“When one speaks about a thing, she does so vicariously.”
—- Cedric Nathaniel.
I think I’m just naturally rebellious. I’m not at heart a joiner.
I can, though, be a team player. In fact, I love where I work primarily because we have such a great team. However, I feel that a team is a group of people who all have a common goal, even while they may not have a common general philosophy behind what we do as a team toward that goal. We definitely do not share a similar ideology or belief about what it is we are involved with or what it means. Quite remarkably, we share a common purpose as a motion of what we are doing. We work well as a team because we share the common bond of what we do together.
I’d have to say that a team is the name for a motion of a group of people who feel a sense of camaraderie around a purpose. Even if that purpose is philosophically indistinct.
My Issue with Society, or the Ideal of the Social
I am, somehow, involved with society and social things, even as I would say I’m not a very social person. My therapeutic work as a counselor has something to do with society, as a sort of underpinning, only spoken in certain context specific to the client, primarily concerned with the person or people in front of me and not theories or ideologies.
Yet, my philosophical work is not social, neither is it about a person, the person, or people. I have to use these words and indeed I talk about them and they are involved with my work; however, I feel if I use these words or invest myself too much into the objects that these words are supposed to be indicating as a substrate (subjects), I cannot help but to feel naturally resistant.
That is the critical posture despite belief.
I feel that being human, being part of society, dealing with people and the world, it’s just some thing that happens. It is a kind of given that has nothing to do with whether or not I’m using words about them or making theories, asserting my agency about how they might fit together, what they are, or what we’re supposed to do about them.
Does God Exist?
Reference my approach on the issue of God‘s existence.
Recently, I was come upon by a person and a discussion with them that comes every once in a while, but routinely.
The question that will come out is, “Do you believe in God?” Or similarly, “Do you believe that God exists?”
My answer was met with a blank stare and look of confusion from the other person.
My answer: “ The existence of God has nothing to do with any effort I make. God‘s existence has nothing to do with my belief. Belief, I feel, is overdetermined. I use the word ‘belief’ very intentionally, in the sense that “I believe I might play guitar today”, or, “I believe that this coffee is too cold”. I do not use the word ‘belief’ as indicating anything that has to do with the truth of some thing, some supposed or proposed object of the question. For example, I do not believe that the chair exists. But likewise, any discussion about the theory of existence does not require my belief. Rather, I would believe something within the discussion with reference to the discussion that already exists or is existing by virtue of the fact that we’re having the discussion.
So it is: I do not believe that God exists.
But if I say that to a person that’s asking me whether I believe that God exists or whether or not I believe in God —which I see is basically the same question despite philosophical dissections — what will happen is that the person will routinely misunderstand what I’m saying. I
So, in my effort to try to be clear to this person about what I’m saying, I simply tell them that I have no belief about god whatsoever, simply by virtue of the fact that God‘s existence has nothing to do with whether or not I believe in it (him,her). And I might add, in the same way as your existence has nothing to do with whether or not I believe that you exist.
If we understand anything about what people have said philosophically over the years, it is a plain fact that I have to somehow deal with the categories that are already there. It has nothing to do with whether or not I believe they exist; it has more to do with whether or not I feel that those categories are accurately representing the situation in which I find myself.
Note: The categories have to do with the situation in which I find myself.
This is different than what I see is most philosophers discussing. Most philosophers, most essays books treaties arguments speak of categories as if they exist independent of other things. And so the discussion or the argument revolves around a very subjective, phenomenal existence: the phenomenal agent is able and is justified in distinguishing things in themselves apart from other things. This despite what argument they might be making or what category to which they apply themselves.
So it is that in dealing with this situation, I find difficulty at every turn calling myself a philosopher. My assertion mostly fails at every juncture. I understand intuitively what I mean, but as I go to engage philosophically with what society or the larger group of people who are supposedly involved with Philosophy understand as Philosophy, I find myself at an impasse. I find myself unable to move. I feel it in a very regular way, as I put it, probably because I’m not a joiner. Idealism is not really my thing.
I have to find someway to identify what it is that I’m involved with. I find most of the given philosophical categories are so well assumed, that I am excluded, in the Kantian scheme, a priori and synthetically.
I am involved with knowledge. No matter what else is going on, everything has to pass through knowledge. It doesn’t matter so much whether that is a phenomenon; indeed I would have to say it is indeed a phenomenon, but then also we’ve already found out everything there is about the logic of phenomenal existence as a category. If you would say we haven’t then I would say you are either just beginning or missed something. Then perhaps we should have an discussion. I’m not sure…
Nonetheless, epistemology would be the usual way that I might identify myself. But I also find that if I start saying ‘epistemology’ there is a whole set of presumed and assumed history about what I’m talking about and what I’m doing.
I am going to try and use a new term:
This has to do with everything that can possibly exist, be talked about, be known, and must arise in knowledge and discourse truly. ￼
As well, because I think when we start to talk about “philosophy of…” some thing interesting, we have necessarily fallen into a discourse and understanding that already exists, and thereby excludes what we’re really talking about as a subject of knowledge. So, what an Epistemist deals with is truth Philosophy.
It does not propose a philosophy of truth, because it is already dealing with everything that can be exist by virtue of the fact of addressing knowledge truly.