Getting Somewhere with Correspondence. Reply to Partha.

This is a reply to Partha Parthesarathy comment in my comment prefacing my reposting of Harman’s OO Philosophy blog posting (reposting), “…Obrist Interviews Michel Serres”. (Just prior to this post.)

The occasion seemed right to make a post of my reply, since when I speak of correspondence, I should be able to indicate what Serres’ ideas correspond to…


Partha; thank you for your reply. I am not entirely sure of your meaning due to your English skills, I believe (unless it is just bad texting :)) But If it is language limitation then am not shaming you for that because I only know English and feel quite embarrassed and poor in my single language proficiency; I admire you for your ability and bravery to exercise it and for learning.

It seems to me you are saying that the transformation is indeed the conveyance of significance in ideology. That the ‘center”, so to speak, is that which knows all, and that ideology is the limitation of this ‘center’, such that to be able to convey the significance of the ‘center’ as it indeed behaves as center of the ideology, as its manifestation as such, is the so sought after transformation.

This would thus be to say that the point of contention is the boundary between what is real and not real, ideology and — not nothingness, but it’s possibility: the ‘edge’ or the least possibility of ideology as void, manifest, as we might say, as ‘center’, what I have called the ‘Significant Event’. As you may have noticed from my essays (or not), I attempt to expose what this ‘edge’ is, what occurs there. Hence, the significant transformation might be to bring light upon this most hidden and marginalized aspect of ideological pomposity and presumption (irony included and intended).

For what I was saying, that led you to comment, and led me to respond (if even from a mistaken meaning) is that philosophy poses a sort of transformation (revolution; conversion in the ‘new’ Harman universe) of the human-on-the-scene into a type of ‘new enlightened human agent’. Yet I am proposing that such transformation only occurs in reality and has no basis beyond its real inscription: No movement occurs except within an ideological faith, and faith is based inherently in a denial expressed in its deceptive mode. For what I am attempting to expose is that space of ‘eternal’ position wherein no transformation is possible, that horizon wherein movement occurs along a necessary and determined vector, determined by the point of insertion and trajectory of its entrance, which thus falls into a ‘singular’ mode due to its necessary motion, but yet by its involvement with ideology (reality) — itself as ‘center’ is not real — posits a transformation from the position of real determinations that never occurs except as an aspect of faith.

The description of such an ‘eternal’ position thus is not so much a ‘void’ or ‘nothing’ as it is (as I have just said above) a kind of ‘evental horizon’: The constituency of a black hole is purely arbitrary and theoretically speculative, and in essence, beyond any ability to know of. That is, except that there is a real universe that notices such a hole. So perhaps one could say that where the individual resides in the conventional universe, her ideas about what may be the ‘hole-ness’ of the black hole (eternity; nothingness; void) amount to being merely a placeholder, a marker by which one may ‘jump’ from the real universe to the true universe — as if — but without ever enjoining with the horizon that can only be said to be not real, but through which one would have to travel in order to ever get to the true hole-ness of the black hole as well as the reality of the conventional universe. For, if there were no conventionally noticeable ‘hole’ then the conventional universe would not be conventional, it would be merely ‘universe’ and true, at that against a purely supernatural (metaphysical; speculative) conclusion gained by the lack of such referent void — as this is exactly the conventional ideological operative premise, it’s presumption of its ability to address all that is true. (See that this ‘physics-being’ correlation is all purely an analogy). And to boot; as we say and attempt to describe the truth of presumption of the not real center: There is no lack, but that the move or jump to the void is exactly part of the transcendental clause (see Badiou, the ‘immortal subject’, Ethics., as well as Kierkegaard’s ‘leap’).


Partha, if this is what you meant to incite by your reply, then I find it quite provocative. If not, then the mistakes of your conveyance still then nevertheless has provoked a significant meaning, and I thank you for your involvement. Though then also I would ask if you could clarify your intended meaning.

Katerina Kolozova on The Real in Contemporary Philosophy

Simply and best put: Reality is that which we deal with every day as every day things, even as an everyday thing may be to be a philosophical theorist the theory with which she deals everyday: hence the real corresponding rhetoric: conventional methodology.

