To the things themselves

I am finally diving into Levi Bryant’s “Democracy of Objects”, and I gotta say, I do not know why I hadn’t looked At this sooner.

http://www.openhumanitiespress.org/books/titles/the-democracy-of-objects/

This is not a big post; I was only reminded of my position:

It is due to the current correlational episteme — not in spite of — that we have access to objects in-themselves that are not for human thought. It is due to the ubiquity of thought that we can know the object outside of human subjectivity, perception, language, etc…

The object ontologists all stake thier claim in one way or another upon correlationalism; basically that we can know of objects that exist outside of thought, or outside of the phenomenal thinker.

Again: My point is it is due to the total inclusivity of thought that we are thus able to have knowlegde of objects in themselves — contra Kant and others who pose this condition as leaving the object as a moot point, totally removed from consideration.

X

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Philosophy and Psychology as First Correlational Object

Considering the possible relation I put forward in a recent post, philosophy and psychology might define the first object to its correlational universe.

This would be in contrast to the Continental Philosophical theologians and the Religious Science congregants who perpetually wish to assert their own dominance over the object human; which is to say, an uneasy truce of individuals who all see themselves as having special privy to a part of a whole, like the fabled blind Buddhist monks experiencing pieces of an elephant.

Both are linked to higher given orders of transcendent spirit (potential hidden in everything which the thinking of agents of transcendence discovers or figures out) through which information is interpreted. Their faith thus demands them argue to the end, evangelizing all who already can ‘see the truth’ of thier orders. Both, though, participate in the same orientation upon objects and the view that should allow us a rational ‘truth-real’ coordination for thinking.

Yet the soul of things does not advocate such inspiration, and relies upon a humility of ‘being given’ without the culminating motion for rising up to the transcendent heights.

The soul of things, so to speak, might see Philosophy and psychology not only as complement to each other but actually complete each other like a two piece puzzle. The only problem is that many practitioners of either discipline see there’s as just one of a multitude of disciplines that go into what a human being is. And just speaking improvisationally, tentatively : Yes; from a phenomenological standpoint indeed a multitude of aspects can contribute to what is meaningful. But from a different standpoint indeed snow is snow. Water is water. Frozen is frozen. 32° is 32°. Hydrogen is hydrogen and the hydrogen bond is a hydrogen bond. The issue here is less meaning and more about how objects relate. Because one would have to ask silly questions like “what does snow mean?” Sure, we can come up with answers about what snow means but it really never tells us about what snow is except from the phenomenological standpoint, which is exactly the limit at which object ontology becomes an available yet distinct philosophical manner from phenomenological Philosophy as well as what we understand as science itself. Indeed probably the more difficult approach will be upon the catholic scientific faith, because, just like back in the day when Catholicism was the religion of the day, who can really say anything against it without getting their head chopped off?

“Of course Catholicism is God’s ordained religion, proceeding naturally from what we can possibly know of the universe history and the human being.”

How different is this to say “of course science is the true way of things, discovering what is actually true of the universe history and the human being”.

How do you overcome that absolutely set manner of understanding reality?

Well, as I’ve talked about in earlier posts: you don’t.

Just like in race relations and Courageous conversations, we aren’t here to convince anyone about what is the truth. If you can pick up what we’re laying down then you might be interested; if you can’t then, hey good luck to you.

Catholicism did not lose power because people were convinced Through argument that it wasn’t God’s ordained True religion. It lost power because it became obvious to people that it wasn’t the case.

Perhaps…

It would be ridiculous to try and argue that science isn’t scientific and it’s not dealing with real things. One simply cannot argue against these facts.

But just as logic is not something that finds us the truth, but is rather a tool to use upon things, so facts can be used and assembled in different ways for different uses. Presently science, as a category, is a particular assemblage of facts which gain for us a reality for a particular purpose, or use.

The Ancient Egyptian Empire lasted something like 3000 years. We know it now as bases in myth.

Modern Science has been around maybe 300. Can we prove that science is not as well a myth without merely referring to the modern ways of proof?

We ca d fullan similarly ask, can we prove the lesser status of people of color without referring to whiteness for the basis of that proof?

