Psychology and Counseling

To a Psychologist is where you go if you want to find out what is wrong with you. To a Counselor is where you go if you want to know what’s right.

This ‘rightness’ is what people are missing from their lives. We have been given a bill of goods as soon as we become conscious citizens in and of the world, and this bill weighs on us even as society sends us the massage that it is ‘Natural and human’, that nothing is really wrong and “just get over it”. Psychology is the modern apology for the anxiety which lay at the heart of its systems of repression, an attempt to correct what is systemically incorrect, but by putting the blame effectively upon the individual.

Counseling, on the other hand, is toward the emancipatory, the “freeing” and not just the identity which is supposed to be free. Counseling says that an assumption of wrongness is itself an incorrect manner of assessing the mental health of the person. Hence, counseling is more an act of enlightening the person to their modern subjectivity but without the need to instruct them to its proper language. For, the proper language is found already in the individual through its own innate intelligence and existence. Counseling is about empowerment.

XX

Freedom and Telos: Commitment

You become freer once you’ve made a commitment.

Paradox of freedom.

—- I see freedom without limits is not only meaningless but anxiety producing. The anxiousness is the ontological condition of the modern identity arisen in the ideal that freedom is limitless ness. Actually, True freedom is the finding that which defines end, such that one is confined by that end to grow and unfold toward it, inevitably. This confinement is commitment.

Philosophical Dimension.

https://soundcloud.com/usertransspace/reason-emotion-and-religion-groove-n-talk

@

it is possible to understand philosophy as having two dimensions. Non-philosophy thus is the philosophical ability to comprehend the use of the real object called philosophy.

The issue that philosophy raises against this Confinement of its resources and agency, is that philosophy seeS itself –or permits a view that is itself –as without dimension; it understands or otherwise presents reason as having a link to an infinite source, what we generally call transcendence, or what the postmodern called immanence — because what the postmoderns are really saying about immanence is that the human being is able to get a hold of transcendence entirely .

The only argument that philosophy can make against what we are beginning to understand is it’s own limitation is to merely reify it’s access to infinite reasonable adaptation.

And this is why we have to speak of the two routes: conventional philosophical thinking is not really grasping that it is at once an infinite resource, while at the same time able to be described to its limitation. Conventional philosophy will use the rebuttal of no predictive capacity to say that philosophy is not being defined to its limitations. And then the only response to that is that conventional philosophy is not comprehending the issue at hand. Conventional philosophy sometimes then will take that as an affront to its agency, to its eminence, to its privilege and centrality. And thus would be Because it is not grasping that to describe itself to its limitation is not an insult nor an invalidation; rather it is an invitation to its constructive use. All the while opening up an avenue for thought that it is unable to conceive or otherwise encompass.

As well, it generally cannot conceive of an act that is not involved in an assertion of power as it understands power as the ubiquitous universal underlying force. Again, this is the reason why we have to speak of two routes upon objects that do not reconcile into a further unity.

An Opening to Understanding A Social Theory: Human Babies are now Alien creatures, Florida Representative says. Yes

“Host bodies”

https://feministphilosophers.wordpress.com/2019/03/03/host-bodies/
— Read on feministphilosophers.wordpress.com/2019/03/03/host-bodies

FROM IGNORANT REACTION to MORAL RESPONSE.

People are so smart that they are stupid. It’s like picking up dry sand with your hand. The distortion of post-modern ideas usurped into the Post-modern religion yields human brains that think they are being sensible.

That is; One can not contain sense, for people will always use what tools are at hand for their own strange values.

It really is a logistical problem and not an ethical or subjective problem: There is no getting rid of people who think differently than you do, and so the burden falls upon the people with the greater capacity for morality to try to check the non-reflective people from getting too much a foot hold. In this case, the pro-lifers are always coming up with ways to assert their small ideals on everyone else. Because the post modern religion says that everyone is involved in the relative negotiation of reality.

It works both ways: One always is made to play the games of the lowest common oppressive thinking instead of the highest aspiration of goodness. The mental-slaves must see themselves as having a freedom to be who they are, and the higher functioning people must then cater to them like to an upset child with a shotgun. The higher morality is always made to understand the less fortunate and ignorant, while the less fortunate are allowed to see themselves in the context of freedom; They are thereby allowed to hopefully make the climb themselves.

The absolute ethics arises in facing the reality that is in front of us openly without bias, to the best of one’s ability. This type of ethics does not ask unto the first cause or some absolute giver of law. Nor does it make any proclamations about what is right and wrong outside of the situation that presents itself as sensible.

What is sensible ? We will find out whether what is sensible is a relational responsibility of democracy or whether it is an authoritarian proclamation from above.

Nevertheless, none is necessarily wrong or bad, rather, it is just exactly human: How any society conceives and confronts ignorance forms the basis of every social organization: It is a logistical unfolding of conditions, and the subjective moral progress is then a path that is given to the oppressed. The path drawn through the altruism which understands what ignorance is thus guides the ignorant without letting the slave see that their plight is being handed to them by the system itself.

The question is: Does this social experiment yield a higher functioning human being and thus better society?

We might be finding that it doesn’t. The deeper question is whether the higher morality is able to keep faith (have fidelity) against the ignorant morality that would recourse to the ethics of freedom. The options: freedom of choice, or the choice of freedom. The latter is the higher ground.

The logic of Two Routes in Application. A Discourse in Freedom.

.

The very interesting thing about this 5G (if not all of modern technology) Is that it means nothing less than volunteered enslavement. It is no mere coincidence that lately the nature of free-will is being commandeered by neurobiology: It is not that we are not or cannot be free, rather, it is that if we want to be free we would actually have to fight for it, and who (in their right mind) would want to argue with Neuroscience? (trick question: the battle does not reduce to a confrontation with neuroscience.)

The keen indication is that the modern free agent is what it has always been: A rare artifact in the imposing consciousness. There has never been a free humanity; on the contrary, there has only been a few free people that speak in such a way that everyone else wants to be and so the “commoners” start to use the language of “the free”, or way a speaking (way of organizing discourse).

