Philosophy and Psychology as First Correlational Object

Considering the possible relation I put forward in a recent post, philosophy and psychology might define the first object to its correlational universe.

This would be in contrast to the Continental Philosophical theologians and the Religious Science congregants who perpetually wish to assert their own dominance over the object human; which is to say, an uneasy truce of individuals who all see themselves as having special privy to a part of a whole, like the fabled blind Buddhist monks experiencing pieces of an elephant.

Both are linked to higher given orders of transcendent spirit (potential hidden in everything which the thinking of agents of transcendence discovers or figures out) through which information is interpreted. Their faith thus demands them argue to the end, evangelizing all who already can ‘see the truth’ of thier orders. Both, though, participate in the same orientation upon objects and the view that should allow us a rational ‘truth-real’ coordination for thinking.

Yet the soul of things does not advocate such inspiration, and relies upon a humility of ‘being given’ without the culminating motion for rising up to the transcendent heights.

The soul of things, so to speak, might see Philosophy and psychology not only as complement to each other but actually complete each other like a two piece puzzle. The only problem is that many practitioners of either discipline see there’s as just one of a multitude of disciplines that go into what a human being is. And just speaking improvisationally, tentatively : Yes; from a phenomenological standpoint indeed a multitude of aspects can contribute to what is meaningful. But from a different standpoint indeed snow is snow. Water is water. Frozen is frozen. 32° is 32°. Hydrogen is hydrogen and the hydrogen bond is a hydrogen bond. The issue here is less meaning and more about how objects relate. Because one would have to ask silly questions like “what does snow mean?” Sure, we can come up with answers about what snow means but it really never tells us about what snow is except from the phenomenological standpoint, which is exactly the limit at which object ontology becomes an available yet distinct philosophical manner from phenomenological Philosophy as well as what we understand as science itself. Indeed probably the more difficult approach will be upon the catholic scientific faith, because, just like back in the day when Catholicism was the religion of the day, who can really say anything against it without getting their head chopped off?

“Of course Catholicism is God’s ordained religion, proceeding naturally from what we can possibly know of the universe history and the human being.”

How different is this to say “of course science is the true way of things, discovering what is actually true of the universe history and the human being”.

How do you overcome that absolutely set manner of understanding reality?

Well, as I’ve talked about in earlier posts: you don’t.

Just like in race relations and Courageous conversations, we aren’t here to convince anyone about what is the truth. If you can pick up what we’re laying down then you might be interested; if you can’t then, hey good luck to you.

Catholicism did not lose power because people were convinced Through argument that it wasn’t God’s ordained True religion. It lost power because it became obvious to people that it wasn’t the case.


It would be ridiculous to try and argue that science isn’t scientific and it’s not dealing with real things. One simply cannot argue against these facts.

But just as logic is not something that finds us the truth, but is rather a tool to use upon things, so facts can be used and assembled in different ways for different uses. Presently science, as a category, is a particular assemblage of facts which gain for us a reality for a particular purpose, or use.

The Ancient Egyptian Empire lasted something like 3000 years. We know it now as bases in myth.

Modern Science has been around maybe 300. Can we prove that science is not as well a myth without merely referring to the modern ways of proof?

We ca d fullan similarly ask, can we prove the lesser status of people of color without referring to whiteness for the basis of that proof?