The New Philosophy

The Moment of Decisive Significance took more than 4 years to write and publish, and it still needs edits. The Philosophical Hack the first and second parts took a little less time, partly because of how Nathaniel approached it.  Actually, The Philosophical Hack is not yet complete, so all and all, for all 6 parts, will probably take even longer than 4 years — and being that Nathaniel undertakes other projects, the last 4 parts will probably come out perhaps in 2030. 🙂

This is true philosophy to me.  Yes, philosophy can be understood as a commodity, a product, a piece of consumer good, but that is not what I think good philosophy does and is in truth.  In reality maybe it appears as something different…

Philosophy takes time, it is out of time, and it is thus timeless. 

It arises in time and out of time, but through arising in this manner, it is essentially of two ontological natures.

One of the points the Kierkegaard makes in his book “Fear and Trembling” is that Abraham had a faith that is beyond him; Kierkegaard says that he could never make the move of Abraham and, basically, this is why a person is in despair, sinful, as he says, in despair to will to be oneself.  Kierkegaard thus uses the literary figure of the Biblical Abraham to show the irony involved of Being a Knight of Faith.

His point is that when one is willing to be oneself never does she have the faith of Abraham, and thus, for those who might be so inclined (but not everyone), the best someone who is willing can do is live as a knight of infinite resignation. His point is so long as one is willing, that is, is open to the possibility of being oneself, as opposed to actually being oneself, then that person lives in despair.

Indeed this is the modern dilemma of the individual.

Time Spiral

 

My point is that so long as one is in time, they have faith in themselves and are working towards an end which is always ethically compromised: They have faith (hope) that the world holds a place for them to Be, but they never are quite sure how they are supposed to be (how am I proposed in context is the quandary of modern mental health).  The irony, though, is that one must indeed live in time and be ethical (in the sense of Being involved with ethics), but that that this is not all that one is and does.  One does not live in a condition where she must always choose upon ethics.  This is the point that Kierkegaard makes of Abraham.

Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical? 

We find the answer through his books, and the answer is yes.  The reason for this is that Abraham’s activity was not for his time, and yet in that he was indeed there, a human being doing actions, his actions were not ethical. Indeed, the point that Kierkegaard makes is that the ethics of Abraham were vested in God, and that God thus makes the world ethical by virtue of the absurdity that is not acting in time: Abraham has faith by virtue of the absurd.

Ironically, Slavoj Zizek, a contemporary social critic and philosopher, makes the same point when he says that the subject always acts too late, that by the very ontological nature of the modern subject of ideology, action is always reactionary.  Similarly Alain Badiou says the best political move is to not act politically, to abstain from politics. The revolutionary move is thus to move out of time, and to bring Kierkegaard back in, to act by virtue of the absurd such that what is ethical arises out of the act, as opposed to the ontological act Being involved with an attempt to act ethically.

The condition which evidences this ontological contradiction is what Kierkegaard and Nietzsche as well, call angst, which was first translated into English, by Walter Lawrie, I think, as dread, but then later authors (Hong and Hong, May) call anxiety.  The philosopher who arises out of time to act finds herself in a state of anxiety because she still appears on the scene within the ethical universe, albeit, one that is being manifested by the absurd situation of her being out of time. This is particularly salient in our 21st century because we find that this is a condition of knowledge, and not a condition of every human being who thinks thoughts.

  • The question that I have been grappling with is how does one who is so out of time do the work of art (or of love, Heidegger, Kierkegaard) which is motivated through the state of anxiety? (Also see Harman’s Dante’s Broken Hammer.)
  • How does one arise in time out of time?

My next project will thus be to produce a work of philosophy which covers the whole breadth of philosophical knowledge while at once mentioning neither a known philosopher or author, nor conceptual philosophical tropes, that is, terms which have assumed (privileged) dense philosophical definition.

That is what I am going to attempt, anyways.  🙂

Good luck!

