Determinism and Determinica: Using Rock and Roll as a way to make a point about philosophy.

It is very difficult to argue against a term that already has a common meaning. Despite if that flower there is a rose, and always smells the same and always have thorns that you have to be careful of, If a bunch of people around you decide it is a Plerub, say, no matter how much you try or no matter how much you try to define that flower there back to the term rose, You will be utterly fail because everyone will adhere to the group-speak-know. See This has nothing to do with choice, And so any argument to the contrary will just serve to justify that the group is making the choice, This as opposed to the post modern agent in denial who feels like he is making a choice of terms in cultivating a reality.

We find this understanding that the whole modern idea of structuralisms, postmodernisms and philosophical ideas around that 20th-century type of view is now turned on its head. Because we see that the choices that are argued in philosophy to be reasoned out in this way or that really have no invested “line of flight”, if you will. The idea that there is a choice to be had that can move along this line of flight is actually based in a denial of the truth of the situation, and that the line a flight actually involves no choice in the conventional sense.

All this Can thus concern what Slavoj Zizek refers to as a “changing the past”, and what I refer to in the more active participation, “do you see it”. There is a distinction to be made about people in this sense.

In the same way,though, if people have decided that that plant flower there is a rose, I also cannot argue anything to get them to change the name of it. Only the group can change the name of it and for reasons that are utterly of the group ; this is the postmodern irony that constantly oscillates between the individual and the group depending on argument that they want to make; agency or systemic structure, the arguments sway this and that, and meet in the middle at fashionable ratios of ‘nature and nurture’, ‘evolution and will’, ‘genes and emergence’.

So I announce, Perhaps a new philosophy, perhaps as a tongue-in-cheek, determinica.

I use This term to distinguish from the regular argument about “determinism”. Because despite what anyone would say, such an argument would have to live in a state of contradiction in so much as each philosopher is choosing a position and then arguing the various yeas and nays, pros and cons of that position that they might be able to assert determinism. The most aggravating contradiction of philosophical terms is to put the criteria of a determinism on ability to predict outcomes. So it is, because everyone is so concerned about predicting outcomes there is never going to be any sort of argument that will dissuade people from attempting to predict the future and mitigate risk.


So I take my cue from what was once understood as ‘heavy metal’, (the music genre). Before Metallica came up, as many people may not realize, heavy metal was something else. Whatever it was, it was not Metallica, and Metallica only sounded like the Heavy Metal that was around at their time. In fact, that is where Metallica find it’s interesting name, because their music is “like metal”, which is to say, kind of like Heavy Metal, but not.

Before Metallica, heavy metal was bands like quiet riot and rat and Lita Ford. Metallica stepped away from that kind of stuff. But they were hardly heavy metal even by that standard. Even Blue Oyster Cult was considered Heavy Metal. And if you go back to the movie cartoon called “Heavy Metal” and you listen to that soundtrack music, maybe the only thing that you find of heavy metal music that resembles anything today that we call heavy metal music is that Sammy Hagar sang that song “heavy-metal” and he used a particular brand of distorted guitar and a particular way of screaming. I mean, look at that Album cover; wtf Even slightly resembles what we know now as Heavy Metal? Christ; DEVO was even Heavy Metal at the time according to the movie. Lol.

And then when we think of Lemmy the founder of the seminal Heavy Metal band Motörhead, we must realize the plain ignorance involved in citing them as a Heavy Metal band. Listen to their hit Ace of Spades; that is Punk Rock they are playing (which again has nearly zero resemblance to what in popular circles we know now as Punk rock). And we knew this; but not anymore. Then go and ask Lemmy himself; in an interview, which is fairly well-known (somewhere; I can’t find it now), Lemme talks about how he had no idea why they got lumped in to the heavy metal genre, that to him it was just rock ‘n’ roll and he hung out with a bunch of punk rockers. In fact he played bass for one of the best English punk rock bands of the day, The Damned; and here is a Show in 2009 where Lemmy is Jamming back there playing bass.

