Seeing Empty And Full, and some Jung

The Uses of Not Thirty spokes meet In the hub. Where the wheel isn’t Is where it’s useful. Hollowed out, clay makes a pot. Where the pot’s not is …

Empty And Full

— I love those little poems. They are so filled with meaning. One could even more say:

we structure our thoughts with words, but where are the words are not, there is what is useful.

Or perhaps something in a way even more profound:

psychology provides a structure of explanation about what is going on in mental health,

but where is psychology is not, there is what is useful.

*

Much of my thoughts about psychology, as a career science are generally not very supportive of it. Sadly, I feel that the effective purpose of psychology is to exult status, and not to actually help people. Psychology leaves a sour taste in ones mouth, whenever I think about psychological theories and testing and outcomes and conclusions. When we really look and see what is actually occurring, The psychological proposals that are supposed to help people be mentally healthy tend to appear to be talking about a select few people who want to organize themselves around being mentally healthy. Everyone else, which is the other 88% is left in a gray area where psychology is supposed to mean something to them, that they’re supposed to feel better, but really all that’s happening is they are taking meds and then hoping that The therapy in interventions based on statistical outcomes is making them better than they were two weeks ago or whatever. It’s like a kind of hypnotism or suggestion; psychology the name just has such a force that people having mental health issues, if they are being treated psychologically, then they are sort of “hopefully convinced” well enough that psychology is indeed going to help them, that perhaps they most likely just hope them selves by pretending that they’re doing better. If we ask them more questions, then they will believe we know something useful to help them, kind of approach. The opposite of the notion that was is “not” is actually what is most useful.

*

Psychology in the large general sense is helpful to many people., so I’ll stop that General complaint right there. For like most things, the name ‘psychology’ is used for such a vast assortment of practices and philosophies and determinations for meaning that it almost doesn’t mean anything at all, but that I tend to pick those pieces that are psychological which appear to be at least infused with I want for goodness, and I’ll leave it at that.

Out of compassion, I recognize that most people are stuck in the middle, and so to engage with a philosophical discussion about the merits of what psychology is supposed to deal with, doesn’t really help those people. It just makes them more worried.

**

Id Never really read Carl Jung, which is to say, I’ve never really known about his history very much except in a general sense, and I tend to have only heard about and base my opinions upon just general kind of “spiritual” notions that he tends to be involved with, The “fad” Jungian stuff, and my impression of him has always been slightly worried. I worry that people see what he is saying is so profound.

I’ll try to clarify.

Now that I’ve delved a little bit further into actually the person who he was, and the actual development of his psychological theories, I am confirmed in my concern.

Psychology is not really a science in the sense that we currently understand science, which is to say the “hard” sciences; it is, as a colleague of mine said, a “very soft” science. And in fact, his (a counselor and a registered nurse in the mental health field for over 25 years) opinion was that it is hugely biased and it’s approaches to finding things out, and the people who are psychologists are often extremely pompous and defensive about their practice and Philosophy.

Now, this is just in America. I get the feeling from a European friend-colleague that psychology is very deep over there and taken very seriously as a very profound and substantial body of knowledge. It is in America also, but I tend to think Americans tend to be rebels, and, I am as well just naturally resistant. But I try to keep an open mind.

*

Anyways. Jung.

He definitely develops an intensionally closed system of spirituality. It can’t really be denied once you understand from where the more “spiritual” ideas of Jung in psychology stem. He did not really break from Freud in a radical way, he broke from Freud in that they were generally developing two different systems about how the psyche operates and what it is. By this, I mean to say that they weren’t really considering what is really going on; what was radical about his break it’s ultimately just that they differed on their theoretical opinions. There was nothing really radical about the break except if you consider what was happening in the first part of the 20th century so far as the way that human beings and scientists were able to understand the human being and the universe. They were considering empirical evidence and coming up with theories to explain the empirical given.

I think that is the short tiny short version of what is been confirmed to me through investigating Jung. From this investigation I get the feeling that what people get from Jung usually is really not what he was trying to give. or, indeed what he was trying to give is contrary to what actually occurs. This is to say, in so much as he offers us a closed system, people use that closed system through which to offer a kind of “open psyche” involved with the universe.

