Does the Banach-Tarski Paradox Anticipate The Two Routes Upon Objects ?

This is the best vid I’ve seen all month!

I definately am Not a mathematician, but this vid explains this paradox pretty well. And, despite the scope of his conjectures at the end, a significant philosophical question would concern whether reality presents a sufficiently able manner for conceptualization to encompass all that we are able to know?

The precipitate of this first question thus moves retroactively as opposed to redundantly:

If we can take the initial object as any real object, then we can likewise take ‘reality’ itself as an object which itself is real. If we are to understand anything, communication of reality must be involved in some manner.

The initial issue, then, is if what is proposed to have been communicated is able to be viewed and understood as not having been communicated. And then if what was not communicated is able to come through as this latter view, that is, what has not been communicated being communicated but not in the former instance and not a replacement of the former (what was indeed communicated is not nullified by the communication which was not communicated by the proposal of what should have been communicated)?


The initial contemplations upon truth can be found in Nathaniel’s The Philosophical Hack.

The Object of the Subject

Wellness and Oppression

wellness is not about being well; unless you are already sick.

I saw this article this morning through my Apple news. my wife sent it to me; she’s definitely not caught up in this type of mind control, but I can’t know for sure that similar type of thinking and reflection don’t go through her mind at times. She passed this article along to me because she is more concerned with instruments of oppression than she is about keeping up with the Joneses.

It got me to thinking about curvy women or larger women or just whatever the correct word is for the other 99% of the real women who are not the mega media image of oppression.

By the way: I am not trying to get in an argument with people who might read this who might say that I am using incorrect terms or not politically correct or am using some terms that might offend people. I admit I don’t know all what the hell words to use so To not offend people, but I am open minded enough and intelligent and understanding enough to know that I might be using words that might bother people or that might offend them in someway, and so here I am, and I apologize if I’m not using the correct verbiage.


So it seems to me that any non-media obsessed real woman is told that she might do better if she just accepts her body The way it is. And I don’t mean to be stereo typical to say this is women only because I’m sure there are plenty of men that obsess over making their body fit into some “accepted standard of wellness”. But I think the sane thing is that people are OK with themselves; I think that is the universal standard of being human for every aspect of being human: everyone just wants to be OK with them selves and should be, no?

I am going to get really philosophical here because I am a counselor and I am a philosopher so here we go.

The article above is a kind of critique of An oppressing discourse. It addresses what at least I see and I would imagine the author understand, as a kind of oppression that is being an acted upon people across the world having to do with body image, food, and behavior in general including reaching over into psychology. Please note;My little bit right here is not making a comment upon whether the article is right or wrong or true or false; I think it is right and I think it is true, but this post is not critiquing that article nor its methodology; I am more using it as an occasion to point out or indicate what I understand as the two routes.

The short of my position is that everyone is exactly the way they’re supposed to be. The real issue then is why people don’t feel that way or think that way about themselves. Now, also I am not suggesting that there is some sort of “actual utopian ideal human being that is totally comfortable with themselves”. Rather, I am indicating a certain manner of being that human beings are.

Everyone is exactly the way they’re supposed to be and perfect in that way, whatever it is. I think that is a good statement of really what we’re after so far is human being in the world; I think when it’s all said and done and we’re sitting there taking our bong hits or drinking a glass of wine at the end of the day, ultimately we want to be OK we want to feel OK we don’t really want to be angry we don’t want to be sad we don’t want to have to do all the myriads of negative self talk, etc.

OK, do you have that picture?

The next question is: why are we not? The real question that comes up in everyone’s mind is why am I feeling bad about myself; why do I think my large body is somehow not too “well”; why do I doubt myself?

And I think the answer to that is telling: The typical answer to that is always that something else is making me fucked up. Now, again, I repeat, I am not suggesting that we need to come to some sort of inner acceptance within ourselves. Of course, that is what we have to do, but that is not the point that I am suggesting, nor is that the medium upon which I am placing this discourse of this post right here.

Already, if you are understanding what I just wrote then you might be able to begin to understand what I mean by two routes, or, two orientations upon objects. Subjective and objective is of the one route. The idea that there is some thing that is making me do something that I would rather not do, or is making me think a certain way or behave a certain way –that is an absolutely valid and real way of understanding oneself in the world.

But I’m getting at something when I do that I feel is more significant. I was tempted there to say “more substantial”, but I try to tend away from suggesting that something is “more real” or “more true”. I am not involved in this essay right here, of the two routes, in a capitalistic frame of trying to discern what is more correct or better. I am more concerned with establishing a ground of facts.

So we might ask ourselves where the idea that I am perfectly OK comes from. And then along with us we might ask ourselves where the idea that something else is making me do something or look at myself in a way that I don’t like comes from also.

In particular I point out the part in the article above that the author points out when she finally got comfortable with eating intuitively I guess, where she just Kaina eats what she wants and doesn’t trip out on it too much, she has the same body that she has had through all her obsessing about the various diets and the binging and they’re restricting and the eating healthy and all their various facets of trying to stay skinny, I guess.

What this says to me is that however she was being, she was not being in any particular way because something else was telling her to be that way. Rather, that both of those real items were arising in existence simultaneously and conspiratorially for her being.

Now try and keep in mind the two routes as I’ve tried to describe them briefly so far in this essay as I go forward: it is not that society is erecting this image of women and people such that then people get low self-esteem and want to do terrible things to their bodies or eat only lettuce or work out three times a day seven days a week. There is no element that is causing them to behave in such a way or to think in such a way, if we can include thinking as a kind of behavior.

And to stack up on that kind of awareness, I’m going to bring in something a little more personal to me; because I am a white man, many people would probably say I’m filled with shit commenting on this kind of stuff. Which I admit maybe I’m overstepping my bounds and I am actually filled with shit, that’s OK, I’m totally open to learning where I might be failing.

My daughter died suddenly two months ago. It was a purely random event, she died of viral meningitis. Sure, we could probably sue the hospital and get to the root cause of it and get people in trouble for malpractice and stuff like that because no one diagnosed her with meningitis until it was really too late. So put that aside, that we could’ve retaliated. There is also no reason why she should’ve got it, no one we know nor no one that she has come in contact with has meningitis that we can find her that we know of. The doctors hypothesize that it was just kind of a perfect storm of infection that got into her brain.

