Reason and It’s Other

Reason and It’s Other

Reason and It’s Other
— Read on retphi.com/2019/05/03/reason-and-its-other/

The example.

Conventional philosophy insists that there must be a unitive reason in order for philosophy to function.

I think that many people read “the questioning of reason” to mean that anything else has to be something “not reason”. I say that this is a fundamental mistake in the estimation of what it is to be human, and I propose that there is another type of reason that does not reduce to that conventional philosophical unitive category. Either/or is one manner if discerning what is reasonable.

This is to say that if we are going to get anywhere philosophically then one would need to begin to see that what I am identifying as conventional philosophy is providing a certain function for the real world. And that to invoke a different reason does not thereby negate the function that conventional philosophy is enacting. Another reason can provide a different, and just as valid, function, including for the function “Reason”. What ever reasons Reason outlines, there can be another set of of Reason that is reasonable, without offsetting or proclaiming the ‘first’ reason invalid; this is the non-philosophical finding of Laurel: only the ‘first’ kind of Reason functions through invalidating it’s subjects.

Tis “other” function, though, is historically devalued to nothingness and negated through the conventional theological motion.

In order to get anywhere, one would need to suspend judgement and wish to see what is outside of its ontological (cosmological) surety.

A Philosophical Religion in the works

A Quick Note on Patchwork Subjectivities

A Quick Note on Patchwork Subjectivities
— Read on xenogothic.com/2018/09/29/a-quick-note-on-patchwork-subjectivities/

When reason is upheld in its potential to apprehend the truth of all things, the result witnesses the philosophical movement of the 20th century: We find then that philosophy begins to replay itself under different terms. This replaying, seeing itself as a true expression of the meaning of the traditional lineage, thus reiterates in pieces what has before been called whole ‘religion’.

The manifestation of these pieces, as embodiments of truth which are unable to view or consider outside of their own reflexive discursive sense, represent various manners of overcoming what we have recently called “correlationalism” (Miellassoux), but due to the nature of the automatic way that truth has arisen for these ‘pieces’, each solution itself manifests it own correlational limit.

I call these pieces ‘religious’ because they behave by their inclusive discursive assertion of self-evident truth as a complete cosmology and associated dogma.

The link above is to a blog which gives us a great example of how such Philosophical religions are functioning. There are a few WP blogs the authors of which deal exclusively with that particular philosophical religion as “Xenogothic”: And when you start to read their posts and engage with the authors, one can get a sense of their religiousness through the use of the dogmatic jargon.

The key in this estimation of religion, though, is in as much as at least this one (link) actually is describing that same situation as I, and it yet cannot get outside of its own reflexive theory-making to see their correlational faith is indeed operative. The theory is understood as indeed reflecting a view of a ‘patchwork’ of ‘fantasy worlds’ within the (somehow) actual world. And yet, even unto thus recognition, often and apparently, they are still unable to actually engage with these supposed ‘other’ worlds of the patchwork unless those other worlds subscribe to their particular theoretical discursive structure of terms and their definitions.

In short: It behaves as a religion for them, assuring to their own reasonable sense that their sense is absolutely correct and that any other discourse which challenges that sense is beneath consideration, as it represents to the religion that which is heretical or ‘uneducated’ to the truth, which ironically is discounted as an essential dogmatic component of the system.

In other words: There has been no effective philosophical break in the historical tradition in these philosophical religions to bring about an understanding of how discourse and reason are insufficient to relieve a subjectivity of its correlational faith. And this is why they indeed can be called philosophical religions: Because such a break indeed is possible, and does occur, religion serves to justify the subject who is unable to come upon such a break, as we see in the philosophy of the above link. Such philosophical religions inherently argue that no break is possible outside of the break that is represented by their reasonable philosophical theology.