This is just a blog post so I’m not going to go into all the various aspects of proof, because it wouldn’t work anyways. Suffice it to say that his assumption was upon an essential difference between the human being and the universe, that this assumption goes by the name “empirical”, and that Jungian psychology is a description of how the psyche functions in so much as the psyche is located and is developed through the physical brain and perhaps general biological human system. If he is understood to have moved out of this closed domain, it is merely because the system that he created posits such transcendence.

His is a perfect spirituality of modernity.

Now, I’m not suggesting that he doesn’t have good things to say or that he did not come up on things that were actually occurring, neither am I saying that some of his extrapolations of explanation are not applicable to what is actually occurring.

However, I am saying that the systems of modernity are inherently partial to subjectivity. This is not because subjectivity accounts for everything that is possible, rather, it is because in the partiality of subjectivity lay the problems and motions that Jung describes. Empiricism is the systemic subjective proposal of objectivity. It stems from and is based in the primacy of the subject given of the universe.

My point is, I suppose, that individuation, the process that the subject is involved with, is in itself, in the end, something that is not modern. It appears Jung did not recognize this, and hence the confirmation of my concern.

The process of individuation is the object of the psychology of the subject.c

Positivist Culture

www.huffpost.com/entry/cnn-advertisers-rick-santorum-native-americans_n_60997c0ce4b012351604a9b2

Perhaps some people may not entirely understand the back lash against Santorum’s statement that “there isn’t much Native Culture in modern American culture”.

There is plenty of Native culture in American culture, but Santorum is talking about

(1) popular material culture, where we literally do not see very much representation of Native art in pop media, cities, etc.. which is true.

(2) his positivist naive view on culture which explains current manifestations of institutions, events, activities as a result of European (read: white) ingenuity, intelligence and fortitude, etc…

This latter is false because it ignores and eliminates the actual material conditions upon which such positivist notions gain their substance. It is a “never mind that man behind the curtain” view of America. It is a view which supposes itself arising and occurring in a vacuum that is itself.

*

Ideals of Positivist Mental Health likewise suffer from the same kind of myopia.

As well, what I term conventional philosophy.

Later on those last two.x

Reflecting Upon Into

In a couple days, it will be two years since my daughter passed on to a new adventure.

Tonite, I just happened to start playing guitar and Pink Floyd’s Wish You Were Here came out. I did not really think about what I was playing until I was playing it, and the last time that song even came to my mind, let alone the last time I played it on guitar, was probably at least 10 years ago. X

I find these kinds of coincidences and ‘thoughtless-motions’ significant sometimes. Like tonite. In this instance, it reflects into my life, my experience, but also my philosophical work. Perhaps some of you readers will catch the last part more than others.

Then after I sang the song, I actually thought about the lyrics in a whole new way. I would like to share this new meaning with you. Maybe my daughter will live on a little bit in this world by you participating in this automatic memory motion with me.

I invite you to be here with me.

_

The song is an indictment. The singer is accusing someone of claiming to understand something they really have no clue about.

With some of my slight artistic license involved (but the spirit is the same, I think), it reads:

So, you think you can tell heaven from hell?

blue skys from rain?

Can you tell a green field from a cold steel rail?

a smile from a veil?

You really think you can tell?

?

Did they get you to trade your heroes for ghosts?

Hard ashes for trees?

Hot air for a cool breeze?

Cold comfort for change?

Did you exchange the walk on part of the world

for a lean cot in a cage?

?

How I wish you were here.

We’re just two lost souls swimming in a fish bowl year after year.

Running over the same old ground, and

what have we found?

The same old fears.

I wish you were here.

_______

The singer is asking the listener to get over themselves.

To stop pretending that they know what its like to be conned,

and “come here, and Be with me”.

How I wish you were here.

But you are not.

___________________________________________

Songwriters: Roger Waters / David GilmourWish You Were Here (2019 Remix) lyrics © Roger Waters Music Overseas Ltd, Pink Floyd Music Publr., Inc.

MARLEY JOY. 2002-2019

#thiccbeefcake69

The real skinny legend.