We can get a glimpse of what freedom might actually be beyond the relative conventional scientific assertion (conventional philosophy; theological and ideological rhetoric; mistaken ((the weak)) postmodernism) when we think about the various social scientists and psychologist’s developmental models of morality. Very few people, they suppose, reach what we could call the “higher” stages of moralistic thinking (moralistic thinking reflects a kind of intellectual ability or capacity). And yet most everyone likes to think of themselves as though they are of this higher bracket of thinking.

Nevertheless, only a few people really have the ability or capacity to think about the world in this “higher” kind of moralistic manner. These few people are able to formulate sentences and meanings (structure discourse) of this “higher” manner of being able to perceive the world in what it does, and in so indeed speak of something that is common to the human creature. Those who do not think through this manner (have this moral capacity), though, who reside within a “lower” stage which is basically, for lack of a better term, being law abiding and having a sense of good that comes from absolutes (relativity is an absolute in as much as relativity must mean or indicate a definite quality absolutely and not just relatively) see or otherwise understand that transcendental essences are being expressed in these discourses, such as the topics that the Socratic dialogues entertained, e.g. justice, virtue and such; most people fall into this latter general category of being, to various degrees of ability and development, law-abiding and having essential truths based in good and bad, right and wrong, etc.

After not too long, the appropriation of the “higher” discourse into the law abiding scheme defines a technological space which forbids the delineation of a human being which is not entirely encompassed by the technological ideal of free agency. Nietzsche said as much: Technology equivocates humanity to the lowest common manner, all the while allowing for the “Idols” of equivocation to take control of the common agents. This is Nietzsche’s meaning of enslavement, or the slave mentality. Because the former “higher” order of “moralism”, being communicated in a particular manner, draws their natural attentions to what is good and just (viewed as essential or absolute categories), such people begin to behave in such a manner that these discourses seem to be advocating. They do this unthoughtfully and automatically as part of their critical process; that is, these higher discourses appear to them to be communicating a rationality of the absolute (unrecognized in-self reflection: the view of conventional faith). Yet, such people really do not understand this “other way” of understanding the world through a broadened moralistic intelligence, thus de facto do not have the ability to think through these discourses nor really what these kind of discourses mean or are indicating in themselves, and thus take these discourses as indicating elaborations upon what is right and wrong, good and bad in essence; In short, they take these discourses as being a discussion about absolutes or essences of law.

This is the significance of technology: Two manners of viewing technology inform human beings, or what we could now rightly call, world citizens, as to what is true and real. One manner understands its freedom as an essential tenet of being human given the conditions of free agency to manipulate and develop useful technologies, which then function as a closed system or ideology which supports the ideal of the free agent. Another manner speaks truthfully about what is occurring in the actual relationship with technology that is being human in the world. The latter’s use of discourse thus (sometimes inadvertently, but more often with intension) serves to consolidate the technological authority’s ability and capacity to control agents through refining the ideal of freedom. In other words, most people are enslaved and have no actual ability to enact any effective countermeasures to abort such confining motion because the nature of their intellectual capacity prevents them from truly grasping that situation by which they indeed are being human in the world.

It really is an ignorant bliss disguised by intellectual complexity and sophistication (sophistry).

One of the most Important Questions Of our day: How Much is too Much?

I know this question is heresy for the traditionalist Westerners, but it is nevertheless a question we need start to address:

How much money does a person need to make to be happy?

Is there an ethical standard that requires those who have accumulated vast amounts of money to give back to the economic system and its constituents that has allowed them such power?

…An ethical standard that requires such benefactors to yield at least some of their money for the benefit of what we collectively call ‘our world’?

Is there a mental standard of the same? A standard for sanity?

Can we be justified as deeming insane a person who demands more than X-amount of money to be happy and content ?

We can no longer afford to have faith in the transcendent hand of freedom. We must begin to ask these hard questions.

Does the capacity to make a tremendous amount of money equate to a right to control the world?

Reclaiming the social from the platforms that are eviscerating it

Reclaiming the social from the platforms that are eviscerating it

Reclaiming the social from the platforms that are eviscerating it
— Read on markcarrigan.net/2019/01/08/reclaiming-the-social-from-the-platforms-that-are-eviscerating-it/

My comment:

That is interesting in how their proposal implicitly retains the ideal of freedom. Where there is a supposed as essential “exception” that is being impinged upon.

I think what the internet is exposing (what Latour and others are involved with. I think). Is that indeed that exception will collapse into the controlling structures which are themselves supporting the very ideal of exception, such that control will arise in the very activity of continual assertion of essential exception;

thus we need to focus out attention on what is occurring there as opposed to constantly refocusing, pulling back into the exception which is, at root, merely deconstruction for the sake of ideal freedom. That this perpetual pulling back merely places control in the hands of “others”. That we should “take control” of our own situation by understanding how the control indeed controls. But not to thereby aliviate the control or to “free ourselves” from it, but to “own it” as an inevitable act of the construction of our freedom.

The impossible, Part 3.

When we talk about the impossible we might see a light at the end of the tunnel, but this light is really just the part of the tunnel that has electricity. The point of any discussion that wishes to find a solution, should not be about solutions. So far as reality proper and ideological power goes, as long as there is a solution, nothing changes. So the true revolutionary should not be so much concerned with enacting revolution, but should be more concerned with revealing and elucidating problem, because it is only when there is no solution, that things change. So if we see what is impossible, then we have found the real game: that the effort for the radical occurs to reify the state of reality, so ingenious, self centered and fearful of losing power humanity is. There is no successful freedom beyond the state (see my essays on feminism) in this way, freedom is an illusion, an ideological clone of the ghost in the machine. Freedom occurs through fidelity to the state. Freedom is violence.

Now, doesn’t that sound pretty impossible? But this is exactly the post-modern judgment that opened the doors by which to speak of ideology and social justice. The activities of social justice lay exactly in the discourse of freedom; this is what was realized, that there is no justifying effect in attempting to speak of justifying the individual outside of the state, as some sort of essential subject.

