The paradox of modern ontological reckoning is always constitutive. The activity of modern academic theory is a reification that such constitution can be overcome or changed, despite its argumentative semantic content (see. Lyotard as well as Haroway and Barad). X
—-referring to the previous linked essay by Thomas-Pellicer, Ruth, De Lucia, Vito (2016)
This rhetoric describes (it has no agency to inscribe) the inherent offense which thereby we are able to understand modern cosmology as a religious order. In this sense, “ideology” is a theological tenet that shift’s responsibility to Other, away from the horizon of discourse onto an essential spirit, if you will, that is neatly avoided by the religious act itself.
Religion, in the sense, is defined by a categorical offense. A contradiction, but more so, any motional rejection which lay at the core of all identity for modern being.
New materialisms have identified this basic offense as body. …The problem with the academic methodological core is that Word PressBlocks are shite.
Now Stepping back into this post from the basic annoyance of the platform that I have to use in order to post a simple idea (WordPress Blocks)…
The way, process, anti-ontological route, by which the new materialists attempt to overcome the modern faults uses the method in the attempt to overcome it, and thereby denies by its very act the meaning that it proposes.
I’m reading this essay about “re-embodiments“. the basic force of the paper and the ideas there of I generally agree with. However, at the same time, the fact that they have to situate their meaning within traditional discourse is —
as though the argument might be able to dispel the modern categories, the modern polemics, the either/or political foundation through which we find social identity,
—merely shows that they have to rely upon the problem itself in order to give us any sort of idea of overcoming the problem. Basically, they have to tell us that the problem is inherent their solution. And this method, this giving and taking away that we notice of the post modern theorists in general from the 20th century, shows that we are really not getting anywhere but more problem.
The problem is this constituent of being, again, as I agree with the general force of the argument itself, ironically.
Where I differ is in so much as they attempt, often, to do away with certain terms by inventing new terms. Basically, they see that the old terms are embedded in a political discourse of history, so many of the new materialists feel, it seems, that they need to come up with new terms that somehow get beyond or disrupt the old terms. So, instead of using “body“, which, some authors say merely reify the mind-body distinction, they talk about “re-embodiment”.
I say that the use of the word “body” does not necessarily imply mind as a counterpart, and that to think that it does merely shows an orientation in the modern way of being, the modern way of understanding where by everything is political, and discursive at that.
I say that my cup of coffee is a body. The body that is the cup. The body that is the coffee. The body of work that may be any discussion about that cup of coffee. There is no difference in this sense between the body that is the computer monitor in space in front of me, and the body that I inhabit as myself in the universe, and the bodies of knowledge that likewise arise in the universe as such, as a body.
The body of knowledge about myself is of no different quality in itself than the body the computer monitor embraces, constitutes, and embodies in itself. The body of knowledge is no different as a thing that arises in the universe, the body of the universe, than the celestial bodies themselves, the planets as well as the body of forces between them, nor the bodies of knowledge that concern them and are involved with them.
——- Physician, heal thyself!
I love this post. Not only is it a Nice reflection upon the situation, but I also think it indicates a problem in philosophy: it has no body !
I think one of the things that we found out in late 20th century Philosophy. and coming into the 21st-century, is, that human beings have an ability to cast its self it’s ideas, upon the world and make the World answer to its ideas.
This is particularly a 20th century phenomenon. To the extent that many of us are not able to read philosophy that arises outside of the 20th century within its own temporal manifestation. We simply are unabke to conceptualize what they were talking about in the proper sense of what they were talking about becuase of the manner that philosophy is prefugured now in the ideological context of nothingness; we hear everything, read all text, in the context of an atemporal yet universal code of words, of idealized thoughts of definition.
The issue with 20th century philosophy ever since Wittgenstein , but I might even say ever since Kierkegaard pointed it out rather specifically, without actually naming it I would say (lol. Kierkegaard talked about it specifically but never named it in a way that the 20th century could understand)– it is that we are able to become enamored with ourselves and us see the world in our own image. (Lacan’s mirror stage). And this is so much the case that we are unable to even consider philosophy that didn’t arise in our 20th century understanding of it: that is the definition of the end of philosophy that we had been dealing with for the past 20 years at least. namely, that philosophy argues its own self reflection as the valid point across all philosophical dimensions, time being that main component, that main dimensional feature of being.
And without going into the further discussion of this discrepancy that makes Philosopher is so adamant and adherent to their own view, as though ones own view is able to argue with someone else’s view, that is, is even able to encounter it– this is the definition of modern subjectivity that brings about the end of philosophy, anyway we want to put it, this is the fundamental and basic issue that we are dealing with. And, We might say, is the reason why “realism” has become so popular lately: as though suddenly we can change our interests and be able to change how we see things. We’ve been so caught up in ideas and thoughts, now we are trying to find what is actually “real”. ￼
But my point is less intellectual. philosophy argues itself into its own ontological corner through its reliance upon epistemological identity, which is to say, where we see and understand terms as identifying some thing that exists between people who think, but also between the thought in the world, thereby are we are caught ultimately in an idealism. For any other name.
