The question of Orientation.

Objects and Objections

Very interesting interview with an author who i guess wrote a book that explains while critiquing Graham Harman’s Object Oriented Philosophy.

While it appears that i might disagree with his opinion about the synopsis, i agree with his synopsis. lol

The author seems to have a problem with a philosophical device which allows us to make use of other philosophies.

Sounds to me very significant, but I guess the author doesn’t think so.


Readers can refer to some of my recent posts for my view on how we might bring some clarity to philosophy by first being honest, and then asking what is being done in any moment of philosophy.

Empathy as a Philosophical Response to Phenomenology

Empathy as a Response

Empathy as a Response
— Read on

I like the way my comment formulated to this post on Edith Stein, about empathy (I call her Edith Catholic saint lol).

“… I suppose what I’m talking about is the call for a true self reflection. That’s what phenomenology is all about: seeing in the reflection ones self reflecting. But as Graham Harmon indicated, often enough people who talk about phenomenology talk about it as though they are not really seeing them selves in the text (Derrida) , they thus often “over mine” or “undermine” what is actually going on, what I call over determination and under determination, because they are determining themselves in the text as something that is more than the text or something that is within the text, which is to say “under” The discourse.

And so what appears to be called for by some contemporary continental authors is a determination that is actually determinate, or as a friend of mine might like to say, “mind”, lol. Which is to comment on Harman’s “mined”, A determination that is actually mined. And what we mean by this is that it is not a mind (mining) which is coming up on things that it reflects upon, to then contain everything within its own phenomenological conception as being.

The call , as Laruelle might say, is to see oneself as the reflection and not as the thought of the object in-itself. This latter is phenomenology, but phenomenology which has not taken the full turn, or really the quarter turn in Laruelles estimation, to actually see it self as what it is doing, as what is occurring.

From here then it is possible to notice the edges of phenomenology, what some philosophers have called “in the last instance”, what other philosophers have called “the end of philosophy“ or “the end of history”. Once that edge is reckoned then we are able to entertain possibilities that were not able to be understood or entertained in a thoroughly phenomenological world.

This is where I think Edith Catholic saints idea of empathy begins. ”

–the Philosophical Hack.

And on a further considerate note: Zizek talks about Plato, when Socrates talks about whether there is justice and nobility, wisdom and such in the lower things, such as shit and piss….

… and I might add.. drug addicts, homeless people, …hackers, etc….

A Good Synopsis Of Harman’s OOO and the Laruelle-Harman link.

How are we to take the Object Oriented Ontology of Graham Harman?

Well, any way we would like.

But the way I take it is specifically philosophical. And by this approach I mean to position my self from that of non-philosophy, which is to say, what Francois Laruelle meant as opposed to what his congregants would want him to mean; and by this I mean to say that by understanding what both these authors mean, I have the single critique against both in as much as there are people who would be non-philosophers or object oriented ontologists as a philosophical position. I am neither. But I understand both. And I propose that it is through understanding what both these authors are saying in the context of philosophy, that I am a philosopher who’s object is philosophy.

I have said elsewhere that I think Graham Harman offers us the most significant philosophy of our time.  I also argue in various places that philosophy only concerns itself. And I often use the example of walking along absorbed in your cell phone and you walk into a low tree branch. My point is that such an event is utterly impenetrable by, what I work to call, conventional philosophy.  This is not to say that I cannot have a philosophical position about what happened or what the branch is or what the gash in my forehead is or the blood, or my scratched glasses; rather, it is to say that the meaning of the event or it’s ontological status is not all there is to talk about.

As I have in an earlier post, what we are dealing with is the difference between the nothingness at the inside-end of the phenomenal reduction which is the lacuna or gap and well as the magical ‘filler’ of capitalist subjectivity, and the in-itself essence of the object that withdraws from view.

I see my hypothetical anecdote, and the conclusion I have just put forth, in line with both Laruelle’s and Harman’s philosophies.  My critique of both of them is that the way they distinguish their particular philosophies from any other is based in discursive semantic distinctions that have nearly nothing to do with reality.  This is to say, the reality that they both propose in their manners is exactly a philosophical reality that has nearly nothing to do with the branch smashing into my forehead.  It is exactly the certain kind of viewing upon their own work which allows them to be saying anything about reality, and yet never be a part of it.  This is not to say that they are wrong, but only that they do not recognize what they are doing, or if they do then they are involved with a sort of deceit (see my posts on Bad Faith which I wrote like 5 years ago).

