One More Z/P Goodie: Nature, Culture, and the Displacement of Time

On Slavoj Zizek and Jordan Peterson: Nature, Culture, and the Displacement of Time

On Slavoj Zizek and Jordan Peterson: Nature, Culture, and the Displacement of Time
— Read on

It appears that the people who really do use their thinking skills took a little longer for their comments. Here is another goodie. Bobby gets a little deeper into the various philosophical authorial substrates, and a couple play by plays from the debate.


Bobby points out one of the significant parts of the debate that I forgot about; namely, that Peterson definitely sees a kind of progress of history, sees history as a ground outside of human cognition, and then that cognition indeed is able to perceive this ground and make analyses of it. Then; Zizek’s rebuttal to this kind of suggestion is, basically, that though it is possible to perceive some sort of progressing lineage, the lineage itself is articulated at the same time as these articulations disrupt the continuity of the scheme, and at that, at a notably random times.

Bobby has a better version of what they actually said, and then goes into the various philosophical ideas around this idea, for example, Derrida’s trace and erase.


I Am digging his approach, but I depart from Bobby’s analysis in a couple of ways.

1) I am not sure that there is any argument that can be made which overcomes the presentation inherent of the debate. And, what I mean by this is that when we understand, say, Derrida, then there is a further development philosophically that shows us that there is no “proper truth”, As though By virtue of what Derrida proposed the nature of human existence demands that there is no historical ground that human beings can cognitively know in the manner Peterson stakes his position. I describe this particular situation and I am indicating right here some of my earlier posts, perhaps from a year or two ago; I will not rehash them here. If we understand Derrida, then much of what he says is like the wind — “the wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth…”

2) It is sufficient to say, that the argument (as a form) has only a particular bearing upon truth, and that Francois Laruelle’s non-philosophy has basically disrupted the idea that there is some sort of unity of truth that human beings can be suspended within to thereby exist in a argumentative reality. The suspension is itself, as I say, real, but not true.

In my work, I try to show how this particular method, this particular way of coming by or upon reality, that I call the “conventional method”, is but one manner, The One Route of the Two Routes. Further, these two routes do not further indicate a “reasonable or rational” route as opposed to and “irrational” route, but that this kind of argumentative way of establishing truth is indeed one “rational’ manner of coming upon objects. The routes are mutually exclusive in a non-philosophical manner, not complimentary as the early 20th century Existentialists would want people to believe: Belief is required first for the compliment to be realized.

In short, I am saying that all Bobby really does is kind of lean on supporting what Zizek is reputed to argue in relation to a traditional lineage of authorial representation. And that’s ok.

And –

My take is that there is no reduction of this sort possible once we understand what Laruelle is saying; and indeed, this is what I think Zizek was relying upon, as it indeed accounts for why he did not plow into Peterson.

My position is that these two men represent The Two Routes upon objects. These routes do not further reconcile to another unitive, and a singular route. And this is to say that what the debate shows is that these two routes function together without necessarily reducing to either, nor to another further unity.

Indeed Petersons argument is valid by the mere fact that people — regardless of what argument I want to make to pronounce upon such ‘other people’ — indeed can and do experience and encounter reality in exactly the way that Peterson is philosophically describing in his solution. And that this particular way, or route, is not false by virtue of the fact that I may come up with an argument against what they are saying. These people are not wrong or somehow have some sort of invalid way of understanding the truth of reality. The way they (those who understand an objectively knowable history) understand it is indeed True. And this truth, while perhaps in communication with me nevertheless does not fall into falsity due to my points, nor theirs due to mind. And, our existence is not relative nor reductionary to either that or this. It is true. Period.

Objects do not require my acknowledgment or permission to be true, or otherwise have or hold truth.


And whether or not Peterson understands technically what is going on philosophically in this ‘larger’ sense, Zizek nevertheless does understand and that is why (I submit) he didn’t plow into Peterson about his ignorance, to show how ignorant Peterson might be upon these philosophical intricacies and subtleties.

(See my earlier post about what Peterson might actually be involved with.)