Kolozova evidences the real transformation of reality as reality is the occasion of experiencing real events.

synthetic zerø

The Real in Contemporary Philosophy

Katerina Kolozova

What Baudrillard called the perfect crime has become the malaise of the global(ized) intellectual of the beginning of the 21’st century. The “perfect crime” in question is the murder of the real, carried out in such way as to create the conviction it never existed and that the traces of its erased existence were mere symptom of its implacable originary absence. The era of postmodernism has been one of oversaturation with signification as a reality in its own right and also as the only possible reality. In 1995, with the publication of The Perfect Crime, Baudrillard declared full realization of the danger he warned against as early as in 1976 in his book The Symbolic Exchange and Death. The latter book centered on the plea to affirm reality in its form of negativity, i.e., as death and the trauma of interrupted life. And…

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Homeland: A Little Bitty Introduction to the Post-Post Modern Modern Subject.

Here’s a tiny consideration, if just for the fun of it.

A little late to the party, I watched season one of the Showtime series “Homeland”. In very Zizekian fashion, this story can be a sign of our times.

This is just a quick and general comment and perhaps later I will expand to write a Zizekian type essay and describe the all the plot vectors and their relevancy. If one is curious for specifics, I guess for now they will have to watch “Homeland”.


The general plot line of the the story can be seen to outline the plight of the philosophical subject in the world of objects.

The issue still arises with the quite Hiedeggarian theme of the homeland. Quite ironic this show is called “Homeland”.

The main philosophical subject is CIA agent Carrie Mathison. She is characterized in the series as suffering from bi-polar disorder controlled by medication. She is able to interact constructively and effectively in the world so long as she takes her meds.

Her intuitions about the situation is correct, but seemingly random contingencies occur in the real blind spot to make her appear all the more crazy.

Sgt Nicolas Brody represents the real philosophical subject (Dasein), in a quite Badiou-ian vector. His plight is similar to Carrie’s and the plotline of the story concerns the interaction between these two subjects: The real religious inspired subject, and the intuitive ideological subject. Both are acting within reality determined along the unfolding lines of contingency.

The significant role of philosophy is to outline these two subjects. The first season of the show “Homeland” represents the real situation of the subject after the conventional subject (phenomenon) has played out historically.

Bring out the Hard Hittin’ Mother F****rs.

The issue of the subject is always dealt with. While I am working on developing the Significant Event, I will put forth another aspect of my work concerning the subject. Though history is filled with examples, I will focus upon five contemporary authors that appear to restate the issue in an array that appears to grant us the situation in a technicolor not previously noticed. Though Im sure this is an early prototype, my examples are Lyotard. Zizek, Laruelle, Badiou, and Harman.


A common duality is noticed and exemplified. Various authors deal with it in various manners. The situation at hand can be linked to a whole history of the subject, and thus I outline briefly this history, but we should see that such a progressive representation is only for the convenience and procurement for conventionality, for each of these displays of the subject occur at all times in all places. For example; there was no ‘post-modern’ era in which a supposed people behaved, accommodated and or thought in a particular fashion that is ‘post-modern’ as opposed to any other time when human beings wandered and interacted with the world and one another. The greater human society is at all times a conglomerate made up of various individuals of ‘modern’, ‘enlightened’, ‘post-modern’, ‘romantic’, ‘rational’, etcetera, temperament, ideals, passions and demeanors. The idea that humanity as an historic whole has passed through stages of thinking is a philosophical issue which I will address (perhaps eventually) in the re-establishing of the polemic in terms of real and not real, and by which ideas such as power, hegemony, ideology have found purchase in the critical discussion of history and society.


Lyotard exemplifies the ‘problem’. The subject is found in duality wherein objects cannot be formulated to their true meaning. The meaning of the duality as such, the subject and object itself within a scheme of meaning, upholds the veracity of the subject in its attempt to communicate the situation, and thus upholds the veracity of the duality due to the object apparently presenting a ‘misconstruing’ of the overt presentations of the effort, which is discourse. The subject in reality is thus processes, effectuates, plays a role, and ultimately becomes the role that is played.

Zizek exemplifies the ‘process’. Here duality emerges ‘as the moment in which’, so to speak, such that historical and real events coalesce in an ever present moment. The duality is sublated in the process of the subject. The expression notices the simultaneity of the subject and object; the world is occasions for notices of irony.