I am dealing with it pretty well, I suppose overall. But even at times I find that suddenly I will randomly start to cry. Sometimes, or actually somewhat often, Some innocuous thought our image, like a tree or a song, will lead over into some sort of reminder that Marley is gone or some other thing that Hass to do with various things around her death, and I find myself getting emotional and getting teared up. And it is kind of interesting to me in a way that something will start that kind of cycle but then there is this also kind of sub cycle where some part of me feels like I have to continue in that cycle and ruminate and be emotional and miss her and be sad. I’m not making judgments upon myself; I’m just looking at it through an intellectual lens; I am fortunate to be studying counseling and so I had many people and do have many people that are helping me on this path.

So, of course I can say that I am grieving I am involved in the process of grieving still and that the reason why I cry at times that seem random is because, is caused by, this outside thing that is my daughter having died. There is something that occurred that is not me that is making me behave in a manner that I would not otherwise enjoy. As I said, not only do I find myself getting welled up with tears at random times, but then there’s also a further kind of talk to myself of myself that somehow feels like I should continue to dwell in these images and thoughts of loss and sadness and death and missing her, etc. it literally is as though something from the outside, something that is not me or something that I’m not in control of controlling how I am being, how I am viewing myself, how I am behaving, how I am thinking, that I really would not like to have to go through.

And yes all you psychologists out there, don’t read this as though I am in denial or I’m trying to reject my feelings or anything like that because I’m not. 🙂 I am positive that no one would choose to have to mourn for someone they loved dying. So I’m not saying anything about maybe criticizing myself about the fact that I am mourning and grieving; I am not beating myself up or trying not to grieve or trying not to feel.

OK I just had to clear that up, because this is a philosophical consideration based upon a real valid and significance experience that probably millions of people go through every day.

So if we look at the fact that I just start crying at random times. There is no immediate cause that I can really know of; of course, Though, Ido it all the time: I reflect upon myself (like I am doing here, coincidently, lol) and I can say oh it’s because I went into her bedroom which is still set up the way it was when she was alive. I can say that oh the cause that I just started crying randomly was because I brought some water into her lizard into her room. But that’s not really the cause. Maybe we could say it is a proximate cause; but I’m not getting into trying to define a system right at this moment. So if we back up, we get into the general category of grief trauma and loss and so we have to say that my behavior overall is conditioned, or caused by, the loss of my daughter.

Yet, there is no reason that she died. Without going into all the various aspects and break down all the arguments of possibilities about why she died or the cause of this and cause of that, The very simple conclusion is that she got sick for some unknown reason, and this sickness developed until she died despite the best efforts of her doctors. But that doesn’t really give us a true cause; it satisfies a desire for reason, but only if I don’t think about it too much. 🧐

So what I’m really saying is, what I really must be saying is that the cause of my grief cannot be found. There is no reason why a cry at those specific random times; sometimes there is a trigger, other times it just pops up. Because, if I say the reason is that Marley died, and then I say that there is no reason why she died, I would kind of have to say also that the reason that I am grieving has no cause.

And so I must repeat again, here, I am not making a reduction in my thinking to justify or somehow deny the fact that I am in grief or that Marley died or that all that stuff.

This is the nature of the two routes that I’m trying to convey: The basis of the two routes is that they are mutually exclusive and do not reduce to another common unity. The fact that I can understand this ontological truth does not mean that somehow I am comforted by it or somehow I’m trying to deny the fact that my daughter died or trying to prevent myself from having to experience grief or sadness. There is no underlying psychology (Reason, cause) which links these two aspects; and this is to say that where a linking is understood, there we have fallen back into the one route. And that the distinction that I am making is the nature of the two routes, the nature the way that consciousness indeed functions: reduction is a particular function of consciousness, it does not necessary constitute consciousness toward its entire truth.

I’m saying that these events arise conspiratorially in the same sense that there is nothing wrong with my body. There’s nothing wrong with me. I am exactly the way that I am supposed to be.

And so coming back to the article that lead this post. Accepting who I am as a person with all my flaws, whether or not I’m binging and purging and doing tons of exercise every day and being on comfortable with myself and otherwise worried about people not excepting me etc., is both at once caused by other people and arising coincidently. And these two ontological situations do not indicate a further unitive cause.

And so the radical idea I think I’m trying to suggest is that me being OK with myself has nothing to do with rejecting that thing which I understand as causing me to be in a way that I would rather not be. The fighting, the rejection of that perceived outside force really, it seems to me, just reifies the fact that I am not comfortable with myself as a type of comfort. It allows me to be in this particular world that I know so well; the reduction we call “world/subject”. I call this the cosmology which positions the subject in reality.

The radical move of the two routes says that I am never removed from the struggle in reality even as I am entirely OK with myself, and at that, even as I might be totally in shambles. The world is not causing me to be any way; neither is something wrong with me. They are Co-incident, parallel. The reduction to a further “psychological” meaning is ultimately of the one route, the “real world”, the cosmological argument.

And that is not an indictment; it is simply a fact.

Repost: Notes on Orientation

Notes on Orientation
— Read on

Note: This author’s notion of orientation appears to me to get very close to describing a reduction to what I am calling Routes, which I also call two orientations upon objects.

Yet, in my proposal, such Routes do not reconcile. But I am intrigued at this author’s effort Becuase it seems he or she is coming very close to grasping what I call the issue at hand.

So here is my comment on the linked post:

I like it. But then something bothers me about it. Also.

I’m not entirely sure what it is that strikes me as off —

– I think it is good as a sort of psychological sense. Like, if someone is looking for a pseudo-scientific-Philosophy to help them with “life’s meaning”. I’d say this is a good one.

Yet also, it appears to me you move through 3 stages in this theory: 1 and 2 . A pretty good bridging of phenomenality with the rational thinking subject. 3. Purpose.

My issue: 1 and 2: I’m am not sure that this distinction is not a conceptual device which functions from (3) instead of toward it; but together they make a nice bond, for sure.

Phenomenality, as I understand it, is the correlation of thought and world. The Phenomenon is existence; it is that the whole field is understood as existence, And yet within this field there appears something that does not seem to accord with the experience of the field; i.e. that there is something that appears to defy that everything is the known field. This situation is a phenomenon: the explanation is itself an effort to sort out a particular contradiction into non-contradictory states. This seems like what you have done, and then the last part is to fill the last gap that comes about in the contradiction of sorting out the non-contradictory aspects of the (first or primary) contradiction.