We can find evidence everywhere in his talks and writings that Zizek Understands what I’m talking about: when he talks about “naïve”, he is talking about that particular kind of existence which does not answer nor even fall into the category of the philosophy he proposes by his analyses as a sort of categorical imperative. The ‘common people’ do not answer to his kind of philosophy, and indeed exist outside of it in an essential sense, even to the extent that those people’s reality (truth) has nothing to do with what analysis he is making upon them. This is the nature of his philosophy and it forms a foundational ground that most people seem to miss or are unable to reconcile with their experience.


If you are interested in The exploration of the two routes, please check out The Philosophical Hack: The concluding unscientific post-script to event, by Cedric Nathaniel.

It is crazy inexpensive.

On Derrida: Voice and Phenomenon

On Derrida: Voice and Phenomenon

On Derrida: Voice and Phenomenon
— Read on

Interesting conventional small exegesis of Derrida. I think it shows where Derrida fits into time in contrast to what a subject might be doing at any time. The subject of Derrida is exhibiting a particular moment of time; he is not describing a moment which extends into, through, or as time. Where he is involved with such metaphysics, exactly there we are able to breach his proclamations and find the object.

But of course, my issue is the object, and not so much the subject. So there it is.

This is to suggest that the subject in its centrality is involved with a problem of communication. The mark of Derrida shows that he must have been of his moment; the extension which occurs through an understanding of his texts, no matter how closely we read them, is itself an exercise of not understanding what he is saying, of compensating for the centrality Of subject thought, ignoring it, and brining it into the present as though it indeed is Derrida who meant such a thing.

This shows that we are dealing with Derrida only in as much as we are dealing with a misreading of him, and as much as we do not behave as though our misreading is indeed a misreading. This contradiction thus shows us less how everything is bound in subjectivity, and more how human beings are what they do.

Writing Before the Letter: Jacques Derrida and Deconstruction

Writing Before the Letter: Jacques Derrida and Deconstruction

Writing Before the Letter: Jacques Derrida and Deconstruction
— Read on

I am always curious of philosophical bloggers who post an essay but then do not except comments.

I suppose my curiosity is piqued more when I have something to say about it. For example this essay.

I am also curious about certain authors, which then goes to inform comments I would make on essays that propose to be talking about or explaining what the author philosophy is.

in particular, there is Jaques Derrida. and then there is all the people who like to make comments or like to use his philosophy in someway.

my curiosity which forms a comment on the essay that I linked to in this blog post goes like this:

has anyone ever considered how Derrida would be able to know what he is knowing to thereby have his ideas?

I mean, has anyone who has read him pondered how it is possible that he could know such a thing?

and in reference to the essay, I am particularly asking how anyone would be able to pose truthfully A philosophy which says that everyone’s appropriation of text is ultimately subjective? that everyone has has or comes to their own idea about what the text is, and that this idea is pretty much excluded from everyone else’s idea.
How could Jaques Derrida possibly know this?

has any large brand thinker in the past 50 years contemplated how he could know such a thing?

or has everyone just kind of taking it on faith that he has some sort of intellectual prophet?

Perhaps anyone who might read this post might instead of only liking it leave me a comment which asked.

but if you don’t want to, that’s fine too you can just give me a like it’ll make me feel good.

Risk 2…

So what do I mean when I talk about Heidegger’s risk and his support of nationalistSocialism? 

Right off, I definitely do not mean that ones philosophy should be founded in a type of social activism. Indeed philosophy in the loose sense in the larger sense can be said to be a kind of Political philosophy, like someone’s philosophy of human rights or gender equality or merchant access; for sure one needs stand up for their philosophy in this sense. But likewise we should be more so skeptical of the view that see his philosophy as primarily, essentially and inextricably linked to social activism; I do not believe that The veracity of a philosophy need to be evidenced or proven by some sort of social activism, for example marching on Washington or something. Yet it is by this determination and apparent orientation that we find an impossible partition between essential, what we might call, cosmological substrates, The political ideological realm being that what we call ‘real’. 

No; we are not associating Heidegger’s risk with this type of philosophicalorientation. That he is perceived within this orientation to perhaps have taken a risk of that same sort is based in the type of argument that I call redundant. For sure there is a Heidegger that took an ideological risk in his move toward nationalist socialism; but this is not the only Heidegger. In fact that Heidegger is a phenomenological being.