Laruelle exemplifies the ‘effects’. The duality is noticed as its polemical situation. The ‘object’, or that by which duality is obtained and noticed, is found in the difficulty to express the very situation by which it is noticed, such that the ‘subject’ is situated in a description of this polemical situation, as an ironic ‘settling’ that removes the ironic problem by ‘setting’ the problem resolutely in the dual problem instead of trying to re-solve it (again) as a systematic assertion in a ‘one whole’. The situation is described as it is also a method by which to gain the notice of the polemical situation. Irony is set in its duality for a resolution to ‘one side’; the effect is emphasized as it can be a result of method.

Badiou exemplifies the ‘plays a role’. The subject arises in reality from its (reality) inherent polemical counterpart (void), and thereby ‘sutures’ the duality as reality through the very presence of the subject. The subject thus amounts to the ‘whole’ situation, accounting for itself as discernible and indiscernible counter-partial real elements, determined as a vectorial presence of being. Objects thus are already accounted for by the truth procedure of the fidelitous subject, but nevertheless (already) transform the being of the subject into its object as presence. The duality reifies the subject of Lyotard through its necessary ‘giving up the truth’ to the reality of the object.

Harman exemplifies the ‘became the role’. The subject, and thus duality as an issue of the subject, is given up entirely such that the role given by the object is taken on as the subject’s truth. A complete transformation has occurred, and hence a ‘real break’ has occurred.


By this exposing of the subject as object, and the various displays of theory, the subject itself, it’s mode and manner of ‘being able to’ or ‘having to’ may come to light through two problematics (these terms are tentative):

Distance: The issue itself as theory;


Exception: The scenario by which the issue arises.


Now; being this is really an intro to a third or fourth book (fifth?), I think I should get on the first one and finish it. But one lingering question concerns me: Will I live long enough to get all these out? Or will simply learning the self publishing crappo be so time consuming and frustrating that I’ll never get even the first one out ?? Stay tuned.

(Man It would be cool to have the benefit of an already organized publishing army. )

The Issue of the Subject and the Route Before Us.

The issue of the subject is one of mis-affection. What we can say is the allure to many of philosophy concerning the subject, the description that ‘calls’ many to philosophy’s endeavor, but then ‘traps’ them in a mistaken real-true calling of theory, the deception of methodological reduction that draws them into a vicious circle of argument, that seduces them to identify themselves with the cycle and the subjective nil it incorporates, that brings them to invest their soul in a ‘soul-killing’ venture defending identities that are in truth polemical and non-identical as their reduction only yields effective defenses of real positions, positions based in inherent offense — this route distances the human being from itself through theory that is inherently objective and non-integrative in method; reductive but not integrative.

The traditional philosophical route deceives by providing a view of reality without the involved human being; which is to say, the manner by which it accounts for the human being is always through a particular manner of objectifying the subject in theory and placing it as an affected entity in a further objective case generally called science (evolution, biology, physiology, and psychology). In this way, philosophy has historically failed the impetus of its instigation; its course has always been away from its subjective bearings, even as it is supposed to be concerning or involving the human being. Those philosophers who have attempted to re-instill life back into this death-route are those in whom we can view irony; the presence of what Heidegger identified as Dasein is noticeable in the inherently objective method as irony. All such authors can be viewed in this way; they are the ones who at least resisted investment; those who are so ‘wholeheartedly’ deceived are thus received as a blatant mistake, or at least as authors of critical ideological and political theory, their discourses various treatises upon the manner in which the subject is an object (subject-object) shows how thoroughly and deep their deception is, for their offerings are upon the altar of real-truth.

It is somewhat recently in the conventional reckoning of history that we can see this discrepancy being felt. Heidegger himself becomes an ironic figure, an actual transitional presence in the scene of history, his profound discourse and his amazingly enigmatic yet somewhat obvious tentative position back of Nazi Germany. Dasein being a description of being is thus destruction of its presence as present, as its relinquishing or ‘giving up’ of itself to the philosophical objectification is its destruction, but in a particular obscene fashion: Heidegger viewed his effort as a kind of course of enlightenment. And it is thus the sadness that accompanies this complete acquiescence, this willingness to give up something so precious to a cause that appears to be working on its behalf, but is rather working for its own interest, that of gaining investors and enacting oppression and nothing else — it is no wonder we have the post and post post modern authors (can we say now that we may have gained an ante-modern situation ?? [note: This is not anti-modern]) address the impetus for World War 2.