My other proof-anecdote I have used is that I doubt that Harman goes to grab a beer with lunch and friends and sits with the server for and hour or two to make sure that everyone knows the truth of what they are getting themselves into (or whatever) by ordering food and drink, both Harman and his friends and the server, the cooks and brewmasters, etcetera, all understand the reality that they are involved with before he even starts to order.  Let alone the car (he does live in LA) and all the philosophical ideas that must go into him even starting a car.  For how could the server bring him a beer if he is not privy to same the ontological ground as Harman? How does he ever even get to the pub?

The point I am making here is exactly a non-philosophical point that Laruelle makes (and others); namely, that the idea that there is an extension of actuality beyond the argumentative motions of philosophical work is itself based in a kind of faith.  It is in no uncertain terms indeed a belief that what the thinking subject has come upon in the philosophical moment extends to include the ordering of dinner and a drink behind the scenes of the actual situation. And this is exactly what Harman talks about so far as “behind the scenes” (what I call transcendence).

Anyway. I must save the more in depth analysis of this linked essay for a submitted paper.

In short, I am a counselor and a philosopher.  The philosophy exists as a thing in-itself (ala Harman) for the knowledge which dismisses itself from itself for another object; as these objects withdraw from the scene to do their own business, they thus involve me and the other phenomena vicariously, each drawing upon the another to do their relative business in the real world: Actual non-philosophical business of dealing with real things philosophically, which is to say, completely separated from any causal linkage to the theoretical base, incidentally coincides with various Marxisms and critical theories that also have sense.



{artwork from the book Subjects with Objects}


The Philosophical Object.

Phenomenology says that we all have subjective worlds that are reflected in our opinions and views.

The Speculative Realist conference philosophers spoke to the point of how that formulation of reality leads to a closed loop of philosophical correlation. Thus, their problem has been how to find something outside of this closed system.

The concern of an orientation upon objects is how that correlation occurs outside of the talk about it, encompassing the talk about how we are to get outside of it.

The issue here then arises between an object which withdraws from view (Harman) and the subject which is never expressed or communicated (Lyotard).

The difference, I say, lay more with orientation and less with ontological ubiquity. More with the manner that the subject is able to view the world and less with how there is a “real” world that subjects can only partially view.

The difference is thus between the phenomenon and the object. Less about how we situate philosophical definitions and more about the manner of being able to see.


— Read on

great post!!

Yet/and… read on…

I am not sure that we need to use the term “hyper objects”. I think that term functions and works to miss the significance of objects in-themselves. if I were to use the term “hyper objects” in the context that I am understanding it, at least through this link post: It’s as though I am approaching a great significance, and as I get closer to it then all of a sudden I need to turn away and completely ignore and miss what the significance actually was and create my own subjective interpretation of what I actually never encountered. The speculative term “hyper object” is an evangelistic manner of retaining subjects under its theological dominion.

In a very real sense, it’s as though existentialism of the Sartean kind (revolting from the abyss) is in fact less a rational ontological truth, and more A functioning of religious theological dogma for the purposes of Establishing and maintaining a transcendental subject of offense (ubiquitous politics).

Nevertheless, This post link is a perfect extrapolation of the theme that Zizek mentions somewhat frequently here and there: The significance of modern critical theory and philosophy is that while it thinks it’s self as a player in social activism, it’s discourse has nothing to do with “the people”. The masses, or the people, cannot be appropriated by philosophy nor critical theory; rather, the appropriation links back to its own assertion of power, as though it is getting at something new; as I say in places and as Cedric Nathaniel will argue in his book, the world that is encompassed by modernity and postmodernity cannot even reach “the mass of people” except through denying that “the people” as a universal object actually exists in itself. This situation that philosophy/critical theory has gotten itself into is ultimately correlational unto itself. The issue thus is not how to get out of correlational existence, but how we deal with this fact.

This post is a perfect example of the motion that I just described: As soon as the people attempt to act for themselves, the agent of critical theory (and the general congregation/constituency of the theoretical religious body) have to impose and discount it, make it marketable, discount the people themselves because the people acting in themselves and for them selves actually exhibit a manner of existence which does not accord with the theological mandates of critical philosophical theory of the One Reality: The People exhibit no excess, no margin for profit. The irony of this contradictory activity is eternal, and is why we must locate such idealized activity within the envelope of transcendental law, A code of laws “given from God”.

I am excited that this post mentions GrahamHarman In what I see as an appropriate use of his philosophy in something that is not architecture — because this is the first post, even though he’s referencing an article from 2009 or something, that I’ve seen anyways, that is beginning to understand or somehow reflect upon the world as though it is filled with objects, and as well seems to be beginning to comprehend it self in the context of universal objects as opposed to a common humanity of inter-relating subjectivities. But but of course, this is not to say that there are not interrelating subjectivities, but only that The universe of interrelating subjectivities is not the only universe that can be known, and that indeed interrelating subjectivities are objects, or, is an object in itself.