What is a Philosophical Hack?

What is a Philosophical Hack? The answer is quite philosophical. 🙂

But in this philosophy a number of things are challenged which then indicate that the hack must arrive from an aspect or element that exists which is not philosophical.  This is a sort of truism: A thing cannot be in relation to another thing unless itself is first a thing.  This is the problem with philosophy as we know it: Philosophy depends upon as it actively re-inscribes and enforces a particular regimen of power of bringing into existence the absolute truth of the universe; namely, in this case, everything is relative. Relativity is not a natural absolute and essential

truth that we come up on through our human ability of reason, it is a particular establishment of power.

One of the first imperatives of the philosophical hack thus must outline or bring into view not merely the postmodern critique of power which then ironically replays itself to maintain the systems of modern power already in play, and at that, as it is supposed to be bringing about emancipation or a removal from of that very power-state, but more how this power itself is not an omnipresent and omnipotent aspect of a fixed and closed absolute real universe. 

Key is the disconcern the hack employs in its effort for truth.  Not merely another power play of false promises but indeed a recognizing of truth about humanity and the universe in-itself.  Indeed it is less a disruption than a revealing despite populism and identity politics.

The Philosophical Hack uses analogy with terms borrowed from what we know of science to describe the issues involved in being able to identify a thing that is called philosophy: Quantum physics is a project of physical description which does not comply nor answer to what we generally call classical mechanics.  Quantum physics is nevertheless a viable and true manner (albeit theoretical) of coming upon –and application of — the world, but indeed its methods and concepts do not fit nor concord with classical conceptions of the world, even while quantum conceptions may explain the classical in manners which classical physics cannot reconcile or even agree with; both nevertheless function and operate.

Presently, philosophy is caught in a “classical” , or what philosophers have called correlational, mode, what I have called together as a true form of subjectivity (subject-object duality) to no longer challenge and to thus identify as conventional philosophy.  The key to this move is thus to see that just as quantum physics does not negate, invalidate how classical mechanics indeed operates and functions, the identification (the operations of the hack) does not invalidate nor argue against the modes of conventional philosophy, even while it may challenge its method towards absolutism (in whatever forms its takes). Rather, the hack consolidates objects unto themselves by showing the weaknesses in the systemic facade. This move thus concerns an orientation upon objects because the hack allows conventional philosophy to be itself, as a thing in-itself to function as its does. The move is thus two-fold, unilaterally dual in its estimations and methods.

The book by Cedric Nathaniel is involved with the the first efforts to make visible what is invisible and sacrosanct to the conventional philosophical mode.


THE PHILOSOPHICAL HACK: The Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Event.

THE SECOND PART.  Coming to a thought near you.x

A Game Theory take on the question of God’s Existence.

In an earlier post, I explored What I feel is a more sensible application of Pascal’s Wager to God’s existence.

Now I am attempting one founded in game theory.

Goes like this:

I like what someone said: I am an apatheist.

But my version is:

God does not need my belief to exist.

This then could go around something like this:

* god exists:: Is It communicating with anyone?

How can We, as a group, know which individual It is communicating with?

1) we (as a group) cannot know for sure.

2) we can know: some are right, some are wrong.

A. Power is evidence of who God is communicating with. (War)

B. Or, no power is evidence. (Peace)

2) God is communicating.

A. No one knows who (1.)

B. Everyone can know.

If God can be communicating with everyone then the question becomes:

– can we accept that someone else May have the correct communication?

This last Does Not reflect back to the first person pondering for a double-back contradiction. Instead, the answer only concerns the possibility of the other person having the correct communion. It has nothing to do with ‘agreement’.

This can be consistent with game theory (if I remember correctly) with sides equally powerful which is able to destroy the other conclusively.

Matching moves under condition:

– I will not shoot if you do not shoot

– if you shoot and I am not destroyed, then I will destroy you.

It is most beneficial to both sides if the each person places the impetus of truth on the other person, into the possibility that the other is indeed receiving a valid and correct direct communication from God.


And then some more, Not game theory possibilities:

…. I have a different way of putting it.

I say that for philosophy, the proper issue is of The 2. This is the Kierkegaardian question; though K speaks of the relation of the relation to the relation, the actual issue he is dealing with is the 2.

0- is nothing.

1 – is the universe. By definition, it is something as opposed to nothing. It is unitive and perfect, if given that nothing is flat, or not knowable = zero has no content.

2- admits the duality of knowledge. In as much as we may know of the universe existing by virtue of it not being nothing, we know of the Two.

But wait…

3. Is multiple. From here, all permutation arises. Like the three-body problem, with the three comes the introduction of multiplicity. It is the first indication of Reality.

Hence, also we have with the Three the introduction of transcendence. And thus the possibility of mediation, the central Cartesian subject, the subject of science, and the withdrawn subject. It is in the Three that every form of religious and spiritual reckoning arise, due to the phenomenon of the thinking subject of transcendence.

Hence, the issue of the Three is actually the indication of bifurcation; the question: “Is communion with an aspect which is outside of Reality possible ?” Is operative. This is the central ontological question:

Is the mediation between two opposing elements? Such that the human being is the third element which then can commune with a Real God?


Is there no mediation, and reality itself Contains the Ideal Of communion as it’s operational mode?

In this last, the significant issue is thus found to be of the Two. Because the issue of the Three is unsolvable aside from mere subjective assertion of propriety (view, opinion). The issue of the Two changes the game by leaving the three as outside of solution, where the content of zero then remains in relation to the One, is therefore not flat and is knowable in possibility (0,1 or finitude) as opposed to infinity (multiple).

The Stoned Ape.

The Rational Animal.

“The philosophical process could be described as a human being noticing and then transcending her animal condition of the moment. It is thus the process of coming to the full rationality of the human animal for the time, and describing it. The description is thus the symbolic culmination of irony, at once only knowing of the pure knowledge of her animal rationale but then also describing it to a full systematic which is then viewed to be speaking about something that is the furthest point that rationality has stepped from her animality. ”

The Philosophical Hack.

Problematizing Whiteness; Correlation and the Two Routes.

In my very early and preliminary reflections on whiteness and being white it seems obvious to me that two issues are present in the philosophical reckoning.

1) The theoretical postmodern maxim of discursive reality.


2) The fact that no human Being is actually white. At best, even an albino is not truly white.

