The philosophical/critical modern academic method

Abstract: In this paper, I argue that people should think a certain way about things, and believe in the semantic content that such thinking portrays. I give examples that everyone should already understand, and hopefully provide a route to make sure they are not making a mistake about what they are understanding. I then further claim that everyone should understand that they are deciding upon whether or not they want to understand my thesis, and that by making such a decision, they are probably making an argument against what they already know by virtue of their understanding the argument I am putting forth.


Critical Theory and Philosophy, revisited.

I tend to conflate critical theory with critical thinking.

I think the philosophers or theorists or authors who came up with the term “critical theory” for what they were doing, or for some class of social comment, was simply extending philosophical motion and applying it to ideology as though ideology was something separate from the philosophical situation. To my mind they did not want to make the philosophically sound argument why philosophy should be able to address something like ideology or Social constructs. So instead they just proceeded to use philosophical ideas towards ideology, and called it a day.

They were thinking philosophically about the presentation of the social world. But they could not just call it another kind of philosophy because then they would have to justify how it is possible they could make such claims as they did, whybsuch claims should have veracity or relevance. So instead they called it “critical”, and because it really has no basis for a discussion of reality except that reality is already presented to the analysis, they called it “theory”.

For example, Theodor Adorno’s “negative dialectics” , perhaps his most noted work, arises out of the philosophical deadlocks of his time that we found, say, with existentialism (But really The encompassing deadlock of Wittgenstein). It is a negative dialectics because there is no dialectical way to step into a critique of social presentation except to continue in the philosophical traditional manner, which if a person is to introduce themselves within the context of philosophy would never get outside or beyond the “positive” dialectics of philosophical tradition.

But the short of it is that Adorno, as well as Walter Benjamin who made a similar critique of art and mechanization and industry, we’re simply using “thinking skills” and not philosophy as such towards their work. Contrary to philosophy as a methodology, they were actually merely using philosophical ideas and not making a philosophical argument. They were using their thinking skills, their skills at thinking, to critique categorical Givens around the use of society (modes of production) to, according to a philosophical idea without a necessary argument, “Destruct” The field of “being there”, or as Derrida argued of Heidegger, The critical theorists were involved in an effort to ‘destroy the spirit’, so to speak, attempting to correct what was apparently or assumed to be faulty of capitalistic production in the order towards bringing the spirit back to life, again, so to speak. (One could argue that Laurelle’s nonphilosophy — but indeed much of academic philosophy in general — is still involved with this attempt.)

I would say then that critical theory has to do with an ability to think critically. Where as philosophy is a particular set of processes and conclusions linked to history and tradition and how they coordinate with the cosmological position of the human subject in the universe. Hence, Quentin Meillassoux’s “critical philosophy” which notices “correlationalism”.

And so actually, come to think of it, THe SECOND PART (the object of the subject) of the philosophical hack by Cedric Nathaniel actually discusses how we might think critically about philosophy, Instead of just thinking philosophically about philosophy, which then only lends itself a way out of itself to arrive back within itself, as do all theoretical mandates of theological dimension: there is always a transcendental “out” which leads back into the same state. Thinking philosophically about philosophy leads to the same state — that is, unless there occurs a “philosophical break” or Event, but then we’re getting into Zizekian waters there. Heh.


In light of my recent post about trying to speak to people who are not already informed about the “traditional” philosophical debates:

Of course what I’m writing here and this post is very informed by the jargon terms of philosophy and people and the ongoing issues in philosophy.

But I contend that if a person reads what I wrote without the invested idea that the reader needs to know what these other authors are saying in order to understand what I am saying, then they indeed will understand what I am saying. And this approach upon the text will inevitably lead the reader to understand what these other authors are saying before they read them Becuase when (if) they read them they will already have an understanding of the position from which they derive their discourses as a reader. (For, the significant philosophical question that is being set aside for our time —this time — is exactly how it is we are able to know what the author might be saying when every appropriation of text is subjective, I.e. subject to the Postmodern Condition, and then how what is read as not subjective is indeed constrained by correlation.)

What I am saying is that no one needs to understand what these other authors have said in order to understand what I’m saying about them. And if a person takes that approach to what I’m writing, then it doesn’t matter whether or not they’ve read anything by the Frankfurt school or not, becuase indeed critical thoery assumes that the subject is already in play in the state that it is in, such that reading, say, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, becomes unnecessary as due to the fact that the reader is already engaged in the significant discourse: The very discourse that will draw their intrest as a reader.

