The logic of Two Routes in Application. A Discourse in Freedom.

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The very interesting thing about this 5G (if not all of modern technology) Is that it means nothing less than volunteered enslavement. It is no mere coincidence that lately the nature of free-will is being commandeered by neurobiology: It is not that we are not or cannot be free, rather, it is that if we want to be free we would actually have to fight for it, and who (in their right mind) would want to argue with Neuroscience? (trick question: the battle does not reduce to a confrontation with neuroscience.)

The keen indication is that the modern free agent is what it has always been: A rare artifact in the imposing consciousness. There has never been a free humanity; on the contrary, there has only been a few free people that speak in such a way that everyone else wants to be and so the “commoners” start to use the language of “the free”, or way a speaking (way of organizing discourse).

We can get a glimpse of what freedom might actually be beyond the relative conventional scientific assertion (conventional philosophy; theological and ideological rhetoric; mistaken ((the weak)) postmodernism) when we think about the various social scientists and psychologist’s developmental models of morality. Very few people, they suppose, reach what we could call the “higher” stages of moralistic thinking (moralistic thinking reflects a kind of intellectual ability or capacity). And yet most everyone likes to think of themselves as though they are of this higher bracket of thinking.

Nevertheless, only a few people really have the ability or capacity to think about the world in this “higher” kind of moralistic manner. These few people are able to formulate sentences and meanings (structure discourse) of this “higher” manner of being able to perceive the world in what it does, and in so indeed speak of something that is common to the human creature. Those who do not think through this manner (have this moral capacity), though, who reside within a “lower” stage which is basically, for lack of a better term, being law abiding and having a sense of good that comes from absolutes (relativity is an absolute in as much as relativity must mean or indicate a definite quality absolutely and not just relatively) see or otherwise understand that transcendental essences are being expressed in these discourses, such as the topics that the Socratic dialogues entertained, e.g. justice, virtue and such; most people fall into this latter general category of being, to various degrees of ability and development, law-abiding and having essential truths based in good and bad, right and wrong, etc.

After not too long, the appropriation of the “higher” discourse into the law abiding scheme defines a technological space which forbids the delineation of a human being which is not entirely encompassed by the technological ideal of free agency. Nietzsche said as much: Technology equivocates humanity to the lowest common manner, all the while allowing for the “Idols” of equivocation to take control of the common agents. This is Nietzsche’s meaning of enslavement, or the slave mentality. Because the former “higher” order of “moralism”, being communicated in a particular manner, draws their natural attentions to what is good and just (viewed as essential or absolute categories), such people begin to behave in such a manner that these discourses seem to be advocating. They do this unthoughtfully and automatically as part of their critical process; that is, these higher discourses appear to them to be communicating a rationality of the absolute (unrecognized in-self reflection: the view of conventional faith). Yet, such people really do not understand this “other way” of understanding the world through a broadened moralistic intelligence, thus de facto do not have the ability to think through these discourses nor really what these kind of discourses mean or are indicating in themselves, and thus take these discourses as indicating elaborations upon what is right and wrong, good and bad in essence; In short, they take these discourses as being a discussion about absolutes or essences of law.

This is the significance of technology: Two manners of viewing technology inform human beings, or what we could now rightly call, world citizens, as to what is true and real. One manner understands its freedom as an essential tenet of being human given the conditions of free agency to manipulate and develop useful technologies, which then function as a closed system or ideology which supports the ideal of the free agent. Another manner speaks truthfully about what is occurring in the actual relationship with technology that is being human in the world. The latter’s use of discourse thus (sometimes inadvertently, but more often with intension) serves to consolidate the technological authority’s ability and capacity to control agents through refining the ideal of freedom. In other words, most people are enslaved and have no actual ability to enact any effective countermeasures to abort such confining motion because the nature of their intellectual capacity prevents them from truly grasping that situation by which they indeed are being human in the world.

It really is an ignorant bliss disguised by intellectual complexity and sophistication (sophistry).

The Impossible. Part 1; If/Then.

The impossible can be discovered along many significant vectors of reality as limit. The particular discussion that contains or otherwise accounts for the various vectorial meanings is ironic; it is the event that begins the count, that can be said to to be a basis upon which a linking of meaningful terms is made that presents the truth. That by which irony is informed, due to its unknowable prior linkage, is impossible. What is possible is made upon the meaningful linking of the event which places it among other events in an eternal conventional relativity of True Objects.

In reading this essay, one might understand that while it addresses a particular discourse, it explains many. When discovering conventional limit and the situation concerning reality, one thereby begins to understand what true agency can be in revealing reality’s counter-partial not real situations.

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The search for truth through a negotiation of objects, or limits, establishes reality; if we are seeking a truth that is not negotiated then we must no longer attempt to discern what is more real. The assertion that there is some article of knowledge that is more real than another is of conventional faith, which, as we may have seen, does not find the truth, but only the True Object, the object of faith. For the conversation to mean anything beyond merely repeating what was before, it must be about effects.