Self-reflection Can Be a Bitch: X-phi – or, alienation as wanting to not Reflect. (In Despair to Not to be Oneself)

X-phi – or, alienation is not correlation

https://enemyindustry.wordpress.com/2019/05/02/x-phi-or-alienation-is-not-correlation/
— Read on enemyindustry.wordpress.com/2019/05/02/x-phi-or-alienation-is-not-correlation/

Thanks. finally some light in the intellectualized self-stigma.

Over the past 5 or so years I have had a tiny intrest in, what I might call, the “dark ecologies” wing of philosophical speculation. It is a kind of morbid self-abuse I put myself through, a sort of twisted curiosity that stems from (1) its common philosophical repertoire as what I typically understand of authors and ideas, and (2) a curiosity of why anyone would put so much intellectual effort in, what I see as, sadness and depression, as though the authors are trying to justify a situation they are caught in to the world instead of using that intelligence to see how it is indeed, again what I see, a self-limiting and berating correlation. I usually understand a lot of it as Fiction in the ‘wrong’ sense, which is to say, a fiction which does not generally wish to recognize its mythological component (in the Jungian-Hillman sense).

Well, I think I was right. And, as a counselor, I have to admit that depression cannot often be intellectualized away. But strangely enough, this essay reads as a critique of its self, of its own discourse. It’s as though, getting tired of all it’s verbosity, it resorts to its own dense jargon to try and dig it self out of its own swap. And I mean that in a good way; how else is one to talk it self out of a mess that it’s made for itself and in which it harbors in comfort and security that it hates?

The link above has a short essay I think shows a beginning of an ability of the discourse to show reflection upon its (what I see as) subjective correlational obviousness. The essay, to me, shows that at least that author is beginning to be able to view how the “dark ecology” is merely a “dark subjective fantasy” — but not one among many, which is to say, not like all other discourses. Rather, it is beginning to be able to comprehend that the discursive semantic routes are theirs only. It is evidencing an awakening upon what correlationalism actually means with reference to the internal mistake of phenomenal postmodern reference. Which is to say, the correlation as is caught in what establishes as it creates its own web of lies, if you will, and it is beginning to work itself out despite the intellectual intention invested in the attempt to get out of its own recognized as faulty correlation.

See — and this is not uncommon in many areas — as I have expressed in past posts, when one engages with such “dark ecology” authors, often one finds that they simply will not hear you If you do not play their intellectual game by using their words and clausal structuring. And I see this because of how post-modernism has allowed for people to build “semantic philosophical islands” which then reflect themselves into everything else. Such “religious philosophies” thus see a problem but are unable to find a way out; what happens then is they just figure that is how it is and so try to justify it. (See Lyotard, The Differend). I mean; what else is someone supposed to do? Develop intellectual capital the best way one can.

So, thank you enemyindustry for actually allowing what is not intensional to begin to perhaps bring one out the other side, besides the best of subjective intentions.

The alienation is correlation. This is the significance that most people work diligently to prevent themselves from realizing. It is the “offense in the machine”.

In the dark ecological sense, it is the working of the modern subjective fantasy in such a way to, as the essay states, make itself autonomous, as though not correlational, somehow beyond itself, which then ironically is the pathology: Xenophilia (and the other inhabitants of the dark world) attempting to intentionally explain its paradoxical limit away, and assert its truth upon the world despite itself –assert itself as valid by negating it’s own substance and then describing the speculative results.

Good essay. Makes me feel good. Thank

You.

—note: I could be wrong in conflating this essay with discourses of dark ecologies (weird, patchwork, Deleuzian-Landian, etc..) discourses. But to me, they appear similar in character.

The Point of the Slavoj Zizek Vs Jordan Peterson debate: An Assessment

Slavoj Zizek Vs Jordan Peterson: An Assessment

https://aussiesta.wordpress.com/2019/04/27/slavoj-zizek-vs-jordan-peterson-an-assessment/
— Read on aussiesta.wordpress.com/2019/04/27/slavoj-zizek-vs-jordan-peterson-an-assessment/

Thanks Neotonos! I agree with much of his assessment.  He hits on some significant turns of the debate; Im glad, because I didn’t really want to assess a play be play.