Onto-taxonomy and the Object of the Subject

www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/bitstream/123456789/71894/1/SM Vol 17 pp. 27-36 Young.pdf

And…still finding support for the proposal:

https://epublications.regis.edu/cftsr/vol3/iss2/3/

The irony that never is resolved in the onto-taxonomy proposal itself, is how the content of the argument against an onto-taxonomy is withheld from its own semantic meaning?

I think this is the basic question Harman never deals with. Apparently, humans have a special ability to “withdraw from view”, just as every object has that same ability, but this ability is also exempted or withheld in the intellectual papers which propose the ideal or proposal. How does meaning itself occur precisely and yet withdraw?

In other words, the meaning of the proposal of OOO, namely, that objects withdraw from view, among the extended proposal, is supposed to not withdraw, but rather is proposed in its presentation to be fully present for the purposes of making its point.

It is this situation to which I refer The Two Routes. It concerns the material of the substance of Object Orientation more than its substance itself.

For,

If indeed Triple-O is sound, that is true, then it answers to the two routes.

If it is merely another philosophical proposal, of idealistic argumentative dimentions, then it fails for what it means.

oh?

Why We Wear Masks.

I just realized something about the issue of wearing masks for this coronavirus COVID-19 thing:

People are selfish; that is the modern individualist way. The issue about the wearing of masks is or was around “Am I protected?”

The big confusion around masks is whether or not I am going to be protected because I wear a mask.

And it just dawned on me why there is confusion.

It is because we’re not used to doing things for other people.

We are not, as a society, used to thinking of other people just in a mode of kindness first, and then having myself thought about kind of vicariously due to that first act.

The reason I wear a mask is to protect other people from myself. 

What we have been thinking as a society when asking ourselves whether we need to wear a mask, or buying up all the products off the shelves, the masks, all the N 95 masks, and whether or not a cloth mask is effective is:

is it protecting me from getting the virus?

And that is the wrong question out in public, in general.

We should be asking: Am I contributing to spreading the virus.

When I am out in public I am wearing a mask to protect other people because I may be carrying the virus without me knowing it.

The two primary concerns we have around spreading the virus is shooting liquid droplets from my mouth as I speak to someone else. That is why we are told to stay 6 feet from one another, because typically the droplets from me speaking will only go 6 feet before falling to the ground, and at that in an arc toward the ground. And then virus on surfaces.

In general, the only time I need to be wearing a mask to protect myself from the virus is when I am in close contact with people who are sick, like if I work in a hospital with sick people.

The idea is that if everyone wears a mask then we will all be better protected from transferring the virus to each other through the liquid that naturally flies from our nose and mouth.

Other than that just because the virus may stay alive on surfaces for any amount of time doesn’t really matter so much if I’m washing my hands frequently and being careful not to touch my face.

Of course, if you have some underlying or aggravating health condition which has compromised your immune system then it might behoove you to wear a mask such as a N95 or better, that is protecting yourself when you go out in public or at work. But you should also put a scarf or a handkerchief over the front of that mask. 

But most of the issues around wearing a mask is that most everyone is thinking how can I protect themselves from other people; they aren’t thinking about how they protect themselves by thinking of the other person first.

This is what the CDC and the WHO is telling us, this is what doctors know, this is what we are supposed to understand and trust: Work together. We are in this together and we will survive by thinking of others.

I take care of myself by being concerned about the other person.

That is how we get through this.
x

So, in a manner of speaking:

The plain and simple lack of resources and ability to produce equipment means that To think about worry and protect only myself is chaos, contributing to less effective ways of beating COVID-19, longer and more debilitating effects of the virus on myself, our quality of life as a Global society, and more death overall.

To worry and protect others is to bring order, contributing to the lessening of contagion vectors and the actual lowering of numbers of people who are affected. And greater societal Resilliance overall.


x

Climate Change and Pascal’s Wager.

In this Era of Prehistory, everything gets turned on its head, just like in the Pirate’s of the Caribbean movie…

As I have put forth in various places a “turned on its head” version of faith in the spirit of Kierkegaard (somewhere in my posts Im sure Ive spelled it out, but I surely address it in my book The Moment of Decisive Significance); I am applying Pascals Wager to the issue of climate change.

