The New Philosophy

The Moment of Decisive Significance took more than 4 years to write and publish, and it still needs edits. The Philosophical Hack the first and second parts took a little less time, partly because of how Nathaniel approached it.  Actually, The Philosophical Hack is not yet complete, so all and all, for all 6 parts, will probably take even longer than 4 years — and being that Nathaniel undertakes other projects, the last 4 parts will probably come out perhaps in 2030. 🙂

This is true philosophy to me.  Yes, philosophy can be understood as a commodity, a product, a piece of consumer good, but that is not what I think good philosophy does and is in truth.  In reality maybe it appears as something different…

Philosophy takes time, it is out of time, and it is thus timeless. 

It arises in time and out of time, but through arising in this manner, it is essentially of two ontological natures.

One of the points the Kierkegaard makes in his book “Fear and Trembling” is that Abraham had a faith that is beyond him; Kierkegaard says that he could never make the move of Abraham and, basically, this is why a person is in despair, sinful, as he says, in despair to will to be oneself.  Kierkegaard thus uses the literary figure of the Biblical Abraham to show the irony involved of Being a Knight of Faith.

His point is that when one is willing to be oneself never does she have the faith of Abraham, and thus, for those who might be so inclined (but not everyone), the best someone who is willing can do is live as a knight of infinite resignation. His point is so long as one is willing, that is, is open to the possibility of being oneself, as opposed to actually being oneself, then that person lives in despair.

Indeed this is the modern dilemma of the individual.

Time Spiral

 

My point is that so long as one is in time, they have faith in themselves and are working towards an end which is always ethically compromised: They have faith (hope) that the world holds a place for them to Be, but they never are quite sure how they are supposed to be (how am I proposed in context is the quandary of modern mental health).  The irony, though, is that one must indeed live in time and be ethical (in the sense of Being involved with ethics), but that that this is not all that one is and does.  One does not live in a condition where she must always choose upon ethics.  This is the point that Kierkegaard makes of Abraham.

Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical? 

We find the answer through his books, and the answer is yes.  The reason for this is that Abraham’s activity was not for his time, and yet in that he was indeed there, a human being doing actions, his actions were not ethical. Indeed, the point that Kierkegaard makes is that the ethics of Abraham were vested in God, and that God thus makes the world ethical by virtue of the absurdity that is not acting in time: Abraham has faith by virtue of the absurd.

Ironically, Slavoj Zizek, a contemporary social critic and philosopher, makes the same point when he says that the subject always acts too late, that by the very ontological nature of the modern subject of ideology, action is always reactionary.  Similarly Alain Badiou says the best political move is to not act politically, to abstain from politics. The revolutionary move is thus to move out of time, and to bring Kierkegaard back in, to act by virtue of the absurd such that what is ethical arises out of the act, as opposed to the ontological act Being involved with an attempt to act ethically.

The condition which evidences this ontological contradiction is what Kierkegaard and Nietzsche as well, call angst, which was first translated into English, by Walter Lawrie, I think, as dread, but then later authors (Hong and Hong, May) call anxiety.  The philosopher who arises out of time to act finds herself in a state of anxiety because she still appears on the scene within the ethical universe, albeit, one that is being manifested by the absurd situation of her being out of time. This is particularly salient in our 21st century because we find that this is a condition of knowledge, and not a condition of every human being who thinks thoughts.

  • The question that I have been grappling with is how does one who is so out of time do the work of art (or of love, Heidegger, Kierkegaard) which is motivated through the state of anxiety? (Also see Harman’s Dante’s Broken Hammer.)
  • How does one arise in time out of time?

My next project will thus be to produce a work of philosophy which covers the whole breadth of philosophical knowledge while at once mentioning neither a known philosopher or author, nor conceptual philosophical tropes, that is, terms which have assumed (privileged) dense philosophical definition.

That is what I am going to attempt, anyways.  🙂

Good luck!

 

Thinking Marx Through Harvey — thru reality

Thinking Marx Through Harvey

Thinking Marx Through Harvey
— Read on syntheticzero.net/2020/01/23/thinking-marx-through-harvey/

I like it.

The only critique I would have of it is that one does not give way to the other. To give way, to choose either one or the other or to have one or the other “prove” itself to be the basis ground or ultimate truth of things as it is, is to resort to a reading of Kierkegaard that is not conventionally mistaken: it is to have faith.

We might see that the issue is not so much (or is less) that there is an idealistic Marxist realm where ideologies or abstractions usurp brute realities, and then a disillusionment that comes along that shows that such abstract realities, or theoretical systems based on abstract concepts, is an incorrect way to understand the truth of things, so to speak — but indeed such conceptual (e-)motions occur.

My critique is that the reduction to one form or another, at least in this kind of dialectical polemic, where I was incorrect before but now my idealistic version of reality has been proven incorrect– this kind of polemical thinking, this way to position myself in the world, this either/or mentality, is what is incorrect. It is not unethical; but it is incorrect with regards to what is true.

When we read Kierkegaard, we might understand that what he’s really indicating, especially in his Pivotal philosophical works “either/or, pts 1 & 2”, is it is possible that my ideological theories posing or pointing towards some truth actually does still occur as such, that is, showing truth, while yet also as I come upon the real world which discounts it and proves it to be incorrect. What occurs is that there are two correct versions of reality that do not work together nor conflate into or toward another unity, and that this is the truth that shows how our interaction with the world takes place.