And this is the case because Critical Theory is not Philosophy, but rather uses philosophical ideals and tropes to make thier case which only concerns the reader under certain conditions.

We lead more by example than by instruction.

Philosophy is not a manner of thinking. But Critical Theory exemplifies what Thinking might be philosophically: critical thinking skills are not thinking philosophically unless there is already an investment in reproducing the “art” of “philosophical thinking”, which can be understood as indeed a type of thought linked to history and tradition.

But I could be wrong.

I don’t really know because no one leaves a comment!!!




Perhaps a better phrasing of the Question…

Where or when does philosophy and critical theory part?

Where does philosophy end and critical theory begin?


where does critical theory end and philosophy begin ?

Because I can see a achair in-itself and likewise a table, and I see for sure where the chair ends and the table begins and vice versa.

There are these things called philosophy and critical theory, each which have thier definitions and adherents. Are we able to know if indeed they are separate and distinct efforts or things?

I mean, it is easy for me to look at maybe Plato or something and say yes that is definitely philosophy.

But then if I look at Wittgenstein I am tempted to say that he’s crossing over somehow.

The Frankfurt school appears to me as philosophy but then they call them selves critical theorists.

Marx was definitely making a statement about society and yet he’s a philosopher somehow.

Bertrand Russell appears to me like a philosopher in yet I feel that I can take some of what I’ve read of him as being more towards critical theory.

Kierkegaard I feel is making a significant contribution to how we view history society and culture and yet he is considered a philosopher.

Hegel I think would fall firmly into the philosopher area but he does make some claims towards what we could call critical theory.

Where do we draw the line?

How do we distinguish one from the other?

How do we know when we are doing something philosophically from when we are doing something that is more critical?

I think the big postmodern names such as Derrida, Lyotard, Deleuze, Guattari, Are philosophers, even though most people who like to refer to them would see them as critical theorists. Same with Michel Foucault. But I think most people who would consider themselves post modern would associate themselves more with making political statements and that’s with critical theory, and that, even as they would consider what they are doing as philosophy.

What is the criteria that distinguishes whether philosophy is occurring or whether critical theory is occurring?

Please help me figure this out.


— Read on

great post!!

Yet/and… read on…

I am not sure that we need to use the term “hyper objects”. I think that term functions and works to miss the significance of objects in-themselves. if I were to use the term “hyper objects” in the context that I am understanding it, at least through this link post: It’s as though I am approaching a great significance, and as I get closer to it then all of a sudden I need to turn away and completely ignore and miss what the significance actually was and create my own subjective interpretation of what I actually never encountered. The speculative term “hyper object” is an evangelistic manner of retaining subjects under its theological dominion.

In a very real sense, it’s as though existentialism of the Sartean kind (revolting from the abyss) is in fact less a rational ontological truth, and more A functioning of religious theological dogma for the purposes of Establishing and maintaining a transcendental subject of offense (ubiquitous politics).

Nevertheless, This post link is a perfect extrapolation of the theme that Zizek mentions somewhat frequently here and there: The significance of modern critical theory and philosophy is that while it thinks it’s self as a player in social activism, it’s discourse has nothing to do with “the people”. The masses, or the people, cannot be appropriated by philosophy nor critical theory; rather, the appropriation links back to its own assertion of power, as though it is getting at something new; as I say in places and as Cedric Nathaniel will argue in his book, the world that is encompassed by modernity and postmodernity cannot even reach “the mass of people” except through denying that “the people” as a universal object actually exists in itself. This situation that philosophy/critical theory has gotten itself into is ultimately correlational unto itself. The issue thus is not how to get out of correlational existence, but how we deal with this fact.

This post is a perfect example of the motion that I just described: As soon as the people attempt to act for themselves, the agent of critical theory (and the general congregation/constituency of the theoretical religious body) have to impose and discount it, make it marketable, discount the people themselves because the people acting in themselves and for them selves actually exhibit a manner of existence which does not accord with the theological mandates of critical philosophical theory of the One Reality: The People exhibit no excess, no margin for profit. The irony of this contradictory activity is eternal, and is why we must locate such idealized activity within the envelope of transcendental law, A code of laws “given from God”.