 

Orientation and Meaninglessness

An event is a mark of where meaning takes the place. ‘The place’ can be anything, from a positive known-unknown, such as ignorance, to a negative unknown-unknown, such as a thing in-itself. These instances correspond to Badiou’s event as well as Zizek’s, respectively.

An event is a lacuna begun on one side of the sentence waiting for the other side; an event is the erasure of the lacuna, what Hegel could call a negation of negation.

Meaninglessness could likewise be understood in the same way as a lacuna. Namely, is it the substance that is supposed in the “…”, or is it more in line with Rudolf Otto’s version where the meaning is already gleaned from what came before and after?

Similarly we have our orientations:

Given an event which erupts into and or disrupts meaning: it is the difference between a sense which finds itself through presentations of words and the sorting out of what sense could be (is possible) made from the words and clauses already established — where there is a possibility of a meaning or sense which conveys to the person their own lack, incompletion, failure or stupidity, upon which then, toward either asset or deficit, one can build meaning– but then there is the case of already total sensibility that attempts to use words to convey “what already has meaning”.

The difference is in how discourse is used and is the issue more significantly than what is meant by any particular discourse. It is not about whether one is coming to conclusions prematurely or assuming what is meant compared to a thorough reading or consideration of the text — because even the deepest and most studied reading is still based in an assumed estimation; rather, it is more about the nature of the discourse in-itself, which is to say, how one is viewing the terms of the discussion that is at issue, and less what meaning one is making necessarily.

It is the difference between viewing and dealing with what is right there in front of us, and what is supposed to be lurking behind the scenes of any situation. The object itself is right in front of us; the lack is the assumption/ presumption of a deeper truth. The approach is evidenced in the difference between a science and a religion.

A Good Synopsis Of Harman’s OOO and the Laruelle-Harman link.

www.researchgate.net/publication/320254177_Materialism_Without_Matter_The_Recurrence_of_Subjectivism_in_Object-Oriented_Ontology

How are we to take the Object Oriented Ontology of Graham Harman?

Well, any way we would like.

But the way I take it is specifically philosophical. And by this approach I mean to position my self from that of non-philosophy, which is to say, what Francois Laruelle meant as opposed to what his congregants would want him to mean; and by this I mean to say that by understanding what both these authors mean, I have the single critique against both in as much as there are people who would be non-philosophers or object oriented ontologists as a philosophical position. I am neither. But I understand both. And I propose that it is through understanding what both these authors are saying in the context of philosophy, that I am a philosopher who’s object is philosophy.

I have said elsewhere that I think Graham Harman offers us the most significant philosophy of our time.  I also argue in various places that philosophy only concerns itself. And I often use the example of walking along absorbed in your cell phone and you walk into a low tree branch. My point is that such an event is utterly impenetrable by, what I work to call, conventional philosophy.  This is not to say that I cannot have a philosophical position about what happened or what the branch is or what the gash in my forehead is or the blood, or my scratched glasses; rather, it is to say that the meaning of the event or it’s ontological status is not all there is to talk about.

As I have in an earlier post, what we are dealing with is the difference between the nothingness at the inside-end of the phenomenal reduction which is the lacuna or gap and well as the magical ‘filler’ of capitalist subjectivity, and the in-itself essence of the object that withdraws from view.

I see my hypothetical anecdote, and the conclusion I have just put forth, in line with both Laruelle’s and Harman’s philosophies.  My critique of both of them is that the way they distinguish their particular philosophies from any other is based in discursive semantic distinctions that have nearly nothing to do with reality.  This is to say, the reality that they both propose in their manners is exactly a philosophical reality that has nearly nothing to do with the branch smashing into my forehead.  It is exactly the certain kind of viewing upon their own work which allows them to be saying anything about reality, and yet never be a part of it.  This is not to say that they are wrong, but only that they do not recognize what they are doing, or if they do then they are involved with a sort of deceit (see my posts on Bad Faith which I wrote like 5 years ago).