Yes; what we name something often enough has no relation to what it was, let alone is, but indeed we should recognize that indeed there is something originary to a Name, and changing the name merely then shows, indeed, a certain ability or power, but then also shows in relief the distortion which commandeers what we see against the truth of the matter: The enactment of power is not necessarily true even while it may present something real. Some might even go so far as to say that the discrepancy between truth and reality accounts for the aggregate of problem which shows up in and as reality.

Metallica was more glam rock (heavy metal) meets speed metal (and even verging on punk rock) at the time they came out, but they dressed, in a way, like a run off of the glam rock that was around Hollywood at the time or at least California maybe or at least the West Coast possibly. It was like late 80s hair band meets punk rock. So, maybe we could talk to the Metallica guys James, and Lars and whatever the hell else those other people are named I don’t even remember even though I should know their names — what made their band name cool was because they were playing music that was kind a like heavy-metal but not really. so putting forth their whole package they changed the sound of hard rock.


So I’m not arguing a determinism because most who would have heard that term probably would not understanding what I’m talking about and would come out with an argument against what I’m saying by referring to to traditional definitions of philosophical determinism. And in this little interaction the whole point that I’m trying to make would be missed.

So it came across my mind to call this philosophical move determinica, because what I’m saying is kind of like the arguments for determinism but then is really something totally different, because it’s not an argument.

Preliminary thoughts on the parameters of determination: Phenomenology and Object Orientation.

We already know how reality proceeds; there is no mystery about the mysterious part. We love mystery. We love figuring things out and we love not knowing; every time we come to know of something, then something else catches our attention. This is no mystery.

The Why of this process we also love to get into. We love to always withhold something or have something be withheld; that is what profit is, as well as magic, as well as the object of science. Even as we try to disclose everything, we always leave something out, and we love to find out what is it so we can have something else left out, to find that out. This also is no mystery, it happens all the time, everywhere.

Yes, the contingency of reality is why we live; we look into something, and everything changes . Despite my depressions and frustrations with how reality may be for any moment, these insecurities is indeed why I continue. They are not what I am attempting to overcome, they are the roots of the insecurities itself; a depression is weather; my insecurities inseparable from the realization of happiness except as we might speak of different centralized systems of motion ; they are what I withhold while I propose to be looking into them. As soon as I find a way to relive myself of the insecurity, another one pops up.

The manner, order and cause of these psychic contingencies occupy the totality of my concern; they inform to where my attention is focused. I may look outside these psychic events to events that are not psychic, and even though I may be the mediator and arbiter of such events and such objects, I am able to consider these occasions outside of the notion that they are occurring in my psyche. What this means then, is that such occurrences are not occurring as psychic events, but are indeed occurring as objects independent of the psychic occurrence. This means that to tie such moments together, the event of an object that is entirely of my psyche, and the event of the object that has nothing to do with my psyche, in a causal relation is problematic at least. As Saint Anslem: This is an unstable condition. We begin to understand how the philosophical turn that saw ‘language/discourse’ or ‘meaning/semiotics’ or ‘phenomenon’ as some sort of temporal historical stage, can itself be based in a misunderstanding of the issue involved with those very categories, and likewise how the turn to the object is most probably, by many, also misunderstood in its bases.