I submit, arguments of what is real, or what is actually the case in the world, function As we might understand them informing us intellectually ,through a vacillation of ideological categories that function truly to establish the world, a world, the world, in exactly the way it is, and the subject mediating between those worlds as though indeed I, the subject, is changing. In the scheme, though, the world that is involved with the greatest of all categories, essentially does not change. We can even bring Slavoj Zizek’s question in here: are we able to change how we understand change?

No matter what discourse, or any other indicator, might “truly mean”, ultimately it is only indicating ideas that are attached to whatever actual world in the way that it is at that present moment. The idea that I am coming to find out what is “actually real” through any sort of theoretical mechanism or intellectual device, is ultimately based in what we would or should properly call “faith”. To resolve the either/or dilemma to one or the other “reality” requires faith.



As someone else has put it elsewhere, it is not a question of whether or not Jesus Christ was actually the son of God or not the son of God, was an actual human being, or was a God on earth, or was the son of God, or none of those things.  The more complex and significant issue is how Jesus Christ occurs in the world that I am coming upon. This last question differs substantially and is quantitatively different than the previous types of questions. 

Similarly, racism for that matter, or aliens, or The European Union, or quarks, bits or gravity, or unicorns.

To be able to weigh up sides and decide which appears the more real, to have placed the stakes within that trial, as though I am along with the world Being determined by those stakes, requires faith.



Likewise it is not a question of whether or not the brain functions in whatever way that science or neurology might say that it does or that it doesn’t, or whether or not science is correct or incorrect in its estimations. Whatever situation is occurring at the time is indeed the situation that we must deal with at the time. Yet, strangly philosophically sognificant, most often how we are thinking about it is understood to be involved with some actually true of the situation which further tends to want to avoid itself this time, wants to “prove” to not others – against, with or by others — but mainly itself how such a truth is indeed essentially true, no matter what anyone will say about it. 

“Faith Turned on its Head”

Choosing Belief with Kierkegaard

https://notentirelypyrrhonian.wordpress.com/2019/09/06/choosing-belief-with-kierkegaard/
— Read on notentirelypyrrhonian.wordpress.com/2019/09/06/choosing-belief-with-kierkegaard/

This linked post is a great case by which to begin to understand the parameters of the conventional philosophical orientation upon things.

*

I disagree with the writer: the leap of K is the absurd situation of already having occurred. It is not “into a choice” of faith, rather, such a choice is evidence that faith is already there.

Sartre, as I see him, misunderstood K and posited a free choice in light of the absurdity of brute existence, as S might have been reacting to the reality of the Final Solution and World War 2. But in his bewilderment of such atrocity, as with others of his time, like Fankl and May, his reading of Kierkegaard was produced in his (Sartre’s) astonishment, where as Kierkegaard was not astonished, or, he was more astonished that the brute reality of existence was/is missed so thoroughly by most (the crowd, or those oriented in such a way for their identity).

I see Sartres existentialism as a complete misreading of K. But that’s not to say that S did not have good insight given the condition of his moment.

However, the trauma (ww2) limited his ability to view; it refined his view such that the tiny pin hole he was looking through appeared to grant focus to the “whole”, perhaps like a small apperature of a photographic lens has a longer depth of field.

But we know now with trauma, the tiny view just takes over the field rather than representing it truly.

The traditional conventional readings of Kierkegaard routinely misrepresent his works (or thinks only inside the close reading of his words rather than the whole meaning of all his works — that is, philosophically rather than psychologically . Many of Ks works are indeed called by himself “psychological” btw.) Hence in order to render the meaning of his works properly for our time, one must turn thier idea of faith on its head, turn it upside down.

K’s reprimand is of the “inauthentic” individual who simply is always in despair to will to be oneself. Such individuals, ironically, 😘 find and found solace in Sartre’s existentialism because Sartre and his peers (and others) were shook by the apparent inhumanity that humanity would be party to — and such individuals understand the view from despair (the view that despair brings about) as indeed the true view, the viewing of the true existence, but it is the distortion. I call this distortion the “real” view, because it is the view that must be reckoned with first, in reality. So, in a way, Sartre was actually giving a sort of psychologically compassionate statement by his philosophy.

Like the analysis of Trauma, the view that is true of the situation is not found in the reasonable conclusions gained in the traumatic coming upon such brute force. Rather, distance allows the true picture to come into focus without restimulation.

From the brute existence already having been forced and come to terms with The reading of events is no longer informed through the “post-traumatic” apprehension-reaction against a circumstance of things; the person no longer involuntarily enacting actions and views from the still resonating “close-range” and the re-encountering of the traumatic stimulus. Or, in Sartre’s way: The encounter with the abyss of freedom is traumatic, hence one revolts from it, rejects it in order to reshape one’s own life through choosing it out of the chasm of nothing upon which identity is based.

What Kierkegaard already had processed and viewed truly was already lost, as we see in K’s reprimands of Christianity. What Sartre “rediscovered” was a reading of Kierkegaard through the lens of deflowered ignorance: In despair to will to be oneself. Hence Sartre’s Existentialism just posits that one can will to be oneself through the free choice to no longer be in despair. This reading, while good for the modern citizen who is already in despair merely tells everyone it is ok to live in ignorance of oneself through choosing to deny thier despair through the free act of choice.

Judge Wilhelm (in Either/Or part 2) describes the condition of those who would wish to “join in love” with that which is apparently unknowable, and hence the ground of ethical choice that is despair.

