some sort of theoretical ground upon which we can implement some sort of activity that we all generally direct as a solution.

But the a epitome of reference is when we refer to ancient authors, other languages, for example and especially, Hebrew, Greek, and Latin.

What perplexes me is why I would need to refer what I’m saying to some originaria Greek term.

And I don’t necessarily mean this in the sense that it doesn’t help with the clarity that I am trying to communicate; I mean it in the sense of why don’t we refer even further back to what the Greek word might have its roots in?

And then also I don’t even mean to suggest that the people prior to the Greeks or prior to the Hebrews etc.. might have had a better way of putting things into terms.

What I mean is what is happening with me, and what is happening to the person that is reading what I’m writing? In so much is I might refer to Greek, say, or even it’s Proto languages, what is really striking me that I might route my discourse is in these Proto languages?

And I think the most basic question that I come to in this Perplexity of why, is do these Proto languages have a more substantial or original airy position with reference to what it is to be human or what it is we might be talking about in actuality?

Because I tend to think that this thing that’s going on inside of me, and I feel that is going on inside the reader, in so much as we both feel really great about being able to bring up these Greek, Latin, or Proto Greek or Proto Latin terms which mean something original, I guess, is that somehow when I do this I feel I’m getting more closer to some “natural” way that the human being actually should or actually does exist in the world.

What do you think?

Direction 2.28: Appropriation of the Rhetoric of Power

The impetus of this blog page “The Direct Tangents of Constructive Undoing” concerns the question: In the explication of his project called ‘Non-Philosophy’, why is Francis Laruelle so bogged down in high-speak jargon?

Now, be prepared; this series of essays is gonna drop some super bombs on your ideal reality. Granted, probably next to zero people are following along ( though I write as if some one person is), but the explanation is simple, as I said earlier: people care nada. Most people do not care about anything but their own idea of what is correct. If I can coin a term I just picked up from another blogger: the sheeple make up 99.99 % of the population, the cattle-people, and of that .01 that may care, hardly another .001 of those will be able to burden themselves with such a weighty, hard-hitting conceptual explosion. They only want to do their skill set and proclaim their ethics upon the world from their porch while they drink margaritas and bar-b-que steaks on their days off. There is no getting through to most people.

OK. Now that I’ve alienated what audience I had left, as i eat my steak and drink fruit smoothies, you fraction of a minutiae, you one people, you zero-percenters, get to see if you can hold on, because I am speaking to you. It is among you that the point of this discussion may find root. What I have to offer should be heard by academics, but I’ve probably insulted them too much already and their career typically doesn’t allow such boldness. One must remain timid, pliable; which is to say, conventionally acclimated.

* *

One might be easily drawn to the conclusion that Laruelle is an academic, and has been involved in academic circles so has been long acclimated to such linguistic weather. Sure. I am sure that this is the case. The idea behind this, though, is that academia hold the path to answers and that these answers, as well as the route, can only be understood through jargon. This is one explanation: it was the only language he knows/knew ( he is still alive at this point in time).

Yet the nature of his non-philosophy belies this explanation, for its message, the message that necessitates the ‘project’ aspect of his proposition, is saying as much as I am. Whether he sees it or not, there is a contradiction involved in his using the jargon to speak, or attempt to convey a reason and a proposal for action, against the proposal that is implicated by his use of such jargon. Hence, non-philosophy and philosophy, respectively.

The point of his project, though, is exactly that he sees the contradiction, and is in an effort to make it consistent. This is his project. To be clear: he must assert the project because it has to be more than a theory because the theory contradicts itself in its presentation.

* *

What we are seeing here is a trick of mirrors. See, what I am offering here is a description of what Laruelle is up to all the while showing through my description what he is actually saying; I am presenting a picture of what he must mean by not only explaining his ideas, but presenting the moment of understanding as the process of reading this essay.

What we have with non-philosophy is a juxtapositioning of rhetoric, as this juxtaposition thus indicates the rhetoric of power. One would not be wrong in calling it also a discourse of power, but more so its significance is found in a particular rhetoric that usurps meaning unto itself.
In the same way feminists speak of hegemonic discourse, such as, colonialist discourse, or as Paulo Freire might call the discourse of oppression, Laruelle’s proposition is based in the notion that there is a manner of speaking that appears on the scene as reality, as if it is indicating a true reality, but that it really is indicating mere one particular reality. By his non- philosophy, he is saying that this particular rhetoric is the only way of speaking that can be used, but that indeed, it is being used (by non-philosophy) in the attempt to convey another reality: one that is not subject to the rhetoric in power, but one that has no other rhetoric to use for its conveyance.