The Ethical Universe and the New Order

OBSIDIAN. By Nick Sullo

Kierkegaard famously asks the question of our times, the question that defines modernity by its post-modern parameters:

Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical?

The irony in which Kierkegaard couches every clause of his philosophy might be best comprehended in contemplation of a couple of other philosophers that never mentioned him. In fact, I am going to remain true to the spirit of K’s work by refusing to cite the other authors. It is true to his meaning Becuase the point of Kierkegaard’s work is that there is nothing one needs to understand by reading him: The point of all of his works, individually and together, is ironic:

Once we have climbed the ladder, and understand the meaning gained in the progress of knowledge, we find that if we indeed understood the truth of it, then we must throw away the ladder. 

What?

The enigmatic statement that is able to arise in this context indicates references are not needed to gain credibility to the meaning of the statement; the statement is not ethical, arising in truth outside of the ethical universe. Indeed, such incredibility beckons us to ask back to beginnings, of humanity, and to oneself, and ask: Why is credibility for myself gained through reference to other’s ideas? What is the answer to that question truly saying about who and what I am in the universe?

The irony of Kierkegaard is that he was not being ethical in his philosophy; in fact, he was being entirely not ethical.  In his works somewhere (does it matter where?) he attempts to explain how what is not ethical is not the same an unethical.  As well, he is not impacting a condition for all human beings by the not ethicalness, as though each of us has a part that arises in a condition of absurdity. On the contrary; he is relating a particular condition of Being human that only arises in absurdity.  Not as an ironic feign to imply that all human beings naturally exist, as Sartre night have read Kierkegaard, against an absurdity where by we attain agency to make choices authentically.  Sartre’s point about Kierkegaard being the first existentialist, is a remark based in a particular rational ideal of what is allowed to make sense; in this example, the notion of absurdity, as well as its implied content (or definition) from the Sartrean Existentialist standpoint, is understood to indicate something quite rational: that the notion of absurdity marks something by which the subsequent remarks and experiences are rational, i.e. the definition of absurdity is….the definition itself is a rational ideal of what is absurd– as though we should make account for ourselves rationally, that is by Ks reckoning, ethically.

Even though Sartre, in this regard, might be talking abut something that can be found in this manner of viewing meaning, this is not what Kierkegaard is talking about directly.

The absurdity arises in as much as what the individual comes upon once the truth of that matter is found at the end of a progress of knowledge guided by love. This absurdity is the realized motion where in the activity of one’s Being does not answer to what is ethical.  This is to say that the activity of Being becomes absurd in itself because what is ethical is not informing every act.  Not a rational act, but indeed one could say an act — if I might be so bold — that arises in the Pure Reason…

 Again: must I cite? why?

Is there something inherently less powerful in the notion that I just conveyed when I convey it as a sense of being sensible, than when I convert it as something that a particular other person said at some point in time? Does any philosophical argument gain more credence because a bunch of people say it or agree with it, or argue with it?

We come back to Kierkegaard: The Crowd is Untruth.

Likewise; does it give my post here more credence when I say that Kierkegaard said this, as opposed to me having coming upon the same truth without him? Why do my words and statements suddenly have more weight and significance because I place it in a context of someone else who is then supposed to be more credible? Or intelligent? Or insightful?

Does the intelligencia ever ask this question with in good intention? In good faith?

…we can come back to Sartre and reconsider what he had to say about bad faith.  

And again, ponder why when I say “Kierkegaard” or “Sartre” suddenly the very same notions that may have been come upon in mere sensible experience of Being have more weight?  Shouldn’t that fact that, indeed, with a certain kind of reflection, each person will come upon the very same ideas about what is occurring philosophically have more weight that the mere name dropping?

And then, why should I discount what Might have come upon by myself despite that any philosopher in particular has just said stuff that I had already realized?  Why am I waiting to realize or know things until I verify it with someone else?

In reflection of this, we begin to understand the problems of history, as well as authority, as well as authenticity. But more; we are able to begin to understand why those methods of knowledge show us that I need not reference anything else, any other corpus of knowledge, for the ideas to be true because they are merely telling me that I already know.