This is what Michel Foucualt and perhaps others, were dealing with in their works; this particular issue that keeps coming up over and over again. Recall Kierkegaard’s work “repetition”.
The body was “cut away” by the surging force of the intellect, until the ‘gaze’ that the intellect identified with the object became the whole of interest: This is clinical medicine. The body was replaced with a holistic version of the intellectual gaze of sense. Disease became positive and the body negative until we now no longer even an ability to ground knowledge except in the gaze-idea, the knowledge-power of the subject of reality.
And philosophy has supported the whole notion the whole way. The basic issue is that Philosophy has removed itself from the body by which it originally gained credence.
Yet, in contrast to the modern ideological development and to point the view to where it does not want to look: I will go so far as to say that there is nothing that exists in the universe that does not have a body. And this is to say that everything and anything that has any sort of truth that we work with is a body. Hence we find many authors talking about this very thing, even though they might not put it in terms of “a body”. Many authors talk about how Philosophy. has just become subjective abstraction, various idealisms caught in their own subjective worlds asserting themselves over other peoples essential Transcendent represented in words.
The problem is that we are talking about nothing; we are talking about talking. That philosophy has become an eternal argument about vacuous idealism.
Emotions are about reactivity. They direct or tend.
Thoughts are about transcendence.
While fear can be understood as an emotion, it is also able to be understood as something which affects an otherwise functional (efficient) system. Fear is that which creates dysfunction through making its agency appear necessary to the functioning of the system itself, Or at least an integral part of it. It posits one’s arguing out of one’s limitations as a way to avoid what the limitation actually is in itself.
In this sense, Fear exploits a vulnerable teleological tendency or thread that runs through these three different aspects of Being. It then emphasizes or exacerbates the ideal of the unitive creature that Is the singular path among those things, that is, which presents those things as inherent and inseparable from Being.
It is not difficult then to see a correlation between identity, fear, scarcity and modern capitalism.
To overcome fear, one might see that fear itself is an agent which enacts operations, Or brings about and ordering to actions, as opposed to an innate (a part of, or inseparable from) feature of a functional (or dysfunctional) human being. Less as an evolutionary adaptation or trait, it is possible to use the same kind of ability to conceive in order to understand fear more as a kind of symbiotic or parasitic agent.
The dysfunction which might be said to arise around being-in-fear Is the orientation upon Being which sees the thread as granting the (only) source of valid coherence. As though the agent is necessarily a vital part of the human being it Self, which is to say The only agent that matters to identify an agent.
It is the emphasis on transcendence, the encompassment that thought wants (desire) to enact upon Being, which allows fear to color Being to a unique identity of truth, which is to say, fear inscribes subjective truth. Less to the ubiquity of opinion, and more that thinking does not notice how fear has co-opted its ability to discern what the truth is. The transcendence in which truth invests it’s self misses that there is even an emotion in play at all, and decides for itself And everything else in its imposed unity, what emotion shall be. The focusing and insistence upon thought as the designation of a true being Thereby nullifies emotion by making it subject to thought’s domain, as though thought can have an ability to know the essence of emotion outside of its own designation. Which is to say, as though thought— and only thought— is indeed being human. One might even go so far as to suggest that the concept of anxiety arises as thought continues to impose its dominion upon a body which essentially does not recognize its authority.
Fear is the thread which induces thought to link all human being processes together. Fear, in a manner of speaking, is the losing of desire. It is redundant in its operation in the sense of how we might use the analogy of a computer which has redundant operations; ie failures in one section will not cause or bring about the collapse of the whole system. Where the analogy fails for the human being though is that this idea of collapse is it self invested in the unitive being of fear. That indeed a collapse of the total system does not mean that the human being has died or ceased in its ability to be effective; on the contrary, what occurs ironically is that the human being becomes more effective because it exists no longer in an isolated fear-based world.
The feminist effort is always a gravity that brings the object back to in itself. Always the meaning that accounts for transcendence as a non- religious posture, which is to say, as merely real, essential ideological subjects.
Edited by Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman and published in 2008, Material Feminisms reads something like a group manifesto. Contributors include Alaimo and Heckman, along with Karen Barad, Claire Colebrook, Elisabeth Grosz, Donna Haraway, and others. With philosophical roots in phenomenology and post-phenomenology, the project is to return feminist theory “back” to the thing itself, […]