We have encountered a description of divergence and how an arm of such motion remains conventional despite itself. On one side of things, conventional discourse functions to perpetuate its method by subsuming and sublating contradiction in real meaningful negation, exposing the contradiction as a form of negation that itself is negated but not reinserted as positive. Disputes have arisen concerning this, infamously around Hegel and his dialectic; venture to say that the argument is due to its want for inclusion in reality. Then on the other, this is all to say that the conventional method re-inserts or otherwise asserts its (hypothetical and practical) imperative, the True Object that compels through faith the downplaying of ‘mere’ intuition, so as to allow for contradiction as part of reality. The former can be said to identify basic movements of continental philosophy, the latter, analytic philosophy. We can discuss the significance of this apparent historical irony elsewhere. Suffice it for now that conventional philosophy can be categorized in this way; continental philosophy at least considers irony regardless of its analytical tendency for method which commonly reifies the more overt assertion of the primacy and ubiquity of the One reality.
It Is sufficient to argue backwards, to work from, as away from, the point of contention into a unitary discourse of inclusive reality, to take through intuition or inspiration of the term-object’s real-truth as a means to argue, as many authors do, a theory of simultaneousness, a theory whereby the terms coalesce or otherwise represent (albeit as an extended philosophical culturally relevant effort) an identical situation of reality (Zizek; Kair – myself, author of “Constructive Undoing”), or where real objects exert distances and effects in the same manner as humans do with objects, such that humans are also objects (Harman; Kair). It is sufficient for reality to argue through logic that there is no separation between, for terms, the experiencer and the experience, the subject human being and the object of its experience, the sayer and the said, the viewed and the seen (scene), or even the indication of overdetermined terms, such as ‘larger humanity’ or ‘society’, to the limit that expresses such idea, and then to suggest that such a situation may be realized and actualized into a sort of ‘new praxis’. Likewise it is sufficient to argue that objects are separate but ‘vicariously causal’ in their relation to each other. It is sufficient for the discourse of reality involved in the investigation of objects and subject-objects to reach a point when the saturation of meaningful terms allows for a redundancy of segregate categories to develop multiple Objects, or ‘multi-‘ universes, each overlapping universe holding the potential for truth by the nature of the necessary discursive ‘universal’ categories, categories that posit their segregation based within the intuited identity of term and object, that then may negotiate with other ‘universes’ toward a better ‘world’, and then propose a ‘new’ discourse that accounts for this. This is what discourse does in, or for, reality. When this occurs, though, that is, to reach the argument that makes the move for this deliberate (as maybe opposed to ‘organic’) — not over-determination, but its encompassment, the assertion implied by the unreflected intuition — designation or adamant removal of ‘sign’ for the sake of (faith in, intuition of) truth-reality, the terms of reality now must reflect themselves in relief, such that every term is the position-expression (matter, object) of a particular moment-space (energy, potential, kinetic), at once informing and being informed by reality in discourse — but without the inclusion of the position by which such a situation may arise; the True Object oriented clause of transcendence. That is, unless we posit that what is excluded is indeed not. This is then the opposite; imminence posited as reality, which is for no other terms, in definition, and in so much as terms are taken to indicate or otherwise show the truth (the true object), we have thus a return to what was just argued in the previous segment, redundancy and repetition.
What we have just come across is a real ironic moment. But this detachment, real individuals in a negotiated world, comes in the same course by which reality is always come by, choice, through the distancing of the object from the subject, through denial of that which offends ones faith, such that one universe can ‘no longer contain’ the meaning conveyed in the eminence (prestige, grandeur) of colluding meaning, the ‘singularity’ gained by the investigation into the (True) intuited object term — and ‘another’ universe is gained, another discourse. In fact, admitting the breaking of such singular activity, it is the revolt from this ‘meaningful’ abyss by which a real ‘multitude’ of universes arise. The real universe itself is thus not brought into question, rather, reality is now understood to involve a potential for many universes. Where once was the One, that which enjoined all terms’ meaning, that was (is?) impetus for which contradiction showed the route, now the same method has shown that the One is actually multiple (the pure multiple, ala Alain Badiou) which is the point behind the explication of conventional reality, the effect of contradiction being an indicator of what is ‘truly false’.