I am excited that this post mentions GrahamHarman In what I see as an appropriate use of his philosophy in something that is not architecture — because this is the first post, even though he’s referencing an article from 2009 or something, that I’ve seen anyways, that is beginning to understand or somehow reflect upon the world as though it is filled with objects, and as well seems to be beginning to comprehend it self in the context of universal objects as opposed to a common humanity of inter-relating subjectivities. But but of course, this is not to say that there are not interrelating subjectivities, but only that The universe of interrelating subjectivities is not the only universe that can be known, and that indeed interrelating subjectivities are objects, or, is an object in itself.

The caveat to this, though, is that I fear that such theoreticians will still be involved in the attempt to reduce this kind of alterity, this disparity, to another common manner to link power to its absolute ideological object, and completely miss the significance that they almost came upon.

But in the meantime, like I said, at least people are beginning to notice them selves in the context of universal objects.


We are just beginning to see, to actually be able to view, what human beings do. We are just beginning. This is the long game…

….But all that is for other posts.

The Post-Human. 

“The ideal of getting beyond how humanity actually functions as a unitive category is a utopian dream. This dream is then placed in a ‘post-human’ category of (often dystopian) progress for the purpose of satisfying the failed desire of an individual identity, once again dismissing itself from itself in fantasy. It is based in a complete misunderstanding of its own theoretical base: ironically proposing nothing. The best we can do is use this aspect in discovering and admitting a true human for its universal object.”

— from My Previous Post. 

Wow! This Philosophical Hack guy is no BS. I wonder if he realizes that such a hard line has been tried before? And this is what we got: an arena (postmodern nihilistic) where no one cares. The spirit is destitute.  Trip out! Post-humanism is a fraud!   Damn. 

Gratuity. Link. ;))

Reality, Naivety and Addiction; Part 2: Google and the failure of communication.

(Note: These posts refer to Slovoj Zizek’s talk he did in Spain a few months ago; this one:


This ‘post-traumatic world’ that might exist in a utopian dream, if it were not for the naïve subject who is able to have a view where by hope can reside, does not occur within the Symbolic and Imaginary frames; or rather, such a utopia is possible as a political empiricality within such effective frames. Where the ‘post-carnival’ state is possible, there do we find what is ‘the carnival’ itself, the moment wherein things are not what they seem and indeed shift and change in the single view. This is what Zizek (Lacan) calls ‘the impossible’, or, the Real order. The manner by which we make sense of what is impossible is called, for Zizek, psychoanalysis. When we see that these states do not change through subjective agency acting upon some actual empirical object but rather are only changes in view, then we must ask: What is this state wherein Zizek must disclaim his lecture in order to be understood, at once, to be not contradicting his innate imperative for logical consistency, and then as well not offending the sensibility that is discovered through psychoanalysis? Or more precisely: What is occurring such that this state, that he would have to qualify his subjectivity as naïve, against which a Socialist Bureaucracy seems preferable, or, what might be best to deal with things ‘after the carnival’ , needs be stated? Does not a state reflect itself de facto, automatically and axiomatically in the presentation?

What is occurring in the naive state is an inability to be dismissed from the carnival; an inability to make the next move; hence, for Zizek to communicate at this level and be honest he must qualify his presentation: What is naive is that which understands itself as not subject to psychoanalysis. So, the trauma continues and the carnival goes on; this is reality, the effect of the various periodic failures of the Symbolic and Imaginary Orders, and the solution to these evental failures is usually and commonly to resource the Symbolic and Imaginary orders, the orders by which the political world gains veracity, or the semantic scaffold by which what is political may be known.

One does not simply decide to give up on their world and then the world goes away; the world must be destroyed without consent. This is a fact. If we must speak of effective ideologies, we can hear Zizek through his book “Living in the End Times” (paraphrase): It is only at the time we notice the impending failure of an ideology that we fight hardest for its truth. We do not simply give it up, even if we know the battle is lost; we still man our stations and fight for the state. We do not simply and easily relinquish our world because we have a conception that it is ending. Notice the general responses to global warming. The rhetoric is not a condemnation of our system, rather the reaction is either flat denial or a call to adjust how we approach our modern living.