While such a reading can be therapeutic considering that most of society citizens do their best to try and avoid their brute existence, the reading, such as evident in the linked-post (as well as the scholarly reports) nevertheless is opposite of what K was saying.

Ks use of the trope “Christianity” often throws off interpretation, as we see with Sartre; for who could still think God was in history after the Holocaust? Sartre’s whole philosophy is informed by active trauma: the trauma of having the very human force of belief confronted at its core, that is, as an actual force connected with causality.

*

Read more insights into philosophy in THE SECOND PART of The Philosophical Hack: The Object of the Subject.

The Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Event.

Coming to mind whether you want it to or not.

Don’t look behind that Curtain!

The event of Modernity is represented by the plot culmination of The Wizard of Oz: The moment that the Feminine Mystique is comprehended in its reality: The all and power Oz, the great wizard that holds the good society together is a fraud. The myth of the evil witch is destroyed upon arrival but then there is another bad witch that pronounces the struggle and the good witch helps expose the sham, thereby ushers in post-modernity. We first find the hierarchical power structure, then individual truths and relativity itself actually go into the reestablishmeant of modernity as a unitive effort of a now common whole of pluralist truths in progress, just like The Emerald City was before with all the “guilds” and various sorts, sizes, colors and shapes of people, when Dorothy arrives, all the different people who were other wise living happily except for the shadow of the wicked witch(-es) who now appears Becuase Dorothy kills her sister when she arrives. Now that witch is gone, and everyone has their own truth (again), another specter will arise: the struggle-fantasy of the white man-woman oppression ends with the man remaining in the Fantasy Emerald City and the woman returning to her black-and-white world, of which the real figures of life were represented in the fantastic struggle.

Presently we are involved in the consolidation of a one world. This is to say, the overdetermining manner of consciousness is involved with its function of the reconciliation of difference. What such a function rejects, though, is the notice which brings to understanding that such difference and reconciliation was and is already already occurring at all times.

In reality, the current struggle always must remain paramount. The involvement with that activity is called justice.

The difference involved with the attempt to get justice for the group that is oppressed in a present condition of difference Always takes precedence over the past or historical situation. This is to say that what we learn from history informs the present struggle. Yet what we don’t learn from history, the lesson of history that should otherwise commandeer or correct the present situation for eternity, or for a kind of utopia, is that some group will always be oppressed. This is to say, in the overcoming or correction of a presented condition of oppression, another oppressive situation arises that needs to be corrected. The present situation towards justice always has to take place towards a limited ideal based in a utopian frame. The idea that there is no actual “utopia” is really a statement of empty set, because if we actually ever believed that that was true then there would be no reason to make any efforts whatsoever to address a present injustice.

The two situations that I present here exist at all times. While they may be ideological, and indeed we can find all sorts of ideological structures which will support various meanings of oppression and freedom, even that cognition itself exists within a utopian condition of oppression.

Hence the two routes. Hence the non-philosophical unilateral duality.

Due to the imperative of the present moment, which is characterized presently by an effort of reconciliation, this as opposed to “destruction” or “Deconstruction” — which is to say as a historical motion of consciousness — One is not allowed to speak of facts in a general sense, because the problem of difference has not been sufficiently reconciled into the One reality. For, if there indeed was a One Reality wherein everyone had sufficient recourse to a personal idea of freedom, happiness, or whatever sort of “good” conceptions and recourses of self in a world, then we could speak of facts, say, the “fact of the human being”, because then no one would have a recourse to an offense that the very idea of a “true fact” elicits by its very nature. This is the theological mandate of the current postmodern religious paradigm: I can only speak of “facts” under particular ethical headings.

So, in order to speak of truth and facts, As things in themselves that are actually facts and actually true things, a partition in reckoning must be erected.

There is a reason why most religions have an esoteric arm of the system of belief: Because the general real tenants of ethics and morality that the particular religious ideology pro pounds and supposes upon, understood intuitively by the congregants of that belief, do not allow a recourse to exposing the potential falsity of whatever theological structure: Ideology is mythologically self-referential (correlational). Indeed the congregants rely upon the cosmological maxim in order to go about their (our) daily lives. They (we) exist, in fact, in the absolute true world of either/or mentality, of essential choice despite what theoretical ideas might come out of them, because any theory I would come up with to describe how there may or may not be choice, whether it be evolutionarily, discursively, biologically, neurologically, socially, is a theory that is relying upon me/someone choosing to do things.

This fact of an ethically absolute true world thus does not contain all that exists, but neither does “another description” negate the “first world”; indeed other things can be known and talked about which do not answer to the “absolute true (first-ethical) world” that is the relative universe of subjective views and opinion. Much like the difference between quantum physics and classical physics, there is two absolutely true universes which do not reconcile to a further one knowledge in practice.

This is how it must be only now, but also never. As well as only in possibility.

On a Different Note: Concerning Truth: Ethics as Logistics.

I just had to repost my comment:

It seems to me that once we say “religion” and we understand the word to indicate something other than what the particular “religion” means, then we necessarily are discussing something other than whether the content is true or false, but are talking about how those “objects” to which the term “religion” refers, i.e. Islam, Christianity, Wicca, etc… relate. what might be common of them, different, aspects, etc..

