Emotion and Reason. Part 5

I got this from Philosophics Blog who was commenting on my series of post.

lets see if i can get to my point of all this.

In Parts 1 and 2 I posed an exercise of monitoring and then graphing ones emotional intensity over a period of time. Then I pondered if it would be possible to develop a similarly construed graph of Reason intensity. I received a number of comments from friends and readers about this. And the issue was all the same: How could we graph an intensity of Reason ? Some asked or attempted to grapple with such a monitoring and scaling and others wanted a definition or are trying to find a definition by which we could then appraise Reason graphically.


I was not trying to trick anyone. I honestly was wondering what people thought about it. It just crossed my mind that we so easily could make a chart of emotional intensity over time regardless of what the emotion was — could we do the same with reason?

I guess the answer is apparently not.

The graph above I think came close to what I was formulating in my mind about how, if I could rate an intensity of Reason, how emotion might relate to it.

I was also thinking quite similar to:

However, I think my original idea behind this series was more about how inseparable Reason and Emotion is; less polemical and more correspondent.

The reason I was asking folks to think of charting emotional intensity was for a setting up of a different model for how Reason and emotion relate, one where Reason is not a mitigating or taming aspect of emotion but rather the converse.

So let’s use the hypothetical graph.

As an instructional analogy, I suggest that Reason is that part of human consciousness which is the graphed line, and emotion the space below the line. Instead of taming or stifling or controlling emotion, Reason rides the line of emotional intensity usually exhibiting an unaware and incognizant state of awareness–while regularly dismissive –of its emotional affect: The thing we usually understand as Reason is when consciousness is not acknowledging the emotional state involved with its operating, which is to say, Reason is seen, viewed or understood as by definition not being influenced by emotion — or at least this is a common idealized goal for “being reasonable”. This seems to be such an ideal mandate that where we might conflate Reason declares Reason as a flat exemption from emotion such that “what is able to see truth” has been compromised and thus develops a compensation for its (reason’s) own lack called irrationality, say, and as though Reason has stepped out of the picture in the being able to identify the irrational and the rational state.

{I advise one take counsel from the non-philosophical idea of unilateral duality, which I have talked about often in my posts recent and long past.}

Reason thus may identify a particular manner by which consciousness establishes the human being in the world as indeed an object which has only reasonable connections with the universe. And this is to say, the polemic such as the figures above could represent what is able to arise once Reason is picked out, so to speak, to distinguish the human being as special and self-evidently separate from the universe, that is, except along those specific junctures that reason dictates or reflexively understands of itself or allows for such an understanding, those junctures by which the human being may or is permitted to know of her interaction with the operating universe. Such Reasonable manner can be said to be inherently disembodied knowledge.

This could explain why so many people, perhaps especially in the West, have a low “emotional intelligence”, difficulty understanding emotional connection, as well as how emotion can be involved in how one is able to perceive (know) the world. As well, my explanation could make a contribution to explaining why the modern human being is involved with a world which seems to be responding negatively to human activity despite our best intentions: Becuase our reasonable intentions are necessarily disembodied, the knowledge which is produced through such a naive reasonable state is necessarily maladaptive to the problems it perceives; in other words, the problem itself is already formulated in a mistaken manner of coming upon the true universe.

Ok. Let’s munch on those cookies for a second.

Embodiment and reality.

Body Theology?

— Read on thenotsosolidearth.wordpress.com/2019/04/22/body-theology/

By the way, “the not so solid earth” guy I totally love his posts so my comments are an addition to his essays, rather than a condemnation.

I am not sure I like the term “theology”. Let’s just be honest: there is no theology without religion. Theology seems to me a way to have religious faith without having to admit it, as though if I have theology then I am better than those ignorant people who foolishly believe in religion.

That’s just me, though.

It is interesting to me how Philosophy means different things to different people. Personally I think philosophy is something that does that it is. But I get a sense that there are many people that view philosophy only as a particular way of reasoning within thought, that there are all sorts of types of reasonings that can be accomplished philosophically.


The first comment I have, the first thing that I notice stuck in my mind, is the idea that modernity is associated with no transcendental horizon. Granted, many people would like to talk about all sorts of logico-historico-traditional discursive manifestations, and indeed these develop ‘layers’ as “not so solid earth” guy has talked about in a post long ago, in a galaxy far far away, as a sort of sediment.

On the other hand, if I’m really trying to talk about what is actually occurring over being-involved with what we are actually doing, as when what I’m able to do coincides or otherwise occurs within “thinking”, then I think we must enter into the contradiction that much of everyone wants to avoid in our human commonality of metaphysical being. And this is to say that so long as we entertain ideas within “thought”, so much as thought is the ubiquitous and impenetrable ground of existence that human beings can be involved with, there have we found the modern transcendental horizon, for anything that is known is known within possibility. And I say this because anything anyone would put into discourse automatically depends upon this transcendental horizon; every idea is an idea of something that is not the idea. If there is an idea that is only an idea, then it is nothing; we begin to get an inkling of what modern being is about then: limit and exploitation that come about through the effort invested of believing the contents of ideas.