And then when we take that idea and reference it to Plato, say, what becomes not-ethical is to say that I did not need to even know of Plato for it to be true on one hand, but that indeed, such a statement is not an argument to be debated as to its veracity, which is to say, that so and so had this to say about it, but so and so disagreed.

It is not that Plato said or thought such and such about remembering or recollection, but that indeed to see such ideas as something to ponder over whether or not I believe or agree with it, is merely referring my knowledge to something that is a modern ethical standard by which I reference myself to ontological status.

It is to this kind of knowledge that Kierkegaard refers a suspension. He is asking if indeed the knowledge that I come upon has nothing (or at least, not what is commonly thought) to do with referencing someone else’s great ideas, because if I am able to understand the great idea, it is not because someone else had it.  If indeed I am understanding my knowledge in this way, then indeed I am referencing myself to what is ethical as a standard under which I stand to consider what actions I should take.

In this regard, that I come upon the progress of knowledge which leads me to the understanding of the truth of the experience of philosophy, then indeed the ladder becomes thrown away and I no longer am determined ethically by what I might choose, but indeed my choices determine what arises as the ethical world.  Not again whether I have made an ethical choice, but rather, that there is nothing that I am doing which is un-ethical; it is not ethical.  Again, not in some meta-standard of rationality and subject intuition, but through the absurd situation wherein the pure reason arises as an imperative to my being whereby I never make any choices as to my determination of my Being, but only by the rationality where the ethical world must exist, at that, practically, as that through which I move, that which determines my Being, how I am only able to move. It is to this determinacy that Sartre finds disagreeable: Because he found a huge distortion of this ideal in the modern emanation that was called The Third Reich.  He was unable to reconcile the incredible unethical manifestation of the world agent (Hitler and the Final Solution) so he had to define a new modern agent to ethically counter the incredible ethical breach (not suspension). Due to the atrocity of modern industrialism accompanied by a individual ideal of the historical agent, Sartre rightly sees that the socially ethical modern individual must make a choice as to whether such agency is responsible. Of course, we find after, again, that a mistake was Being perpetuated….as well as post-modern…all Beings determined by a freedom to choice…

Where Sartre moves philosophy toward a more rational ideal (that is by definition absurd–the Irrational Man– which is ironically very not absurd), he misrepresents philosophy to a new modern religion of what it is to be human.  This, ironically, is less a rational choice of contingency, and more determined in love: To a new meta-discourse or meta-narrative which is unapproachable by modern ethical rational means. The means ends up confirming and relying upon the negation of its idealized past.

Such a state is absurd to that view of the world which sees that everything adheres or should comply with what is rational.  It is absurd because ethics, and its rational ideal, has been suspended in such a state, and such that rationality itself become subject to the determination of absurdity. Or as Sartre called out, nothing.

This is absurdity in the positive sense, where the crowd is always untruth, but where the crowd doesn’t think itself through the individual as such, that is to say, Where the ratio of thought is upheld only in the imperative of what is ethical.  The absurdity is thus to move by the imperative, such that what moves is no longer subject to ethics, but indeed– as above– determines them.  Not as some Hegelian agent of history. By the exact opposite: Or in terms of “Can the Subaltern Speak?”: The subaltern speaks through the moving of what is true, Being called forth into the world, rather than what is ethically decided upon rationally.

 

 

The problem with a dip in productivity due to working from home

There is no problem. That is, a dip in productivity is against the idea that “we“ are in a race to get somewhere.

I’ve already dipped my Kierkegaardian cards. He asks, “where is everybody going so fast?”

First, where are we going? Where are “we” going? Where is humanity trying to get to? What are we trying to accomplish? Why?

Who is this “we”?

And I find myself asking that question for probably since I’ve been an adult. Does anyone ever ask why we have to get everything done so quickly? What are we trying to do?

Does anyone ever ask these questions?

What is being educated if no one ever considers or even thinks about these kinds of questions?