I’ll use this repost to give my final comments on the Z/P debate.

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It’s intresting to me that none of the commenters saw what I saw, which is, really saw any big picture. It really is, like Neotonos said “like a bunch of people reporting on a cricket match”. To my eyes and ears, it really is like people miss the debate for the spectacle. I think Noetanos gets a little more involved that the others I’ve read, though.

First off; yeah, I get it: people wanted a WWF slam-a-thon, of whatever that WWF thing is.  Zizekians wanted Zizek to take Peterson apart, and the Petersonians wanted him to show Zizek where he is stupid liberal, or something like that. These two celebrity philosophical figures represent a certain polemic in the philosophical world; people wanted a battle.

The thing is, if you have been listening to Zizek lately, and understand Peterson’s general effort (which he does use his point in the Z/P debate), both are actually more concerned with the world than they are just political voice boxes. Both actually care. They both advocate responsibility.
You can listen to and read my essay about the current state of philosophy HERE, the essay I wrote before the debate. One of the main reasons why one can tell they actually care is because they don’t give a shit about towing the political lines.

It is interesting to me that people seem perplexed about Zizek’s apparent shift from what they understand as his usually Marxism, and his basic support for capitalism. But if one is familiar with Zizek’s philosophy, he has not changed his view; rather, he had elaborated more upon the situation given the condition at hand.

In the debate Zizek even alludes to his earlier work about Marxism, of which he says he’s not going to take the debate that way; it is obvious to Zizek that Peterson has not read Zizek enough to be able to address the subtleties involved with Z’s “Marxism”. He highlights his Hegelianism. But the reason for this, I think, is because Zizek was not concerned with showing how Peterson is a ignorant fool (like many of us were hoping). Zizek’s point has always been Marxist in that the subject is a state of being which is involved with a dialectical reality which shows up in the Lacanian manner at all times. That is; through the symbolic order mediated by what is ‘imagined’, or what is the real fantasy. This fantasy is manifested in the (further) dialectic between what appears should occur due to the symbolic presentation. But there is a problem (as we understand the “barred S”). When the subject attempts to speak about what the symbolic world is presenting, a transformation takes place: similar to Derridean issues of subjectivity, what was once the true meaning of reality is noticed as a fantasy. The issue within this world, though, Is that one has to be able to notice it (clean house; think).

It is in this dialectic that Zizek locates his Marxism, because it indeed functions to supply all the multiplicity of material for and by which the subject is able to act in reality. There appears to be an element or aspect which oppresses the subject’s ability to appear in the world. This is why Lacan’s “Real” is impossible; because reality presents that which appears to not exhibit a contradiction in its terms for existing as such. It indeed shows aspects of its operation everywhere as contradiction in the, what i call conventional and what Zizek calls naive, sense, but because the withdraw that this ‘Real’ enacts occurs in the dialectical relationship with the symbolic-imaginary domain, as I just said, manifesting an appearance of real truth. As Cedric Nathaniel discusses in his book The Philosophical Hack, it is this ‘real-truth’ that is the political world.

There is no “actual” reduction to the usual traditional-conventional rhetoric or some “actual” political state where the “pure” Marxists or the “pure” capitalists exist because these supposed entities, states, or situations are –yes — already occurring in the discussion, as Nathaniel discusses, of term-object identities. The idea of ‘identity politics’ is a mistaken or distorted use of the the concept of the Term-object Identity in the same way that reality is a ‘mistaken’ apprehension of what is Real. They are dialectical mechanisms.

Now, the situation that I described above is the real political situation. It accounts for why we are having such huge discrepancy in political ideals and ability to get things done in government across the globe. It is the situation of what I call “no communication”. This situation of no communication is what Zizek refers to when he says that he does not see a way out of our capitalistic situation of inequality and exploitation, because it is exactly the ‘equality’ which is posed in the politically real estimation which is able to skim profit off of the ‘excess’ which occurs in the dialectic between what is true and what is real, between what is ‘equal’ in the dialectic of relation of what is Real, and what is ‘unequal’ in the dialectic of what is real politically. This current process of existing in which humanity finds itself now, seems inescapable because it is indeed how we function ethically, which is to say, in remaining fidelitous to what we know as true (Soren Kierkegaard defines this space, and Alain Badiou describes our activity within it).