My other proof-anecdote I have used is that I doubt that Harman goes to grab a beer with lunch and friends and sits with the server for and hour or two to make sure that everyone knows the truth of what they are getting themselves into (or whatever) by ordering food and drink, both Harman and his friends and the server, the cooks and brewmasters, etcetera, all understand the reality that they are involved with before he even starts to order.  Let alone the car (he does live in LA) and all the philosophical ideas that must go into him even starting a car.  For how could the server bring him a beer if he is not privy to same the ontological ground as Harman? How does he ever even get to the pub?

The point I am making here is exactly a non-philosophical point that Laruelle makes (and others); namely, that the idea that there is an extension of actuality beyond the argumentative motions of philosophical work is itself based in a kind of faith.  It is in no uncertain terms indeed a belief that what the thinking subject has come upon in the philosophical moment extends to include the ordering of dinner and a drink behind the scenes of the actual situation. And this is exactly what Harman talks about so far as “behind the scenes” (what I call transcendence).

Anyway. I must save the more in depth analysis of this linked essay for a submitted paper.

In short, I am a counselor and a philosopher.  The philosophy exists as a thing in-itself (ala Harman) for the knowledge which dismisses itself from itself for another object; as these objects withdraw from the scene to do their own business, they thus involve me and the other phenomena vicariously, each drawing upon the another to do their relative business in the real world: Actual non-philosophical business of dealing with real things philosophically, which is to say, completely separated from any causal linkage to the theoretical base, incidentally coincides with various Marxisms and critical theories that also have sense.

 

db91c99c4cc2a7dc47da785672b0066f_original.jpg

{artwork from the book Subjects with Objects}

 

Harman’s review of Badiou’s seminar on Lacan

my review of Badiou’s seminar on Lacan

https://doctorzamalek2.wordpress.com/2019/05/28/my-review-of-badious-seminar-on-lacan/
— Read on doctorzamalek2.wordpress.com/2019/05/28/my-review-of-badious-seminar-on-lacan/

Of course Harman does a great job at giving us a view into this book.

Nevertheless, I have so many comments that span the presentation itself: into What we can see of Lacan through Badiou; What we can see of Lacan and Badiou through Harman; What we can thus see of Harman. And what we can understand more of Badiou.

And then the critique of the whole thing.

🤣

And what I would say I think it is already presented in my blog here, and so to put forth a reply that would probably take an hour and a half to read on this blog — I think I’ll wait until I Figure out how to write and submit papers to various journals to make my comments.

In the meantime, this post is really just a marker for me, and as well as some interesting information for you.

THE SECOND PART * crossing your mind near you.

thephilosophicalhackthephilosophicalhackthephilosophicalhackthephilosophicalhackthephilosophcialhackthephilosophicalhackthephilosophicalhackthephilosophicalhackthephilosophicalhackTHESECONDPARTthephilosophicalhackthephilosophicalhackthephilosophicalhackthephilosophicalhackthephilosophicalhackthephilosophicalhackthephilosophicalhackthephilosophicalhackthephilosophicalhackthephilosophicalhackthephilosophicalhackthephilosophicalhackthephilosophicalhackthephilosophicalhackthephilosophicalhackOUT SOON

The Post-Human. 

“The ideal of getting beyond how humanity actually functions as a unitive category is a utopian dream. This dream is then placed in a ‘post-human’ category of (often dystopian) progress for the purpose of satisfying the failed desire of an individual identity, once again dismissing itself from itself in fantasy. It is based in a complete misunderstanding of its own theoretical base: ironically proposing nothing. The best we can do is use this aspect in discovering and admitting a true human for its universal object.”

— from My Previous Post. 

Wow! This Philosophical Hack guy is no BS. I wonder if he realizes that such a hard line has been tried before? And this is what we got: an arena (postmodern nihilistic) where no one cares. The spirit is destitute.  Trip out! Post-humanism is a fraud!   Damn. 