The Simplicity of Substance and the Lengthy Post

I have been re-approaching philosophical ideas that have long held a deep significance for me. Because my life has been basically informed by an incessant and consistent questioning of what I am coming up on, I am finding that I am merely continuing to be what I am, which is, for a term, in motion.

I think this last round of doubting comes about because I am realizing that I am more concerned with actual people than I am with my ability to think great thoughts.

Now, what is strange about this is I am intensely antisocial in general while at the same time at ease with being social in a certain context or a certain framework. I generally hate people (groups) but I love and am very concerned with people (individuals). 🌏

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This is very Zizekian, from the Zizekian standpoint of media/ideological primacy:

“I do not love the world….I pick and choose who and what I love.”

So far as “the world” might be an ideological fantasy established through magical symbols, Zizek, the critical theorist/media critic-turn-philosopher states unequivocally that “love is evil.”

What he means by this is that we are persuaded by an existential anxiety which pervades the maintenance of the fantasy– that is, due to our investment in the truth-value of the fantasy (the value is gained because it prevents us from having to encounter that which we are most of afraid of: the dissolution of the fantasy, or death) — to love the world, to extend an ideological hand out into the grandiose narcissist world because the idealism inherent of the fantasy is we are ‘in this together’, so to speak, individually yet identically.

The modern individual is ethically bound to, at least, trying to love the world. But in the whole, he doesn’t have a clue how to actually love his sisters and brothers around him. The imaginary world establishes intuitive subjective barriers which serve to maintain the ideological modern identity at all costs against his neighbors, while extending out ideals to the “universe” or “the world” where we all must try to get along.

So; yet in truth he denies what is really occurring; which is, we are all being selfish and choosing certain universal things and people to love, and not really loving the world.

It is this tension of modern subjectivity we deny through the institutionally normalized and sanctioned “state of” anxiety which then in relief shows our ultimately ‘sinful’ nature: “In despair to will to be oneself” (as Kierkegaard puts it) is the condition of the modern man concept of love which avoids its true nature: hence, it is evil because it is an ideologically sanctioned “global” love that misses the intimacy that we generally misconstrue in the notion of agape, or man’s love for God. Since, God in this modern sense, is indeed a “usurper” god which takes the place of brotherly love to which agape would otherwise return to reflect in God itself, that is, in the world.

Zizek is, of course, referring to the modern ideal of love by which humanity defers itself and by which humanity is regulated to its conceptual ability.

Beyond the ideological love, by reflection, any love of a transcendent world is a narcissism, a pathological version of the human being. While within the fantasy, the narcissism is justified through the fantasy erected by trauma and told or narrated as “just human” , the “all too human” who takes on little responsibility for his actions, while erecting layers of intellectual and ideological facades in grandiose defense of them. Hence, the love that is evil is indeed, on one hand, a carnal love based in the libidinal control of the ego which then moves to impose or identify itself with the super-ego material norms: the subjective ideological identity.

Yet on the other, love is evil from the transcendent standpoint because the love I would have for the world that is my sisters and brothers, that is, not put off to a mere grand idea, is an evil and absurd activity.

So ironically, items that I pick and choose to love are in or of the reality that I cannot but be involved with– this is an evil manner of doing things. Hence, I do not love the world from Zizek’s standpoint of an ideological (media critique) analysis.

But indeed. I should not love the world in this way, so I don’t. Instead, I pick and choose to thus remain consistent and cohered to that which is the fantastic manner by which I must apprehend the ideological world.

The true love I profess is not modern, thus from the modern ideological standpoint, it is evil.

I won’t go on.

(Please don’t) 👨🏽‍🚀

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Use the corona-lockdown to see yourself in the world

HERE reposted : actually wanted to post this in 7 weeks, but because I see the population getting nervous and impatient amongst lockdowns and because it is my …

Use the corona-lockdown to change your life forever within 6 weeks

——————The re-post here starts out good; I like the introduction. The “solution”in the meditation practice, on the other hand, is up to the reader.

“Take what you need and leave the rest.”

Personally, I am not in a place Where I am able to understand and apply such practices as framed in a way such as this re-post does.