Likewise the recent Google diversity scandal. Notice that there is nothing terribly irrational or non sensible in the manifesto. In fact, his essay makes good sense from a open-platform ideal: Every voice should be heard, even the voice that has been marginalized in the popular political environment. He is not saying that Google should not address inequalities in the workplace; he is saying that the manner that they are being addressed may be based upon an incomplete consideration of the facts; a more complete rendition of the facts of inequality or structural misrepresentaion or skewed hiring and promoting practices being the logical and rational ideas that he presents, which are, actually, not too radical. He is not saying anything that I haven’t heard; whether or not I believe them or not, the various notions about gender he produces are indeed valid — but in a certain light.

Then look at the answer that is made by Danielle Brown, Googles new diversity manager.

…I found that it [the anti-diversity manifesto] advanced incorrect assumptions about gender. I’m not going to link to it here as it’s not a viewpoint that I or this company endorses, promotes or encourages.

Does anyone notice anything peculiar between the two discourses?

At risk of putting myself in either camp and looking as if I am defending the manifesto, the anonymous writer is merely putting forth his view under the ideal that everyone should be heard, he is saying that perhaps Google’s diversity policy should be put on hold until everyone is heard. There is nothing radical about this ideal; it is a very democratic and American ideal, liberal as well as conservative.

How about Ms. Brown? Her decision has already been made. The judgement of the diversity manager is that he is “promoting incorrect assumptions about gender”.  Is that really true? It kind of sounds to me that it is the diversity manager that is promoting assumptions that are not true, namely, that the dude is promoting incorrect assumptions. But as Lyotard noted,by what ground shall we legitimate either of these discourses?

Nevertheless, this (his, the Manifesto) incorrect assumption is one that Google does not endorse, and indeed is why he ended up fired.

I don’t think there is a better indication where this world of ours is headed: Nationalism is on its way out; Corperatism is in. Democratic ethics is no longer the standard but is indeed being commandeered by corporate policy, policy that will decide what is ethical for the future.

Just from a (fair) neutral position: I am curious what exactly his manifesto says that is an incorrect assumption about gender. Are we not allowed any more to suggest that men and women are different? I thought in the discussion about race, at least, we are supposed to embrace difference, acknowledge difference and not be blind to color of skin and cultural expression. Any considerate and intelligent person is left to wonder why difference in gender is not to be acknowledged and embraced? Don’t we do that when we fuck?

In the corporate world we do not fuck each other, we fuck other companies. Competition defines the space of ethics; a meta-narrative of ethics does not yet define an umbrella space of companies. Difference, it seems, is not to be abided in the consideration of the workers value: Only the overt potential involved in the equality and sameness of human beings in general is to be considered in the place of production. The ability to produce is the standard, and we, as corporate subjects, cannot afford the inefficiency that can arise in the a priori classification of workers ability: All workers are equal in the potential to produce. That is the (post-) modern ground of ethics.

What do we have? We have the very postmodern condition coming to fruition. The Manifesto Man speaks of a Google echo chamber. What could be a better description of his very condition: He is speaking about a kind of ethical space that we all know of, but because the our existential condition (for lack of a better term here), the ethical condition that is the liberal agenda of freedom and equality that has been with us for at least 200 years, he cannot be heard, indeed will not be heard. Knowledge no longer exists as some source  or conduit for access into an essential and ideal ground for ethics; knowledge now is determined along lines of which knowledge is valid, and so which knowledge is able to be heard. Lyotard puts it in terms of which knowledge is efficient. The Manifesto Man is speaking, and we all (but do we?) know what he is meaning, where he is drawing his knowledge from, but it is mute. Such knowledge is invalid: It is no longer a kid of knowledge that is included in what is valuable. The ‘experts’ have agreed and they have decided.


What better description of this world: carnival. And as well: dialectical. So what happens after? The discussion by two or more people is shut down and the discussion continues as if in an echo chamber, which is to say, the movement merely occurs and everyone just rides along, regardless of what sound is made. The Dialectic continues but under a new semantic rubric that is understood to not be new. Indeed; there is an irony occurring. For, while the point I make in my recent essay about ‘the event of the past’  and Zizek being naive, I find that around the same time (well, relatively speaking I suppose, lol) I was writing that post, Zizek himself was in Spain speaking about how he was going to proceed as naive (listen to the youTube above).