If there is a reduction or a larger meaning between these two aspects then it must fall into one of those categories. While it is not properly truthful to say that they are mutually exclusive, it is, so far, sensible to see that any argument that would be made would have to get its footing in one of these choices, ie either the argument is making a point about discursive reality and the manifestation of power, or, it is not making an argument.

Not making an argument? How can that be? You say.

There is no tension. Rather, the tension is come upon when both statements are understood within a methodological axiom where they occur in equal stature, both in the same existential space to be or as a question, both equally allowable and accessible to questioning. For example, each term of both phrases can be looked into to find its specific meaning, and at each step of inquiry, the results themselves are allowed to be questioned. This is usually what is meant by philosophy; this standard method has brought about a historical-traditional liturgy of reductionary theory and philosophical systems put forth by various free thinking and inspired people.

Yet when there is no tension, then the statements are seen to be describing what is obvious: 1) the post modern condition has to do with the organization of discursive structures and the corresponding belief that these structures reflect essences and or basic and operative realities ; 2) no living human being has ever been truly the colour white.

The sensible question should be what is the purpose of asking into these statements. For (1), the method is implicit: In bringing out Postmodern there is a invitation into discussing and debating what the statement means and whether it is true. (2) is not implicit; questioning into this statement would be more like a philosophical exercise , yet one that would seem to point out how the philosophical method can sometimes be taken too far, or be used for merely pondering and wondering; like the speculation that our universe could be but a speck of dust under the fingernail of a inconceivably large giant creature.

But again, the distinction of these into categories like I easily explained above, has shown us how argument falls into one of the categories themselves: Either it is relative or it is true; the discussion that takes place in the category that contains all humans, within the common category of human mental ability, has therefore already fallen into the meaning of the first statement, which, due to this seemingly automatic motion, can be come to be seen as a kind of religious dogma. It can be understood as areligious dogma because the plain fact of the two statements have already been tested. We have already found out that they are true beyond what argumentative proposals might confront them: The arguments necessarily fall back into the meaning of those statements unless we adhere to a special condition of the first statement, a condition that we automatically understand as obvious, a meaning that usurps as it calls all meaning to itself to thereby negate any other possibility situation. Hence we have located and identified a true aspect about the human being, and have begun along a different road in the effort to discover what the human being is. The question that informs this finding is “why are we still arguing whether or not the results are true when the same result has arisen through multiple testings of the same experiment?” This is how Philosophy retains its religious privilege of failing to become a science: Such a privilege is imposed as it is asserted. Religion allows for the human being to be infinitely creative in avoiding its determination and thus control — especially once it has established its power to control.


What I mean by this is the same or very similar to what we mean when we point to the near impossibility of getting outside or beyond capitalist ideology. Discourse is understood as communication of identity, which always involves a processual excess (transcendence) which when communicated “properly”is called progress (communion), and capitalism is the exploitation of this excess, again progress in evidence (“God’s Plan”). Because at this point, this moment in which this post for example is being read, anyone that has any higher sort of education at all will very soon come upon the reality that the argument about there being no skin colour that is naturally actually white in colour is an assertion of a discursive reality; shortly there after with a little bit of reflective thought people will inevitably stumble upon the fact that there is a sort of power that is being implemented in the use of the word “white” to describe human groups, social and cultural and economic positions and systems, in various sectors and for various reasons.

And yet there is indeed a certain factual basis that tells us in an obvious fashion that there is no human being that is white in colour. The next statement that would depart from relative discursive realities is the one that would say that the fact of there being no actual white person is true beyond what the discourse might reroute into a discursive reality, that is, to be argued and negotiated.

The involvement with the philosophical arguments around this issue thus becomes the issue, the issue that falls outside of a certain self-evident scheme of ideas.

But not everything is of ideas, you say.

The point then, the usual point, is that there is no argument to be made about whether or not being white is a discursive reality: The argument to be made must have to do with power relations and so is automatically reflective of this real situation of postmodern multivocal realities. In other words, there is no argument that can be made in the ethical region of common humanity that can argue that arguments about the problemitzation of whiteness should not be discussed; Even as we might be able to describe a situation where the discussion about race, power, and privilege becomes a secondary concern, we cannot, in good faith, dismiss the discussion as merely some sort of Idealistic fashion.

The only real way to get back to the things themselves is thus to create or establish or, even more, recognize that there is a partition that must occur. Some will cry “foul”, though, seeing this partition as another means to install a justification for segregation. But such a reaction is not comprehending the issue, nor the statement. Integral to this partition must be the fact that there are not separate species of human beings (we know that race is not a description of genetic fact), that ultimately whiteness as an indication of a particular group of people as well as a particular power structure of systems which is ultimately an ideology, and that this ideology a particular type of scheme of ideas that is been placed there necessarily. Nevertheless, this necessity is uncomfortable and tends to rely upon arguments that only make sense unto the ideology they support. Hence if we are to get around the contradiction that arises of the bare fact and the ethics that sees the necessity as incorrect, then we need to be able to theorize about the nature of Being that gets outside what necessarily has been given us for such Being. We find the placement of the postmodern as a rejection of this necessity. The problematization of whiteness is a pushback of ideas based in a universal ideal of proper human treatment. The idea struggles with itself.

We then must acknowledge that we are not allowed to acknowledge that we are dealing only with ideas: ethics demands that we are dealing with something that arises outside of discourse. And this is because of the insistence and near impossibility of getting outside what is present of discourse and it’s meaning, as an identity in itself. We must adhere to what is ethical to the common idea of humanity and no longer argue about what is real and what is Ideal, or what is actual compared to what is merely an idea. All such arguments are hopelessly caught in what philosophers Have termed lately “correlational”.

The very idea that we can formulate some sort of discourse that is able to get beyond what is correlational is itself based in a real idea founded in what is correlational, which is to say, discursive. The philosophical efforts that attempt to give to us some sort of argument to get us outside the correlational cycle is then, ultimately, based in the ideal that discourse is capable of identifying another way of getting to some actual situation of reality, an actual discourse that will lead, through its linking, to what is outside of discourse. Hence the continuation of the postmodern idea: correlation.

I’m not sure how many more ways I need to say it: If the problem is not understood by now then we have just realized an actual situation that occurs outside of what is correlational.

We’ll let that sit in a minute….