The deep adaptation that I have a link to in my previous posts signals more than drastic political and financial maneuvers, and more than ideological change; maybe I’ll write about that kind of depth in a post to come.

For right now, perhaps as a way to begin to chart the depths we can meet at the crossroads of the wager.

In the original wager, Pascal places what what can occur against what will occur. For example, what can occur is God’s existence, and our ability to believe, and what will occur is ‘nothing’. This is to say that the Wager is balanced upon what is removed from the possibility of it being removed., that if God does not exist, what will occur no matter what we believe is nothing. Yet, what can occur if God exists against our belief is that either we will be eternally damned or we will be saved.

So the turning on it head of climate change in this regard is placed in this framework:

What can occur:

  • the world only changes a little bit, not drastically different than any other change, big or little, in respect to our ability to live through it and adapt: This is to say, the world keeps changing.
  • Humans still exist and deal with the universe.

What will occur:

  • nothing.
  • The world’s end.

My point is that if the world as we know it ends, then there is no amount of believing or behaving that will have had any effect. So, it is better to keep on as we have, as though the world, ourselves, and the climate is changing.

Extension, and perhaps a little more philosophical:

The idea that we will have to adapt deeply regardless of what happens with the climate, coincides with the climate despite what activity we will write papers about or the scientific studies about the Earth. The basic question which stabs at the heart of this whole issue is that if indeed the world beyond a doubt, scientifically, will end, then why are we still arguing about it? Why, if it so certain, must we still try and effect some sort of human business in any way?

I submit, it is because all of it is a human organization. Not an overdetermined basis of utopian solution, not an underdetermined basis of nihilism (or a overdetermined nihilism or underdetermined utopia).

My wager is that the Earth’s climate is changing, but human Beings (as a generality to indicate what ideological Being is) want desperately to keep the climate of knowledge the same even as they might argue drastic change is needed; as Zizek has formulated, their argument is to enact drastic change within the normalized field wherein change is able to be reckoned as change (Postmodern expertise). In other words, keep the basis of knowing of such thing, how the human Being shows up the its world, the same, without the human Being actually having understand it self and the universe in a different manner, which is to say, in the actual manner. My wager is that human Beings will indeed survive to thrive, that the climate will change and will continue to change with human Beings involved with it.

And I argue that this ‘same way’ is Enlightened Reason: The special universal case of the modern manner through which human Beings shows up in the world.

#theactualendoftheworld

#prehistory

International Overdose Awareness Day. 

Today is International overdose awareness day.

Are you taking any pain medications Soley because your doctor offered them to you?

I don’t know the exact statistics but and astonishingly large amount of  people that find themselves addicted to opiates, and many nowadays who find themselves strung out on heroin , were originally prescribed legal pain medication from their doctor for a legitimate medical situation. 

Do you really need that Vicodin or Percacet or could an 800 mg ibuprofen have done the trick? 

Don’t be naive. Please.  

All is Vanity, for Real…Kant, Latour and the Pass, part 2.

220px-allisvanity

Ok; here is the post I meant to put:

So we come to Bruno Latour, and his notion of the pass. What is it that allows for the repetition whereby self-fulfillment is denied? This is the question of ‘what happened’. We will never get to answer the question of what ‘is happening’ until we answer the question of ‘what happened’. This is because if we do not find out what happened, then it will happen again. We are then keen to Kierkegaard’s “Repetition”, for the question that most everyone wants to answer is the subsequent question, the question of Being, “What is happening”, why is there what is and not what is not? This question, though, denies its own bases and so asks upon itself without ever even looking for, let alone being able to see, what it lacks. What ontology always finds then is itself, or an other (an other and self are constituents of the real state). All is indeed vanity.

Further; philosophy as an ontological practice cannot escape the political, ideological and in general social dynamics. It is a simple thing to see the reason why I call such conventional philosophical method real. What is real is what is happening. But because thinkers, as opposed to Beings, but consistent with being real, take the products of themsleves as indication of the potential involved with other beings, and take this as evidence of not a whole, but actually The only whole, they thus always (1) take everything real as a product of some sort, be-caused of some thing or other, and (2) take as an automatic demand upon all things within their field their proof toward what is happening, and this, even to the extent that they demand that the question of ‘what happened’ must conform to the state of Being that is happening.