OK. Peterson, on the other hand, sees a ways out. Both philosophers (Z and P) do not see any constructive point in continuing with the regular status quo situation which they both see in their ways. They both do not simply give up and be naive nor inauthentic (in the Kiekegaardian sense).

In another lecture, Peterson gives us a similar description of Capitalistic nihilism, of the situation that Zizek cannot see a way out of: Peterson describes the situation of larger projects losing their ability to be effective. His idea is thus that we must begin with the smallest or more local project. As he says, we must clean our own house first. We must begin with ourselves, put our own houses in order. He thus extends this manner of being able to get honest with oneself and associates it with a Christian kind of theme.

Both of these philosophers thus pose the same question, have a similar manner of understanding it, and also see that the only way through is, indeed, Capitalism; we must use what we have, and stop attempting to escape the problematic situation through all sorts of fantastic psychic mechanisms (for those kinds of ways of denial enforce the philosophical correlation). Hence, Peterson’s “see how apparently antagonistic positions can work to communicate”, and Zizek’s “think!” as their closing statements, respectively.

Yet, to focus on the small, segregated, details of the debate is exactly a capitalist manner of approaching discourse, even if one says they are Marxist. The hard Marxist activists are indeed perpetuating the capitalist agenda by constantly reifying routes of control for the capitalist congregant (all of us). It does not matter what kind of revolutionary (or fundamentalist) state would do or say to assert a proper manner to have reality because reality itself is being informed by the ontological exploitation of subjective excess. Hence, political-reality is that inescapable condition where philosophers find themselves. And yet, the move seems to be to stop attempting to be Gramsci-esque proponents for the masses, because so long as this kind of philosophically ‘enlightened’ manner attempts to alleviate the struggle of the disenfranchised, the activist has only asserted that those she would help are indeed lost, as they both become as now a positive historical cause.

Yet I am skeptical that siding with the super-wealthy (as some have already decided is best) will be any more effective, for they, as a general class, are “large scalers”, abusers of excess, exploiters of the world, creators of chaos and confusion.

Ok. I could go on, but I think Ive made my point. And if you ae really interested, you can always read mine and Nathaniel’s books.

Commenting on a Philosopher without giving him more undue celebrity.

I had an opportunity this morning to confront one of my biases. This one was about THe-Philosopher-Who-Will-Not-Be-Named (TPNN for short).

Look in the comments of my pervious post about Derrida for a short video of a piece of one of his talks.

I historically disliked TPNN Becuase I feel he is missing a key component of what he generallzes as Post Modern. HERE is someone who took the time to take apart another one of TPNN talks. Yet, I am not sure my disquiet about TPNN falls into that his idea of PM appears incomplete or that he does not address deeply the PM position, and then as well that his generalization is that PM is about the infinity of subjective interpretive possibility. So I have had an opportunity to look more thoroughly into my biases about TPNN.

I think my offense comes from that he only has only intellectually appropriated a general PM tenet, and thus, of course, at once misses vital elements of subjectivity as well then indeed suggests by his presence a faulty ideal of ‘going backwards’ to a Modernist position. He definitely says in that short video that the postmodernists are wrong.

One of the subtleties of my work is that I tend to stick with the argument that Graham Harmon makes in his book “Tool Being”, that it is not a power-play of one against the other. It is not that modernism was incorrect and that postmodern pointed out all the problems with Modernity and so offers a more true way of coming up on the situation, and thus we have now to show how PM is wrong. That is a philosophical naive way of viewing the situation.

Also, Zizek’s psychoanalysis does not confirm Peterson’s psychological approach either.

It seems that Jordan Peterson failed to read the authors that came out of the speculative realism conference 10 years ago, And particularly has failed to understand what Quinten Miellassoux termed “Correlationalism”.