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I cannot deny that to believe that there was a man, who actually was the son of the most high and true god sent to earth, who actually existed as a human 2000 years ago, for whom the Gospels are a history of, is an act of faith. In fact, it is difficult to believe this, so to believe it must be a truly significant feat of faith. For me, it is absolutely incredible, and perhaps, I admit, this is exactly where I do not have faith, except that it is an article of a type of faith. Yet I can, in good faith, believe that it is possible to have faith in such an idea.

Because I can have such a faith, I can also see that the faith in the article presents a dubious situation. My faith in the Idea of the idea is not troublesome, but the process of understanding the Idea can be. It is the one of this latter faith that has made a choice of a difficult path, as I said, to believe in something that by a certain standard is incredible; hence requiring the choice to have faith in it. The redundancy that is denied through the standard brings the nobility of requiring faith; it brings the incredible to its stature of needing faith, and a resultant choice. But by this same criterion, the incredible, I submit that there is an even more difficult article to choose to have faith in, since in order to have faith in this alternate article, the standard, one would have to choose to believe that he has no choice, for the standard is what grants the situation of choice, in that one has no choice in that he has choice, or must be choosing. The faith in the article that presents a situation of having no choice likewise then requires that the idea of faith be relinquished, since the act of faith itself is based in choosing to believe something incredible.

Here then, we can come upon a duality that presents the incredible as something one must have faith in as opposed to that which one need not have faith in for it to be true, such as, everyday reality. In this way the object of faith is understood as exceptional to everyday reality, but the incredible is still possible. It may be just barely possible, but it is possible enough that faith is required to believe it; that is, it is still believable: The standard is given, does not require faith for it to be true, and the incredible requires faith. The significance here is that it, the situation, is not impossible, for it is the impossible that is truly difficult. Yet once what is really difficult to have faith in is realized for what it truely is, which is the standard, then what was once incredible no longer requires faith for it to be true – but also the reverse. This is to say, the standard that is true allows for the incredible that may be true through faith, but what is incredible through the terms of faith, the meaning of what can be incredible, is brought by the terms of the standard; hence, what is true regarding the incredible is nothing more than an extension of the standard, and thereby what is of the standard is likewise or consistently come upon by faith. This is the transitive set. The real difference allowed through the standard for the incredible is exactly of faith, but this, so far as the standard becomes true through faith, is a step into the impossible, the absurd, insanity. The common standard of reality is granted through faith; this is impossible.

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To believe that humanity exists along some sort of continuous thread, that the past and future can be a part of this thread, and that human beings are set upon this thread with a certain fundamental condition that at once is of a same type, inherently and innately discrepant, ‘sinful’ to use a term, such that a figure was or is set upon or within this thread so as to draw all sinners unto itself as relief for the condition – which is to say, this first condition is but an ‘eternal’ condition, against which a second condition then also shows itself: that human beings are involved with a movement of progress that gains its quality upon the first condition, where the resistance to the first condition defines the situation of the second – this is a development upon the point of contention as I see it: the significant difference between what calls for faith, and what is truly impossible.

Jesus can be viewed in the forgoing two ways against each of two conditions, and this gives a quadripartite; the eternal condition of duality and its reconciliation or removal, each applied to (A) and (B) below, disseminates as follows:

A) Jesus the actual Son of God, actually manifest as an individual human being 2000 years ago. This figure is clamed to be able to absolve human beings who exist at all times subsequent to his moment, of their inherent sin. Jesus thus has eternal power despite the passage of time.

The individual existing at any time always has the potential to access the eternal Jesus through choice. They become saved regardless of the actual historical condition of progress as it has moved away from Jesus; time reveals humanity dealing with Christ in history as it progresses to rebuke him until its greatest despair, when Jesus will return to save that humanity. The basic idea is that of a confused or aggravated individual extrapolated in history who comes to believe in Jesus and is thereby relieved of his aggravation. This aggravation can be called ‘sin’.

B) The human being exists within no actual temporal sphere. The functioning of consciousness behaves so as to allow meaning of reality. Reality is thus not separate to what meaning is had of it. 2000 years ago is a situation of consciousness, a particular formation or construction of meaning by which other things have real relations; no 2000 years ago exists beyond the scheme of meaning that would understand it, and in the understanding of this condition as a mere condition, 2000 years ago is actually ‘happening’ now, in consciousness, as meaning. Jesus is the human being who has ‘awakened’ to his existence. Jesus thus is the figure representative that indicates in words the situation of the human being who likewise has come unto his existence of the eternal moment, as those who have likewise such knowledge ‘hear’ the words of eternity, that is, of describing the same atemporal condition. Once such words are heard, it is because no other meaning could have come forth from existence, and this is to say that one has no choice in the meaning which he has gained from the words.