*

Bruno Latour begins his book “An Inquiry into Modes of Existence” with a description of what a pass is with an analogy. I don’t have the book right with me, but he writes about a mountain trail or path that goes from the base to its peak. Note that I will not here follow his description exactly; I am not putting forth a strict analysis of his book and what it means in this post. It is enough that he came up with a pretty good analogy, a good term that can indicate the issue and the way it is dealt with. What is significant with Latour, at least in his AMIE project , is that he sees the need for an opening. It is clear from visiting his webpage that he understands the problem of a multi-vocalized reality similar to the type that Lyotard suggested in the conditions of the post-modern moment . Namely, the problem of communication between worlds. The salient question of every significant philosopher worth considering is “Is communication taking place?” For it is from this pivotal question that the world manifests in its ways.

So, if we can understand what this question means, which is to say, if communication has taken place through this one phrase, then we have found a common pass (a given ontological base). It doesn’t really matter too much if we identify it with Latour’s scheme (supposedly he describes 15 types of passes, 15 ‘modes of existence’; hence the book’s title “Inquiry into Modes of Existence”). What is significant is that he saw the need not so much for another reconciliation, not another philosophical reduction to some essential truth for which the author is trying to gain traction for through their communion with the intuition god, but rather some way to relieve the reduction from being the responsibility of one authors’ intuitive argumentative assertion. What is significant is that he sees that the method is at issue, the philosophical reductive method and its associated (and invisible) givens are at issue, and that the only way to get past this method is to somehow poke a hole in it! Instead of giving into the nihilism that arises in conventional minds, we need to create an opening whereby people can begin to communicate.

In my upcoming book, we might get into the complicity of needs that relates François Laruelle and Bruno Latour’s works; I am getting off the track of this post. The upcoming book probably will answer all the stray ponderings and vectored analyses.

For now, it is enough to understand the simplicity of the idea. First off, ontological foundations must be admitted given. If a traveler does not admit to an already given ontological truth that has already been explored, then the significance of the pass will make no sense; the trail will be missed and avoided. In order to pass, we must set aside the want to apply redundant deconstructivist techniques to every clause. This is because only once we understand the ontological foundations of existence, only once we admit to that truth, can we begin to see the passes. While I see really only one effective pass, Latour sees this pass as expressed in different ways.

The first kind of pass (probably not in the same order or number that Latour notes) is just this: Where a particular methodological application accounts for all that is allowed, a pass has occurred in the scheme of meaning that accounts for real estimations. We might even call this kind of pass a ‘given’, because it functions to allow reasoning to grant reality despite the problem it poses upon that reason to attach to real things. For example: If there is a question of the truth of Being, for which a particular formula answers this question, whether is be God, or whether it be a series of philosophical arguments, such as Deleuze’s Rhizomes, or various ‘arrived-at’ states or situations that we can associate with metaphorical ‘plateaus’ – where such an explanation of what is happening routes all occurrence back into its logic or reasoning such that every event is account for or deflected within that scheme, a pass has occurred to ‘miss’ the meaning of an alternate suggestion. The person effectivly ‘passes over’ the situation where someone is expressing a different reality because everything is making sense to the logic of the first person’s ‘total’ explanation of the situation. This is the post-modern condition.

But lets back up. Latour uses the analogy of a mountain pass. The meaning of the forgoing paragraph is that first we have to admit that there is a mountain in front of us. I show you a mountain and say that we are going to hike that mountain, and I start to walk. But you don’t move; you stand there pondering whether or not there is indeed a mountain. I tell you to come on, lets go, there are great views at the top of this mountain. But you stand there and reflect upon the possible aesthetics involved in being at the top of an epistemoloigcal situation that we cant agree upon.

This is the very problem we face when a philosopher will not admit ontological foundations as true. But I am not going to go into all the ramifications of this discussion here.