TPNN is what I could call an overt advocate for religious reality, which in itself is not an incorrect position to be an advocate. Yet, One of the paradoxes about being in the religious mindset is that while being religious may not be an inherently incorrect or improper way of having a reality to deal with, the developed analyses and The reactionary politics that such kinds of analyses often rely upon if they do not explicitly elucidate them in initial parts of the analysis, Often show that they are not having the awareness that religious allowance does not necessarily convey or have to fall in line with a particular religious truth.

We find in our current democratic system that we can speak about God and we can allow people to have their religious beliefs as an ideal for a good society without having to advocate for the truth any one of those particular religious institutions. TPNN Tends to argue that we must adhere to a particular religious institution if we are saying that the religious view is allowed, but he is using intellectualism as a way to argue for his dogma. In short, he is misappropriating Postmodern thought towards his own ontological argument.

Begin the Hack.

Crack the alienated philosophical subjectivity.

CLICK HERE to BEGIN THE HACK !

“…of course we can talk about snow, for example, talk about what it is, describe how it feels what it looks like, bring forth chemical structures or physical structures of snow all the various aspects of snow — but if you’ve never been to where it snows it’s all really just entertainment and speculative thinking. It’s not difficult for people to understand Phenomenalism and it’s associations with Cartesian worlds and intentionality and correlationalism in the end, because that’s right here and everyone who thinks a little bit can find that the phenomenal central thinker is right here ready at hand, as Heidegger might say. But it’s difficult for people just merely to make a jump and start talking about objects philosophically. I mean, of course we can talk about objects we see objects everywhere; it’s fun and interesting to talk about objects if only because it’s a new philosophical way to address things. But there is no philosophical way yet, none of the philosophers that are talking about speculative objects have given us a real philosophical route into why we should be able to talk about objects in these ways except that we are able to, which is not a very philosophically comforting or satisfactory answer. It’s uncomfortable for philosophers — or it should be anyways — because it’s like talking to someone who’s lived their whole life in the desert about the truth of snow. Because they’ve never seen snow, they’ve never experienced snow and not only this but they don’t know how to get to someplace where there is snow. The philosophical hack addresses these issues and ,actually, does a pretty good job at through addressing them comes up with a solution that I don’t think I’ve ever seen anyone offer yet.”

Rory Andrews. Layperson thinker.

How do we go from phenomenal intention to an object ontology?

None of the speculative realist people have given us a viable route. They simply have started talking about something else, speaking in a different manner. They gave us a reason why it might be wanted, why it might be desirable and needed to start talking about the object, but they never really gave us a bridge into how we get there. Even the philosopher who coined the term, or at least made it popular, “correlationalism”,has really given us very little.

So, whether or not you’ve realized this problem and it has been nagging you for some 10 years now, or whether you just want to read an interesting philosophical book. BEGIN THE HACK.

It’s OK; no one is paying attention. In fact, most people would rather not attend to the loose ends.

CLICK HERE to BEGIN THE HACK ! The Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Event.

Navigating Climate.

Navigating Climate Tragedy – via Jem Bendell

Navigating Climate Tragedy – via Jem Bendell
— Read on syntheticzero.net/2018/10/04/deep-adaptation-a-map-for-navigating-climate-tragedy/

My comment:

“…That synthesis leads to a conclusion there will be a near term collapse in society with serious ramifications for the lives of readers. The paper reviews some of the reasons why collapse- denial may exist, in particular, in the professions of sustainability research and practice, therefore leading to these arguments having been absent from these fields until now.”

Denial of the collapse due to climate change.

I know you do not claim to be a philosopher. So I bare that in mind.

We have to ask what terms refer to. Say, for example ‘society’. Just as a thought experiment, what is that term referring to. Put it in you mind.

Can you tell me or refer me to what society is without using discourse?

Ok. Hold that feeling, that answer.

Now, what is ‘climate’? Again, apply the same questions.

In the philosophical discourse of climate change we have to consider all the possible meanings of climate which still refer back to this term/idea and recognize what occurs as I attempt to tell you or refer you to the climate aside from discourse. Which is to say, the assumption that is at root in the use of discourse to answer those above questions. Can you be explicit as to what such terms refer to without the assumption?

I ponder if at some point of noticing this phenomenon of communication one must admit that given a particular clause or phase or organization of phrases if it can be referring to more than one instance of an object, which is to say has more than a single referent? That is, and mean exactly the ‘same thing’ using the same Clausal structures and subsequent avenues of explanation?