The world let Hitler rise by its complicity in the manifest destiny gained through Hegelian justification of consciousness in history; the (Western?) world was all too ready to see its baby (the exalted subject) vindicated in industry and economy. But then what does this baby do? Badiou puts it so nicely: It ‘voids’ that which is not in its ‘historical’ interest. Post WW2 then sees Sartre express the confusion that remains after the subject encounters its nemesis, but again as a now reassigned, redefined object: nothingness. The post-modernists then attempt to resuscitate and reinvigorate the subject, but again, in the mis-appropriation of the philosophical vehicle (taking the objective route by which to locate and establish the subject), the world reacts strongly: Irony shifts from the ‘One’ subject-object and its propriety, to ‘the many’ subject-objects, and all the multiplicity of multiple possibility located in the objective world. Ideology and hegemony become center; power becomes the issue. Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze and Guatari, in their last ditch effort, serve to finally place the subject in its grave. The subject admits that it has no basis, that it is a discursive aspect located in the possibility of insanity: That it is now but an ideological object. The world cries and complains in emphatic and sarcastic tones, decrying at once it’s own death while watching itself die. (Zizek? “Living In The End Times” ?)


Lyotard clearly outlines the problem: No communication is occurring. The subject is never able to communicate itself, it is always commandeered by the objective reckoning. The subject has a case, but it cannot be heard; the subject is indeed not dead, just mute. The extent of such a revealing and its repercussions will have to wait. The mute has found a voice; Zizek explains how this subject is reaffirmed in its nothingness; the subject is a space of nil in the conflation of objects — and he proves this by his enacting discourse as a presence of the subject. Just prior to this, Laruelle shows how discourse might carry the subject, and Badiou shows the situation of how this carrying enlists a silence (void) by the very presence the object (event). Harman and Miellassoux complete this passage from death to ‘un-death’ by pushing this silence to its proper objective place: The silent partner, the ghost writer.


The Exposition of the Significant Event is an effort to describe logistics, to show how the subject resides in silence, how historical reality is situated against this silence, how this silence is used and exploited in the continuing objective philosophy, and what this situation means for the human being in the world.


I don’t know if this is possible, or even if I will actually proceed to fulfill this statement (I hope it is good for what follows) but we have only to do that we do. We shall see what is uncovered in this adventure.

The End of the Preliminary Explorations and the Beginning of the Exposition of the Subject.

The irony cannot be over nor under determined.


It is not an easy thing to do, whenever, to throw away the ladder, but when the time comes, it turns out to be the easiest thing. I am sure Neitchze or Witgenstein had quite a different meaning than this amended version I am putting here, and the ‘passing over in silence’ offers obvious difference. But if one thinks about it, it is then not so different after all. N’s meaning always tends toward some ‘(non-) spiritual’, if you will, overcoming, some ‘inner to outer’ kind of deep superficiality as opposed to the superficial deep. Yet here we must come right out with it and be bold: Throw away the entirety of the philosophical library. That’s right I said it. Of course, though, this statement and call to action is ironic because I can only say it because I have read enough of it, and if one were to do it then they really needn’t my instruction; so the voicing is kind of useless. ‘Enough’ then becomes a highly suspect and enigmatic form because I don’t think I’ll ever get enough of it, but yet somehow I have had quite enough. It is the philosophical maxim that one can never read all the authors and their books so at some point one merely has to take a position and enter the conversation. That is what I have done with Constructive Undoing, as one can go look at the first post of mine; “Entry into Discourse”, I think it is called.

What we find there is an odd sort of invocation. One has to ask of it just what Is involved in the capitulation. Well, if we must be honest, then we can say that Zarathustra must come down from the mountain. But was he up there with all the worlds philosophy books? No, I would say. But yes, the meaning of all the reading could be said to beckon one away from the meaning gained as the reading. But all the same, the meaning gained had nothing to do with the particular philosophical ideas etched in symbols, but had everything to do with the meaning they contained; hence we throw away the ladder. Whether books or no books, the meaning gained was gained by the reading of them and not gained by reading them, but one could not have forgone the reading of them to know that the reading of them brings the throwing away of them.