Ironically, to speak of freedom as an effect outside of social justice is impossible. So that is the course we take.

*

That by which we may know of what is impossible presents the truth of reality. By this truth, the real argument for determinism is always transferred to the contingent through the contingent; determinism is always a theory. When what is contingent, that is, results found through the interaction of random chance and a choice of free will, is placed or otherwise exists at the root of being human, only problem occurs as oscillation between problem and solution is not seen as a basic motion of existence, and a solution is sought to rectify the motion of human consciousness.

We can say this is the problem: in so much as the universe is determined, such determination is theoretical, and, inso much as there may be theory, the universe is not determined since theory arises in the contingency of the universe: it is theoretical. This is the basis of the argument between determinism and contingency; neither can be argued to the truth it proposes in either placement, they can only argue what is real, and reality involves contingency. We can say also: in so much as the universe is contingent, presently manifested upon necessary causal relations that take their form out of random situations, so much we have free will, and, in as much as we may know of this contingent universe and our freedom within it, the universe has been determined in this way, that we cannot but have a contingent universe.

In other words, we cannot live as human beings and be determined, choice always plays in reality. The idea that we and or the universe is determined, meaning that we have no true choice (see my previous posts), is always set in choice as we live; we make choices throughout the day that if tempered with the idea of determinism perpetually amounts to a choice, or a reminding, that we are determined. The problem of human existence is posed by this determination.

This problem cannot be solved in argument. The discussion that seeks to prove the solvency of contingency or determination always avoids the object of its antagonism; the argument for a determined universe avoids the choices that are made in the arguing, and contingency misses the necessary procurement of terms that are assembled to present its argument, as well as its meaning. The universe is determined, but we must choose, and the choice we make could not be made otherwise – but I have chosen. Though we might find the solution to the polemic here in a universe that is both determined and contingent, and perhaps bring a contextual reduction to a further analysis, this then proposes the reality of the universe as lived experience. Yet, the progress implicated by this move invariably will bring about not only a further polemic of terms, but also will yield a return to the same argument under different terms, as we will see. If there is a human being who suffers no problems, who makes no choice, what we have with him is then a person who has ‘stepped out of time’, or to be more precise, lives in another reality.

*
The solution to the real problem of the universe is impossible. Yet, because the solution of the universe is impossible, it can be solved, and because the problem of the universe can and cannot be solved, the means through which the problem has been posed, as well as its solution, must be the problem. It may well be this posing, but it is at least a posing.

This is to say, the scheme of meaningful terms by which the universe is known, as to its problem and solution, is defective. We can say this conclusion is true because the scheme is that which poses the truth of reality, and this scheme says such a conclusion is impossible, this must be true, so the solution is impossible. If what is impossible is temporary, that is only impossible right now but maybe not later, then it is real, and is not impossible, but then the vacillation of problem and solution is possible. But, again, if we can surmise of what is human by the apparency of this sentence, of the quality inherent of its representation, then a removal of the motion may be human, and consequently is not real. The terms of reality themselves must be the problem, unless there is a humanity beyond terms, so the solution cannot be found through the terms. And, if there is a humanity beyond the terms, the problem is how to use terms to speak of this humanity; we must think less upon definition, since the definitions of terms do not encompass such humanity, and think more upon orientation. This is to say we might think more about a poetics, but this term also risks relapse into the scheme we are meaning to point out as faulty.

*
We have a definition of the universe that is operative: The universe is that which contains or is otherwise accounting for all that exists. The universe operates by laws. By these laws the universe develops stars, planets, and everything else, including the human creature.

Humans began as ignorant of the laws of the universe, how it operates, and due to the capacity inherent of the human structure, brain, body, etc, humans as a species have been involved in an attempt to know how the universe operates. Recently, humans have developed science that tells us that while the universe has been operating by set laws, part of this law is accounted for by random occurrence. Science is still attempting to discover the parameters, the law, by which randomness can occur.

The segue above suggests a definition of human that is operative. Human beings have an ability for free thinking. This ability allows human beings to discover things of the universe, how they operate and function, how they interact, as well as extrapolate possibility of universal things, including relations, themselves, human nature and psychology. Free thinking and action occurs through, or is manifested by, choice, and choice, while based upon a coming upon distinct or sometimes not so distinct options, situations for decision making, these situations nevertheless arise through cause, which when looked into are found to be not so distinct, and are in fact, debatable. Cause, in this way, can be said to arise from randomness, since, at least, we are not able to account at one time for all cause that amounts to a situation, and in one sense those causes that are not accounted for amount of chance, but in another sense, cause that amounts to the chance of a situation being thus situated can be considered random. Yet choice itself, as an ability, is not seen to arise from or within random occurrences, but is understood as basic to a causal chain, and is decision that originates in a primary subject, the individual human being.

We have thus a situation of two situations, and the situation of this situation is one of two situations. The redundancy of this situation will make itself apparent.

The law abiding or containing universe arises in situation from randomness, and the human being makes choices based upon determined causes that arise likewise with random aspects. The random aspect of the universe is understood as a basic feature to be uncovered through science, and the random aspect of being human is addressed similarly through psychology, but the universe is set aside in the act of choice, that is, decision. So we have the universe as it is, having developed along certain lines and junctures of laws constituent or otherwise informed by arbitrary influences and events, and the individual human as it is as an end product of a causal chain of choices, the actual occasions of decision arriving by chance. The confluence of these situations arrives at the point of a common unknown influence (random occurrence).