Once this situation has taken hold, and is no longer an effort of building on quicksand, then we can begin to understand why identity has become the valued thing that founds real ability of human interaction with the world. We have to admit that what is real, while a discursive formulation, functions more akin to a religious institution on one hand, and a thing in-itself to notice and have on the other to thereby be able to use and discuss without worrying about whether what is correlational will suck it back into relativity and conventional philosophical speculation.

This means that we are able then to problematize whiteness without asserting or attempting to impose again a hierarchical racist structure. The issue will level out to become an issue of the human being because of the religious effect of a common humanity.


Everywhere is War…

Anslem’s Argument for the Proof of the Existence of God, the Disruption of Time, and the Categorization of Philosophical Behavior.

I seem to have found a significance for Anslem’s proof. It may be that it is not significance for whether God might exist, but, as I have said, significance for how I present ideas.

We will start with the rendition from Princeton’s site. I think they have a pretty good rendition there.

Without all the strict logical hoopla, I think the simple way to put Anslem’s idea is that God exists because we can think of It.

The significance of this notion appears to disrupt what we generally consider of time, it’s ‘natural and directional’ progress.

The Princeton site says that Anslem was addressing a particular issue that, actually, we still find totday in atheism. Basically, Anslem is confronting two ideas:

1.He understands the claim that God exists.
2.He does not believe that God exists.

Now, I have done only the most preliminary research into Anslem and his ideas. I am just taking the very popular simple version, and considering these two situations. There is no ‘hidden’; whatever Anslem’s results most probably are quite apparent, and the ones that are not – well, what point am I trying to make here? I have already said in my earlier post that there is no logical argument that sways me in any direction or causes me to believe something I didn’t before. So any extension of argument must be involving something else; perhaps I am attempting to get at what this something could be.

I think the main point Anslem makes is that, as Princeton puts it, this is an inherently unstable condition of being. What we might call the ‘founding essence’ can be understood to be responsible for this instability. Somewhat similar to a ‘thing-in-itself’, this founding essence would be a kind of gravity well, if you will, of mental activity. The instability arises because of the knowledge (the known-ness) of what something is able to be. The question arises: How can I know what something is if it doesn’t exist? The basic assumption in this question, what philosophers tend to lump into the category called ontology, is that existence is, that there is no need to discern what existence is because to argue for or against the being of existence does nothing to displace the argument except as much as it merely denies existence. The point of saying something exists thus should equate with what can be known, and so the instability of the situation is found in the human ability to choose on whether what exists is actually true. In this case, though, Anslem is dealing with the basis of all that exists as a category, namely, God; God, in this sense, as we cannot but apply our modern sense to consideration of it, is merely the name of the category that contains all that can exist as an active element, the element by which all else can be said to be. The extension in time to Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time’ can be understood as a factual description of this situation, and thus, rather than an opening up unto Being, ironically as a closing of Being unto itself and thus a factual description of what human beings do: The identification of the in-itself of human Being. More on that elsewhere.

The resolution that Anslem posits of this unstable situation occurs because of the foundational nature of the knowledge itself. In this Medieval Christian context (which I argue is still a modern context), the resolution (the clarity, the definition) that must be referred to must be understood in a context not so much of mind, but of the essential God-inundated mind that is able to uphold and entertain knowledge, which for our context might be the mind that exists. In short, the condition of knowledge is/was such that all things referred or otherwise are established in existence due to an absolute situation, a situation whereby all things gain their status in the universe, what we usually index by the idea of an absolute ethics, in a manner of speaking. In this condition it thus appears that a reflective mind will naturally be drawn into the the contradiction involved in making a choice as to the (true or false) existence of something that (already) exists (in essence), and will therefore correct (or become the correction) the instability by virtue of their own existence (in the absolute universe, or the universe that is indexed by absolution). The question of whether something actually, or physically, biologically exists, such as a race of human beings that live in the midieval antipodes, e2c1fd0e8fc468d9d55d018231578e47

unicorns, dragons, spirits, extraterrestrial aliens, etcetera, has no baring upon existence because of the absolute reference and access of mind to God (existence). What can be incorrect of knowledge as to what is true of existence finds its resolution in the posited (assumed) basis of existence. 

The Medieval as well as Modern mind is consistent in this ideal of progressive understanding of the universe. What is significant of this orientation upon progress is the mind’s innate access to what is true of the universe with reference to an assumed basis of that truth, what we can say is an assumption of stability unto which all knowledge will inevitably resolve; despite whether we posit that there is no actual resolution or that everything is flux, or whatever conditional conditions we define, the result of any positing is always toward ends, toward a resolution. Even if we say that the universe and the knowledge of that universe is completely and utterly contingent, this contingency must be absolute; hence we say that the effect of such terms within any scheme of knowledge or organization of definitions is what we can call a “founding term”. 


Oddly enough, we are able to find purchase into understanding what human beings do by looking at what philosophy does. Not, as Graham Harman might have it, that everything we might do automatically falls into a subjective appropriation of semantics that defies our attempt to locate such philosophical behavior. Rather, at some point we should be able to locate a mark by which we are able to be dismissed from this correlational philosophy that wants to avoid any critical gaze upon its method.

Once we find this mark (which I do not go into here), we can extend this situation (of existence and deferment) to apply to everything that might exist: Within this situation, a person can understand and then decide upon it. There is no thing that escapes this formula, and Anslem is making an accusation about it: It is unstable, and it will eventually resolve itself to the conclusion that the thing in question exists, in his Medieval case, God, and in our Modern case, perhaps, the object of empirical physics.

The point he relies upon is the idea that God is the greatest being or thing that can exist, for, so long as we can conceive of something greater, then that is not God. Similarly, we can use this conversely and say that because we can conceive of ‘that which nothing is greater’, this greatest thing exists as a foundational ontological ground of Modern effort as well: The ‘greatest’ thing is the most substantial. 


What interests me is that this simple notice occurred late in the 11th century. Here, already, is a situation made notice that no one noticed until very recently, like 10-20 years ago with the philosophers such as Alain Badou, Francois Laruelle, an then for the younger folks (of the time), of the Speculative Realist Conference. In particular, the idea is that there may be something that exists outside of our knowledge (not necessarily our ability to know), and as for in this situation, that which is greater than the greatest thing we can know. This category has brought modern philosophy (again) to consider things like voidnothingnesschaos and such things, and the corresponding ideal that whatever works to create identity is all good. But if we are honest, we might be able to glimpse the same ruminations of Scholasticism (St. Anslem is said to be one of the founders of the Medieval Scholasticism), occurring in our Modern philosophies, but under different terms. Indeed; I argue (along with Jean-Francois Lyotard apparently) elsewhere that Postmodern scholarship is really a religious apology for Modernity.