The point is in the meaning of them, and not the cumulative amassing of particular strings of sayings. So I say that the more I reference and address the particular authors ideas, such as “…in the same way that So and So talks about idea~X, Heem and Haw has a similar idea with idea~O, and these may thus derive and support my idea M — as soon as I use that structure, I am asking everyone to agree with the method of amassing sayings and that this method is the meaning one is supposed to have as a method, as opposed to the gaining of meaning. It is due to this non sequitur meaning of what I see as philosophy to a particular methodology, that I address the throwing away of the ladder.

So it is by this throwing away the ladder I am enacting a couple things. For one, I am granting that what I am saying has already been said somewhere by someone or by a synthesized group of their respective sayings. I am figuring that if indeed I say something that sounds like or is a straight reiteration of something someone else said, then I grant that my idea was not a novel idea. Also, thus I am saying that once the situation has been understood, only certain necessary repercussions arise. These repercussions are the fidelitous suture of event to its subsequent multiple. This situation marks the necessity of throwing away the ladder, because once having understood, the rest follows without much effort; it is the effort of the hardest risk that brings such fidelity to the foreground. Likewise I am saying that the apparent repetition of my thought upon others is a philosophical issue, such that one should notice that the manner by which I proceed assumes as part and parcel that I am not plagiarizing other authors so much as I am conveying my piece of what cannot be plagiarized, as they did the same for their peices, and that the issue, as I just said, unfolds necessarily, each author being but a finite manifestation; just as one cannot read every and all items concerning a subject, one person likewise cannot write about and thus exhaust all the repercussions of what is basically an eternal situation. What is plagiarized is an ownership of phrasings, of ordinations of symbols; so I say that if the meaning I put forth sounds like other authors ideas, then I admit that either those other authors did indeed help me in my phrasings, and or such ideas are necessary to the eternal situation. It is thus that the situation of terms become marked, as well as the designation and construction of history, as well a pronunciation of the capitalistic investment.

Yet if what I say is indeed new, then this too is part of the philosophical issue.

Indeed, in the bibliography I will indeed site those authors and books that contribute to this philosophical enterprise, and even site specific verses, but I feel to note all the authors’ ideas that are reflected in my writing, i would end up footnoting every sentence, and every sentence upon that, such that I would be writing for eternity, in and as eternity, as my book would be essentially the whole of human writing bound by hypothetical hardcover. In essence, the conventional method of rigorous scholarly citation applied to my work would effectively necessitate the removal of my finitude; so it is that which necessitates my throwing away the ladder, and the concession that every philosophical argument that has been made is correct at least in its potential. Where I might rebut any particular argument that I may have not noticed, let it be known that I acknowledge the conventional propriety that may be or have been held such that they might get the street cred for their (now) rebutted and proposed incorrect proposal.


Having thus outlined the situation, that the ladder needs be used in order to throw it away, that the nature of the throwing away has thus been the problem, and that the authors are all correct and have valid points, we are left in this state where everything philosophical is gone anyways. I need not cite any authors because I have already said that my ideas are not new, and in so much as everything has been said I should have nothing to say. Thus we have the nihilism I’m starting to hear people have positions on. So what am I saying? Why am I still writing?

Hence I speak of divergence. Nihilism only arises against the conventional state, so no longer do I rise against it; it is useless to do so, it is nihilistic. Like Jello Biafra of infamed punk band Dead Kennedys said (I paraphrase): there is no effective change that occurs by going against the system; one must change the system from within the system. If I were to continue to rehash and cite and question and repose and rebut and cite, nothing will have occurred. In fact nothing indeed could occur; Badiou appears to call this the nihilistic ethical state [oh kay, here’s a cite: “Ethics”. Badiou], and it is not difficult to correlate Kiekegaard’s ‘ethical/universal’ here, and thus we have ended with the point at which divergence diverges: correlationalism. What confines this or defines this state is exactly the move for reconciliation of categorical imperatives, or rather, the reliance upon that which the categorical pure reason allows as then essential ethical categories; for if there is no choice, we have then the imperative situation. Yet likewise, where there is choice, it is imperative that we choose. This is the problematic that Kierkagaard addresses through all his works. It is the effort to reduce this situation to a solution that defines the correlational arena, and all Western philosophy (should I say to distinguish and say all continental philosophy ? But even the analytics are attempting a one reduction I think) since the Greeks has been the effort to reconcile this apparent difference. Judaism seems the only one that actually keeps that which is Cesar’s with Cesar, so to speak, keeping ‘God’ as entirely unknowable, and the practical manifestation and activity privy to this known-unknown unto itself as Law. But the discussion of religion will follow later.