In this sense, we find a certain psychoanalytical significance to what is occurring at Google, but in the context of addiction as well. The naive subject has a voice that is always heard in the context of the times as a political voice, able to bring change to the world, in various potentialities, at various moments. But what occurs is that voice is automatically referred to a context that is outside of the communicative potential of the subject: She speaks, but it is as if in an echo chamber. The dialectical subject of ethics speaks of justice, but her voice resonates only in its own space, the sound that is heard in reality is offensive and indeed (now) incorrect, and actually promoting assumptions that no longer reflect what is true, except in as much as this echoing voice affirms the present justice; the past has been changed. As Zizek describes in his book “Event” determined by the facticity of the past itself, the present act alters the very condition by which it has come about to reflect the actuality of the present moment.


The addict in his cups is not privy to the change; she is determined by her past as she works to keep the past constituent to that ideal and dialectical moment. The addict sees the material as being unchangeable and essential, and ideal world or “musts” and “is’s”. Reality never breaks into the Imagined world to disrupt it and the addict stays in her echo chamber yelling for someone to hear her. But the world only hears a sound that no longer reflects the true of reality. The two exist within a dialectical moment that is denied for the purpose of asserting a justice that is already occurring, indeed has been occurring, albeit, to challenge the past which determined the criteria by which such justice has been ascertained.

Time behaves atemporally, as witnessed not only by Lyotard 40 some years ago, but in the movie “Fight Club” some 25 years ago:

This is no figure of speech, metaphor, or interesting artistic juxtaposition. It is the actual psychoanalytical situation that occurs.

(This clip is just so perfect ! lol)

IDirection 3.20: The summary of Francois Laruelle’s Non-Philosophy, with further commentary.

The Direct Tangents of Constructive Undoing deals with the explanation of non-philosophy. In regular circumstance, this link would have been posted at the beginning of Constructive Undoing, but this is highly irregular, so, here is the link ( or at least the address, since it may not have transcribed the active link) to Laruelle’s own summary of non-philosophy:

Click to access laruelle_pli_8.pdf

That is the official summary. The Direct Tangents reflect a process of coming to terms with Non-Philosophy, since, what non-philosophy is is really part of the issue of figuring out how Francois Laruelle has situated his terms upon the point of contention. This post addresses the meaning of non-philosophy as a step in this process; Constructive Undoing is the revealing of the limitations of non-philosophical principles through aphilosophy. Please see my subsequent posts.

With that, here we are at an early phase of coming to terms.

Right off, I dare anyone to read the link and say ‘”wow, that was so clear as day; his meaning is so apparent”. Occasions aside; someone say that and then tell me what he is saying; that is, read it, understand it and then convey to me in regular language what he is saying. Please leave me a comment. The words appear to be simply laid, but as one reads the ideas seem to get tangled up somewhere. Even as one attempts to wrap their head around his concepts, it becomes difficult to really get ahold of what he is saying.

Now, my issue is why did he use such ridiculously dense and opaque language? I have to ask, why the Greek words? I have to open a dictionary and encyclopedia just to figure out the meanings of those words and then i have to ask why didn’t he just use the French, or in translation, English words. And what’s up with this ‘radical’ business? Its like I’d have to study his works or something, but, as I have been informed, not only that, I would have to study philosophy first in order to really understand him.

A question of mine that aggravates or disrupts this traditional method is: How is it that I understood him at first reading? But first, the more mundane or simple consideration, one that approaches non-philosophy from it’s ‘first’ stage, that of the usual subject-object duality.