There is no argument that can be made to me, and I feel if we are honest with ourselves then there is no argument that needs to be made to me because If such practices were valuable and vital to my existence and being then they would make sense to me and I would practice them.

Ok.

However;

The beginning of that repost talks about how so few people see that the world is their own reflection. And then it gives a meditation that can help people to see the truth of the situation, or be free or whatever.

For me, it just reminded me of the philosopher/psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan.

In particular, if I am not completely misinterpreting his ideas, yet accompanying them with the sensible extrapolations of time:

The modern world of individual identity is based in the state of alienation. Alienation can be said to be brought about through an identification with the image. In Lacan’s idea, The child sees its reflection in the mirror and identifies with the reflection. It is called “the mirror stage”. The modern world, the modern social world, can be said to be caught in the mirror stage.

Identifying one’s Self with the image, is itself the ontological state of alienation. This, in a way, disembodied Self thus looks back into the Real world with anxiety, or angst, for it is unable to overcome the trauma which has occurred in the formation of ego around the image as it views its originating body. The non-Self (image) thus erects a fantasy to help relieve the trauma. It there by does not see its actual Being in the “non-image” but indeed sees a world that is not itself, which is in Lacan’s terms, the imagined world, ie the (modern) fantasy.

Symbols thereby become a sort of fetishized substance, a magical device, which are understood by the alienated identity to be able to bring the world into communion or coordination with its non-Self. This situation develops as a Marxist dialectic called ideology, but is what Lacan calls a “mistake” or “misunderstanding” of, what I call, the Truth.

The Truth is that the ideological world is ultimately the Self occupied with a mistaken identification, and this alienated state thus reflects the world as not the Self. Which, ironically, is the Truth.

Hence we have a segue into the meaning of Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegel: The irony of the “either/or” ontological question is that the question (as method for coming upon the world) itself is based in a mistake. As well, the imaginary “truth” which reveals itself at once as ideological as well as a way to overcome or get outside of it (revolution) arises in the encounter with the symbol because the symbolic world and the imaginary world are indeed what allows for the dialectical and thus ideological world to appear and function truthfully. So it is the Real world is that which actually is “absurd” with reference to the symbolic-imagined fantasy which arises through trauma as post-traumatized identity (modernity), which replays the originating trauma through disembodiment (reason, idea, etc…).

The issue thus is less how to overcome the fantasy, and more how to deal with the originary mistake which manifests through shame as trauma, that is, the inherent vacillation of guilt, shame, and anxiety that arise through the basic ideological default of existential choice, what Kierkegaard calls sin or despair to will to be oneself. Which is then the basic offense that The West in general knows colloquially as original sin.

Today, though, often enough, this kind of discussion is discredited outright in the move toward an ideological importance of reality. This is due, then, to the basic denial that arises when individuals (but the world, society) find the symbolic way through the trauma is closed off. Hence the fantasy routes modern individuals back more firmly into the fantasy, such that the questioning itself becomes blocked (PTSD) as, now, an ideological mandate: A true religious commandment (again, see Kierkegaard): Thou Shalt Not…

The alienation is thus overcome through a new religious devotion to the truth of the fantasy. The dialectic which then will arise is de facto a continuance we know as PTSD.

There is much more to be said here, but we can get much of it through Slavoj Zizek’s Philosophy.

The Gift

on the non-fixity of world identity.

It is not a definitive world by which reality is understood as a singular and fixed truththat is significant. The various opinions, attitudes and mentalities based in subjective meaning upon the stable ground of reality are not the issue.  Rather, it is the relationship that we have with things which is truly significant. 

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I had a moment with a young individual today.

I don’t know how it is in the rest of the world, but in the US it is a strange kind of trend of adolescents who are depressed to self harm. I don’t know if this is a global thing but I know it is a United States thing.