If you think about, say, Judaism. It was not a religion. It was the Truth. It only became a religion when there was another group who didn’t ascribe to those laws and such. And then not even then did it become a religion. There were no religions until like 1000 years after Christ. Christianity wasn’t a religion. It was another Truth that entered the arena of battling over what is True.

there wasn’t even Faith. Faith, in the context of religion, is something that one has to Will for. There is no need to Will for anything or believe anything if you are killing people because they do not think the same as you. It is only when there are many more people who think differently than you than there are apparently people who think like you, that you have to “have faith” the what you understand as true is indeed true.

If it is the truth, there is no need to believe. The truth is the truth. It doesn’t matter what any One else thinks because the truth is the truth, including that fact that they don’t believe it: that fact is true, there is no need to prove to them that their “not true” is true in its being not true.

It is only when a person of faith is overcome with the bare fact that an overwhelming number of people do not see the truth, and that you cannot get rid of them, that now one who has faith must “have compassion” for others to try to convince them or get them to see that their “not truth” is indeed “not true”. Hence this ethical mandate is not some essential kind of commandment or gift from God as much as it is a manner by which consciousness is attempting to deal with the contradiction of knowing something is true that no one else understands as true.

If I know the truth, then it is true. Nothing that can happen can disprove to me the truth. It is not “my” truth. It is simply true. It only becomes “my” truth to the extent that I could be wrong. but then it wouldn’t be the truth, but merely a belief or religious faith.

The distinction thus has nothing to do with what is known as ‘belief’ or ‘opinion’. It is not about any sort of assertion of truth which defect then admits of its inherent ‘untruth’. It has to do with an entirely different manner of coming upon real things, a difference that I indicate through the term orientation.

Climate Change and Pascal’s Wager.

In this Era of Prehistory, everything gets turned on its head, just like in the Pirate’s of the Caribbean movie…

As I have put forth in various places a “turned on its head” version of faith in the spirit of Kierkegaard (somewhere in my posts Im sure Ive spelled it out, but I surely address it in my book The Moment of Decisive Significance); I am applying Pascals Wager to the issue of climate change.

The deep adaptation that I have a link to in my previous posts signals more than drastic political and financial maneuvers, and more than ideological change; maybe I’ll write about that kind of depth in a post to come.

For right now, perhaps as a way to begin to chart the depths we can meet at the crossroads of the wager.

In the original wager, Pascal places what what can occur against what will occur. For example, what can occur is God’s existence, and our ability to believe, and what will occur is ‘nothing’. This is to say that the Wager is balanced upon what is removed from the possibility of it being removed., that if God does not exist, what will occur no matter what we believe is nothing. Yet, what can occur if God exists against our belief is that either we will be eternally damned or we will be saved.

So the turning on it head of climate change in this regard is placed in this framework:

What can occur:

  • the world only changes a little bit, not drastically different than any other change, big or little, in respect to our ability to live through it and adapt: This is to say, the world keeps changing.
  • Humans still exist and deal with the universe.

What will occur:

  • nothing.
  • The world’s end.

My point is that if the world as we know it ends, then there is no amount of believing or behaving that will have had any effect. So, it is better to keep on as we have, as though the world, ourselves, and the climate is changing.

Extension, and perhaps a little more philosophical:

The idea that we will have to adapt deeply regardless of what happens with the climate, coincides with the climate despite what activity we will write papers about or the scientific studies about the Earth. The basic question which stabs at the heart of this whole issue is that if indeed the world beyond a doubt, scientifically, will end, then why are we still arguing about it? Why, if it so certain, must we still try and effect some sort of human business in any way?

I submit, it is because all of it is a human organization. Not an overdetermined basis of utopian solution, not an underdetermined basis of nihilism (or a overdetermined nihilism or underdetermined utopia).

My wager is that the Earth’s climate is changing, but human Beings (as a generality to indicate what ideological Being is) want desperately to keep the climate of knowledge the same even as they might argue drastic change is needed; as Zizek has formulated, their argument is to enact drastic change within the normalized field wherein change is able to be reckoned as change (Postmodern expertise). In other words, keep the basis of knowing of such thing, how the human Being shows up the its world, the same, without the human Being actually having understand it self and the universe in a different manner, which is to say, in the actual manner. My wager is that human Beings will indeed survive to thrive, that the climate will change and will continue to change with human Beings involved with it.

And I argue that this ‘same way’ is Enlightened Reason: The special universal case of the modern manner through which human Beings shows up in the world.

#theactualendoftheworld

#prehistory

Problematizing Whiteness; Correlation and the Two Routes.

In my very early and preliminary reflections on whiteness and being white it seems obvious to me that two issues are present in the philosophical reckoning.

1) The theoretical postmodern maxim of discursive reality.

And

2) The fact that no human Being is actually white. At best, even an albino is not truly white.

If there is a reduction or a larger meaning between these two aspects then it must fall into one of those categories. While it is not properly truthful to say that they are mutually exclusive, it is, so far, sensible to see that any argument that would be made would have to get its footing in one of these choices, ie either the argument is making a point about discursive reality and the manifestation of power, or, it is not making an argument.

Not making an argument? How can that be? You say.

There is no tension. Rather, the tension is come upon when both statements are understood within a methodological axiom where they occur in equal stature, both in the same existential space to be or as a question, both equally allowable and accessible to questioning. For example, each term of both phrases can be looked into to find its specific meaning, and at each step of inquiry, the results themselves are allowed to be questioned. This is usually what is meant by philosophy; this standard method has brought about a historical-traditional liturgy of reductionary theory and philosophical systems put forth by various free thinking and inspired people.