That which breaks with this historical philosophical effort recognizes difference; not the difference that requires the different element to recognize the universal maxim that we should respect difference, which is the conventional correlational move, but rather the difference that realizes that this idea, or respect for the idea, does not contain that which is different.

By this initial distinction, we can begin to consider truth.

Am I Beginning to Make Any Sense at All?

I agree with Malabou’s initial consideration. “Relinquishing transcendentalism”. How tentative. How civilized. But her approach, I must say, just like all subsequent considerations, asks good questions but then never quite gets to any answer what so ever more than a reiteration, a parroting of conventional method. In very short verse: this is correlationalism. The very moment of her critique is correlationalism in situ. The proposal of Miellassoux set as is it in play, as I have said, is prime occasion to speak of the Significant Event; those interested will have to wait for the book, since the development is much larger than the blog format.

Suffice it to get to the issue behind such proposition. We might consider what ‘throwing away the ladder’ means. I am sure there will be the usual preponderance who hang onto the ladder for the use of arguing what one means by throwing away the ladder. And they won’t even see the redundancy and ridiculousness of their position; how indeed they may have thrown away the ladder yet are telling us what Neitzche and so and so mean by this and how they thus might qualify to having already thrown away the ladder, and then give further reason why now having thrown away the ladder, so and so says this and so we argue this and that based upon the meaning of so and so, that we may present the problemitization of throwing away the ladder such that we can the grant our position such that we now are moving beyond the ladder or not.

This little dance reminds me of a jazz artist in the late 1980’s who put out a CD with liner notes that described and made an argument in a quite intellectual fashion, how Jazz is not an intellectual art form or musical expression. I love jazz, but I just had to laugh, and then listen to his non intellectual music that, in my opinion, had with so much obvious talent and expertise so little soul and depth, so much explicit expression and so little inuition and grasp of the reason why, at least I, listen to music.

I draw this analogy to philosophy. The death of philosophy is evidenced exactly in such philosophers talking about the possibility of philosophy relinquishing the transcendent, parting from Kant and such. Obviously the meaning of philosophy has taken a turn, and it hardly hinges upon relinquishing anything, but rather more a hanging on to the well established method working of social lubrication and conceptual capital to make a name and a living. So much for every hobby and career; rarely it seems, if never, do the users of ideas really take to heart what they are talking about or reading about, keeping all meaning at arms length for the sake of quick access and face.

So as I have said of Harman, we have to give these brain users a benefit of doubt, and grant that they do indeed feel and believe with a passion that their involvement and discussion are really involving a type of truth, a type of real working. So it is that we must locate such thinking people in an arena that takes quite seriously their deep ideas, and call it ‘reality’ as a place, space or position, and ‘conventional’ as a method fitting and no larger than the arena, the terms of which holding such a value for investment, the infinity of such an arena, calls to such thinkers to regard it as quite inescapable and indeed thus always accounting for every possibility in its potential; always climbing the ladder, they are, even as they talk about whether it might be thrown away or not.

It is good to be the straw man, because this particular kind of straw man is not allowed in the correlationalist cycle, for it indicts the conventional method, rather, it bases of method. For logic is not a tool; it does not show where truth is located. It is a vehicle, a route by which conclusions may be shown. The idea of a ‘hidden’ truth which by the tool of logic may uncover is a conventional trope, an ideological dogma. Along such conventional lines, such confrontation is rebutted by saying that it defines a nothing, a nihilism, which is why so many authors now are considering and defining what nihilism might ‘really’ mean.