So what we are really talking about when we are talking about what is actually occurring is not so much the either/or ideal, and actually more what is absurd in the Kierkegaardian sense. Contrary to what (post-) modern religions want to posit of Kierkegaard, he is talking less about an “either/or” rational human existence, and more about what is rational outside of the either/or correlation. And so I say that what is absurd is what does not lie within the entirety of ontological ubiquity called “thought”, but is likewise not “irrational”. And again this is not an either or proposition; it is an “and” proposal.

And (lol) coincidently I think this is exactly what the Peterson/Zizek debate handled dialectically, what so many commentators completely missed. See my posts just before this one; not the one on Kant , but you could check that one out also.

We are involved with what we are able to do. The better manner of getting outside the modern correlation is thus to look at what people are doing, rather than what their argument is trying to prove. Find the view upon things while understanding the content as well; that is, not merely retain focus on the content as though it is all of everything.

The next comment I have has to do with technology. I think often people have a very narrow sense of what technology is. Whenever I see the word technology I always read it in context. If I’m reading Newsweek or Wired or something Then I know to expect that the authors are talking about a very narrow idea, a very specific and practical idea of what technology is. It is curious to me that people extend this narrow idea of technology into philosophy, and claim that narrowness as philosophy as opposed to thinking philosophically about everything that is in the world. To me it seems kind of reverse of what is supposed to happen with philosophy. Indeed; was it Badiou who said that philosophy is not something that is ever put down?

Personally, Philosophy is not something that I do at times, like watching TV or reading a book, like going swimming or walking my dog. I don’t understand philosophy in the context of various things that I do in my day. I mean, I am able to understand how philosophy can fit into that kind of approach towards life, but I am not really one that naturally segregates my life into various activities such that the most basic thing that I am is a thinking human being. I am a philosopher; thinking is part of philosophy. In fact it is difficult for me to segregate the idea of a human being from philosophy. And I suppose that’s why I problematize thought as the significant feature of being, both the human being as well as the object of philosophy.

So for me philosophy is primary, inseparable, identifying. And so when I am in the context of philosophy and people mention technology I already understand Technology as something that I cannot escape, as something that is innate and inherent to thinking philosophically about the human being. In other words, I think the human being, philosophy and technology are foundational aspects of existence. To not include these three aspects in activity — somehow it makes me think of something else, something that is, to be honest, quite postmodern and significantly religious.

If someone is making an argument about the human beings’relationship to technology I generally understand them as viewing the world through the eyes of the central thinker, which then moves towards privilege by segregating existence.

In other words, the people that are thinking of technology as something that the central thinking human being uses, which is to say, something that is essentially segregate from being — such people are probably involved with understanding what I’m saying as a critique, which is to say, that I’m pointing out something that is incorrect in the way that people might be understanding things. And this is where I get into contradiction, absurdity. As I say; if we are to find truth we have to look into the contradiction and inhabit that space. More than a few people of intelligence and with knowledge — and I don’t mean like a Buddhist saint or “authentic Christian” necessarily or some sort of enlightened spiritual being or some Big idea like that — actual real people who live very regular and significant lives, call this kind of in-habitation of contradiction as embodiment.

What this means is I am simultaneously calling out a certain kind of approach to viewing the world, while also showing that such a view is not incorrect: it is both correct and incorrect. Lol. It is correct in that people indeed are thinking that way, i.e. viewing the world through the either/or condition of the transcendental horizon, and are indeed validated in that view. But as well, the adherence to that view as the singular truth under which or against which everything else in the universe, which all human beings are part of that universe, must be included, I submit is an incorrect understanding of what is occurring. As well, what I need to address to the either/or condition is that I’m not excluding myself from the indictment that I am making; this is to say that I’m not accusing people of something that I am not involved with.


I wonder if anyone will go back and listen to the Zizek/Peterson debate in mind if this post.




Btw: Here is another example of complete ignorance posing as knowledge:


Meg Hanson doesn’t know what she is even speaking of. She is regurgitating poop 💩 I mean pop retorhic without even a hint that her opinion has been fed to her. She is absolutely to epitome of Zizek’s argument, and she is utterly unable to see it.

–In truth, each man is a caricature of a public intellectual—entertainers rather than leaders. They both excel in provoking strong reactions from their detractors. To many, Peterson is nothing more than an anti-PC muppet come to life (imagine if Kermit got really into race science), while Žižek reminds some of a “raccoon who lived in a dumpster behind a university’s library who was transformed into a human by a witch” (and thanks to his film career, you can watch him drown in Titanic).

oh wow.I gotta make a post about this one.