Yet when there is no tension, then the statements are seen to be describing what is obvious: 1) the post modern condition has to do with the organization of discursive structures and the corresponding belief that these structures reflect essences and or basic and operative realities ; 2) no living human being has ever been truly the colour white.

The sensible question should be what is the purpose of asking into these statements. For (1), the method is implicit: In bringing out Postmodern there is a invitation into discussing and debating what the statement means and whether it is true. (2) is not implicit; questioning into this statement would be more like a philosophical exercise , yet one that would seem to point out how the philosophical method can sometimes be taken too far, or be used for merely pondering and wondering; like the speculation that our universe could be but a speck of dust under the fingernail of a inconceivably large giant creature.

But again, the distinction of these into categories like I easily explained above, has shown us how argument falls into one of the categories themselves: Either it is relative or it is true; the discussion that takes place in the category that contains all humans, within the common category of human mental ability, has therefore already fallen into the meaning of the first statement, which, due to this seemingly automatic motion, can be come to be seen as a kind of religious dogma. It can be understood as areligious dogma because the plain fact of the two statements have already been tested. We have already found out that they are true beyond what argumentative proposals might confront them: The arguments necessarily fall back into the meaning of those statements unless we adhere to a special condition of the first statement, a condition that we automatically understand as obvious, a meaning that usurps as it calls all meaning to itself to thereby negate any other possibility situation. Hence we have located and identified a true aspect about the human being, and have begun along a different road in the effort to discover what the human being is. The question that informs this finding is “why are we still arguing whether or not the results are true when the same result has arisen through multiple testings of the same experiment?” This is how Philosophy retains its religious privilege of failing to become a science: Such a privilege is imposed as it is asserted. Religion allows for the human being to be infinitely creative in avoiding its determination and thus control — especially once it has established its power to control.

**

What I mean by this is the same or very similar to what we mean when we point to the near impossibility of getting outside or beyond capitalist ideology. Discourse is understood as communication of identity, which always involves a processual excess (transcendence) which when communicated “properly”is called progress (communion), and capitalism is the exploitation of this excess, again progress in evidence (“God’s Plan”). Because at this point, this moment in which this post for example is being read, anyone that has any higher sort of education at all will very soon come upon the reality that the argument about there being no skin colour that is naturally actually white in colour is an assertion of a discursive reality; shortly there after with a little bit of reflective thought people will inevitably stumble upon the fact that there is a sort of power that is being implemented in the use of the word “white” to describe human groups, social and cultural and economic positions and systems, in various sectors and for various reasons.

And yet there is indeed a certain factual basis that tells us in an obvious fashion that there is no human being that is white in colour. The next statement that would depart from relative discursive realities is the one that would say that the fact of there being no actual white person is true beyond what the discourse might reroute into a discursive reality, that is, to be argued and negotiated.

The involvement with the philosophical arguments around this issue thus becomes the issue, the issue that falls outside of a certain self-evident scheme of ideas.

But not everything is of ideas, you say.

The point then, the usual point, is that there is no argument to be made about whether or not being white is a discursive reality: The argument to be made must have to do with power relations and so is automatically reflective of this real situation of postmodern multivocal realities. In other words, there is no argument that can be made in the ethical region of common humanity that can argue that arguments about the problemitzation of whiteness should not be discussed; Even as we might be able to describe a situation where the discussion about race, power, and privilege becomes a secondary concern, we cannot, in good faith, dismiss the discussion as merely some sort of Idealistic fashion.

The only real way to get back to the things themselves is thus to create or establish or, even more, recognize that there is a partition that must occur. Some will cry “foul”, though, seeing this partition as another means to install a justification for segregation. But such a reaction is not comprehending the issue, nor the statement. Integral to this partition must be the fact that there are not separate species of human beings (we know that race is not a description of genetic fact), that ultimately whiteness as an indication of a particular group of people as well as a particular power structure of systems which is ultimately an ideology, and that this ideology a particular type of scheme of ideas that is been placed there necessarily. Nevertheless, this necessity is uncomfortable and tends to rely upon arguments that only make sense unto the ideology they support. Hence if we are to get around the contradiction that arises of the bare fact and the ethics that sees the necessity as incorrect, then we need to be able to theorize about the nature of Being that gets outside what necessarily has been given us for such Being. We find the placement of the postmodern as a rejection of this necessity. The problematization of whiteness is a pushback of ideas based in a universal ideal of proper human treatment. The idea struggles with itself.

We then must acknowledge that we are not allowed to acknowledge that we are dealing only with ideas: ethics demands that we are dealing with something that arises outside of discourse. And this is because of the insistence and near impossibility of getting outside what is present of discourse and it’s meaning, as an identity in itself. We must adhere to what is ethical to the common idea of humanity and no longer argue about what is real and what is Ideal, or what is actual compared to what is merely an idea. All such arguments are hopelessly caught in what philosophers Have termed lately “correlational”.

The very idea that we can formulate some sort of discourse that is able to get beyond what is correlational is itself based in a real idea founded in what is correlational, which is to say, discursive. The philosophical efforts that attempt to give to us some sort of argument to get us outside the correlational cycle is then, ultimately, based in the ideal that discourse is capable of identifying another way of getting to some actual situation of reality, an actual discourse that will lead, through its linking, to what is outside of discourse. Hence the continuation of the postmodern idea: correlation.

I’m not sure how many more ways I need to say it: If the problem is not understood by now then we have just realized an actual situation that occurs outside of what is correlational.

We’ll let that sit in a minute….