In this post I confront the veracity of some of our current philosophical modes and arguments by asking what seems to me to be a most obvious and significant question, a similar question that Graham Harman asks of Heidegger’s “tools“: Why did no-one  notice what Anslem had opened up until now, some 1000 years later? We are able to understand Anslem’s argument to this day; no one proposes that the thinkers 1000 years ago were any less astute than our thinkers today. Why is it only now that we are addressing the possibility of what might be ‘beyond’ or ‘at root but not part of’ (Badou’s consideration of set theory) knowledge? And then we might even ask more confounding question if we find that philosophers during the interim of the thousand years also considered the same question over and over. 

I submit for consideration that we have gotten not very far in philosophy. We might begin to understand the vastness of time and how slowly and incrementally human beings, as a group, accomplish knowledge, and how it is much more like a science than philosophers are capable of arguing. Indeed, if we think into this situation, we can then find often the situation that we have already come across elsewhere; namely, that on one hand philosophy is the way we situate the conditions of our times, how we work out logistical problems of being in a semantic world, and on the other, merely reflections of people (the authors) in-themselves. But if this is all philosophy does and is doing, then we also might see that we are actually merely re-contextualizing not what what has already been contextualized (as thus a re-contextualization), but in actually what we’ve already done, making the same arguments over and over but under different terms. We are reminded of Shakespeare’s “a rose by any other word…“.

Upon this conclusion, we are careful to not move too fast as we might then jump to the conclusion that such an idea should negate the ontological status of what I am calling conventional philosophy, as though such a proposal should then move beyond what we have and what we get through philosophical method. This is not the case. It seems near ridiculousness to figure that we can commandeer reality by a stroke of the pen (or a keystroke) except that we might be involved in such philosophical endorsement; we should then ask how is it that am I to get beyond it merely saying something in a particular manner? No. We cannot ‘turn’ the truth of the matter; we have but to see the power that is invested in the leviathan of religious interests, of maintaining a particular formation and method to know that, as the philosophers have argued, I cannot escape it unless I wish to perform some magic, perhaps some discursive slight of hand. We should ask if we can be done with all this trickery of the ontological police. Then, all we have to do is speak of facts instead of the essential Being of things, to speak teleologically instead of ontologically. We can argue the conditional nature of real essence for the rest of eternity and never get anywhere further than circling back and forth away from and back into Medieval type scholarship. And thats fine, and thats the point: This is the factual nature of reality, the impossible aspect of what we have to deal with in reality. Of course there will be those who will argue that what the philosophers are doing now days is not Scholasticism and who will produce all sorts of argumentative and ultimately circumstantial evidence to support their claim. Great! Perfect! Does this sway me to believe something that I don’t already know?  The proper response, in this case then, is that this is not a proposal toward any popular or social change, and in fact it has little to do with how political ideology might be at any moment; we can of course use it for such purposes (identifying our moment from the past conditional moments of history, for example, etcetera…), thats what Badiou and Zizek tell us…

We are not so much learning anything new as much as we are justifying our limited manner of Being in the world, and this is an end in itself that should be heeded but not as a call for change, as though we can somehow transcend what we are — we can only transcend was we identify with as political and ideological subjects. Rather, we should see this situation as a mark of what is true of being human, as a mark of significance, which is to say, a mark of fact. So another of my indictments of philosophy: Despite all the great discursive gymnastics and the twistings of subtle argumentative semantic juxtapositions, philosophy works to avoid having to look at itself as a human behavior. Conventional philosophy refuses to allow itself to be seen as an indicator of behavior, perpetually argues itself as an exceptional incarnation of divine intuition and inspiration, a blank spot of Being, and then uses this fact as a means to absorb all activity under its purview back into the real political and ideological limit — to say that this is all there is. I see the constant and basically automatic referral of all things ‘thought’ back into this kind of philosophical pond is self defeating to the effort of progress, even as progress itself is routed back into this (touted) ‘speculative’, or ‘realist’, or  ‘post-post-modern’ maxim. It is no wonder outside of capitalism is so difficult to think!

As Amoreinblog has argued somewhere, perhaps anthropology is the way out of this philosophical conundrum; despite all the philosophical misappropriations of ideas involved with the AIME (An Investigation into Modes of Existence) project of Bruno Latour (even by Latour himself, lol), his book can be read as an argument for the need to open up a space (perhaps, in his terms, create a pass) whereby we can avoid this modern philosophical whirlpool that we have been involved with for at least 1000 years. It seems that only now, with Postmodernism, but as of late Post-postmodnerism (must we find a Post-Post-Postmodernism also?) do we really get an idea, but also an actual way to understand and realize what human beings are doing.


Time itself may be the issue that is involved with Modernity invading as it usurps all discourse into its machinery. The issue that opens up after Postmodernism (but is not itself Postmodern scholarship) is the break from Enlightenment Ontology. So it may not be so much that we have to philosophically get out of this temporal mode — that kind of move would be philosophy attempting to avoid itself through arguing itself out of itself, redundantly, establishing as it maintains reality for everyone. It may be as simple as admitting that there is no escaping the philosophical limit, and realizing a kind of anti-Husserlian manner: Of finding the independent object in the bare fact that we know that there is an independent object, and perhaps that we need not speculate about how it can be so in order for it to be so. Of course we can discuss how it can be so…and indeed we will, but that does not mean that we cannot stay where we are at and let the pagan-Christian rollercoaster come around again and again.

Maybe we need to make a clean break.

Do You Love Me: Music Philosophical Theory. 

I’m beginning with a typical theme of this music theory, this philosophy of music, with Nick Cave and the bad seeds song

Do You Love Me, part 1“.

Beginning in this way we notice all the facets involved of many philosophers. The first that comes to mind is Alain Badiou and the idea that the philosopher is concerned with one thing. Theodor Adorno’s Negative dialectics come to mind also. Soren Kierkegaard and his teleological suspension of ethical and his piece on Don Giovanni, as well as most of his books. Derrida also comes to mind, in particular the book I’m reading now, “Of Spirit”. And at that even Heidegger’s Dasien. We might even also see that it is not difficult to consider some of the Speculative Realists and Graham Harman’s object ontology. In fact there is a whole library of western philosophers’ ideas that can be applied to just this one song in a way to where the application removes the possibility of doubt that there may be a linkage of philosophy to art.