Gratuity. Link. ;))

Anslem’s Argument for the Proof of the Existence of God, the Disruption of Time, and the Categorization of Philosophical Behavior.

I seem to have found a significance for Anslem’s proof. It may be that it is not significance for whether God might exist, but, as I have said, significance for how I present ideas.

We will start with the rendition from Princeton’s site. I think they have a pretty good rendition there.

Without all the strict logical hoopla, I think the simple way to put Anslem’s idea is that God exists because we can think of It.

The significance of this notion appears to disrupt what we generally consider of time, it’s ‘natural and directional’ progress.

The Princeton site says that Anslem was addressing a particular issue that, actually, we still find totday in atheism. Basically, Anslem is confronting two ideas:

1.He understands the claim that God exists.
2.He does not believe that God exists.

Now, I have done only the most preliminary research into Anslem and his ideas. I am just taking the very popular simple version, and considering these two situations. There is no ‘hidden’; whatever Anslem’s results most probably are quite apparent, and the ones that are not – well, what point am I trying to make here? I have already said in my earlier post that there is no logical argument that sways me in any direction or causes me to believe something I didn’t before. So any extension of argument must be involving something else; perhaps I am attempting to get at what this something could be.

I think the main point Anslem makes is that, as Princeton puts it, this is an inherently unstable condition of being. What we might call the ‘founding essence’ can be understood to be responsible for this instability. Somewhat similar to a ‘thing-in-itself’, this founding essence would be a kind of gravity well, if you will, of mental activity. The instability arises because of the knowledge (the known-ness) of what something is able to be. The question arises: How can I know what something is if it doesn’t exist? The basic assumption in this question, what philosophers tend to lump into the category called ontology, is that existence is, that there is no need to discern what existence is because to argue for or against the being of existence does nothing to displace the argument except as much as it merely denies existence. The point of saying something exists thus should equate with what can be known, and so the instability of the situation is found in the human ability to choose on whether what exists is actually true. In this case, though, Anslem is dealing with the basis of all that exists as a category, namely, God; God, in this sense, as we cannot but apply our modern sense to consideration of it, is merely the name of the category that contains all that can exist as an active element, the element by which all else can be said to be. The extension in time to Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time’ can be understood as a factual description of this situation, and thus, rather than an opening up unto Being, ironically as a closing of Being unto itself and thus a factual description of what human beings do: The identification of the in-itself of human Being. More on that elsewhere.

The resolution that Anslem posits of this unstable situation occurs because of the foundational nature of the knowledge itself. In this Medieval Christian context (which I argue is still a modern context), the resolution (the clarity, the definition) that must be referred to must be understood in a context not so much of mind, but of the essential God-inundated mind that is able to uphold and entertain knowledge, which for our context might be the mind that exists. In short, the condition of knowledge is/was such that all things referred or otherwise are established in existence due to an absolute situation, a situation whereby all things gain their status in the universe, what we usually index by the idea of an absolute ethics, in a manner of speaking. In this condition it thus appears that a reflective mind will naturally be drawn into the the contradiction involved in making a choice as to the (true or false) existence of something that (already) exists (in essence), and will therefore correct (or become the correction) the instability by virtue of their own existence (in the absolute universe, or the universe that is indexed by absolution). The question of whether something actually, or physically, biologically exists, such as a race of human beings that live in the midieval antipodes, e2c1fd0e8fc468d9d55d018231578e47

unicorns, dragons, spirits, extraterrestrial aliens, etcetera, has no baring upon existence because of the absolute reference and access of mind to God (existence). What can be incorrect of knowledge as to what is true of existence finds its resolution in the posited (assumed) basis of existence. 