Yet, the unknown of a universe that is of a different quality than the unknown in which the event of human choice takes place argues that there are different qualities of absent influence. An absence that has a quality is not characterized by itself, rather, that which characterizes an absence is not absence but the choices that establish what influences to define what a particular absence is. The universal absence, which can be said to be the random element of law, is a mathematical formulation, while the random element involved with human decision is a psychic affect; if there is a mathematical formulation that can convey the psychic affect without effecting the psyche, or a psychic affect that can impose math or withdraw a mathematical formulation, then the two categories would not be drawn in this way or be able to convey a sensible meaning in this way for I would say ‘math formulation’ and ‘psychic affect’ would not need to correlated since they would naturally confer the other. This incommensurability argues that the universe and the human being are segregate elements of a larger encompassment, and this is exactly what the imposition of undetermined choice, free will, psychical determination, proposes.

And again, the problem; if the universe is structured with random aspects, then these aspects are in truth universal aspects that are random. Yet this is only known by the agent of free will, thus we should have a problem that begins and ends with choice, that the random aspect of the universe is actually a point of failure of free will. Yet it is quite sensible to thereby argue that this point of failure is the situation of the individual in and of the true universe, or, that human beings are merely ignorant at this point.

It is not difficult to make a correlation between the deduced common random influence and the induced larger encompassment. In effect, the unavoidable contingency of the human being in the universe allows for the determination of both the transcendental and immanent One of sensible reality; the very basis of the ability to choose cannot be separated from its counter partial One. Choice must be set between two elements, the option and the ‘chooser’. As above, this sensibility arrives at two sensibilities that appear segregate. The One Thing called the universe and the One Thing called the human psychic being, and these taken together can imply a third influencing extra-universal element that also counts as a unifying One. But which way do these various ‘Ones’ fall to incorporate the ‘One-and-Only’, irrefutable One?

***
**
*

Where should we look for this One?

In yoga classes and organic grocery stores that make you feel good and bring up pictures of happy Buddha, blissful Mohammed and smiling Jesus, of all humanity holding hands in a loving chain around the world, everyone exhibiting their art to each other, and call it the Zeniverse?

Or in the styley cool centers where eager Bing-ers looking for the next hip place to eat can think on what might be included in part 4 of this nonsense?

Oh wait; probably none of those people have read this far.

But for those who have, I leave you with a riddle of sorts:

Those who see forward are congregants;
Those who see present are prophets;
Those who see backward are enlightened.

Who is correct?

Waiter ??….

Post-post-modern-modernism: The Mistake of Irony; Or, The Ironic Mistake.

Perhaps a little bitty on postmodernism and the, what could be labeled of our current situation, post-post-modern-modernism.

Here are a couple links that roughly define the conventional problem I will address in this essay. The first is a little less ridiculous than than the second. The first offers us an argument for why postmodernism is not dead, but is rather the condition upon which people find a new agency. David Foster Wallace is talking from so far down the conventional hole – at least, that he was at some point- his polemic reveals how deep his confusion is or was, as the case may be ( no disrespect intended).

http://partialobjects.com/2011/08/what-comes-after-postmodernism/

This is not to say that there was not this postmodern thing-era that these authors are talking about; it is also very interesting, and possibly ironic, that postmodernism has been seen as first represented in architecture (so says the first link). Nevertheless, the era was the conventional reaction to a large misunderstanding that continues.

It is not difficult to find a link between Constructive Undoing and postmodernism, especially with the irony/convention duality that has arisen here. So, in light of this parallel, and that irony is too often defined to postmodernism through deconstruction, sarcasm, posed apathy, withdrawal, multivocality and the like, as well that irony does not stem from any sort of reaction (though pm may) as it merely takes the proposed new as old hat, as already given before it became new, one has to hit it straight on, as a tangent, one might say. As the post of the link says, with “arms folded tight” one continues to lift; irony works, despite the conventional reaction.

We should look into this reaction. To do this, we will use the framework of the definition of irony, taken from Dictionary.com ( as of spetember, 2013) since the typical conventional misunderstanding involved with the coupling of irony and postmodernism is at play; the reaction allows postmodernism to be placed outside of its ironic bearings.

[Note: This essay is a shortened version.]

Irony:

1.)the use of words to convey a meaning that is the opposite of its literal meaning: the irony of her reply, “How nice!” when I said I had to work all weekend.

Literature.
A.) a technique of indicating, as through character or plot development, an intention or attitude opposite to that which is actually or ostensibly stated.
(especially in contemporary writing)

B.) a manner of organizing a work so as to give full expression to contradictory or complementary impulses, attitudes, etc., especially as a means of indicating detachment from a subject, theme, or emotion.

3.)Socratic irony. (which is defined as feigned ignorance.)

4.) dramatic irony.

5.) an outcome of events contrary to what was, or might have been, expected.

6.) the incongruity of this.

7.) an objectively sardonic style of speech or writing.

8.) an objectively or humorously sardonic utterance, disposition, quality, etc.

Generally, all the definitions reiterate the fifth definition; basically, the opposite of what is expected expressed in the various arenas. (A) and (B) are literary devices of turning plot or meaning. (3) is an idiomatic expression of the complete misunderstanding of Socrates, a one-sided view. (4) is little more than (3); (5) restates all the definitions. (6),(7) and (8) are the key definitions, the ones that have been elicited from the most offense of irony, in the postmodern sense.

The really interesting thing about irony is the absolute comedy of its seriousness; in all seriousness, this is the most offensive aspect of irony, and is the reason postmodernism has become a kind of stigma in philosophy, a kind of joke for modern thought so much that it had to ‘die’. Where do I laugh? Where do I nod? How can I tell if what is being said is really meant for what it says? The irony never ends, and everyone wants ends. Most every one wants to be told the punch line – but not overtly; everyone wants to be in on the joke. But the joke and the deep meaning are one in the same; if you have to guess or wonder, then you get embarrassed: you are offended.