It is by this feat of consciousness that we can then begin to suggest that such intuition does not gain its footing from some ‘inspiring’ ethereal unknown, compelling the individual to act as an assertion towards some completion as yet unformed if not for the instruction of inspirational transcending element, but rather draws from what is already completed because what is completed is immanent; which is to say, the act, aside from the True Object-term identity, cannot manifest except that it is and does precisely as it does and is. Immanence, in this way, is what then allows for the multitude, of objects in a level playing field of universal operation, but more significantly, of individuals with their own ‘sense’ of truth, in a common arena of negotiation. But what is this sense? What is happening if everything is happening immanently? Is not such immanence merely another argument for and or relying upon a transcendental aspect or element? Have we not merely repeated the same arguments that want to decide upon what is immanence and transcendence?
Here then we have in action the evidence of the true power of reality. The limit come upon by the foreclosing of the transcendental ‘One’ universe, by the methodological reducing of what is or was transcendent of thinking to a True Object of such thought, reveals that what is or was otherwise transcendent has been usurped of its power by the real method, thus transforming this True Object, transcendence, into immanence that, again, proposes to be of some essential truth of reality. Radical or not, and irony aside, such a position gains little but a reification of the real method for establishing truth, as if the transcendent or now immanent aspect has inspired the individual to ‘bring down’ the knowledge of itself for reality, so that now all human beings fall under this rubric of truth. Then the Big or, this is not ‘really’ happening and everyone is really just doing what they do, and there is no encompassing true discourse; but then how are they doing that and how are we able to talk about there being none? What is the discussion about if it is really just the motion of immanent existence? This is hardly ridiculous, it is ironic. Because nothing occurs for the truth of reality without an inspiring transcendental agent. We have argued this elsewhere; whether or not we define terms such as to exclude a ‘transcendent’ clause, where maybe the human being is generating meaning by itself as a sort of ‘meaning machine’ but inclusive of all ‘other’ meaning that may be had, still, the effect is that consciousness operates so as to include and exclude as an imperative of real meaning. The issue of the point of contention, or the suggestion enacted by this point, is that consciousness, itself an effect of the human physiological being of the universe, functions to supply reality but resists at all costs the exposure that shows that reality does not present the truth of itself through inspired agency, that is to say, through an ability to have intuition of universally True Objects, except in as much as one has faith in the terms of discourse to define categories in particular manners so as to identify True Objects, and, only in reality can the agent be inspired by an intuition of the True Object. The limitation inscribed and described by this set thus implicates an exception to reality. Such descriptions (discursive schemes) that propose a grand explanation of the truth of reality thus proscribe a faith, and such faiths account for their trueness by default clauses that define the exclusions by which the system gains its stature for truth; and we may use Harman idea: anything that falls outside such an addressing is ‘accidental’. Such real schemes make so much sense to particular individuals that one can no longer get around them, discourse and discussion can offer no purchase for entry because every statement and every proposal has been accounted for by the tenants of inclusionary and exclusionary caveats. Hence, faith makes true.
To bring a most pertinent example of such faith in action is of course religious fundamentalism. Zizek describes the interactions of real faith in a recent article for the New York Times [http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/author/slavoj-zizek/]. Fundamentalism can be understood as such a discourse of reality that sets inclusionary and exclusionary aspects in a meaningful saturation of True categories; faith. What we deal with from a Western perspective is that there is such extremism, for the example of Zizek’s article, ISIS, the self proclaimed ‘Islamic State’, and how to breach such faith so as to mitigate violence. The discussion about such violence toward peace is taken up elsewhere. The significance that Zizek points out is not that there is an essential difference, but rather they ‘are already like us (the West)’, and the way they are like us, for the point if this essay, is that we and them are not only part of reality (Zizek categorizes this ‘reality’ as Capitalism, a category I tend to agree with), but, and most significantly, oriented upon True Objects. If this is indeed the case, then we should rather look at how such ‘Western view’ holds the object out away from itself, that is, how the perspective that we have, that gains fundamentalism as a category, is likewise a fundamentalism, if that albeit a ‘non-fundamentalism’, a fundamentalism that on one hand denies its being such, but on the other proclaims its (admitted) fundamentalism as a more correct, true and real basis of reality. The Christian fundamentalism of the West has already included the democratic-capitalistic discourse in its faith, already incorporated the secular inclusions and exclusions into its designation for truth, such that its faith, again, likewise merely shows the power of faith in reality. By this reduction, we should then consider then how reality itself is manifested in a particular manner, and that this manner, by virtue of its method that has choice as an integral and indeed innate if not fundamental tenant for all that may be true, cannot be ‘opt out’ of, which is to say, cannot be decided upon based upon an arrangement of discursive meanings.