The Medieval as well as Modern mind is consistent in this ideal of progressive understanding of the universe. What is significant of this orientation upon progress is the mind’s innate access to what is true of the universe with reference to an assumed basis of that truth, what we can say is an assumption of stability unto which all knowledge will inevitably resolve; despite whether we posit that there is no actual resolution or that everything is flux, or whatever conditional conditions we define, the result of any positing is always toward ends, toward a resolution. Even if we say that the universe and the knowledge of that universe is completely and utterly contingent, this contingency must be absolute; hence we say that the effect of such terms within any scheme of knowledge or organization of definitions is what we can call a “founding term”. 

*

Oddly enough, we are able to find purchase into understanding what human beings do by looking at what philosophy does. Not, as Graham Harman might have it, that everything we might do automatically falls into a subjective appropriation of semantics that defies our attempt to locate such philosophical behavior. Rather, at some point we should be able to locate a mark by which we are able to be dismissed from this correlational philosophy that wants to avoid any critical gaze upon its method.

Once we find this mark (which I do not go into here), we can extend this situation (of existence and deferment) to apply to everything that might exist: Within this situation, a person can understand and then decide upon it. There is no thing that escapes this formula, and Anslem is making an accusation about it: It is unstable, and it will eventually resolve itself to the conclusion that the thing in question exists, in his Medieval case, God, and in our Modern case, perhaps, the object of empirical physics.

The point he relies upon is the idea that God is the greatest being or thing that can exist, for, so long as we can conceive of something greater, then that is not God. Similarly, we can use this conversely and say that because we can conceive of ‘that which nothing is greater’, this greatest thing exists as a foundational ontological ground of Modern effort as well: The ‘greatest’ thing is the most substantial. 

*

What interests me is that this simple notice occurred late in the 11th century. Here, already, is a situation made notice that no one noticed until very recently, like 10-20 years ago with the philosophers such as Alain Badou, Francois Laruelle, an then for the younger folks (of the time), of the Speculative Realist Conference. In particular, the idea is that there may be something that exists outside of our knowledge (not necessarily our ability to know), and as for in this situation, that which is greater than the greatest thing we can know. This category has brought modern philosophy (again) to consider things like voidnothingnesschaos and such things, and the corresponding ideal that whatever works to create identity is all good. But if we are honest, we might be able to glimpse the same ruminations of Scholasticism (St. Anslem is said to be one of the founders of the Medieval Scholasticism), occurring in our Modern philosophies, but under different terms. Indeed; I argue (along with Jean-Francois Lyotard apparently) elsewhere that Postmodern scholarship is really a religious apology for Modernity.

In this post I confront the veracity of some of our current philosophical modes and arguments by asking what seems to me to be a most obvious and significant question, a similar question that Graham Harman asks of Heidegger’s “tools“: Why did no-one  notice what Anslem had opened up until now, some 1000 years later? We are able to understand Anslem’s argument to this day; no one proposes that the thinkers 1000 years ago were any less astute than our thinkers today. Why is it only now that we are addressing the possibility of what might be ‘beyond’ or ‘at root but not part of’ (Badou’s consideration of set theory) knowledge? And then we might even ask more confounding question if we find that philosophers during the interim of the thousand years also considered the same question over and over. 

I submit for consideration that we have gotten not very far in philosophy. We might begin to understand the vastness of time and how slowly and incrementally human beings, as a group, accomplish knowledge, and how it is much more like a science than philosophers are capable of arguing. Indeed, if we think into this situation, we can then find often the situation that we have already come across elsewhere; namely, that on one hand philosophy is the way we situate the conditions of our times, how we work out logistical problems of being in a semantic world, and on the other, merely reflections of people (the authors) in-themselves. But if this is all philosophy does and is doing, then we also might see that we are actually merely re-contextualizing not what what has already been contextualized (as thus a re-contextualization), but in actually what we’ve already done, making the same arguments over and over but under different terms. We are reminded of Shakespeare’s “a rose by any other word…“.