Though I can’t be sure about the intent of definition number 6, I assume it refers to definition number 5. In fact, unless it is a type-o, the definition is probably intended to mean irony as the incongruity of what is expected and what actually occurs, in distinction to def. 5 where irony is the “outcome”. If I say I am a liar, and then I lie, the irony could be not very ironic or be very ironic depending on what has been signaled, but the incongruity of this is that one would have to guess, that is, unless the liar while telling the truth were indeed poetic as he lay, for then he would indeed be lying. But what if he were telling the truth?? As it is, the definition number 6, as a definition for irony, is quite ironic, because none of the other definitions reference the other definitions, but we are expected to see that number 6 does. It is a simple pleasure then to think that the authors of this definition included just this presentation (of 6) as a particular definition of irony because probably the best definition of irony is the incongruity of this, as it is not only a definition, but also an example. And just as such a simple pleasure could be a proclivity of some people, this paragraph itself will find many quite fed up and see no humor or pleasure in this exposition; they find it corny or even lacking in a certain finesse or refinement, or perhaps they find it too subtle. Yet it is just this kind of insensitivity or intolerance that seeks ends, that, if not indicated to the punch, will develop a position highly distanced from it, the ironic move so lowly and indistinctive as it is patronized.

Such a humor is of the most inside that one can fathom, so it is no wonder that most cannot help but develop a resentment concerning its irony. To them, they are being made the butt of a joke; like some sort of transcendent wit they miss, they maintain their seriousness as they pull the heavenly act down to their mundane decisions and proclaim and accuse and dismiss. It is not a wonder postmodernism has a bad rap; the dense can hardly hold a tune, let alone wish to appreciate the finest symphony in the world without the liner notes. Grinding their teeth together they talk lightheartedly and then seriously about this and that fashion, all the while truly being the object of ridicule that was never intended for them except that they made it such. “We are not laughing at them, we are just laughing,” and they have much more serious things by which to set their recreation.

(7) and (8). The definition of ‘sardonic’: characterized by bitter or scornful derision; mocking; cynical; sneering: a sardonic grin. In other words, the distasteful, ‘dark side’ of irony: “objectively sardonic”. The attitude behind this irony is an anxious individual, almost despairing of the world. The irony is a type of ‘sick’ humor; his denial is palatable. This one has come close to his theoretical, indeed actual, demise and spits out his fate upon everyone and the world (the objects) because it is the world. Ironically, the world has let him to know, and he doesn’t like it; he doesn’t like being dominated but he has found his distance from it in one of two ways: a) The world is shitty. The world of history is not the place of his childhood dreams; it has brought everything opposite childish happiness had more than hoped for. He wants to be free, but his conscience tells him its all a sham, and this is known to him due to the world’s history coming upon him. The oppressive world. b) His attitude is justified in righteousness. The offense of the shitty world is countered by the nobility of human presence: the world is great, it is working in his behalf. This nobility is held in countenance for the world, but soon the world rejects it, it counters every move. A suitable image must be maintained; the oppressive individual. In both, the object is prominent; in (a), it is the object proper to convention, in (b), the individual, the subject-object, the subject of convention. Whether it is in reference to some ‘childhood dream’ or the ‘grown-up’ approach to reality before him or her, the motion is that the nobility rejects the rejection and the world crumbles; it deconstructs because the individual is no longer complicit with the world, but again, offended by it. The individual perpetually lives in a fear of his own making, cast upon the world that is surely going bad from the activities of himself – if only he could just leave, or, can he save it in time!

*

The reaction here is ironic; the ironic-sardonic postmodernist and the individual that sets postmodernism to a proper era are both implicitly involved in the conventional reaction. Consciousness, by its very nature, is a retreat from the world; perhaps more precisely, the world is consciousness’s retreat from existence. The individual who is being ironic by realizing that the world of the great (at least, modernist in the last, but conventional in its beginning) human history has brought itself to destruction, is reacting not to the world, but to her inability to reconcile it to her knowledge; her knowledge does not ‘reach’ the object. The reaction is completely of alienation, which is to say, the individual is not alienated due to some historical social motion where she is offended at the state of the world and so withdraws from it, but rather the individual is alienated from herself due to her rather un-ironic belief (faith) in the oppressing thing of the world, that is, that there is this world, which is reality, the conventional world of the true object. This is not so much that the world brought itself to its own destruction, but that the world did not destruct, and this is to say that the world did not find solution, but that the world is insolvent. The result of the world finding a new way due to the old way not working, or bringing itself upon destruction, is not finding a solution in this new way, the result is that the new way is exactly the same as the old way, that the two ‘ways’ could not but have caused and resulted from each other necessarily, that the causes will be found conventionally. The reaction is thus not of the world but of the meaning that the individual has derived from it, which contradicts that the human was ever part of the world in the first place. Then the reaction becomes dismissive, yielding the ‘that’s just life’ tail. Asserting the priority of beliefs and their function for finding ‘the good’, the reaction wields the power of resentment in hopes of stifling and ending all dissension.

The belief itself, the act or motion the term ‘belief’ signifies of faith, is what creates or allows for the alienated individual; the condition of the human being in reality is the separated individual. This separation, basic to the individual, is what constitutes freedom, the great future of progress, as well as its complimentary spiritual form of union (yoga) and ‘return’ (Christ, messiah, or ‘anointed one’; the motion as ‘to anoint’ connotes a uniting of separate substances, yet where one significant or uncommon element is rubbed on a regular or common element, and in this moment the two are transformed; the blessed oil becomes merely oil, the common, significant. The misused idea of ‘karma’, so prevalent in the West, falls in here also.) Nevertheless, it is recognition or realization, a coming into knowledge, that develops ‘alienation’ as a lived experience. But the inherent and unavoidable condition of human consciousness is separation.

Anxiety and despair over such a realization is usually understood to be relieved by two moves, though there are really three; the first two are conventional. The first is denial, where the realization is avoided. This reaction replaces the old with the new as part and parcel of willed, reasoned progress. The initial problem here is replaced with the solution that is human agency, the negotiation of parties, be it spiritual negotiation or mundane. The second is insanity. Both of these reactions are complicit in the resolution to the problem, since there is no true overcoming of the discrepancy; faith in reality accomplishes this feat through denial; hence, denial and insanity are the only real options. I emphasize real options, in the sense that I have already been developing conventional faith; anything else is absurd, insane. Thus the third option is the non-conventional, the ‘not-real’ option (Francois Laruelle might call this the Real option); the reconciliation that can come only does so with existence, through the experience of irony: denial and acceptance become not mutually exclusive.