…..

Once this situation has taken hold, and is no longer an effort of building on quicksand, then we can begin to understand why identity has become the valued thing that founds real ability of human interaction with the world. We have to admit that what is real, while a discursive formulation, functions more akin to a religious institution on one hand, and a thing in-itself to notice and have on the other to thereby be able to use and discuss without worrying about whether what is correlational will suck it back into relativity and conventional philosophical speculation.

This means that we are able then to problematize whiteness without asserting or attempting to impose again a hierarchical racist structure. The issue will level out to become an issue of the human being because of the religious effect of a common humanity.

….

Everywhere is War…

Repetition and Repetition. 

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Below is a post by Levi Bryant. Part of my one-sided interaction with him is a sort of incredulousness towards the situation wherein Mr. Bryant has found his kind of Speculative Realism; whatever title he may want to put to it, it appears that all of these SR authors (or whatever Realist projects have replaced SR-in its wake) are involved in a project that, frankly, appears to me as an effort of deception or of ignorance. I get into more detail of why I make this accusation in my books, but lately, my simple explanation is that they have to, that due to their success (how ever one wants to define it) they must uphold a transcendental centrality in their efforts. They have to do this because that is the source of their livelihood; a priest cannot administer sacraments that dont adhere to the teachings of the institutional dogma. What I mean by this is they have to approach their speculations through the contemporary dogmatic proclamations of the church, as well as by its methodology, which is in this case we could call “the institution of philosophy”, what I tend to call “conventional” philosophy to denote that there is a cloudiness within the general philosophical mode that needs to be cleared up, this as opposed to lumping everything that is philosophical into one dogmatic category.

Also what I mean by this is not merely to be antagonistic; i’m not just being contrary to institutions. The basis of my incredulousness is that I read these SR people and then many of them, like Mr. Bryant, I find it difficult to believe that they put forth the ideas that they do; I find it difficult to read his premises and then understand the conclusions that he finds. To me there is a break or some sort of disjuncture occurring that, in the example of Mr. Bryant, he is not seeing. And I describe the situation as having to be one of either ignorance, insomuch as he (they) plainly does not see, or deception, and as much as he does see but that somehow he is not allowed to proceed, where he doesn’t want to put forth the actual meaning that should follow from his premises.

I come to this conclusion after a few years of attempting to engage with various people in similar type arguments and situations. It is apparent to me that certain people cannot or will not understand what I’m saying; it appears to me that at some crucial point of argument there is some barrier that projects or injects itself into the meaning of the discussion that we were having that makes this other person in capable of following the argument that we have agreed-upon up until that point. I have played with the idea of calling this point of rupture, a “partition”. The reason why I said there has to be a partition is because it appears that they are not doing it voluntarily. Though I can’t rule out deception, it appears that they’re not doing it voluntarily because no matter what argument I reapproach with, no matter how much I dissect, no matter what size or portion of clause that I wish to pull out and analyze with them, to thereby help them see where the disjuncture is occurring, at no point are they able to overcome the disjuncture. Every occasion that I’ve had with individuals in discussion of this sort,  at some point they simply cannot make the move and instead revert back into a point of discussion that we supposedly had already resolved earlier. It is as if regardless of their intelligence and regardless of the information or philosophical Library that they absorbed and the various arguments of various authors that they understand and can convey, at some point they have to leave the line of argument; it’s as if we’re driving down a road, a straight road, together, carefully taking notes of the landmarks the mile markers the potholes the various substrates that the road is paved with the different colors of the lines, staying on this road that both of us are allowing for in our discussion, A road that naturally unfolds in a particular direction and manner given the common understanding that we come to between us in our discussion and deconstructions a various issues — and then suddenly when were almost at the destination they grab the wheel and veer off, circling back into the unknown that is nothingness where through they will end up somewhere miles back on the road we are already traveled.

The understanding that I have gained through these types of experiences is that they were really all saying the same thing, they all basically agree with each other on a certain tenant of method but also a kind of “belief”, but we could associate with a sort of force, a sort of immovable tenant of what we could call a “faith”. We can locate this tenant by what is been called “correlationalism”, but this tenant really comes about through a type of misappropriation of philosophical statement that says discourse is all there is. I call this a “mistake” because it usually connotes a particular condition that is ignored for the sake of maintaining the condition. This condition is the central thinker, and this is why I say that any sort of argument or discourse that wants to displace the central thinker somehow through a move of discourse is really based in a condition of what I have called bad faith.

It really takes a book to be able to divulge and explicate all the factors involved with this idea. Nevertheless, it comes down to the idea that there is a central thinker (subject) that perpetually withdraws or is void or is nil or is nothingness or is unsubstantial or is nonexistent or is only existent, but yet that somehow becomes or contains or otherwise enacts a certain power within a field whereby discourse manifests the totality of world, but not only this, but that due to the centrality of this vanishing mediator, this “less than nothing” nonpoint, this “due to” is taken as a given situation of power to alter discourse and thus to alter reality.

The power involved with this kind of meaning is evidenced by its religious hold, and the faith that allows for it.