Upon this conclusion, we are careful to not move too fast as we might then jump to the conclusion that such an idea should negate the ontological status of what I am calling conventional philosophy, as though such a proposal should then move beyond what we have and what we get through philosophical method. This is not the case. It seems near ridiculousness to figure that we can commandeer reality by a stroke of the pen (or a keystroke) except that we might be involved in such philosophical endorsement; we should then ask how is it that am I to get beyond it merely saying something in a particular manner? No. We cannot ‘turn’ the truth of the matter; we have but to see the power that is invested in the leviathan of religious interests, of maintaining a particular formation and method to know that, as the philosophers have argued, I cannot escape it unless I wish to perform some magic, perhaps some discursive slight of hand. We should ask if we can be done with all this trickery of the ontological police. Then, all we have to do is speak of facts instead of the essential Being of things, to speak teleologically instead of ontologically. We can argue the conditional nature of real essence for the rest of eternity and never get anywhere further than circling back and forth away from and back into Medieval type scholarship. And thats fine, and thats the point: This is the factual nature of reality, the impossible aspect of what we have to deal with in reality. Of course there will be those who will argue that what the philosophers are doing now days is not Scholasticism and who will produce all sorts of argumentative and ultimately circumstantial evidence to support their claim. Great! Perfect! Does this sway me to believe something that I don’t already know?  The proper response, in this case then, is that this is not a proposal toward any popular or social change, and in fact it has little to do with how political ideology might be at any moment; we can of course use it for such purposes (identifying our moment from the past conditional moments of history, for example, etcetera…), thats what Badiou and Zizek tell us…

We are not so much learning anything new as much as we are justifying our limited manner of Being in the world, and this is an end in itself that should be heeded but not as a call for change, as though we can somehow transcend what we are — we can only transcend was we identify with as political and ideological subjects. Rather, we should see this situation as a mark of what is true of being human, as a mark of significance, which is to say, a mark of fact. So another of my indictments of philosophy: Despite all the great discursive gymnastics and the twistings of subtle argumentative semantic juxtapositions, philosophy works to avoid having to look at itself as a human behavior. Conventional philosophy refuses to allow itself to be seen as an indicator of behavior, perpetually argues itself as an exceptional incarnation of divine intuition and inspiration, a blank spot of Being, and then uses this fact as a means to absorb all activity under its purview back into the real political and ideological limit — to say that this is all there is. I see the constant and basically automatic referral of all things ‘thought’ back into this kind of philosophical pond is self defeating to the effort of progress, even as progress itself is routed back into this (touted) ‘speculative’, or ‘realist’, or  ‘post-post-modern’ maxim. It is no wonder outside of capitalism is so difficult to think!

As Amoreinblog has argued somewhere, perhaps anthropology is the way out of this philosophical conundrum; despite all the philosophical misappropriations of ideas involved with the AIME (An Investigation into Modes of Existence) project of Bruno Latour (even by Latour himself, lol), his book can be read as an argument for the need to open up a space (perhaps, in his terms, create a pass) whereby we can avoid this modern philosophical whirlpool that we have been involved with for at least 1000 years. It seems that only now, with Postmodernism, but as of late Post-postmodnerism (must we find a Post-Post-Postmodernism also?) do we really get an idea, but also an actual way to understand and realize what human beings are doing.

*

Time itself may be the issue that is involved with Modernity invading as it usurps all discourse into its machinery. The issue that opens up after Postmodernism (but is not itself Postmodern scholarship) is the break from Enlightenment Ontology. So it may not be so much that we have to philosophically get out of this temporal mode — that kind of move would be philosophy attempting to avoid itself through arguing itself out of itself, redundantly, establishing as it maintains reality for everyone. It may be as simple as admitting that there is no escaping the philosophical limit, and realizing a kind of anti-Husserlian manner: Of finding the independent object in the bare fact that we know that there is an independent object, and perhaps that we need not speculate about how it can be so in order for it to be so. Of course we can discuss how it can be so…and indeed we will, but that does not mean that we cannot stay where we are at and let the pagan-Christian rollercoaster come around again and again.

Maybe we need to make a clean break.