The human being in existence cannot but help behaving in the only way it can: ultimately determined in every activity. But this activity, this existence, is also human consciousness; it can only behave the way it does. This is to say on one hand that consciousness does not behave or operate in any way separate from the behavior of existence, but also on the other that its operation is to have a world that is sufficiently separate from itself by which it can then perform its functions, and these are exactly formed and allowed for through the partition we call free will, that is, choice. Human consciousness must have a true object, it cannot function without it, but in order for there to be a true object there must be a correspondant of at least equal stature, and this is the individual thoughtful human being. The evident aspect of consciousness is thought, and is itself a mode or motion of the existing universe. Thought thereby retains an effectively universal operational structure as part of its nature, which is to say, the processes and features of knowing resonate the very motion of the universe as course, which is unity. Yet unity, unfortunately for the individual, can only exist by separation; only in the condition of separation can a notion of unity have meaning. Separation and unity have a significance for the meaning making existent human being; the tension or motion thereof, which is vacillation, is not allowed in the progressive reality: reality relies upon the equanimity of subject and object as real things, absolutely true objects, and its privileging of either dependent upon the circumstance at hand as the circumstance is foundational in indicating progress.

Stepping back from this, we can say nevertheless, once the equilibrium, or symmetry, of the statures of true object and thinking subject are upset, existence effectively takes over its proper imperative, that is, the sanctity of the true object begins to fail for knowledge, and knowledge likewise is compromised of its ability to ‘hold off’ the encroachment of the operation of thought upon itself: consciousness then must uphold its existential operation, as its foundation is the differend between thought and object, and the reduction of the knowledge of the object to the object of knowledge eventually brings thought into a consideration of itself, as an object of itself. Only in the balance that holds the (inner) subject and (outer) object at sufficient distance in consciousness can one say that the objective dominates; psychology is the conventional method that attempts to keep the distance of thought and object, to maintain the balance. Once this symmetry is lost, however, the motion never falls toward the object, the motion is always toward the knowing subject, falling in upon the subject of knowledge until consciousness almost comes upon itself and faith is reestablished; this can be called, what is typically known as a ‘psychological breakthrough’ or a ‘spiritual experience’. Where it indeed truly comes upon itself, we call this insanity or death. Where the individual is incapable of functioning constructively in the group of humanity, conventional reality is upheld by the group through a faith that functions to keep the balance and maintain the symmetry of the subject and object in knowledge, as an objective aspect, and thought, as a subjective aspect, which is to say, in knowledge that such an individual is insane defined as a true object for the purpose of establishing the standard for the individual: the subject (subject-object), and in thought for the purpose of establishing the objective standard of reality: the object.

*

The usual reading of postmodern exposition is contained thus far; not for a reiteration of it, but to a step from it. Though more than a few authors either contributed to the development of postmodernism, or step from it, to offer their version, I address two authors here: Jean-Paul Sartre and Francois Laruelle. Through a particularly conventional lens, each offers a stating of the point of contention, a reiteration, as well as a reconciliation of the ironic problem, while saying, really, ironically, the same thing. The punch line: the discrepancy (the individual is established in separation) is solved through an assertion of essential freedom. Again, this is to say that both proposals arise through a denial of existence and an assertion of the true object. This, in effect, is the definition of what Sarte terms “bad faith”, as I have argued of Laruelle in the Direct Tangents of Constructive Undoing.

Sartre’s points are foundational. The reduction of thought to an object of itself opens meaning to an ‘abyss’ of freedom, where meaning comes to its own essential lack. To (here now) reiterate the foregoing, the essence of meaning (if we can say there is such a thing) is seen to be vacant, void, nil, as Slavoj Zizek has said of the subject. This knowledge of contradiction, meaning that is no meaning, causes the individual angst, or Kierkegaardian ‘despair’; in my terms, the individual understands that the reality through which he or she was moving, that has been established and motivated through basic, what was before thought, true tenants of reality, true objects, is found to be not true. Sartre’s move then is to ‘revolt’ from this ‘nothingness’, since the individual supposedly sees now that meaning is arbitrary, and thereby find true freedom because the individual sees that he is no longer constrained by any essential, determined, or otherwise actual truth of any matter whatsoever.

Laruelle, if we are able to set aside the conventional-temporal object for one moment, where Laruelle builds his non-philosophy due to Sartre’s and others’ ideas before him, we may find his address through what I shall use as his basic idea. While all of his terms interact and compound upon one another to indicate the same thing, which is the point of contention, his ‘unilateral duality’ works to indicate the last conventional object. The ‘future Christ’ he terms as a culmination or basic differential which allows or accounts for the total meaning of, what I call, the scheme of meaning that is conventional reality, the meaningful organization of true objects. By summoning total meanings of significant oppositional objects, his critique of philosophy proper reduces its operational terms to explain conventional reality; he limits conventional reality to the arena of ‘philosophy’ for strategic reasons, and calls the consequence or result of this reduction the ‘Real’. Using the idea of future Christ, his reconciliation poses some sort of radical agency – mind you, ‘agency’ has been likewise re-situated in non-agency – that, one is to gather, comes about through a proper understanding of reality. The reason he can appear, as we say, ‘in the last’, is the real and the Real remain for him ‘lateral’ or maybe better, parallel but are situated more properly upon a parallax. The freedom of Sartre is similarly re-situated with the ‘radical’ form of knowing and proposes some more evolved state of humanity.

Again, keep in mind that I am presenting a typically conventional reading of these authors, that the fact of their presentations are routinely and faithfully, in Laruelle’s terms, ‘made into another philosophical object’, a representation of the point of contention. The problem is at all times conventionally upheld for reality, Real or free. The problem is not the presentation that these authors enact, but the re-presentation: the overcoming of the true object is impossible for conventional reality.