It seems that there is a rash of depressed and or anxious young people who, lacking any particular sharp tool, such as a razor blade or perhaps a knife, will scratch themselves in one place with their own fingernail, often short, until The skin finally breaks and a wound develops. They will continue to scratch that one place longer and wider until some unknown threshold is achieved and then they will produce another one right next to it, often parallel and sometimes in squared or triangular designs. And they will do this, many of them, until their arms are covered with these kind of burn sores. When you get a bunch of these children together, it is at once striking and at the same time strangely of no concern; for in part, one might be just as inclined to wonder why a group of kids will start smoking tobacco or in our current situation, vaping. One has to admit there is a certain amount of fad or trend or whatever you would want to call it. Because anxiety and depression does not necessarily mean that you have to self harm, and indeed when I was young there was many kids my age, many who were depressed or had problematic families who were friends of mine, who never thought of self harming in the way that seems so trendy and ubiquitous for our children nowadays. It is sad and strange.

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My intention for this post was not to discuss the philosophical fixtures of mental health theories or to offer any sort of help necessarily to these young people.

I really brought it up because this one person I was talking to today used to self harm, and then stopped for a couple years and only recently had started again because of some sort of life event that was triggering.

This person was also depressed but having more issues with anxiety. I was talking to this person and they happen to mention how they are not suicidal because their best friend had committed suicide a few years prior, so they never contemplate killing themselves.

It struck me how they said this so matter-of-factly, for it is common with people who suffer from great and long lasting general anxiety as well as depression to have to also battle with intrusive suicidal thoughts.

And I said to this person:

You know, that’s kind of amazing, in a strange way, when you think about it. What you just said…

Your best friend died? I said.

And so you never think about killing yourself, you simply don’t have thoughts about killing yourself? I said.

Then I said, you know, in a strange way, your friend gave you a gift, for he gave you a reason to live.

And this person began to slowly tear up, as I did also, with compassion in my heart.

They were looking down but then they kind of looked up at me through the tops of their eyes and gave a sleight little smile On top of that kind of frown that you get when there’s a deep hurt that just quickly surged to the surface, when your face can’t help but strain into an childish ugly grimace. A kind of embarrassment and yet of connection.

Yeah; maybe… they said.



Sometimes we need a different way to look at things. Sometimes we can hold what seems as two opposing sentiments for the sake of at once mourning and yet celebrating, missing and yet respecting.  and yet, sometimes when we see it, it seems so obvious. Like, why didn’t I think of that.

I think some of it may be not so much that this person didn’t think of that, but they did not allow themselves to think of it because of the polemically reductive fashion by which we arrive with our ethical selves to the encounter with the world. We are often not permitted to think but in specific ways about specific things.

Often we just hold the sadness a certain way because we think that’s the only way that sadness is allowed to be, holding it so dear that we fear that person is going to be disrespected, as if it is this supremely fragile thing. Whereas actually it could be a source of the most profound strength and Resilliance. 

The modern ideological and ethical sense sometimes misleads us into seeing tragedy as one way, into what Kierkegaard calls the “either/or”, which is the mentality of fixation, of limit, of finitude. 

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How much does my identity depend upon this either/or reduction towards self and world, as if indeed they either have to be 100% intertwined and subjective, or 100% separate, psychological and objective?

Maybe the relationship changes under various conditions.  maybe it is both.





Current Deontology

When we do not suppose that morality is created by thoughtful humans, as opposed to existing in-itself, then it becomes possible to read Kant’s categorical imperative (or his basis of deontology) as meaning that which can occur in no other way than it does. This reading seems to deny the traditional reading which sees deontology as having to do with an the morality of the doing of the act, as to choice.

The question that I have yet to see be held against this latter sense arises when we find that we are using hypothetical reason to address the categorical imperative, or, that what Kant proposes as Pure Reason answering to the Practical. The question should be: why?

When the other why question is never addressed to the categorical imperative involved in the practical thinking approach to pure reason, then we have a deontology which contradicts is own meaning by answering to whether any act is justified morally in-itself, and we view Kant as suggesting that a categorical imperative has to do with an ought. Which is to say, ethics and morality are imperative to human existence.

As a side, Kierkegaard already questions this: what the attempt to iron out self-contradictory motions of reason implies (or at least the half he was able to see given the ideological conditions of his moment).