The post just before this one, here in Constructive Undoing, the “reblogg” post, is the example for which we say that we must destroy the transcendent. Miellassoux is being much too kind, much too diplomatic. The reason for this necessity is that the real conventional discourse relies upon the transcendent even as we might want to and in order to posit that we might get rid of it. And if anyone has been reading my blog, it is only in the act of blatant and obstinate denial that an arrangement of terms may effectively do anything, let alone now not have a transcendent involved in what reality may be. In fact, this is also why we must say that reality is the place where discourse determines what is true. We need not reiterate the past year of posts of Constructive Undoing. It is enough to use the “reblogg” to give a concrete and specific example of what it means to destroy the transcendent, what divergence means and why it is necessary. I’m not sure if this post will cover all that right now, but at least it will get to showing what we are up to by distinguishing ‘conventional methodology’.

Thus a throwing away of the ladder really evidences the problem I indicate by referring to the “Reblogg” post. Let’s look there now, the comments and discussion arena after the blog….Heres the link:

Ok, we’re back. Now keep in mind, I am not rebutting his essay for its content. In fact, D.E. rebukes me for not wanting to discuss within the parameters of what he has presented. Yet, we might say that part of the discussion of the Significant Event concedes the benefit of doubt to the argument in question, that for this case, the author of D.E. (Sorry man, I never got yer name) has indeed read the authors quite thoroughly and is fluent enough in the verses to bring to mind various quotes appropriate to the issue in question, and that such referencings likewise connote a good possible consideration of the matter. We concede that the opinion expressed is a valid opinion, in as much as it most probably sticks to the commonly recognized version of meaning, that this common reading thus laid admits various hazards, that these hazards will surly be rooted out, voiced and problematizing in various ways, etcetera.

My question is always: What does that mean? When I read his essay (as this is the example here), I have a pretty good idea of what he is saying, as well as the problem he suggests or implicates, as well as how an impetus for discussion has been set. Having a pretty good reading of the authors myself, I understand how the stage has been set, why the lights are faced here and there, the actors supposed to enter here, turn there, the music come in here. While I know the play, and the different showings and performances, and casts, that each is slightly different, with different stage sets, different colors, interpretations of phrasings, tempo, mood, timbre, etcetera — the play is the same play. It may be entertaining to see the play every year at different venues, but it always suggests the same meaning even while differing in reference to the moments in which I attend the showing, as my attendance and watching may have different significances to my regular life at the various times.

So it is that when I read philosophy, i am informed to meaning through the question of what does it mean, what is the author saying. Now, the problem I wish to shed light upon. In this effort for meaning, a reader inevitably comes to want to find out what is ‘really’ meant, and so dismisses the meaning that is gained in potential through definitional ‘gaps’ such that now the reader has to look for context that does not seem to appear in the present text, i.e., the reader needs to read other authors and see what they are saying, and so on. What this process amounts to is a storehouse of information that when drawn upon appears to be conveying deep significant meaning, but when stood back from, really just presents a bunch of terms that says nothing in particular; this type of discursive posturing that seems so profound by its educationally privileged layering is what I call metaphysical (in the bad way) because the level that is supposed of its definitional structure is supposed to get at some more real or more true meaning of the issue presented.

It is this kind of philosophical method that is correlational, that which relies upon a transcending aspect of discourse by which to assume or propose an actual truth of the situation. As we might see in D.E.’s talks on Zizek; Zizek himself talks in a way to show this very situation: that there is no subject that has any actual or substantial truth to it, but that we are viewing it in a particular way, in a particular fashion. This is what all the various Zizek talking abouts on this particular issue means: there is nothing there.

Now, philosophers will debate this, but the debate will be based upon the fact that obviously there is something ( but again Zizek accounts for this in various places also, but how he says it is less important that what he means; how he says it is just nice to look at). So the philosophers will bring in their storehouse of authorial knowledge to pose and discuss what Zizek may be saying and what then may be the actual truth of the matter. But never do they stand back and find out what it is such rhetoric actually means. The point which Zizek reiterates all over the place is that such rhetoric is nonsensical, that the discourse itself, a particular discourse that he references capitalistic, sees its elements as substantial capital, actual true real things that are negotiated. But the point I’m making is not to dispute what Zizek is saying; the points of Zizek will be pronounced in the Significant Event. The point I wish to expose is that the various arguments that would rebut or expound upon Zizek often miss what Zizek says over and over.