Hence, perhaps a better rendition of the matter at hand can be better situated to address the impossible. To put it directly into conventional grasp, we might then see that to confront the impossible is a matter of insanity.

*

Yet before we venture into the impossible, I would like to offer a small quote from Thomas Nagel, and his effort from the possible, of staying in the possible:

“However, I do not find theism any more credible than materialism as a comprehensive world view. My interest is in the territory between them. I believe that these two radically opposed conceptions of ultimate intelligibility cannot exhaust the possibilities. All explanations come to an end somewhere. Both theism and materialism say that at the ultimate level, there is one form of understanding. But would an alternative secular conception be possible that acknowledged mind and all that it implies, not as the expression of divine intention but as a fundamental principle of nature along with physical law?”
~ ‘Antireductionism and the Natural Order’, in Mind and Cosmos, p.22.

One should see that Nagel’s situation is nothing larger than what Soren Kierkegaard offered 160 years ago: Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical? For the question Nagel asks here is nothing greater than conventional, though he might be trying to indicate something more (we shall see). Nagel is asking if there is a way to bring the remnants or basics of the bifurcated real meaning wherein we have idealist subjectivism and religious transcendence/immanence versus materialist objectivism, into a scheme of meaning that does not indicate upon such distinction, which is to say, does not reify the insolvency. The answer is: conventionally, no. All human reality depends upon the duality of meaningful categories; the real is the universal is the ethical. The answer ironically is: yes.

Further on Faith; A Reflection.

Im gonna step a little closer to home here, just for a moment, and offer what could be considered a fictional account of life in experience. A word on faith.

“Where I am offended, I have faith.”

I have difficulty with a faith that must be worked for, as if some times I have faith and other times I do not. The fact is, if i have faith, it is because I doubt; I have faith in doubt. This may seem offensive or contradictory to some, but I cannot help but doubt. I cannot hold to some idea of hope. I cannot hold to an idea that seems to be working sometimes but other times does not; rather, I can only hold on so long. The idea of ‘working’ is very problematic to me; if faith only works dependent upon what work I do to get it, then I am doomed, because I will fail every time – because then what about the times, despite myself, i am not working for my faith? But not just that, if i am working for faith but it somehow does not seem to be working, I will take that to mean that I am doing something wrong, that I am not worthy. I thereby end up invalidating myself unto the world and validate myself in the world. I cannot but be justified and be human.

If I have faith and I am working for it, but things do not seem to be going my way and yet I still have faith that indeed I am still worthy, my faith is vindicated but I may not have been involved with what is true, but only what I have made true through my belief that working for something is noble. If I have faith but am not working for it and things seem to be not going my way but yet i still feel worthy, again i am vindicated but I may be avoiding what is true for the sake of what I have made so, like a mistaken type of zen master; what then is this faith? And, If i have a faith that i need not do anything for, why would I even call it faith? Either way, my faith seems then to not have anything to do with whether things are going my way or not, except that my faith concerns a justification of what i am doing. If i am completely removed from my relation with the world against which i have to justify myself, what need have I of faith? Even so, the world in which I behave without the necessity of justification, is sufficient for revealing the truth of the matter of faith. .

The pivotal issue has to do with one who has no faith and does nothing for it, that is, I am not working for my faith for I have no faith. Here then the issue of truth is presented in its fullest. One idea that truth needs no faith is basic to anyone who sees faith as having to do with religion or spirituality, where instead, one opts for a scientific, or perhaps, in a manner of speaking, a ‘practical’ approach to reality, one that needs no faith but is steeped in knowledge. This one works for knowledge. So what we have is a person who works for knowledge, but has no faith, but feels worthy despite whether or not such knowledge is working. In fact such knowledge is or contains or accounts for knowledge that works and knowledge that does not work. Here is one who is justified in his work despite the results of that work, and he thereby completes all of the possibilities of faith. Whether or not he calls his work a work of faith makes no difference except in that he would deny that his work is based in faith, for if it did not matter to him whether he was in faith or not, or working for it or not, then it would be equally valid to say that he indeed had or has faith. When he denies that he is working in faith, then he is exactly without faith but is working for something else, and in this a state of denial he is precisely having faith in the fact that he has no faith. He has not doubted, so his faith is in that he justifies himself in the terms of his doing, for if he was doing nothing he would have to justify it or he would not be worthy and his faith that is not faith would fail, since he had no faith by which to support his worth; his situation then is that he had no faith, was not working for it, and was not worthy. Hence, the truth that he was working for despite whether it worked or not would be found not true, but only true in so much as his working for it was allowing it to be so. This one would not see that indeed his effort is ironic, that in his not working, and so not being justified or worthy of the world, his effort was exactly one of faith.

*

To have faith in a goodness that permeates the bad spots of life, as if there is a transcendent good purpose, or proposer, of which I can only know a piece, an immanent piece, selects my person away from what may be true, into the world, which is to say, into reality; such a faith removes me from a relationship with the world where I am intimate with the truth, and leaves me in a relation of distance and denial, of fear and frustration, a potential that is grounded in hope. I become invested in a person that is mythological, one who misses the truth of the world for the glamour of heaven, which is exactly missing the adventure of existence for the beauty of fantasy. In this fantasy, the world and I are at odds of a natural course – this course, of course, needs an interlocutor, a fantastic redeemer, one who restores worth and relieves hope with the hoped-for.

I can come to this notion only through experience, not reality. If i see my experience is of, or gained from or through reality, then i can only hope that my experience is faithful. Through a faith that is based in hoping, because of my wanting to have faith, I inevitably find that my faith is actually a term I use to refer to a relation with my object of faith. I can say it is God, or a god, or spirit or daemon, the universe, or whatever, but I have some sort of interaction with the world where an element of faith is involved, where the goods and the bads are tempered with a certain kind of reflection, one that has me in reaction to things of the world. What have I done wrong? What have I done right? How can I go about things differently or what did I do so I can repeat it? What lesson have I learned? How can I apply what I have learned to present and future circumstances? As many of these questions are not answered satisfactorily, or such answers again yield still the same queries from oneself, i come to a crossroads and divide myself into experience: I thereby come upon transcendence and immanence localized in the meaning of an unrecognized world of doubt that appears as an object of faith.