So again: what climate is changing? Is it an ‘out there’ object to which the discourse refers, or is it the ‘climate’ of the discourse itself which is changing?

In mind of this thought experiment, the question Becomes a logistical question: How do you know?

Is it ‘obvious’? Is it because others are confirming to you what you understand ? Are you seeing what you want to see? When or where does culture come in?

Again: How do you know?

If we understand 20th century Western philosophy, The question must to be: to what universe are we referring to when we say that the climate is changing?

As I think you yourself have referenced,

How am I distinguishing what, say, a “philosophical world” is compared to an ‘actual world”? What is a ‘world-language’?

All of these questions inform the situation at hand.

So it is interesting to me that you are referring to an essay that is talking about people that are trying to conserve the climate, to perhaps somehow allow the climate to not change so drastically because this change in climate has been reported by people to mean that society is going to be disrupted or somehow damaged. And the abstract even references how are we to deal with people that are in denial of this climate change.

So it is interesting to me that it appears that you are referencing the fact that you call climate change, and you are asking or you are referring to that particular essay that is addressing people that are in denial of this climate that is changing.

And, what I thought was interesting, that in response to your comment on the other blog, (Xenogothic on patchwork subjectivities) I spoke about the situation of denial so far as the difference between language and discourse.

So this juxtaposition of apparently two different discourses within the same instance of use of language brings me to ponder what is being conserved and what society is at risk?

Of course these terms most often refer to something that is obvious, something that appears to obviously extended throughout the human condition that every individual human being should be able to conceive of and know of.

.And I say yes, language is able to refer to these various types of specific situations that are assumed for the common humanity as a common object that we call the universe and its various manifestations, that we affect by doing various things in good and bad ways. I am not arguing against this and in fact agree with that very conception and organization of thinking.

But at the same time, I understand that discourse itself organizes peoples ontological existence to refer to specific understandings of these concepts. These understandings are assumed to spill over into, onto or unto other human beings and reflect upon themselves for that particular being in existence automatically such that they cannot be ‘proven wrong’. This is to say, that there is a massive coincidence of climate, and so it is possible that when people talk of climate change, they are referring to this kind of climate (the “objective” kind) automatically and inherently, But then due to the denial involved with the phenomenological intensional being, many people attempt to control or otherwise prevent this type of climate change through effective denial of the relationship of their self, discourse and the world that is operating regardless of intention.

It is that’s possible that the discrepancy involved in the human being being involved with the universe in this manner, which is to say in denial of such climate changing, is in fact what contributes to the climate that changes.

Does that help?

A Philosophical Religion in the works

A Quick Note on Patchwork Subjectivities

A Quick Note on Patchwork Subjectivities
— Read on xenogothic.com/2018/09/29/a-quick-note-on-patchwork-subjectivities/

When reason is upheld in its potential to apprehend the truth of all things, the result witnesses the philosophical movement of the 20th century: We find then that philosophy begins to replay itself under different terms. This replaying, seeing itself as a true expression of the meaning of the traditional lineage, thus reiterates in pieces what has before been called whole ‘religion’.

The manifestation of these pieces, as embodiments of truth which are unable to view or consider outside of their own reflexive discursive sense, represent various manners of overcoming what we have recently called “correlationalism” (Miellassoux), but due to the nature of the automatic way that truth has arisen for these ‘pieces’, each solution itself manifests it own correlational limit.

I call these pieces ‘religious’ because they behave by their inclusive discursive assertion of self-evident truth as a complete cosmology and associated dogma.

The link above is to a blog which gives us a great example of how such Philosophical religions are functioning. There are a few WP blogs the authors of which deal exclusively with that particular philosophical religion as “Xenogothic”: And when you start to read their posts and engage with the authors, one can get a sense of their religiousness through the use of the dogmatic jargon.