Again, enough to say that Latour’s analogy is of a mountain and a way to hike to the top. There are all sorts of dangers on this trail though. We will have to cross some fast streams and climb some crazy rocks, some steep terrain, but it is navigable, we just have to follow the route.

Now; the problems that Latour comes across and discusses in his book are due to the issues of this same type; he is still justifying the situation ontologically and thus has to address, and or finds, 15 types of passes that represent 15 types of manners or ‘modes’ that account for reality for the various types of people (various people use various modes so reality stays ‘whole’ –for those of the particular modes). This is why his gets sticky; because as soon as he attempts to justify something that is passing ontological constructions, he then has to use a pass that somehow avoids any of the passes he lists, or incorporates. Ironically, the need he notices gets set aside as another ‘religious’ dogma, another philosophical reductive scheme, accepted by some and rejected by others.

The point that he himself misses (and we will discuss somewhere the duplicity involved with conventional significance) is that in order to be able to see a pass one has to admit that ontological justifications rely themselves upon a pass. Simply speaking, Latour is attempting to answer a teleological question through ontological justifications.

Another kind of pass, a good one, and I think one of the first passes that Latour notes, is: Say we have a map of the mountain and the route leading up to the top. We mark our progress along the trail by markers in the map that indicate, like ‘when you get to a big dead oak jetting out of a rock, then you go east for two miles until…’ or symbols or pictures that say just as much. How are we able to transpose or translate the actual mountain to the map of it or vice-versa? The map itself looks nothing like the mountain, and in fact is nothing like the mountain. Yet there is some sort of resemblance between the two, and indeed, provided that something has not happened to have changed or altered the actual physical landmarks that the map notes, we are able to stick to the directions on the map and get to the top. In this kind of transferal there is a pass enacted in our understanding of reality. While I am not here addressing all the peculiarities of the situation, it is a simple thing to see that there is an obstruction in the actual Being of things to get around or past, and this can be analogous to two Beings attempting to communicate. In order for us to be able to follow the map of the course up the mountain, there has to be a sort of pass that allows us to ignore the problem that occurs in between the actual physical mountain and the small paper drawing of symbols that describe how to get up the mountain. This pass thus marks a particular manner of coming upon reality, a particular ‘mode of existing’.

The significant point, though, of noticing this situation is that in order to get beyond the dead end that is the modern-post-modern obstruction where no communication takes place (again: what do I mean by this? Read my past posts and my books to find out!, (and maybe check out some killer tunes to boot!)) is that an opening is needed through which people can be free to describe, what frankly amounts to, the ‘insane realties’ that actually occur in the meaningful life, but without fear of judgment of reprisal. Yet, this is not so much some sort of auto-biographical non-fiction or something, nor some authorial-fantasy of artistic license. It is more a manner by which we might be able to find out some facts about what reality really is.

At least, this is the idea behind Latour’s vision.

While I do enjoy the idea and see the need for a pass, I am not so optimistic as Latour.

Crash Space and the Move to a ‘Science’ (of the Subject): To Ping or Not to Ping, Phenomenology and Observer Effects. REPOST

 

THREE POUND BRAIN Im finding has got some cool observations, often a manner of approach that seems insightful.

In the discussion of a philosophical scientism, the post below appears to me to indicate more a datum, a kind of data point, over a semantic content. If we hold to the idea that indeed we will be able to come upon a ‘phenomenological science’, so to speak (for lack of a term; maybe it is better voiced as a science of continental philosophy, science of the Subject, or a science of philosophy, or existential science) it will come when when the content of proposals does not fold back into itself to ask questions of its epistemological and ontological being. The problem we (as a kind of Western dominator-colonialist hegemonic discourse) have been dealing with for some time in philosophy is the problem of redundancy; that is, the recurrent check upon sovereign privilege. Yet we cannot escape the issue that surrounds the statement ‘for those who understand’, for, there is indeed an issue for those who understand, if you catch my drift*.