I have stated my opinions earlier, but one more easily gotten reason is that it is because he is talking to academic or intellectual-ized idiots. Now, here I now reach: To back pedal; i do not mean that these people are stupid or unintelligent, I mean only to refer to a tendency for pomposity. Though in many cases the regular meaning might apply, here I prefer the ancient Greek, roughly in the sense of “one alone” or “ones own person”, and I extrapolate this to our issue: as one might will himself into the community, and thereby resemble Jean-Paul Sartre’s picture of the waiter as an analogy for ‘bad faith’, he thereby remains an ‘individual’ alone and separated: an idiot. Of course, idiocy abounds everywhere, but one must suppose that he is primarily speaking to an audience of academics. What I mean is, many of the people who would be interested in non-philosophy are so caught up in terms of privilege (read: educated jargon) that even the academics don’t know what they are saying beyond the jargon. They are actually speaking a language the meaning of which they cannot reduce to actual life; they are speaking of such high matters that practical application to being human and human knowledge has no baring in their purpose, except maybe in the sense of poetry. Yet, the idiocy is because it doesn’t matter; they are making a living or establishing a position or identity speaking this way and so it doesn’t matter if what they are saying makes any sense. In fact, it only makes sense because they are establishing an identity and or making a living doing it. Because they then have an identity by their jargonizing, their nonsense is very important, and the proof of this is they take no criticism from non-academics or people who may not appropriate the jargon, because they are ‘educated’ royalty who have worked so hard that they deserve to talk about nothing because it is very important – and because in many cases, all those other identical based thinkers turn to them for their great skill at thinking (such philosophy I call methodology because it has to do with coming up with methods based in an assumption of ethics that is invisible) all the more confirming to their own sense of propriety that they indeed – yup – are making quite a valuable and significant contribution to the world. As well; one can tell how important a person is by how many people they listen to; the deaf ear is a cultivated aspect of a truly skilled and deserving member of aristocracy. At least, this is most of them; Laruelle, I have found, is one of the exceptions, maybe. (See my earlier post.)

Anyways; to me what he is saying is clear, and the jargon does not hinder the conveyance; so I attempt to make clear in Direct Tangents his most significant contribution for the rest who do not have the patience or gumption to wade through his pudding, but who nevertheless would like to venture toward the truth of the matter. He is saying that we can know ‘more’ than what we think we can know, and that reality is larger than what we know as knowledge of typical reality, and – and this is key – and this atypical and unusual knowledge can be known. There; how clear is that ? Maybe about as clear as a sink full of dishes in dirty, soapy water? We might begin to get a glimpse of the problem before us then, as well as why Laruelle’s language appears illusively simple yet confoundingly dense: we cannot rest upon metaphysical or spiritual conventions.

See, many of the academics, intellectuals and philosophers who think they understand him really do not. But that’s ok because we really are only half way to seeing what the necessary implications of non-philosophy are. And a quarter the way, here, we find that the consideration of understanding is a mute point for Non-Philosophy, that it only goes off of what people who think they understand reiterate back in their involvement with the Project. The significance here is that we have to wonder about two parallax ideas: is any communication taking place, and then, what or what kind of communication is occurring. But see: these questions do not run into each other, they no not stem from either of each other to the other. They are parallel ideas that do not combine to coalesce, except in that their separation allows for the combination of meaning intended. (And again I have explained what a ‘parallax’ might be in the context of its description: two entities which are separate but which nevertheless combine to create a single impression or meaning. This meaning is gained through the converse of the definitional meaning; which is: a displacement of apparent position depending upon line of sight. )

Then again, some may just understand him. But there is only one position that has any barring upon the non-philosophical project: those who may understand it and yet disagree with it. In this case, we have two possibilities. Either they understand and merely confirm the point of what they disagree with, and thereby set themselves in a state of self-contradiction that they are in situ – that is, in their situation being as they are right then (see, I clarified my Latin (Latin ??)) – in denial of, and thereby confirm the situation whereby non-philosophy gains its credence. In this case, any rebuttal is a tragedy, since its so obviously comic efforts would be wasted on the seriousness of the rebuttal. Or, they understand and thereby set themselves in an apparent contradiction that they do not deny and are thus in a position to rebut non-philosophy. In both, one has to doubt the question of whether communication is occurring, and then figure just where, from what orientation, this question is coming from; this is an indication that we have to step aside in to another tangent, for someone somewhere is failing in the attempt to find truth, since he or she may have already invested the truth in relativity, which is to say, invested in denial. And, if they do not see this irony – that they cannot understand how there could be no communication, and yet they have not been communicated to through reading my posts – then I can only say that my proposition is true (Laruelle is in bad faith by the presentation of non-philosophy) and their doubt, again, is orientatively and concordantly wrong. But then I have to consider if a tangent on this point is even worth the compassion, since those I would be attempting to educate or enlighten have already decided against finding the truth of the matter, so accustomed and acclimated to darkness they have become. Yet, if there be light, what a comedy this has been!

We will see what post forms in the intermission.

For a more thorough addressing of the issue at hand, check out “Non-philosophy and Aphilosophy”.  Avaliable in eBook here: Support independent publishing: Buy this e-book on Lulu.