The key in this estimation of religion, though, is in as much as at least this one (link) actually is describing that same situation as I, and it yet cannot get outside of its own reflexive theory-making to see their correlational faith is indeed operative. The theory is understood as indeed reflecting a view of a ‘patchwork’ of ‘fantasy worlds’ within the (somehow) actual world. And yet, even unto thus recognition, often and apparently, they are still unable to actually engage with these supposed ‘other’ worlds of the patchwork unless those other worlds subscribe to their particular theoretical discursive structure of terms and their definitions.

In short: It behaves as a religion for them, assuring to their own reasonable sense that their sense is absolutely correct and that any other discourse which challenges that sense is beneath consideration, as it represents to the religion that which is heretical or ‘uneducated’ to the truth, which ironically is discounted as an essential dogmatic component of the system.

In other words: There has been no effective philosophical break in the historical tradition in these philosophical religions to bring about an understanding of how discourse and reason are insufficient to relieve a subjectivity of its correlational faith. And this is why they indeed can be called philosophical religions: Because such a break indeed is possible, and does occur, religion serves to justify the subject who is unable to come upon such a break, as we see in the philosophy of the above link. Such philosophical religions inherently argue that no break is possible outside of the break that is represented by their reasonable philosophical theology.

Problematizing Whiteness; Correlation and the Two Routes.

In my very early and preliminary reflections on whiteness and being white it seems obvious to me that two issues are present in the philosophical reckoning.

1) The theoretical postmodern maxim of discursive reality.

And

2) The fact that no human Being is actually white. At best, even an albino is not truly white.

If there is a reduction or a larger meaning between these two aspects then it must fall into one of those categories. While it is not properly truthful to say that they are mutually exclusive, it is, so far, sensible to see that any argument that would be made would have to get its footing in one of these choices, ie either the argument is making a point about discursive reality and the manifestation of power, or, it is not making an argument.

Not making an argument? How can that be? You say.

There is no tension. Rather, the tension is come upon when both statements are understood within a methodological axiom where they occur in equal stature, both in the same existential space to be or as a question, both equally allowable and accessible to questioning. For example, each term of both phrases can be looked into to find its specific meaning, and at each step of inquiry, the results themselves are allowed to be questioned. This is usually what is meant by philosophy; this standard method has brought about a historical-traditional liturgy of reductionary theory and philosophical systems put forth by various free thinking and inspired people.

Yet when there is no tension, then the statements are seen to be describing what is obvious: 1) the post modern condition has to do with the organization of discursive structures and the corresponding belief that these structures reflect essences and or basic and operative realities ; 2) no living human being has ever been truly the colour white.

The sensible question should be what is the purpose of asking into these statements. For (1), the method is implicit: In bringing out Postmodern there is a invitation into discussing and debating what the statement means and whether it is true. (2) is not implicit; questioning into this statement would be more like a philosophical exercise , yet one that would seem to point out how the philosophical method can sometimes be taken too far, or be used for merely pondering and wondering; like the speculation that our universe could be but a speck of dust under the fingernail of a inconceivably large giant creature.

But again, the distinction of these into categories like I easily explained above, has shown us how argument falls into one of the categories themselves: Either it is relative or it is true; the discussion that takes place in the category that contains all humans, within the common category of human mental ability, has therefore already fallen into the meaning of the first statement, which, due to this seemingly automatic motion, can be come to be seen as a kind of religious dogma. It can be understood as areligious dogma because the plain fact of the two statements have already been tested. We have already found out that they are true beyond what argumentative proposals might confront them: The arguments necessarily fall back into the meaning of those statements unless we adhere to a special condition of the first statement, a condition that we automatically understand as obvious, a meaning that usurps as it calls all meaning to itself to thereby negate any other possibility situation. Hence we have located and identified a true aspect about the human being, and have begun along a different road in the effort to discover what the human being is. The question that informs this finding is “why are we still arguing whether or not the results are true when the same result has arisen through multiple testings of the same experiment?” This is how Philosophy retains its religious privilege of failing to become a science: Such a privilege is imposed as it is asserted. Religion allows for the human being to be infinitely creative in avoiding its determination and thus control — especially once it has established its power to control.