The suggestion offered then, which is and was already the enjoining of real method unto itself to reveal itself, due to the logic of the explication put forth in the previous paragraphs, is never taken, whether it was not actually of transcendence or is now of immanence; such placements, the truth of such discursive formulations, are considered but never actualized in reality because it is in itself contradiction of the method. The method is real because it functions to hold the object out from the subject; yet while this method is founded in discrepancy, it operates effectively because it represents what is presented at once as an immanent and attainable goal: the True Object. Such contradiction of said method is offensive to the individual invested in reality, and so elicits from this offense “nihilism” as a ground of reductive reason that serves as a Biblical cherubim, securing the individual in its real position of willful inspired agency. Hence we can begin to understand the issue that Miellassoux and Harman bring for their proposal, but also the situation that is already enacted by maybe Miellassoux, but at least Harman, Badiou, Zizek, and Laruelle bytheir presentation. In this way we can also begin to understand how the veto and the pocket veto might come into play for the discourses of these authors in the discussion of reality — and their methodological dependence for their offering of solution — as to what is being framed as not real.
A side note: An operative question, when for example one reads Zizek [Please see Agent Swarm’s post that makes an argument that concerns this same feature: http://terenceblake.wordpress.com/2014/09/04/16-traits-of-continental-philosophy/%5D, is, how then are such observations brought? For, there is nothing evident nor inherent to his arguments that describe how it is he is able to bring such a discussion, nor even, really, besides the social commentaries that read like edicts for action, what he is talking about. Zizek, for all his apparent eccentricity and genius, gives us no insight as to why what he is saying has any relevant meaning for us. His social historical anecdotes appear to give his writings substance, and we are to assume his draws from a well reading, excellent education and grand synthesis of big ideas, but then, when one actually listens to the meaning of his arguments, one can only see that his whole parade cannot have the substance we think it holds, that if one takes to heart the meaning of his philosophy, aside from yet implicit to the directly implied call to action of the social commentary, one can only see that the very act of reading and understanding Zizek is itself a motion of contradiction, irony; and this is to say, for such an experience, not real.
The only respectable move in this situation, then, is to ask into this doubt.
Reality, in this way represented by discussion and argument, is sufficient unto itself, which is to argue by the extrapolation of method that a free individual is self sufficient, that is, in the ideal utopia that is the society of free agents. The discourse of freedom (social justice) thus promotes this maxim. But when we look around at the apparent social situation and if we can trust what is said of history, never is there a time when such ideology can ‘hold all the eggs’. The mythology of progress thus holds out its activity against itself to gain a purpose, with all the usual disclaimers, ‘we tried’ being the most basic one, but in the context of this essay, more ‘we are simply doing what is to be done’, whether we want to call it the solution to the discrepancy between the 1st and 3rd Worlds, the haves and the have nots, the rich and the poor, oppressor and oppressed, security and terrorism, environmentalism and the human effect towards Earth’s destruction, or the discrepancy that the institution of philosophy holds within itself. The world thereby may present itself as a current unitary discourse that can be viewed in a manner that Zizek describes in his book, “Living in the End Times“, for it seems apparent, according to the analysis of ideology that reflects unto itself, that there would be an ‘end’ and that this end is evidenced in the very motion that it has ultimately promoted by its method of seeking into the terms for their objects’ essential in-itself truth. In short, denial in this sense is the discourse of reality failing. The redundancy involved in such an undertaking is seen to be revealing itself, but due to the nature of the operation of consciousness for having true objects, it (reality) resists its uncovering, and this resistance can be understood, so Zizek suggests, as an historical analysis of ideology through the ‘five stages of grief’.