A most specific and pertinent example of the motion of conventional correlationalist philosophy occurs in relief through the exchange in the comments of D.E. of the link I gave, between him (her? Come to think of it, I don’t really know) and I.

Hopefully my distinction will be made more clear.

I use the term ‘True Object’ in my writings. This usage often gets the best objections in the form of it making no sense. My question is what sense is there not to be made? The philosophers (and I have encountered this over and over in many places) routinely bring argument against ‘truth’ and ‘object’, and are typically repulsed by ‘faith’, at various junctures. My proposal is of a simplicity that is completely missed by the conventionalists that I see is due to their investment in the storehouse of authorial knowledge. I am saying that reality is constituted of True Objects, objects that cannot but be helped to function in reality as true things. Like the car I drive down the road. There is a car. The question of what a car may ‘actually’ be as an object is of no concern; indeed I am, as I drive, driving a car down the road. The ideological or theoretical considerations do not come into play here; much like Harman’s Third Chair, but most like the ‘First’ chair, what ever may be the actual ‘car’ does not come into play in my driving down that road. The car is a True Object. To argue what the car may actually be is entirely a theoretical issue, but more, an issue that is entirely metaphysical, which is also to say, concerning what is more true or more real, which is for all other terms, concerning what is transcendent or for better terms, as a methodological reduction, concerning ‘The’ transcendent.

There is no theory that needs go into this, but the theory is already there in the various authors all over the place. Harman’s difference with Zizek, even as he may say he disagree with Zizek, is in as much as Harman is invested in the truth of the terms he is using, as his terms are stemming from a sort of essential relation of thing to thing (the ‘thing’ that is Harman, and the ‘thing’ that Harman is addressing: object -> object). As I have said, he must argue this because this argument then validates retroactively the position by which he attains his truth of reality. And this next is key to my proposal of the situation of the True Object: his difference with Zizek takes place in reality.

Once this situation is understood, then we can consider the meaning ala Miellassoux, correlationalism and transcendence. Then, once this situation takes hold, the question no longer concerns what the author means, for this routinely beckons conventional method back into its correlation of ideologically ordered (Foucault) and scaffolded (Wittgenstien) terms — and besides, we have already climbed the ladder of this meaning — but rather the question becomes: What does this situation mean? Hence, to question this situation stems from a position that is not real. The real ladder of meaning must be thrown away. The question comes to concern the Significant Event.

We can see this in action in the comments of the linked blog on Dark Ecologies. That the simplicity I propose is countered by recourse to an authorial bank (Freire) of knowledge. The conventional philosopher cannot understand what I am referring to because he is caught in the metaphysical correlational world of ‘real’ discursive method. Hence, divergence.

Again; this is not to say that D.E. essays do not present valid points, but rather that the meaning of the points are routinely missed for the sake of the correlationally (transcendentally) justified arguments that stem from an assertion of identity, from the equivocation of the object and the discourse (terms) about them — but not just any discourse; a particular discourse that can be associated, as Zizek does, with the capitalistic paradigm wherein True things exist because of the metaphysical discourse that supplies the ‘more true’ reason for its objectivity — as if I am not really driving a car down the road. The car is thus a True Object due to the insistence of the metaphysical support.

But to get back to Malabou; the question of ‘why’ should the transcendent be relinquished (I apologize; I have only listened to the first 20 minutes of her talk. My input may change when I hear the rest) is made nearly moot due to the understanding that comes through the simple understanding of what authors such as Badiou, Zizek, and Laruelle, (if not many, more; such as, Kant, Hume, Hegel, Faurbach, Spinoza, Kierkegaard, Nietchze, Wittgenstien, Heidegger, Sartre [my spelling is horrendous] and many, many more, whose names apologetically do not directly come to mind right now — oh, and if not Miellssoux, and Harman) are really saying. The difference between these varied authors concerns the awareness of the following: The transcendent must be destroyed because it is the transcendent that perpetuates the continuance of real confusion. We must not ‘relinquish’ it because, as Malabou also says, to relinquish is more like a kind parting, and such a codependent relationship will never kindly part ways.

“Should humanity be saved?” Laruelle has asked. I say: humanity should not be saved. Because, should humanity be saved it would not even know that it had already been saved, if indeed humanity should have been.