The caveat to this, though, is that I fear that such theoreticians will still be involved in the attempt to reduce this kind of alterity, this disparity, to another common manner to link power to its absolute ideological object, and completely miss the significance that they almost came upon.

But in the meantime, like I said, at least people are beginning to notice them selves in the context of universal objects.


We are just beginning to see, to actually be able to view, what human beings do. We are just beginning. This is the long game…

….But all that is for other posts.

Philosophy, Religion and Negation.

Here I am reading the paper that Was accepted to the conference at the University of Toronto, Negativity, Pessimisms, and Sad Affects in the Study of Religion Conference. Next week, April 18-19, 2019.  Right before THE GREAT ZIZEK PETERSON DEBATE!!

I just realized I said the name of the conference wrong in the video 🙂





I am not able to attend, though, so I made a video.

Note – the negation of the speculative negative theology can appear as a philosophical venture of arguing philosophical primacy as not a religious effort. We can call a move of bad faith, the “sickness” which permeates some avenues of philosophical effort; that is, a sickness unto death. Hence the problem Highlighted in my essay. See also this essay. This is to say that the problem does not dissipate through philosophy but is rather suspened, which then perpetuates real psycho-social aggravations.

My paper can be viewed at HERE. Even though I wanted to post the paper with resources, it looks like it has posted without them.

And HERE is the Researchgate listing, with references.

(Im pretty sure I formatted the paper incorrectly. Oh well. Learn by living, learn by trying.)

Maybe someone will want to give me some pointers.


Heres the three books I cited:

Carol Gilligan’s In a Different Voice

Graham Harman’s Tool Being

Slavoj Zizek’s Living in the End Times


* * * *

If you want to hear all the hoopla about the Zizek Peterson debate, just search Zizek Peterson debate.

Of course, I have my opinions, which can be found throughout my blog.



Commenting on a Philosopher without giving him more undue celebrity.

I had an opportunity this morning to confront one of my biases. This one was about THe-Philosopher-Who-Will-Not-Be-Named (TPNN for short).

Look in the comments of my pervious post about Derrida for a short video of a piece of one of his talks.

I historically disliked TPNN Becuase I feel he is missing a key component of what he generallzes as Post Modern. HERE is someone who took the time to take apart another one of TPNN talks. Yet, I am not sure my disquiet about TPNN falls into that his idea of PM appears incomplete or that he does not address deeply the PM position, and then as well that his generalization is that PM is about the infinity of subjective interpretive possibility. So I have had an opportunity to look more thoroughly into my biases about TPNN.

I think my offense comes from that he only has only intellectually appropriated a general PM tenet, and thus, of course, at once misses vital elements of subjectivity as well then indeed suggests by his presence a faulty ideal of ‘going backwards’ to a Modernist position. He definitely says in that short video that the postmodernists are wrong.

One of the subtleties of my work is that I tend to stick with the argument that Graham Harmon makes in his book “Tool Being”, that it is not a power-play of one against the other. It is not that modernism was incorrect and that postmodern pointed out all the problems with Modernity and so offers a more true way of coming up on the situation, and thus we have now to show how PM is wrong. That is a philosophical naive way of viewing the situation.

Also, Zizek’s psychoanalysis does not confirm Peterson’s psychological approach either.

It seems that Jordan Peterson failed to read the authors that came out of the speculative realism conference 10 years ago, And particularly has failed to understand what Quinten Miellassoux termed “Correlationalism”.

TPNN is what I could call an overt advocate for religious reality, which in itself is not an incorrect position to be an advocate. Yet, One of the paradoxes about being in the religious mindset is that while being religious may not be an inherently incorrect or improper way of having a reality to deal with, the developed analyses and The reactionary politics that such kinds of analyses often rely upon if they do not explicitly elucidate them in initial parts of the analysis, Often show that they are not having the awareness that religious allowance does not necessarily convey or have to fall in line with a particular religious truth.

We find in our current democratic system that we can speak about God and we can allow people to have their religious beliefs as an ideal for a good society without having to advocate for the truth any one of those particular religious institutions. TPNN Tends to argue that we must adhere to a particular religious institution if we are saying that the religious view is allowed, but he is using intellectualism as a way to argue for his dogma. In short, he is misappropriating Postmodern thought towards his own ontological argument.

Archinect with a collection of Graham Harman lecture videos.

Archinect with a collection of Harman’s lecture videos
— Read on

Thanks Graham. And thanks Archinect.

and Don’t forget to check out the free copy of The Moment Of Decisive Significance.

The introductory segue to The Philosophical Hack (coming so soon) where I describe how one gets from the Phenomenon to the Object — and back!!