Indeed, following our argument of the Significant Event, there is only one ‘stage’ effective here: denial, for there will only be an end in as much as there is always an end in sight and presented in history through the present, just as there was an ‘end’ of the various ancient empires, as well an ‘end’ to the Romantic Era, to Modernism, Postmodernism, an ‘end’ of Y2K, an ‘end’ of history and or philosophy — in the extended analysis oriented upon Objects, such historical progress appears then to argue a ‘great culmination’ that ushers in a ‘new era’. To be fair, perhaps there is a real motion of this sort, but the proposal to be considered is that such reckoning never occurs, or more precisely, it only occurs through the particular condition of knowledge as an indicator of true reality for the individual. It is this condition that expresses the power of reality in the manner of Paulo Freire’s deliberation upon the game of oppression (both the oppressor and the oppressed are oppressed in the game of oppression); i.e. a human being attains its individual identity through joining in the discursive determination of reality, by appropriating the discourse of power, which we may call the ‘priority discourse’, which is to say, by becoming the oppressor. It is all too common to see the how the priority discourse usurps such ‘existential’ meaning for its own ideological purposes, locating specific arenas of oppression where such game occurs in the world while excluding itself (the analysis, as well as the effort to counter it) from such a category of world-state. It is not too difficult from a historical view to see where such free agency has gotten us. But this is reality, as Zizek aptly confirms, explicates and reiterates through his whole repertoire. With this in mind, we can easily see how Freud’s notion of the ‘death drive’ is significant, only now, the denied redundancy has taken the form of desparate solution; this too is a feature of the ‘end times’ the Zizek addresses in his recent book.
To explain how or why reality in its truth does not present any essential segregation of elements, to rely upon the identity posed of logic to the meaning of a phrasing of terms, simply reifies that such duality is not being overcome in the discursive re-presentation of Objects, but rather is only seen to be being overcome by individuals invested in the intrinsic mythology that is denying its end as its end is taking place because of the denial inherent of the orientation upon the scheme for itself that is positing its own ending. This is a discursive situation of historicity, the fact of history as an object, the result of discourse having power of dominion over reality, a presentation of affairs that misses the reflection of itself due to itself operating to maintain real progress. But this is not so much ideology as a hegemonic assertion of power, not that discourse itself has power, because ideology is a real situation of discourse; it is reality itself, as a designation of ubiquitous power by which ideology can be said to be the vehicle of power as opposed to other marginalized ideologies. Likewise, this is not a situation of an actual temporal movie of static objects, of reality ‘before’ having some different quality in itself such that the discourse then was manifesting reality (powerfully) differently than now; reality then was the same as reality now: it was reality. Reality was not behaving any differently than it does now for the human beings living in those times; and this is to say emphatically that the human being is not segregate from the operating universe, but complicit with its operation. If there was a reality that was different due to the hegemonic power of discourse, then it was exactly reflecting the condition of the universe in reality as human discursive power, as said, within the scheme of meaningful terms by which such discourse can be said to assert power as a hegemony. Sure, manifestation of things in the universe presented different conditions, but the effect of what is real was exactly the same; what was different is that now we have an idea of discourse asserting a power of primacy over what reality is and means for all of history as a True Object, whereas before what we now situate as discourse was seen and or defined through another discursive operation. This is redundancy in your face; this is the condition of knowledge now. This is the limit denied as limit, even to its understanding in its discursive formulation. Such notions are entirely ideological, absolutely Idea, absolutely real discourses about what is and was true for all time: the hard correlational limit; mythology functioning intrinsically. The fact is that no historical end ever occurs except in as much that ‘history’ is an object in-itself; the individual investment in reality will not allow it. This is consistent with another argument Quentin Miellasoix presents in his “Beyond Finitude“, that of another arch-fossil that occurs due to death, and evident in Zizek also; if an end were to occur, its ending would have no basis, but only the basis that arrives through there being no end — and if there is an end, then it is the indication of limit as what lay beyond the limit and antecedent to thought-reason; that which is not real. So to repeat; such a break prescribed by such knowledge never occurs in reality, except so much as an individual may be inspired through intuition of a ‘more true and real’ Object, that is always transcendent to the discursive operation. So it is: no break ever occurs.