Yet, when we understand pure reason, as a thing that exists, as really having nothing to do with morality in the first place (morality is something that can be accounted for by the imperative rather than a by-product [Nonphilosophical unilateral duality]) then we can understand what Kant is really saying about the categorical imperative. Namely that it is a thing, an act that is existing or that exists, that occurs in no other way than it could, A thing which is consistent with its category, a thing which cannot occur except how it is. It is a category which occurs the only way it can, and thus affords no purchase by the practical; that is, except in as much as the practical or hypothetical is already being understood through its own imperative of Being, which is to say, as the ubiquitous and proper way of Being, which denotes a proper way of seeing, thinking and understanding, as this proper way axiomatically excludes the act of thought by its definition. 

Wiki says that deontology derives from the Greek deon which means obligation. That’s cool and all. But I also like de-ontology. In the same way I like to use intension (in tension) when speaking of phenomenology and such, as opposed to intention.

We are able to see what we are able to think, but also vice-versa — and not simultaneously.

Have we yet begun to think?

{for those who read the unedited typo version previous to this post: I have no idea where the last comment, which is now deleted, came from.}. 👨🏽‍🚀

Stiegler’s Faux-pas?

I have been chipping away very slowly at Stiegler’s Negathropocene.

And here is a paragraph from the end of Part 2 in the book that I thought encompasses, what we might call, a faux pas in reckoning.  Similar to Lacan’s mistake , i’m calling this author’s mistake a faux pas because it seems to me that his mistake he could not help because of his investment in the ubiquity of the social criterion, or so it appears.

In particular I bring out to relief his suggestion that what is required is a change in the theory of value.

what I am calling a faux pas in the context of his proposal is the same type of error that is indicated in Lyotard’s “The differend“, and elaborated on in “ThePost modern condition”.

So It is interesting to me that just prior to this posted paragraph the author comments how he attempts to show where Lyotard’s condition Is insufficient. My answer before I even read his piece is, “of course it’s insufficient because from your position you are required to argue a denial of the situation at hand”, which I have discussed in other posts of mine.

I submit, that if we understand what Zizek has described as “A change in how we reckon change” as an indication of the same requirement that Stiegler is talking about, then he (S) would have to first give us a disclaimer about how what he is writing about a change in the theory of value is not already invested in the very value that is attempting to change by the submission of this essay. Without it, That is called duplicity. Often we have an example of why these theoreticians who are so invested in the social equation and the phenomenological involvement of subjects actually serve to function the perpetuation of the theory of value that they would so hope to change through their use of discourse.

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The question that haunts every modern philosophical text is whether it embodies and thus accounts for this odd incongruence. It is the incongruity that shows up in the lacuna between Hegel and Kierkegaard, As well as Kant and Wittgenstein.

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When we get beyond the either/or of quick subjective assertion (I want to be heard! And seen! ) then the political realm garners a more appropriate response. Such reply then has little to do with value as an issue, for the adversary is understood as and inherent part of the struggle. It becomes less an effort of attempt to rid or dispel the adversary and more about changing the relationship. A theory of value is that which is inherently changed by virtue of the fact that the real relationship is changed.  Thus does not occur in politics (the ethical universe), and thus the political effort of argumentation does very little to change the theory of value (see Kierkegaard). But again, this is not an either/or statement (Kierkegaard was caught in his historical moment: hence his despair). It is not suggesting that a person somehow becomes or refrains or steps outside of the political sphere;!rather, the individual’s orientation upon that arena has changed implicitly.

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This condition should be what Stiegler stands upon. In this sense, the “macro-economic” reorganization does hint at a recognition, but I think the either/or might have him by the bit, which then leads him in a circle, or maybe and ellipse.

So it seems that Stiegler is arguing the condition that must be brought about by his discussion, and so moves beyond Dasein in as much as he must argue history and society already in the motion of getting beyond: negentropy: which sounds suspiciously Similar to what he is arguing that he is stepping beyond, or that we have stepped beyond. He begins to sound startlingly similar to a child singing in the dark instead of flipping the light switch which she knows lay just in reach on the wall.