I have asked myself why do we find philosophers referring to art in their philosophy? We have Heidegger involved with Friedrich Hölderlin; Kierkegarrd considers Mozart; Quentin Meillassoux takes apart Stephane Mallarme; Harman got into H.P. Lovecraft; there are plenty others. But what strikes me is that noone (no one? That I have noticed, anyways; I could be very wrong (can someone help me out??)) has been considering art that is happening at the time of the philosophy. What I mean is, it appears to me that all these philosophers only consider artists of their (relative) past. Why are all these philosophers bringing past forms into relevancy of our time? Are there no current and living artists that may represent the significance that seems to only occur in old dead artists?

Now, as I said in the other post; I am am not talking about some cultural philosophical analysis the likes to reify themes of social justice or ideological evangelism of recursive ontologies. Slovaj Zizek is great in this regard; his is ideological recursively in its most immediate incarnation; his is the mark of the closed distance, he is the example of his own ‘filling’ of his own parallax gap. We could write a whole book on what is occurring with Zizek, but then by then end of it, never get further than anything Zizek has already said himself; suffice it to say that when we begin to understand my work, let alone his work, then we might also begin to have a baring upon what is occurring for a number of philosophers, if not philosophy itself in general. This brings to mind certain authors, and as well (again) the issue I treat most everywhere in my work: I am not sure we need to plaster over an issue with thick, viscous jargon and dense conceptual acrobatics in order to find out what is occurring. Though an idea might be entertaining in its conceptual gymnastics and the dexterity and or flexibility of thought that is required to understand them might be fun to consider and talk about (like a rollercoaster), often enough it is the assumption of depth in what appears as complex that amounts to true nonsense and really gets us nowhere besides spinning in a theoretical circus. When we begin, as well as when we are proceeding, we should always keep in mind the question as to if we are actually contributing to something significant or if we are merely creating self-aggrandizing conceptual pleasentries for social mobility circles. Are we getting anywhere or are we risking nothing.

Blah; enough of my proselytizing. Back to the point.

When we speak of a ‘first’ philosophy, we must keep in mind the meaning that I suggested in my post “Being Decay”, and see that we have settled in the land of what has been typically called ‘Continental’ philosophy, but likewise that arena from which we find a further divergence, that is, in so much a what is ‘continental’ perhaps has become merely another conventional philosophy; whatever its significance was, we might be able to notice that the destitution of spirit (see my earlier notes on Derrida’s book) marks a collapse of continental arena; more precisely, the move of what could be the point of the continental designation is into what is ‘destitution’, or of ‘desolation’. It is this desolation that the Postmoderns mark by their attempt to ‘pull it back’ from the nothingness, the void that it fell into. This is the irony of the post-Postmoderns such as Laruelle and Badiou, as well as Zizek. This is to say that the idea of democratic multi-vocality is itself a voice of the destitute spirit.

Our concern is that never (it seems) do or are modern philosophers considering an art that is actively present, meaning here, by contrast and therefore the spirit that is indeed destitute, that spirit that is indeed living on desolation row, instead of attempting to deny the fact of its existence. The reason why philosophy, as a philosophy that concerns ‘spirit’ ((with or without parentheses)) of any sort, is destitute is because the spirit by which it proposes to be concerned in indeed lacking. We might then reconsider what I mean when I say that conventional philosophy deals with everything from a distance, but proposes it within a condition of intimacy and why I say that what is theoretical occurs at a distance, but further that this is not always the case, but is only the case in a particular condition of Being, i.e. that ‘spirit’ of Being-there that is destitute of spirit in as much as it exists through a denial of this situation. We shall elaborate on this facet later.

To wit; Nick Cave is still alive and playing concerts! But we will also notice that his situation evidences the transition (the conversion? Harman?) that had already occurred, what we notice as Postmodern, which is an apology for Modern, that still had a plausible purchase upon authenticity in its attempt to rescue the the wayward spirit, and the post-Postmodern, which is an apology for the Postmodern not being able to rescue it. In other words, we find that the German Idealists (in a very general, as well as very specific sense, as well as the French and others) ironically were correct about somethings while being entirely incorrect of those same things. We begin to understand what Kant was talking about, what he was addressing, and we see how the closing of the distance that appeared in the Modern found its closure now in the explanation wherein the destitution of spirit marks, but not in some sort of anti-spiritual atheist biological evolutionist continuance of ‘Being there’ ontology, but rather exactly in the Being-there having no substance, but entirely consituted in material; what we view as historical does indeed function within a presumption of the material of substance. Yet we find the closing marks that point of divergence because the closing that is the meaningful nothingness, the coming upon the nihilistic universe, did not end anything. We find, inevitably, if we can be honest, that it is not that somehow ‘nothing’ is at the base of all things, but indeed, that the rational route by which it founds substance in nothing is the destitute spirit, but further, that the only manner, the only possibility through which such destitution can be noticed is by the spirit that is not destitute, which is to say now, not real.

We begin to get the picture that philosophers sit in their library chair and ponder deep and significant elements of philosophical lore through long hours of reading and study of other literary folk who (it seems) must be dead. We cannot but ask: What risk was wagered? If it was anything less than death then we have to question just what was come upon by such novel considerations. Strangely enough, Heidegger can be seen in the attempt to buck the trend of ‘academic safety in distance’ in as much as he does indeed talk about “the work of art”. I admit, though, that I myself do not go out an look for philosophy-art, but somehow I feel that there should be at least some who are engaging philosophy and art that are contemporaneous with one another. Here is one artist/blogger I have come across. The impression I get from much of our current (state of conventional) philosophy is that same age-old image of the scholar who never encounters anything real (dangerous), while proposing great treaties on the nature of reality; they surround themselves with the ideological, epistemological, ontological, walls built of discourse, isolation, but painted with the veneer of life of the Everyone, of the masses, the common human being, of social commentary. But this is what the academic institution is for, what it does, and why it does: It supports the real ideological paradigm and supplies the rationale for why it is supplying the only route for what can possibly be true. We the call this type of philosophy conventional, but likewise we call it, unapologetically, real.