So I begin to recede…

So it was, my faith was exactly not faith, but in that i had no faith i only had faith – yet i doubted this. A curious thing happened after a while of living life this way; I began to reflect upon my reflecting, for i could not have such considerations as to appraising the moment toward what i should do next unless there was some thing that aroused or caused such consideration, which is to say, the world, that is, unless i wanted to make the the world ‘happy’: In effect, i found myself, consciously, in a motion toward elements that were not me.

*

If this first reflection is exactly self-conscious, where my motivations and aspirations, strategies and tactics were geared toward establishing myself in the world, my second reflection is upon the elements by which I am developing such self-consciousness upon or towards; the reason I have such thoughts and behavior is exactly because I am a reflection of the world. The third reflection sees that the world is no longer a stage that I arrange and upon which I assert my play because I now am involved withthe world.

*

The second reflection emerged because I began to see that my conscious reflection really only occurred when things were not going the way I wanted them to. If things were good, I figured I was doing right, or rather, correctly, like they were supposed to, and my reflection only amounted to a “that was great” kind of feeling, if there was any thought upon it; my ideas concurred with a righteous presentation. I didn’t correct myself at these times, it seemed to come naturally. The only reflection i had upon such moments was that everything thing was ok, and from there I proceeded outward, away from reflection. What I had learned must be being put to good use; what I had learned was being put into practice; things were good. Only when things were not going good would I consider what I may not be doing right, and I would attempt to find out what was wrong. It could have been just being in the situation to begin with, or it could actually be something I did wrong; it could have been merely that ‘shit happens’. Basically, though, if it was good, I was good, but if it was bad, I tried to find out what it was so to reestablish it being good. Life was always toward everything being ok; i never tried to make things bad.

But the bad times would come again. The funny thing is, It never occurred to me that the position from which i drew my assessments might be incorrect, and it took a long time to see that regardless of what I was doing, despite all the mental and physical effort I made towards having a good life and being happy, bad times always came. The blind spot of my situation brought me to dwell in this situation such that i began to forebode of the good, to prepare for the bad to come and the manner by which I attempted to counter these grey times was at best a defensive attitude of indifference, tempered with a renewed fortitude. For a bit, the callus allowed me to have an identity.

Some would say “that’s just life”. Yet, still we endeavor for the good and this, in its most simplistic operation, is the basis of faith.

In so much as reflection is invested in life upon the good and the bad moments, I was in a relationship with life; for it seemed there was something else at work beyond my best efforts to harness it, something always fouled it up. This thing that fouled it up most of the time was the world, but still I was involved, and that made it personal. Here I was, doing my best. The feelings and thoughts around the times when everything seemed good and was going my way was exactly that I was correspondent with the world, which is to say, we were getting along. Whatever the particular aspects that I encountered of the world, these aspects agreed with me in the sense that I was being fulfilled. In so much as they didn’t agree with me, but yet my life was good, the effect was still that I was doing good, the world was ‘functioning’ for my benefit, on my behalf, so to speak, so i could ‘learn’. The relationship was good. Yet, I could not hang on to a faith that would disappear into hope when things were bad, for my faith did not thus disappear, i merely denied it. I would get angry and spiteful at the world and things in or of the world, but it remained; good or bad, the world remained intact for whatever it was doing. It was this realization, this rejection of pitiful insecurity disguised as strength, that the good and the bad was in fact based in a true and necessary relation, not a contingent relation, with the world that then allowed me to come to a knowledge of the situation I was in; this was the beginning of the third reflection.

When things went bad, I had to make an effort back towards life being ok and this effort had to do with my caring for the world, the world that gave me that with which i struggle. It could only be that the world and i were involved that i struggled. I could not longer deny in peace. The relationship did not end, now, in fact, i drew upon it, intuited from it what was off, what angles I could take, gleaned from it the overt and covert elements of the situation: i looked upon – indeed, engaged – the world for the information by which to bring a solution to the problem because it was though the world was working against with me despite myself. Never was there a time where I could dismiss myself from the world, in fact, so much as I may have had faith, I could not help but to consider the events of my life with respect to this other aspect of my experience that I could not control but nevertheless offered to me what i could control, which was really only that these things i could not control were informing me of what i could control because they were in fact things I could not control because they were presented to me as such, ‘those things I could control’. My faith waned as the truth began to assert itself as knowledge. The things I would do to correct the situations became acts of reconciliation or amends, instead of methods and coercements. Eventually I began to see the world not as an object upon which I reflect, but a reflection of the object I asserted when I reflected self-consciously upon the world. This second reflection came back to me, interacted with me, as a world not a stoic and inanimate void of substance concept, but as an emotional and conscious aspect of self, and this was the fourth reflection, where I come present.

*

The fiction above tells a story of the situation of reality. Reality occurs in the first reflection. The truth of existence begins, but is not always completed subsequently, through the second reflection. Reality occurs through the individual in denial of his relationship with the world. The first as it may move to the second has to do with separation, of an assertion of one upon the other, of control over impotence, of exception, of denial, of alienation, of identity: of the philosophy of the One true universe. The movement through and beyond the second has to do with acceptance, praxis and agency, as these are the beginnings to the motion that completes in the fourth reflection.

“Education is the practice of freedom”; where one ceases to doubt for the sake of individual identity, one has proclaimed his complicity in the game of oppression and staked the world against his faith.
‘Faith makes true’ is the operational maxim; for convention it is the basis of belief and the foundation of reality; for the ironic it is the process that leaves itself once the truth has become apparent. Instead of ‘making true’, faith becomes knowledge, such that what was faith then becomes a kind of willed ignorance, and the truth becomes that which accounts for it.