I am not sure his historical argument is quite sound beyond the mere words.

But I will read on, and i will report later upon my progress through his book, and I will reflect upon whether or not I was incorrect in this initial assessment of mine.

“Faith Turned on its Head”

Choosing Belief with Kierkegaard

https://notentirelypyrrhonian.wordpress.com/2019/09/06/choosing-belief-with-kierkegaard/
— Read on notentirelypyrrhonian.wordpress.com/2019/09/06/choosing-belief-with-kierkegaard/

This linked post is a great case by which to begin to understand the parameters of the conventional philosophical orientation upon things.

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I disagree with the writer: the leap of K is the absurd situation of already having occurred. It is not “into a choice” of faith, rather, such a choice is evidence that faith is already there.

Sartre, as I see him, misunderstood K and posited a free choice in light of the absurdity of brute existence, as S might have been reacting to the reality of the Final Solution and World War 2. But in his bewilderment of such atrocity, as with others of his time, like Fankl and May, his reading of Kierkegaard was produced in his (Sartre’s) astonishment, where as Kierkegaard was not astonished, or, he was more astonished that the brute reality of existence was/is missed so thoroughly by most (the crowd, or those oriented in such a way for their identity).

I see Sartres existentialism as a complete misreading of K. But that’s not to say that S did not have good insight given the condition of his moment.

However, the trauma (ww2) limited his ability to view; it refined his view such that the tiny pin hole he was looking through appeared to grant focus to the “whole”, perhaps like a small apperature of a photographic lens has a longer depth of field.

But we know now with trauma, the tiny view just takes over the field rather than representing it truly.

The traditional conventional readings of Kierkegaard routinely misrepresent his works (or thinks only inside the close reading of his words rather than the whole meaning of all his works — that is, philosophically rather than psychologically . Many of Ks works are indeed called by himself “psychological” btw.) Hence in order to render the meaning of his works properly for our time, one must turn thier idea of faith on its head, turn it upside down.

K’s reprimand is of the “inauthentic” individual who simply is always in despair to will to be oneself. Such individuals, ironically, 😘 find and found solace in Sartre’s existentialism because Sartre and his peers (and others) were shook by the apparent inhumanity that humanity would be party to — and such individuals understand the view from despair (the view that despair brings about) as indeed the true view, the viewing of the true existence, but it is the distortion. I call this distortion the “real” view, because it is the view that must be reckoned with first, in reality. So, in a way, Sartre was actually giving a sort of psychologically compassionate statement by his philosophy.

Like the analysis of Trauma, the view that is true of the situation is not found in the reasonable conclusions gained in the traumatic coming upon such brute force. Rather, distance allows the true picture to come into focus without restimulation.

From the brute existence already having been forced and come to terms with The reading of events is no longer informed through the “post-traumatic” apprehension-reaction against a circumstance of things; the person no longer involuntarily enacting actions and views from the still resonating “close-range” and the re-encountering of the traumatic stimulus. Or, in Sartre’s way: The encounter with the abyss of freedom is traumatic, hence one revolts from it, rejects it in order to reshape one’s own life through choosing it out of the chasm of nothing upon which identity is based.

What Kierkegaard already had processed and viewed truly was already lost, as we see in K’s reprimands of Christianity. What Sartre “rediscovered” was a reading of Kierkegaard through the lens of deflowered ignorance: In despair to will to be oneself. Hence Sartre’s Existentialism just posits that one can will to be oneself through the free choice to no longer be in despair. This reading, while good for the modern citizen who is already in despair merely tells everyone it is ok to live in ignorance of oneself through choosing to deny thier despair through the free act of choice.

Judge Wilhelm (in Either/Or part 2) describes the condition of those who would wish to “join in love” with that which is apparently unknowable, and hence the ground of ethical choice that is despair.

While such a reading can be therapeutic considering that most of society citizens do their best to try and avoid their brute existence, the reading, such as evident in the linked-post (as well as the scholarly reports) nevertheless is opposite of what K was saying.