But what of the actual experience of life? What of the engagement with all things legal and illegal outside the safety of the theoretical world? Here we have a distinct possibility that brought about the Continental-Analytic distinction, what it used to mean. Heidegger, for all his insecurity posed as confidence, at least took a stand, however questionable it may have been. We have to ask as we read, for example, “Being and Time”, what the fk is he talking about? This has got to be the question that leads us into the Continental tradition, and the same one as well that finds it having dissolved in its attempt to be real. This is Heidegger’s (WW2) mistake, as well as all those German idealists; the irony of Heidegger is the truth of the falsity, the forensic analysis of ‘spirit’ that does not understand that its method is destructive; the ‘question’ is the imperative of historical manifestation, which is at once the move toward this ‘spirit/world Being-there’ that is destroyed upon its implementation (what struggle are we talking about here?). It does a disservice to the meaning of them to attempt to bring their ideas into our reality as if it still has relevance as a living philosophy. Even then it was already dead; it just had to come to a re-cognition; that this was indeed the case.

When we begin to see that this closure is not one upon some ‘universal’ or ‘common human’ spirit, then we can begin to see that what has been theorized within a horizon of a closing of distance, of the ‘shrinking’ of the distance between theory and its object, has reached its apogee in the present, now, and we can start to understand what I might mean by a theory of Rock and Roll, or a philosophy of Rock, or even music theory.

A sort of side note: We must have compassion and a certain sympathy, indeed an empathy, for Badou, when, as of late I am told, he appears to have come upon ‘love and happiness’ after a life-long philosophical journey. For it is possible to view him, his work and perhaps his history, as a result of being caught in the ‘mistake’ of the academy, of finding his theory through a closing distance. Indeed; what else could Badou mean but that we, as philosophers, are concerned with one thing? And what else could Hegel have meant by his voluminous statement?

With all this in mind, consider the lyrics to part 1 of “Do You Love Me”:

“Do You Love Me?”

I found her on a night of fire and noise
Wild bells rang in a wild sky
I knew from that moment on
I’d love her till the day that I died
And I kissed away a thousand tears
My lady of the Various Sorrows
Some begged, some borrowed, some stolen
Some kept safe for tomorrow
On an endless night, silver star spangled
The bells from the chapel went jingle-jangle
She was given to me to put things right
And I stacked all my accomplishments beside her
Still I seemed so obselete and small
I found God and all His devils insider her
In my bed she cast the blizzard out
A mock sun blazed upon her head
So completely filled with light she was
Her shadow fanged and hairy and mad
Our love-lines grew hopelessly tangled
And the bells from the chapel went jingle-jangle
She had a heartful of love and devotion
She had a mindful of tyranny and terror
Well, I try, I do, I really try
But I just err, baby, I do, I error
So come and find me, my darling one
I’m down to the grounds, the very dregs
Ah, here she comes, blocking the sun
Blood running down the inside of her legs
The moon in the sky is battered and mangled
And the bells from the chapel go jingle-jangle
All things move toward their end
I knew before I met her that I would lose her
I swear I made every effort to be good to her
I swear I made every effort not to abuse her
Crazy bracelets on her wrists and her ankles
And the bells from the chapel went jingle-jangle

And then, once we see this announcement, this proclamation of the situation in the present, of the present already occurred philosophically, later we find Nick speaking in more certain terms of the spirit in its very destitution, yet within a longing, such that the recourse of such spirit is to prostitute itself, for that is all the substance it has left, all the value it holds in its destitution. In this we caution against holding identities apart to say “this” instead of “that”, that ‘this’ interpretation is actually more real that ‘that’ one; of course, what is real determines is own real-truth, but as it is already determined in its offense, in its resentment (do I hear Nietzsche?). In desperation, people cry out for more institutional definition, so in the destitution of spirit do people look more and call out for what is ‘more real’; hence the recent popularity of (what we might call) the “New Realism” (including Speculative Realism).


Do You Love Me, part2

“Do You Love Me? (Part 2)”

Onward! And Onward! And Onward I go
Where no man before could be bothered to go
Till the soles of my shoes are shot full of holes
And it’s all downhill with a bullet
This ramblin’ and rovin’ has taken its course
I’m grazing with the dinosaurs and the dear old horses
And the city streets crack and a great hole forces
Me down with my soapbox, my pulpit
The the theatre ceiling is silver star-spangled
And the coins in my pocket go jingle-jangle
There’s a man in the theatre with girlish eyes
Who’s holding my childhood to ransom
On the screen there’s a death, there’s a rustle of cloth
And a sickly voice calling me handsome
There’s a man in the theatre with sly girlish eyes
On the screen there’s an ape, a gorilla
There’s a groan, there’s a cough, there’s a rustle of cloth
And a voice that stinks of death and vanilla
This is a secret, mauled and mangled
And the coins in my pocket go jingle-jangle
The walls of the ceiling are painted in blood
The lights go down, the red curtains come apart
The room is full of smoke and dialogue I know by heart
And the coins in my pocket jingle-jangle
As the great screen crackled and popped
The clock of my boyhood was wound down and stopped
And my handsome little body oddly propped
And my trousers right down to my ankles
Yes, it’s onward! And upward!
And I’m off to find love
Do you love me? If you do, I’m thankful
This city is an ogre squatting by the river
It gives life but it takes it away, my youth
There comes a time when you just cannot deliver
This is a fact. This is a stone cold truth.
Do you love me?
I love you, handsome
But do you love me?
Yes, I love you, you are handsome
Amongst the cogs and the wires, my youth
Vanilla breath and handsome apes with girlish eyes
Dreams that roam between truth and untruth
Memories that become monstrous lies
So onward! And Onward! And Onward I go!
Onward! And Upward! And I’m off to find love
With blue-black braclets on my wrists and ankles
And the coins in my pocket go jingle-jangle


But this is not the end of spirit. For the nothingness that we come upon is nothingness because it is not nothingness; it is a mark announcing that the route of reason that came upon its insubstantial basis is indeed incorrect in its estimations.

Secular is a real designation of a particular route, a real route, just as religious and spiritual is likewise real material categories. All designation of a particular meaningful paradigm (mythology) has been worked to its end. A pass is enacted that then allows for reality to move apparently unhindered. We find a similarity to the efforts of Bruno Latour, for an opening is needed since reality is found to rely upon invisible passes that shut out the truth of the situation; something has shaken loose, something that shows reality as a faulty estimation.

More in a bit.