And so in reference to Derrtida’s book “of spirit”, we can begin to find a more significant meaning to Heidegger’s destitution of spirit. 

Though I have yet to begin my reading of “logical investigations” (Husserl; Hs mentor), I feel it is not difficult from the pool limitary sketches that I’ve come across of phenomenology to understand Hursserls General form, and though I will approach his books with an open mind through a tabla rasa if you will, I am fairly confident that the reading of his material will only serve to and large in the ways by which to speak about what is said; I am eager and hopeful, though, that reading of logical investigations will completely disrupt not only my preliminary understanding of him but likewise my whole view upon the universe. We shall see. 

If we can trust a certain generic and typical historical presentation, The common of history given us, then it is not difficult to agree with Sartre that Kierkegaard may have been the first exit stencil lis then it is not difficult to agree with Sartre that Kierkegaard may have been the first Existentiaist, but more that the break had most probably already occurred with Hagel such that Kierkegaard became necessary. We find then by Heidegger the voicing of the situation as it was already becoming apparent the destitution of spirit. The desperation of Kierkegaard was only slightly an earlier indication, and Hursserl then appears to be, if you excuse my crass language, and almost frantic attempt to re-suture what so Obviously and apparently was drifting apart. With Heidegger we have the Mark of the ship drifting from its mornings. The move towards nationalist socialism and the question that involves Dasien creates the condition of post modernity through the doubt involved by the risk invested in the discourse evidenced of Heidegger work. 

For the risk was exactly that: The question that moved the enlightenment within a singular force was brought upon itself to question by the movement of world forces. We find that, in effect, Dasien was defeated in World War II. Make no theoretical mistake. 

The desolation of world was brought by the destitution already invested in the question as evidenced by the discourse of the question itself which is Dasien. The risk of Heidegger was the inherent possibility of the question itself manifested indeed as world as argued by Heidegger. What is apparent then and now is that no one gives a fuck. The question thus resides in whether or not we resort to finding truth in a common humanity, which is to say in the majority view, the route wherein the mojority find identity in religious comfort. 

If we understand Heideggernot as a proposal of what might be occurring, which is to say as an argumentative proposal , but indeed a reflection of what ‘is’ occurring as a ‘has’ occurred, then we can do one of two things, but actually three. 

The first is what I call conventional. This approach takes material within a scheme of essentially valued orders. A scaffolding of real truth. In this arena various authors and ideas are commodities to be used within fashion and fad to establish identity move careers and make a happy living . In this course it erects and maintains the political idea logical economy of real things. 

The other two concern Dasien in its originary sense, we might say and it’s true sense. Here, similar and largely correspondence with conventional route , either we take Dasien as an essentialcategory of being human and transcribe the meaning of Heidegger’s work into the ever present moment of transcendental being and use his ideas as platforms to make further statements upon what might be real of being and time and such; or we already understand Heidegger and what has occurred and find that indeed the spirit is destitute, which is to say marginalized, denied,  suppressed and oppressed, and ultimately colonized for the purposes of real effort. 

It is thus the contradiction involved in the irruption ofDasien, of its construction of dis-truction, de-construction, that allows for the discernment of reality and what we should call the divergent thesis. This last can announce the large misunderstanding involved in the appropriation of Francios Laruelles non-philosophy, and speaks to what he calls ‘Christ’. 
The risk of Heidegger is that which is confirmed in the fact that I may have anything true to say of Heidegger in this moment. The risk of Heidegger exactly was no risk; because he risked everything. The move towards nationalist socialism which appeared to be a rising through German idea list philosophy is the ironic confirmation of spirit destitute for real determination that we now call capitalism. Those are the terms that designate what reality may be the situation will always remain the same: Spirit does not rise and fall within the coordination of an essentialist doctrine of manifested discourses. On the contrary; we might be able to speak of the his store cool manner of being human in the world as involving two oscillations, to paths, that at times coalesce in a certain manner to coordinate being and historicalevent, , and at other times diverge such that the coordination is no longer salute and the unitary meaning of discourse crumbles into multifocality. 

The Question: Of Darkness. 