In this manner, by this conventional method, the meaning of the phrase that describes this real situation approaches but never breaches the point of contention, and thus is never realized — understood but never actualized for real human living and experience — for the meaning that is supposed to be conveyed. Such conventional method can be said then, again, to be one of Bad Faith. Such logic of identity is not sufficient for the purposes of coming to any truth, but only sufficient for reifying and reestablishing that what is true is real and that such unitary reality is found through the terms themselves, the method of such terminology, as terms are understood to be gaining the truth of the grand Object of universal reality. So to reiterate in Quentin Miellasoux’s formulation, such method arrives through contingency that itself is necessary, but does little in this way to reveal what the facticity of necessity actually is or how it is indeed necessary beyond the reinscription that contingency is the actual truth of reality. In other words, the discourse of the real that proposes to have found itself through its method only serves to reify that faith makes true. Irony confounds such necessary contingency.
What is revolutionary in the context of our extended analysis is what can be inferred in ‘transformation’, or for another term, ‘conversion’. Such change never occurs in reality, neither outside of reality. Again, Zizek accounts for this. Categories do not change, but are converted in real discourse. But such a conversion is itself a category that attempts to convince or otherwise describe the route one may take to come upon the revolutionary experience. Yet, once having this situation, we can then discern the issue of the point of contention as a starting point that begins the real count as an arbitrary moment in reality as an event of the pure multiple (Alain Badiou). Where then such multiple is seen by the individual to have elicited from itself an inspiration, an intuited true problem of reality, the multiple is thereby reified by the inspired agent in reality, and the proposal continues to assert its correction in different forms, through the varied categories, as real progress, now the issue of transformation being seen as sufficiently described so as to be able to bring about the revolutionary experience. Yet inso much as this may occur upon the organization of real meaningful categories, the experience does not connote what it proposes, but simply shows that reality is all there is, that the priority discourse is indeed omnipotent and ubiquitous.
For this essay, what we have then in this description of reality is not a proposal for such transformation; such a transformation is ultimately real in its potential. What we have here is an exposure of how such real determinations themselves rely upon categorical disseminations of the True Object. The issue of the Significant Event thus posits through the veto that such proposals of transformation are themselves based upon temporal categorical manifestations of such Objects; and further, that such inspired agency thus moves to its argument by appropriating and converting real historical categories (schemes; phrase universes, Lyotard) as they are seen to indicate significant moments of reality, i.e. events of the multiple. Thus when such multiples are taken in themselves to indicate that set which is not included in another set and even its own set, we can no longer be talking about the real intuitive individual negotiating the world, some solution for the conscious individual navigating Life; there is a plenitude of such real suggestions for living. On the contrary, we must address then that category that contains all categories but itself.
Hence the irony of the discussion of the Significant Event.
In future essays (I figure my doing so) I will show how such conventional methodology conveniently avoids its own fault of representation. I will show how the discourse of reality assumes that the logic of an arrangement of terms is supposed to present an actual truth, and how this presumption of faith thereby redirects the telling to consequences of faith. I most likely will begin with Slavoj Zizek’s writing (we will see; many authors can serve as an occasion for this showing) because he appears to recognize and address in a certain way, the ‘gap’; his ‘parallax gap’ is a phenomenon located in the particular phrasing of conventional logic. He seems to notice this fault, but because he cannot or will not address the gap itself, he suits himself to describe the conventional ramifications (social contingencies) of having the gap. He is a master in this, and I even venture to say that he is the exemplar conventionalist, the ‘pope’ of conventional faith and its dogmatics. And indeed, one could see in his mastery the impetus for his discussions lay in his not being able to address the gap itself; thus Zizek can also be used as an example of how the veto, but particularly the pocket veto, is put in play, and thus he also can become a site by which to reach in the heart of the point of contention. In short, through the occasioning of various authors, I will show a ‘hack’ for conventional philosophy.
Similar to this, also in the future I will probably put forth a discussion concerning Francois Laruelle’s ‘active linguistics’, which is, I feel, the basis of his whole non philosophical enterprise.
For now, for “The Significant Event”, I leave the argumentation that proposes to lead one to the truth of reality to those authors more thoroughly invested in conventional reality. It is necessary that the ‘concrete’ social situation of individuals be handled and addressed. So conceding to their efforts and that their efforts rely upon such a faith, and that such faith only is posited as exclusionary, that is it asserts the inclusion of all that is allowed to be counted as true, whereas such instance of faith belongs to a larger situation where such faith does indeed operate, we move to speak more upon divergence.
End Part 9.