We might find the misunderstanding is founded in the “either/or” relation of reductive philosophy. Exactly how do we determine phenomenology from the rest of the western philosophical discourse is extending back to Spinoza or Locke or something ? We do it by ignoring the phenomenology of the situation and particularizing things that are phenomenon with other things that somehow fall out of the category of ‘phenomenon’ that we have to find arbitrarily along a continuum of traditional semantics . Likewise the idea that if we don’t adhere to this traditional lineage and don’t fall into the abyss of Progressive discursive formations then we are talking about nothing, that which has no definition at all: That resultant idea is an either/ or proclamation that excludes the phenomenon of its situation: It proclaims itself in a causal relationship of psyche and object, that this causation is necessary and determined by some as yet discovered “great power“; it is this put off great power that is being negated in the resultant default to nihilism, not the object-universe and definitely not humanity and most likely not civilization: It is entirely evidence by which we can describe what is occurring “Of the psyche”, which is to say phenomenologically. The former phenomenological derivations were or are not, in fact, speaking necessarily to nor about ‘original experiences’ that may be talked about in a unitive and omnipresent “greatest category” field which holds room for such ‘subjective reckonings’, wherein everyone gets to discover all the differences of personal experience. Indeed, in the field of social justice and politics, we do get to discover what has been hiding behind my own inherent prejudices and limitations I didn’t know existed, or perhaps I did but could not alleviate them, and so I get to work on them . But the event of the phenomenon is not based in such subjectivity, and the reasoning that says such discourses as pointing to some psychic event of individual experience is/was a misunderstanding of the notion of what the phenomenon might be. Hence, likewise, an inherent misunderstanding of what Object Orientation might entail.

The question always concerns thus if the authors which proclaim such philosophical categories themselves are misunderstanding their own position, and how that might be possible. We then come to what real motivators for identification of objects might say about the world we live in and even, indeed, if “we” live in such a world. Further, the very idea that arises when such ‘unfounded’ divergence from the ‘traditional’ narrative occurs is if such dichotomy of existence is a true situation that we then have to question; if the various notions that arrive for methodological procedures are really addressing valuable issues; how it is possible that we might be able to decide to dismiss an object sufficiently from the psychic occurrence, etc….

More later…



Clean Shave, by CSP – and other postmodern avoidance.

clean shave CSP logo 2_Fotor

What is the relationship between art and philosophy?

That is the issue I treat.

In “The Postmodern Condition”, Jean-Francois Lyotard speaks of this dichotomy in terms of ‘narrative’ and ‘scientific’ discourses. Emmanuel Kant speaks of the difference between Practical and Pure reason. And others also divide essential Being into dichotomous factions and never seem to approach the ‘final frame’, as Slavoj Zizek might (maybe) call it. While they are all most commonly understood to be speaking of different aspects (all of them) of reality or whatever, the significant issue involved with all of them is that they are really using different terms to characterize and position the same thing, the same aspect of being itself (that which is being itself). This is the issue that Francois Laruelle attempts to show us, that philosophy, what we might call ‘conventional’ philosophy, understands these divisions, these decisions, as indicating essentially real and localizable essences, what we may now call ‘objects’, but also a condition that no human being can get out of (No Exit).

The conventional philosopher sees terms as identifying actual distinct and segregate idealized (there is not situation that escapes what is of an idea) situations as these situations are indeed thus due to the manner by which clausal arrangements are made: Discourse determines reality because that is what has been argued successfully, and this argument thus can no longer be questioned without determining reality in a manner whereby reality is thus determined. This is called idealism: The idea is transcribed into reality because the idea is that the idea is able to be transcribed into reality intact (is the idea itself real?) But again, conventional philosophy cannot admit this generalization, or will vehemently as casually set it aside (whatever works), and will then move to discount its idealist situation by defining further terms and clausal arrangements. They simply cannot stop seeing ‘more things’, or simultaneously ‘the comparison of things’ in their use of discourse as these lineages of meaning are understood to extend through an essential temporal substrate. 

See, though, that of course, this is not incorrect. It simply locates, evidences and positions a particular kind of thinking and the method that supports that thinking. The ability to find this philosophical situation thus, at once, understands that conventional philosophy views itself as a kind of essentialist science through its ability to situate itself above and around every assertion that is made upon it, to thereby deny that it is an idealism (religion); this type of maneuver once noticed cannot escape its scientific attitude, an attitude that ironically denies that it is any sort of science.