**

What I mean by this is the same or very similar to what we mean when we point to the near impossibility of getting outside or beyond capitalist ideology. Discourse is understood as communication of identity, which always involves a processual excess (transcendence) which when communicated “properly”is called progress (communion), and capitalism is the exploitation of this excess, again progress in evidence (“God’s Plan”). Because at this point, this moment in which this post for example is being read, anyone that has any higher sort of education at all will very soon come upon the reality that the argument about there being no skin colour that is naturally actually white in colour is an assertion of a discursive reality; shortly there after with a little bit of reflective thought people will inevitably stumble upon the fact that there is a sort of power that is being implemented in the use of the word “white” to describe human groups, social and cultural and economic positions and systems, in various sectors and for various reasons.

And yet there is indeed a certain factual basis that tells us in an obvious fashion that there is no human being that is white in colour. The next statement that would depart from relative discursive realities is the one that would say that the fact of there being no actual white person is true beyond what the discourse might reroute into a discursive reality, that is, to be argued and negotiated.

The involvement with the philosophical arguments around this issue thus becomes the issue, the issue that falls outside of a certain self-evident scheme of ideas.

But not everything is of ideas, you say.

The point then, the usual point, is that there is no argument to be made about whether or not being white is a discursive reality: The argument to be made must have to do with power relations and so is automatically reflective of this real situation of postmodern multivocal realities. In other words, there is no argument that can be made in the ethical region of common humanity that can argue that arguments about the problemitzation of whiteness should not be discussed; Even as we might be able to describe a situation where the discussion about race, power, and privilege becomes a secondary concern, we cannot, in good faith, dismiss the discussion as merely some sort of Idealistic fashion.

The only real way to get back to the things themselves is thus to create or establish or, even more, recognize that there is a partition that must occur. Some will cry “foul”, though, seeing this partition as another means to install a justification for segregation. But such a reaction is not comprehending the issue, nor the statement. Integral to this partition must be the fact that there are not separate species of human beings (we know that race is not a description of genetic fact), that ultimately whiteness as an indication of a particular group of people as well as a particular power structure of systems which is ultimately an ideology, and that this ideology a particular type of scheme of ideas that is been placed there necessarily. Nevertheless, this necessity is uncomfortable and tends to rely upon arguments that only make sense unto the ideology they support. Hence if we are to get around the contradiction that arises of the bare fact and the ethics that sees the necessity as incorrect, then we need to be able to theorize about the nature of Being that gets outside what necessarily has been given us for such Being. We find the placement of the postmodern as a rejection of this necessity. The problematization of whiteness is a pushback of ideas based in a universal ideal of proper human treatment. The idea struggles with itself.

We then must acknowledge that we are not allowed to acknowledge that we are dealing only with ideas: ethics demands that we are dealing with something that arises outside of discourse. And this is because of the insistence and near impossibility of getting outside what is present of discourse and it’s meaning, as an identity in itself. We must adhere to what is ethical to the common idea of humanity and no longer argue about what is real and what is Ideal, or what is actual compared to what is merely an idea. All such arguments are hopelessly caught in what philosophers Have termed lately “correlational”.

The very idea that we can formulate some sort of discourse that is able to get beyond what is correlational is itself based in a real idea founded in what is correlational, which is to say, discursive. The philosophical efforts that attempt to give to us some sort of argument to get us outside the correlational cycle is then, ultimately, based in the ideal that discourse is capable of identifying another way of getting to some actual situation of reality, an actual discourse that will lead, through its linking, to what is outside of discourse. Hence the continuation of the postmodern idea: correlation.

I’m not sure how many more ways I need to say it: If the problem is not understood by now then we have just realized an actual situation that occurs outside of what is correlational.

We’ll let that sit in a minute….

…..

Once this situation has taken hold, and is no longer an effort of building on quicksand, then we can begin to understand why identity has become the valued thing that founds real ability of human interaction with the world. We have to admit that what is real, while a discursive formulation, functions more akin to a religious institution on one hand, and a thing in-itself to notice and have on the other to thereby be able to use and discuss without worrying about whether what is correlational will suck it back into relativity and conventional philosophical speculation.

This means that we are able then to problematize whiteness without asserting or attempting to impose again a hierarchical racist structure. The issue will level out to become an issue of the human being because of the religious effect of a common humanity.

….

Everywhere is War…