We find over and over again, though, for at least the past 100 years, and particularly associated with the continental tradition, that this does not happen; discourse is not altering the real universe, or rather, it does so long as a certain view upon world is maintained. We see this kind of selective window in the Speculative Realist and (Harman’s) Object Ontological move; the move comes from a highly intellectualized understanding whereby the meaning of discourse, which is to say what they would (could) call “world”, necessarily brings a certain intellectual understanding that does not allow for what could otherwise be called random occurrences. Basically if the whole world and all of reality is determined by discourse that is manipulated by agents of …[nothing? Nil? Void?]… then somehow there is something that is occurring outside of this reality that is affecting the reality in such a way that the reality of discourse is not encompassing it. Hence we have the stuff about Lovecraft and chaos and all that kind of stuff.

But more to the point here; the post below is this type of orientation upon things like wise sees that terms are reflecting identities, which is to say that terms are actually reflecting things in themselves that are being manipulated, again, by these what we should more properly call “agents of transcendence”. In this orientation, though, such ‘appearances’  which are taken as ‘in-themselves’ Hegelian objects, are not appropriated in the same or consistent sense that they are taken to mean; in fact, they are taken to exist in a relative autonomy that we have an ability to affect or otherwise impose our thoughts or results of thinking upon. Here, ‘appearance’ itself is misappropriated for the sake of justifying a religious position.

The example in the re-post below is that Deluze uses one set of terms and Badiou uses a different set of terms, and so they must be talking about different things. D says that this is the case and B says this is the case and so-and-so says this is the case and so let’s compare all the various ways that the authors say that such and such is the case.

The question that I always ask is what the hell are they talking about? I mean, the assumption is that they’re all talking about the same thing, but yet somehow they’re not talking about the same thing; it is a philosophy involved in an inherent nonsense even while it is proposed to be talking about something sensible. My question is how is it possible to compare Delueze to Badou (for example) and to anyone else if they are not talking about the same thing? (Badou even addresses this, as well as Harman) I mean, I could be talking about trees and Joe Overthere is talking about fences, and then we get together and I’m talking about trees and he’s talking about fences but at some point we come to some manner of discussing things to so that we can actually have a discussion; it is this overlap that I ask the question about: many philosophers will not admit that they’re talking about the same thing. They will say that you’re talking about fences and that he’s talking about trees, but then I would say, what’s the point of even bringing them into the same discussion except to say “he’s talking about trees and he’s talking about fences”? The question is at what point does the Subject arise? If it is always the case of the contingency of discourse then of course we are always going to find some nil-subject, some subject that never occurs and that always exists in a state of void. But then again: these “nil-states” are actually occupying space: The space of void!

We thus come to the idea of the founding term, something that Deleuze talks about. It’s as if the philosophers would say that the whole state of existence in reality occurs to discourse manipulated by transcendental agency except this one term that we are going to call the foundation of all existence that never changes and is ultimately eternal and we’re gonna call this “void” or whatever negating nihilistic term we want to use. Then, to avoid the apparent logical exception of the founding term ‘void’, we then say that, well, its only this way right now, but in another time/moment there will be a different organizing discursive framework. The universe, and as well humanity, thus exist in a cosmological foundation of change in flux, a state of eternal unknowingness wherein we are utterly alone like Adam and Eve kicked out of the garden of Eden.

Wait.

Isn’t this what Bryant says in the beginning of his Onto-cartography book (I think he says it there) ?

The SR and 000 pretty much have said in various places that their philosophy is toward a want to bring us back to a pre-modern philosophy of sorts. And then I have to ask what the hell is this? And I cannot but answer that it is a religious apology. That it is not that the SR or the OO getting anywhere progressively, it is more that they’re taking the given situation, a situation that they are confined within that they cannot find their way out of, and they’re making an apology for it, they are making cosmological assertions based on limiting factors that is already been argued in the tradition that somehow informs this contingent reality wherein transcendental agents manipulate discourse.

Now; the point of this post is not to say that somehow they’re wrong, or that somehow they’re coming up with incorrect conclusions. To do so would be to propose upon them a certain kind of stupidity or unintelligence. They are not stupid and they are not not intelligent. We have to admit then that the problem lies within a particular orientation, as I say, upon objects.

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Well; I’m not going to go on here about the overlaps between the various authors of the re-post below , We should see in the post below that D and B and Hiedegger are saying the same thing in different terms, using different terms to describe the same situation.

The point is is that there is no difference between reading text speaking text and going out in the world and doing anything that involves anything in the world. The point is is that where this description I just gave makes someone come to a certain conclusion that it means nothing and that everything is stratified upon an undifferentiated scene, therein do we have evidence of a missed understanding of the meaning of the phrase “discourse is all there is”.

It doesn’t really matter that much what Delueze says about repetition as opposed to what someone else says about repetition, unless we see that they’re both talking about the same situation. They must be using the word ‘repetition’ that is consistent with certain markers of meaning regardless of how they lay it out in various clausal structures or real examples. Likewise if Badiou wants to talk about the event, then it is only in so much as the event itself is a repetition of an idea, of a set of terms, of a clausal structure. Likewise, insomuch as we may want to talk about newness, at every moment of encountering B and D we find that they could be lumped together in one discourse called “Badiou–Deleuze” perhaps, then that they might not be arguing distinctions, arguing that one view is more true than the next view, but that then are indeed describing the situation: This is what is new, the example of what is new. Together having different views upon the same situation that we may come to certain facts of the situation, this is what makes or allows for us to see a particular methodological approach of philosophy ‘conventional’.To the extent that we see the two discourses in this example as saying two different things as though describing two different situations, two different things in themselves, so to speak, thereby do we have the space for the agent of transcendence that is caught in the religious faith of what we can call conventional philosophy, what we can thereby call, and not with too much explanation, modern scholasticism.