Ks use of the trope “Christianity” often throws off interpretation, as we see with Sartre; for who could still think God was in history after the Holocaust? Sartre’s whole philosophy is informed by active trauma: the trauma of having the very human force of belief confronted at its core, that is, as an actual force connected with causality.

*

Read more insights into philosophy in THE SECOND PART of The Philosophical Hack: The Object of the Subject.

The Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Event.

Coming to mind whether you want it to or not.

Self-reflection Can Be a Bitch: X-phi – or, alienation as wanting to not Reflect. (In Despair to Not to be Oneself)

X-phi – or, alienation is not correlation

https://enemyindustry.wordpress.com/2019/05/02/x-phi-or-alienation-is-not-correlation/
— Read on enemyindustry.wordpress.com/2019/05/02/x-phi-or-alienation-is-not-correlation/

Thanks. finally some light in the intellectualized self-stigma.

Over the past 5 or so years I have had a tiny intrest in, what I might call, the “dark ecologies” wing of philosophical speculation. It is a kind of morbid self-abuse I put myself through, a sort of twisted curiosity that stems from (1) its common philosophical repertoire as what I typically understand of authors and ideas, and (2) a curiosity of why anyone would put so much intellectual effort in, what I see as, sadness and depression, as though the authors are trying to justify a situation they are caught in to the world instead of using that intelligence to see how it is indeed, again what I see, a self-limiting and berating correlation. I usually understand a lot of it as Fiction in the ‘wrong’ sense, which is to say, a fiction which does not generally wish to recognize its mythological component (in the Jungian-Hillman sense).

Well, I think I was right. And, as a counselor, I have to admit that depression cannot often be intellectualized away. But strangely enough, this essay reads as a critique of its self, of its own discourse. It’s as though, getting tired of all it’s verbosity, it resorts to its own dense jargon to try and dig it self out of its own swap. And I mean that in a good way; how else is one to talk it self out of a mess that it’s made for itself and in which it harbors in comfort and security that it hates?

The link above has a short essay I think shows a beginning of an ability of the discourse to show reflection upon its (what I see as) subjective correlational obviousness. The essay, to me, shows that at least that author is beginning to be able to view how the “dark ecology” is merely a “dark subjective fantasy” — but not one among many, which is to say, not like all other discourses. Rather, it is beginning to be able to comprehend that the discursive semantic routes are theirs only. It is evidencing an awakening upon what correlationalism actually means with reference to the internal mistake of phenomenal postmodern reference. Which is to say, the correlation as is caught in what establishes as it creates its own web of lies, if you will, and it is beginning to work itself out despite the intellectual intention invested in the attempt to get out of its own recognized as faulty correlation.

See — and this is not uncommon in many areas — as I have expressed in past posts, when one engages with such “dark ecology” authors, often one finds that they simply will not hear you If you do not play their intellectual game by using their words and clausal structuring. And I see this because of how post-modernism has allowed for people to build “semantic philosophical islands” which then reflect themselves into everything else. Such “religious philosophies” thus see a problem but are unable to find a way out; what happens then is they just figure that is how it is and so try to justify it. (See Lyotard, The Differend). I mean; what else is someone supposed to do? Develop intellectual capital the best way one can.

So, thank you enemyindustry for actually allowing what is not intensional to begin to perhaps bring one out the other side, besides the best of subjective intentions.

The alienation is correlation. This is the significance that most people work diligently to prevent themselves from realizing. It is the “offense in the machine”.

In the dark ecological sense, it is the working of the modern subjective fantasy in such a way to, as the essay states, make itself autonomous, as though not correlational, somehow beyond itself, which then ironically is the pathology: Xenophilia (and the other inhabitants of the dark world) attempting to intentionally explain its paradoxical limit away, and assert its truth upon the world despite itself –assert itself as valid by negating it’s own substance and then describing the speculative results.

Good essay. Makes me feel good. Thank

You.

—note: I could be wrong in conflating this essay with discourses of dark ecologies (weird, patchwork, Deleuzian-Landian, etc..) discourses. But to me, they appear similar in character.