The Question of Derrida’s Heidegger is ironically (as they even say) the question itself, which should not be generalized into a ‘common human sort of being’; that question is a response within the consistency that Derrida exposes as failing (decadence). Rather; the question voiced to its particularity that has been obscured  (darkened) by the ‘common’ is exactly coincidental with this moment of the post: “How is it possible that i knew Derrida’s and Hiedegger’s meaning before i had even read it ?”

This thus is an example of Bruno Latour’s opening (An Enquirey into Modes of Existence), that which has been allowed to be voiced.

For if you have been following from the last post, then you will see the obvious anticipation there of this next part of “Of Spirit” which i had never read or heard about until this moment:

There is an Ent­machtung (disempowerment) of spirit. It corresponds to this darkening of the world. It renders spirit destitute by depriving it of its power or its force (Macht), of its dynasty. I shall translate Entmachtung by “destitution” from now on, because spirit thereby loses a power which is not “natural.” Such a loss has noth­ing to do with animal benumbedness (dizziness; of having ambiguous ground for being). It is exactly at the moment when he is beginning to elucidate this destitution of spirit that Heidegger declares, in the passage cited just no that “animals have no world” (if humans are not spiritual entities, but not not spiritual)…

Of Spirit and Repetition.

Heidegger denounces, then, a “spiritual decadence” (geis­ tigen Verfall). Peoples are in the process of losing their last “spiritual forces” through this. This last expression returns often. The Verfall of spirit cannot allow itself to be thought other than in its relation to the destiny of being. If, in ques­ tioning, the experience of spirit appears proportional to “danger,” the German people, “our people,” this “metaphys­ ical people” (das metaphysische Volk) par excellence, is at once the most spiritual (Heidegger speci es this clearly later on in speaking of language), and the most exposed to danger. For it is caught in a vice (p. 29 [36]), in the middle (in der Mitte) between its European neighbors, Russia and Amer­ ica.S On it devolves the “great decision” (die grosse Entscheidung) which will engage the destiny of Europe, the deployment of “new spiritual forces from this middle place” (neuer geschichtlich geistiger Krafte aus der Mitte). Empha­ sis, emphase: the word “spiritual” is again italicized both to mark that the fundamental determination of the relation to being occurs there, and to ward o the possibility of a poli­ tics other than of spirit. A new commencement is called for. It is called for by the question: “Wie steht es um das Seint” What about Being? And this commencement, which is rst a recommencement, consists in repeating ( ederholen) our historially spiritual existence (Anfang unseres geschicht­ lich-geistigen Daseins).

from “of spirit”. Derrida. 

The situation is never lost on those who ‘question’.  A mistake Derrida outlines earlier in this book is a demand for universal compliance, but as well along this line, the concordance of political reflection, shown here by ‘German’. 

The ‘discordance’ then does not reflect into thus ‘world’ (as D and H arguments) but moreso thru the retreat of world from reality; the mark and instigation of this being WW2 and its response of post-modernity. No longer does world connote a ‘people’, eg. ‘Metaphysical people’; a reversal of locality has occurred. Reality now is filled with the metaphysical people in the midst of the confusion of spiritual failure.

So, in this regard, such a notice is not having to do with everyone; this is not or no longer an issue of a ‘common human being’. Rather,  And specifically those of a certain ‘temperment’, those of a certain ‘view’ (the view from here is lovely).  

The historical repetition occurrs after the ‘expiration’, after the ‘decadence’, after failure, but only within the view that would recognize this motion as such. Otherwise, it is merely ‘real’, merely ‘everyone else’ enacting novel solutions to unique or relative problems in front of them.

So; if we can agree even slightly with Heidegger and Derrida, this issue of world being a spiritual concern, But not that of a subjectivity of capital identities, then we might begin to comprehend what The moment of decisive significance means. 

For now it is the end of this spirituality that defines all relation of world.

The crucial mistake is this extension: The concordance of world depends on the faith whereby world and reality coincide. This is then the reflection of (Derrida’s) Goepolitical world that arrives now (and shortly passed) the ‘end of days’ and the insistance of faith, the refusal to relinguish the truth faith provides, fuels and is fueled by fear, anger an ressentment (nietszche). 

One arm of the goal, then, is to expose what occurs, and to give humanity the view by which to relinquish the desien, the confusion allowed by the imposition of its stretegem of religious sense.