It is not wrong, though; it is what it is. Hence, the determination of divergence.

REPOST:

Reading and Repetition

A central claim of Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition is that we only ever create something new through repetition.  Here, then, we might encounter a fundamental difference between Badiou and Deleuze (or is it a proximity between the two?).  For Badiou the new is created as a result of a truth-procedure that is evoked through fidelity to […]

https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2017/04/24/reading-and-repetition/

Faith And reality.

“If I cannot rely on the world to be consistent (I do not mean willful consistency) I will not be able to function meaningfully in it.”

This quote from This blog is a perfect statement of what I mean as ‘faith’ that functions for consciousness as a suture that holds the consistency of reality together.

Faith functions as a counter to the truth of things; it holds reality together.

Social Reproduction.

This little video is cool and quite thought provoking, but Im not sure the conclusion is commensurate with the premises. I like the premises; I tend to agree that there is a kind of ‘wholistic’ kind of human reproduction occurring that extends into the furthest reaches of our Being/activity. But I am not sure that the broad conclusion that appears as a specificity is really coherent as it sounds. (Although I do think there is a viable option of sex and gender that is probably at play that I do not consider below.)

Im not sure.

yet I tend to say…

… the simple version is that we have do not have sufficient purchase upon our reproductive apparatus to cause such change, and the notion of a sort of ‘objective’ ability for self correction is itself a part of the capitalized identity of being human. This is to say that the idea that our mode of being can be categorized in an essential manner by the terms we use to describe it such that the terms indeed become tools or ‘leverages’ by which to change our situation, this is a redundant operation based in a religious type maxim of faith. Feudalism, say, says nothing of the daily activity of people except in as much as we are invested in a certain manner of seeing (-being) something that is ‘not’ capitalism, but this is not to say that there is/was no feudalism distinguished from capitalism, merely that no one ‘reflected’ in any manner to have brought about the change (or that the reflection was exactly ‘of feudalistic); the reflection was determined by the situation wherein we had kings and queens and such to thereby deal with the situation at hand; this is the irony of correlationalism. It is not that we are trapped in an eternal recurring capitalism, it is more that our categories never exceed themselves for the escape we might seek. For example, I may work as a programmer, and like my work but complain about long hours, lame management, ‘low’ pay, etc… but these complaints do not change if I were to be a ditch digger, they merely change form, the words I use, the annoyances I have. The perspectives that we have upon any situation of our doing/being are such that our views have little to do with what we are doing, and mostly with our attitude. Yet, our attitude never overcomes the present situation in which we have the complaint. Only with a specific horizon of ethical activity, a specific ideal of what we are ‘worth’ grants us a relative ‘manifest destiny’ of ‘free will’ and agency. And these all contained an determined by the capitalist state. Feudalism, in this way, is not merely some sort of presentist idea of a capitalized Being, rather, we only are capable of viewing feudalism as a kind of ‘ideal’ through which we know what capitalism is. The issue is not epistemological or ontological as it is logistical.

The problem of change noted by Graham Harman of this situation is moot: This situation is not evoking a kind of flipping of static images through a lens to convey an illusion of movement; it is evoking the movement of universal objects in a determined medium, but not only this: It evokes the scientific segregation of controlled objects. The only escape that Harman can summon os a type of ‘limited Object Ontology’ wherein the human being 1)exists along a continuum of potential knowing, which is another way of saying a common humanity, and 2) maintains as essential ‘free agency’, for lack of a better term, the Being of which I tend to call a ‘agent of transcendence’. These two functions work in secret to block even the effort to know how human beings function by posting an eternal random subjective variable to which then human beings keep at bay investigation that might breach the sanctity of Being Human. As long as we can envision, and hold this vision as absolutely true, a common human Being, then we have a viable ethics which prevents the invasion of science into what the human being actually does as a universal object. It is not difficult then to see how such a project is a religious apology. It says: Thou shalt not be privileged in your Being, for all human beings are of equal stature and ability in the potential of the universe. Yet even as we know this is not true, we still beckon to its commandment when it is announced, albeit philosophically.

To ask into reproduction merely reproduces the capital that we are as we ask such questions, just as the question that arose in feudalism where ‘feudalistic’; there is no ‘ideal’ linking of ideas that inherently must lay with feudal states. This is the beauty and genius of the human mind, of the universal object that is the human Being: It sees its productions as essential universal constructs that arose independently from the universe’s necessary operation. When we begin to view the human Being as merely one type of Being in a universe of Beings (objects), then we begin to understand that human consciousness ‘creates’ such distance, such sufficient purchase, that such creation is the Being of human functioning as a universal object universally.

The problem with stating the matter in this fashion is that it is offensive to the free state which is current of our idea of Being. For such invested identities, such announcements call forth an uncomfortable idea of Being, i.e. determined, which then shows just how capitalism has us regardless of what sort of free agency we which to apply, and regardless of what terms we use to identify our state.

It would seem we need a more novel solution. And I fear (again, I am not totally sold on this as yet) that it is the functionally divided state, where one part sees itself within a holism where it works within as it creates purpose within a free state, one that sees itself with reference to its human right of freedom and representation, and another functional level that knows of its autonomy of power: the setting of Star Wars.  (lol).

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http://www.weareplanc.org/blog/what-the-fk-is-social-reproduction/

via What the f**k is social reproduction? An introduction by Plan C — Deterritorial Investigations Unit

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I will get back to the Star Wars allegory soon.