When we locate this situation, oddly enough, we have found an opening that places philosophy as an object; we are able to ‘see’ it as an object, and once an object can be located and defined for what it does (is something more than it does? IS more than AM? ), it becomes an object of science. This means that people are going to get nervous (isn’t this what we are already seeing?) . While philosophy will continue on in its conventional manner, there will be (is) another kind of philosophical manner that cannot help but supersede what has been traditionally the jurisdiction of philosophy as a whole kind of endeavor. This philosophy that moves beyond philosophy can therefore be called a kind of ‘science of philosophy’ and works to be able to define humanity in a manner that is better able to control and or first describe, then predict the outcomes of humanity even while humanity denies that it is being determined. The irony of this latter situation is that such control is not subject to the fears of totalitarianism or dictatorship (but neither democracy or communism) because such an understanding does not occur within the purview of real estimations; what falls into its purview will be checked by the regular political mechanisms which are around for any moment.

What in the past has been called ‘religious’, and then soon after ‘esoteric’, and then soon after ‘heretical’, now changes the stakes of the game. What has been the arena that these terms denoted has been dispelled (the term no longer ‘denotes’) in all effective ways save the enforcement of the meaning of the term itself: There is no ‘effective’ esoteric occasions but those which are defined within the general political arena as another political case, another political identity. What goes on behind closed doors is subject to the same rules as any other ‘closed door’ policy.

Due to this ideological upset that the concept of science brings about (along with its appropriate narrative support), the human situation is turned on its head and reality, by virtue of its ubiquity and omnipresence, becomes a religious institution. Once this happens, everything remotely ‘spiritual’ goes out the window into the the bin of science, yet even while it retains an effectivity within the meaning of the transcendental clause by which narratives afford, convey and maintain real worlds. What occurs then, is what otherwise would have been classified as ‘esoteric’ by modern analysts becomes the effective means to define parameters upon the human creature in such a fashion which moves beyond the ability for the real narrative to keep up with; power is enacted which does not fall into the modern ‘structural-Marxist-humanist’ designations for how power is supposed (proposed) to be used. As we have just said, what does fall into the lap of such analysts, regardless of what it means to such analysis, nevertheless functions to acquiesce data which is thus used to support the determinate scientific use of power upon reality. This is to say that what has been the problem of modern philosophy, that of what to make of essential difference and its interface, interaction or intersection, has been solved, albeit in a manner that leaves a particular mode of philosophical knowledge playing in the white wash despite its best efforts to paddle out into the monsters of Mavericks. Philosophy (conventional) becomes the means to make sense of what is already occurring, a manner to keep everyone calm and centered upon the practical business of living life, understood in the context of tradition though contingency, randomness, and the vicissitudes of free will. Religion is indeed the opiate of the masses, but to the extent that, as Giles Delueze might argue, knowledge of how this might be the case cannot and does not allow us to avoid its satiating glamour because within each attempt to overcome the oppressive and limiting aspects of our Leviathan, humanity functions to sedate itself through the very terms of its systemic freedom.

What is left is enacted by a contingent that, while recognizing the limits imposed and demanded, does not, as Zizek makes sense of the Buddhist philosophy of detachment, after all, totally comply with those limits, and indeed, lives a double life. Yet this one is not the conned apathetic agent of futility and happiness; on the contrary, it is the engaged and living aspect of the limitation itself.

There is a point, a moment, where Philosophy is split: one Philosophy continues in its traditionally real ontological approach and will see every discourse as a sign to be placed back into the correlational  (real) limit; the other Philosophy sees philosophical statements as the material of a science, as it begins to show what philosophical statements establish, what they do as objectival acts, as things in themselves, behaving in characteristic manners to establish typical situations, that can be identified and predicted along certain lines of purpose. 

This type of knowledge is deemed invalid in the narrative of reality despite every effort to validate it in narrative (the philosophical science is negated in the act of narrative) and so occupies a kind of knowledge that is usually categorized and classified as esoteric, but indeed is a science that is offensive to real agents of transcendence, which is to say, to practical reason. 

This situation always is the case (see my book “The Moment of Decisive Significance” for the description example) as history may be discerned along lines of the relationship of this polemical constant over the motions of ideological climate and of their reactionary politics.