This is where this essay by THREE POUND BRAIN seems to have purchase. Quite compelling; these thinkers have conflated particular arms of the issue to further close the gap that occurs in the perpetual philosophical deferring of redundancy. The issue of what we are calling a science of the Subject (again, for lack of a better term), concerns our ability to dismiss ourselves from the semantic content of philosophical discourses: This only occurs for those ‘who understand’ the issue. The issue is, as I just said, the recurrent enfolding of meaning; this issue has to do with a kind of route where the thought is always extricating itself from the object of its proposal in the effort to find a more true thing of reality. So, if this be the real case, what is and has been occurring all through our history of critical thought, then what is it issue in our ‘science’ concerns an ability to be removed from that recurring redundancy.

The redundancy, the space of ‘naught’ that the redundancy covers, the ‘pass’ that maintains the current paradigm that situates ‘subject’ and ‘object’, is what the essay below calls a ‘crash space’, for another term, and aside from the struct Husserlisan phenomenological reduction, it takes a certain kind of understanding of the issue (this, itself another kind of redundancy) to see and accept the the Reduction is indeed a facet of everyday human life, over a particular methodological approach.

What we find, though, what inevitably is a part of the science that accepts instances of truth (objects) is that this essay below thus becomes another data point. In order to see this, we then need to understand what the traditional philosophical method does, and how it produces ‘Objects’, which is to say ‘ideological/mythological objects’, as opposed to witnessing and involving the manipulation of mere objects themselves.

We need notice that philosophical reduction can occur with any object, that the Phenomenologist reduction is not a particular meaning upon a particular clausal route, as if it occurs only when one thinks in a manner that Husserl denotes, describes or explains. In fact, any object may be looked into to find that its basis is naught; but this does not mean that it thus is a relative ideological manifestation, but more indeed that the ideological manifestation itself reduces to naught, that the route is incorrect in its maner of reckoning. Yet again, this does not mean that there is nothing ‘outside’ of whatever. This ‘nothing’ is the crash space. All discourses arise an an ideological mandate, as a intrinsic mythology, due to the substantiation of a single foundational fact, this fact being the uncontroversial term, the ‘given’ of the discussion.

It is here that Harman’s ‘over’ and ‘under’ determination becomes operative as relational analogous categories to describe what his occurring, again, not as substantial real components of objective quality. His arguments are against particular contexts, particular discursive ‘givens’ that he must confront as a member of the academy, for which he must produce content.

So also, we then see, as much as the essay below represents a datum over another semantic point of argument, it is because it takes another ‘given’ as a means to argue a particular point about what may be real; this time a sort of ‘brain’ or ‘physical operation’ of such real structure. The given of the physical brain producing experiences has allowed a view that sees itself as a partial manifestation of an impartial effect, and has understood that without such partiality (the partiality wherein what is impartial likewsie resides in meaning), ‘nothingness’ occurs in meaning and its corresponding ‘feeling’, which is the collaspe of knowledge into itself, collapsing upon itself. And, that this means only that when there is no view that there is no view; it does not mean that there being no view means that the world is the view. This fact reveals something about the nature of being human, and it is more than an existential nihilistic uselessness amd purposelessness.

Similar to Bruno Latour’s effort in AMIE to first identify the need for an opening, and then to allow for the facts that can be discerned because an opening has been allowed: So it is that we might begin to find these ‘givens’, and how they manifest discourse as proposing substantial content. These ‘givens’ as datum, rather than the argument upon what is reduced or produced from the discourses, which result in redundancy; seeing there discourses as results of a given situation, thereby grants us the data by which to discern our sought after science. The data will then be the content, but not in its argumentative capacity, but rather what it is doing. 

The example is, say, a chair. How much do you need to say in describeing a chair before I understand what you are talking about? Probably very little. Yet conventional philosophy says that you can never describe enough, and I will never realize what you are describing as a chair. It takes little more than this to realize that philosophy of this sort is based in a fantasy. So we might see that the idea behind these two aspects of the philosophical method is: Left only with a capacity to know, which is to say, if I already did not have a conception or idea of what a chiar is, and or I did not have recourse to a personal gesture from the first person toward the object in question at hand for reference, and or in some imaginary world where there might be a being or intelligent creature who is not human who has no access to a chair nor has ever experienced what a chair might be — in the condition of at least one of these three conditions, knowledge left to itself would never be able to convey the chair to another’s knowledge suffuciently to supply this other with ‘chairness’. Always there would be another question that would have to be qualified, and the answer to which that would fail to qualify exclusively what a chiar actually is.