Yet, typically the individual of reality sees it through a lens of historical time that exists in actuality, one thing arising from another, contingent upon actual conditions of things moving in essential time. Ironically, in such a state, the individual is ‘aggravated’, is in ‘sin’ due to the mistaken ideas of reality, the limit that is the reasoned and knowable aspects of reality, so while it seeks really its own existence, it perpetually and continually puts it off in seeking into temporal things, thus creating the world, but also by mistaken default, creating the condition of being divided unto itself, this condition that is capable of arguing an actual Jesus individual God-human being that bridges the unassailable gap, the condition of (A) above.

This dialectic brings us to a situation where one might say that these two versions are equal in effect, where both (A) and (B) can be understood to account for a lack, in (A) by Jesus, in (B) by the potential of knowledge, but I must say that where (B) appears as a more comprehensive account of what is represented, it also seems to bring a reasonable defaulting – in the extreme case – to (A), due to its similar limit. (B), though it may seem more appealing, does thus not seem to solve anything since it develops a polemic with (A), which, in the last, is merely repeating (A) in different terms. At last, then, (A) seems to me not to work; again, it is insoluble, for this reason:

The effect (A) appears to reify and maintain the problem, since the individual is still left to his capacity or ability to believe, which then apparency compounds the problem because the believer still vacillates in moments of question, willingness, and perhaps sinfulness, basically over their own inadiquacy. And it seems even one so devout in his faith is only so through selective denial, who then gets angry at what offends his faith, and who cannot help but turn a blind eye to logic that would show him where his belief may be lacking.

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What ‘Jesus’ (as I develop both possibilities, A and B above) accomplished might be described in this way: Below, items (1), (2), (3) present the possibility that what is impossible lays in an absolute polemical relation to what is possible, the principle of exclusion, or being a part; item (4) is thus impossible with reference to the first three, the principle of inclusion, or belonging:

(1) The dual understanding of (A); (2) the dual understanding of (B); (3) the dual understanding of (A) against (B); (4) the understanding that includes these three possibilities.

Which is to say: If, either, either A or B, or, either 1 or 2, then 4.

In short, we have moved from the ‘either/or’ possibility into, what I call, the ‘if/then’.

To explain; (A) is that of admitted faith that claims the actual Jesus as God Christ; (B) is that not admitted of faith that claims Jesus as part of the negotiation of reality; the true method of knowledge will bring understanding of truth. (1) is the duality inherent in the consequence of not having faith, i.e., going to hell, say; (2) is the duality inherent in the consequence of having faith, i.e., that we do live in a progressive temporal causality. (3) is the either/or condition that argues the veracity of either (A) or (B), which is really, (4) the inclusion of (A) in (B), which is the standard of non-philosophy as method.

The problem lay in the situation of (3), which defines the polemic of faith and establishes the true within reality, the preliminary (4); reality, while admitting faith, does not require faith. Faith thus belongs to reality, but reality does not belong to faith. The event is reality and faith is included in what may constitute the event, or the count that was initiated as the event. But what we have in the method of non-philosophy is a restating, a repetition, of either/or. The methodological event of non-philosophy poses its limit in the Real even while Laruelle attempts to disperse the Real from its object; yet to distinguish what becomes the non-philosophical philosophical object, we should not propose a ‘one-in-one’ because then the ‘unilateral duality’ becomes an identifier of limit, of a knowable true object, another philosophical object – either that object or this object. This feature of non-philosophy evidences bad faith; thereby we can have his Gnostic base, as well as method. To assert or otherwise argue a Real overdetermines in the last instance the meaning of convention, which is, in the first, a progressing knowledge or order of true objects, which is, in the last, merely another assertion of faith, merely another repetition of ‘either A or B, and 4′, the eternal linking that is the critique by the differend, whereby no progress is made beyond (A,B). It is no wonder that Laruelle expounds upon a ‘Future Christ’. Yet, where non-philosophy presents and does not represent, there and only there is ‘if (A,B) then 4’, there is the impossible; here is aphilosophy. The object has become the occasion of the condition by which I can exist in reality.

The argument for truth that seeks what is more real resides in the confines of which Jesus is part and only possibly significant. Here, the state of reality I call ‘convention’. The impossible move is to see that what is of choice (A,B), by virtue of the impossible, requires or is otherwise constituted by a faith that cannot but be situated in the way it is by the standard for it to present the object of faith, and in this, involves no choice. Yet if I have somehow chosen the impossible, then that by which I may not have chosen requires faith. Jesus, in this way, can be said to have achieved the impossible, but where this is possible, Jesus is not necessary.

The irony cannot be overestimated.

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But wait, there’s more! Always more – but nevermore.