Nevertheless: There is a chair right there and I do have recourse to many human aspects and relationships to be able to convey to me what a chair is sufficiently enough for me to not only use it functionally (to sit down on it), but as well to use it in communication on many levels. One might ask: What else is a chair then? Wee; it is more than ideology and political social justice, though these things are indeed necesaary and good (we should instead just call them what they are instead of lumping them into the category of ‘philsophy’.)

Conventional philsophy would have it that we have access to what the chair might actually be, but not only this. Conventional philosophy assumes as it is important that we not only acknolwege that the chair exists as ‘more than’ a chair, but also argues this importance. This is why modern conventional philosophy has been accused of being nothing less than sophistry. The aggravating issue has to be what happens when we notice what conventional philsophy is doing.

We notice that philosophy is arguing its own validity even in the face of the exposure that its validity is merely an argument. The idea is this: Do I have to argue that a chair is a chair for it to be a chair, or is it always already a chair? I would say that the chiar is a chair regardless of what I want to say about it, but that further I can say many things about a chair, but I dont have to argue its existence for me to be able to consider the many things about what a chair may be.

Now; when we look at philosophy and we realize what it is doing, what does that mean?

I say thay it means that we have found the object called philosophy despite its argument about how it cannot be found. I say that this object is conventional philosophy because most philosophers are so caught up in the method, the substance that is logic step 1, logic step 2, step 3…as of logic is more than merely a tool, that they are incapable of admitting that thier method has been identified, in fact, as an object. They will be completely mystified as to what I can possibly mean, and will use the method to prove to me I am wrong, that philosophy is not an object that can be found. Yet it is because I used no method to find it, I stick with what I am doing to call it philosophy, and distinguish the arguments of convetional philosophy as now a near empty set, an object whose content I may now use as data.

So we might continue along this idea: How much do I have to read of Emmanual Kant before I understand what he is talking about? I say not very much, because , just like the chair, once you understand what he is saying, you understand the object he is talking about. Likewsie; how much do I need to read of Hurserl? Quite soon in the reading of Husserl you see the object he is describing. What about Derrida? Delueze? Wittgestien? Hegel?

What happens when we admit the object they are talking about is indeed a common object, rather than a secret and deep, complex and elusive object? Answer: We can begin to address what these authors are saying as data, that is, as examples of what Subjects are doing with the common philosophical object. Relieved of psycholoigcal theological approximations that rely upon intuited transcedental subjective interpretations to manifest identity, we can thereby begin to view the human object, as opposed to having only the enfolded and redundant subjective interpretation of objects. Once we can begin to accumulate data on what the Subject is doing with the common philosophical object, we can begin to more fully understand what the human being is, and what it does.

 

The THREe POUND BRAIN essay evidences a certain cognition, a certain intentional acknowledgment of the issue, as well as intuiting what needs to occur. It seems that, at least here, THREE POUND BRAIN evidences a closer move toward this science.

 

 

* “The Moment of Decisive Significance: A Heresy” which will be out soon , fingers crossed , addresses these concerns, albeit in a non-conventional manner. The Revised edition has an added Preface, Preface to the Introduction, Forward and an Introduction, as well as an Author’s Note,  just to make sure everything is handled. 😄

REPOST:

 

JAMES XAVIER: Sam, what’s the range of human vision? SAM BRANT: Distance? JAMES XAVIER: No, wavelength. SAM BRANT: Between 4000 angstrom units and 7800 angstrom units.* You know that. JAMES XAVIER: Less than one-tenth of the actual wave spectrum. What could we really see if we had access to the other ninety-percent? Sam, we […]

via To Ping or Not to Ping: Physics, Phenomenology, and Observer Effects — Three Pound Brain

 

[NOTE: A variation of this comment about an essay posted in THREE POUND BRAIN forms part of the “Preface to the Intorduction” of the revised 1st edition of the book “Absolution“, that is called now: “The Moment of Decisive Significance: A Heresy“. It is copyright 2016 by Lance A. Kair.]