Psychology and Ideology

From “Mental Automatisms“. commentaries and translation of the work of Gaetan Gatian de Clerambault. by Paul Hriso, M.D.

Used without permission.


There is ample evidence that shows that medication for mental illness is not as much based in science as it is in an ideology that medicine might have a beneficial effect upon mental issues.

Despite what might be said of why psych meds work, Psychologists do not really know why they indeed do, and in fact, even though some sort of effect has and does occur in many people with mental health issues. What that effect actually is is so vague, and the numbers generally so statistically insignificant given the ever so fast growing number of people with such issues, that it is almost enough to say that they do not do much physiologically, and indeed, their noted effectiveness is the product of an ideological enforcement not very unlike early Catholic ideals, supported arguments and enforcements about the Earth being the center the universe.

From quite near the beginning of what we know now at psychology there has been a concerted effort of career professionals to mold the ideas about the psyche toward what we know as empirical physiology and science. This is to say that even the word science It’s self has been commandeered by a project, a clumping together of empirical observations, that if it were not for the career motive, psychology As an effort to help people With their mental health would probably be a name for a loose set of differentiators, different groups of causal associations from empirical observation andlikely would not be associated under a common theme of physiology.x

The money motive seems to inform and be a sort of gravitas for anyone that enters the mental health field, whether they be counselors, social workers, psychologist psychiatrist neurologist — Anyone who enters the any of those fields is immediately keelhauled into this “empirical science paradigm” were medicine, psychiatry and psychology and the medical model are the pinnacle aspiration for truth, and is where everyone should be properly headed if they are trying to help this person in front of them, or get help themselves.

I question this assumption deeply. For it is really the love of money that is the root of all evil, and if we follow some of my philosophical explorations in this blog, most of the time people are not choosing what they love. So I say responsibility has to do with a self reflection that might not be occurring in this axiomatic reflection of empirical physiological scientific human being.  It is as though psyche-science is a kind of sleepwalking. 

My position on this, though, is not that psych meds do not work or are working due to some sort of mass hysteria. The issue is more that ideological constraint might shape investigators to view the situation along certain lines of causality and connection, and thus motivation and constraint may be due to the supreme importance money and career grant to our sense of the righteous world.x

It is as though clumping of psychology and physiology has become such a religious cosmological identity thatpeople just blindly move along a line of conclusions which merely verifies and confirms that their Nightwatch discovers facts.

The philosophical responsibility is what to do. For the psychological and emotional reactivity that ensues whenever a deeply held an axiomatic truth is confronted, more often prevents change were change is needed. And this is because the emotional activity which informs and it’s connected to subjective empirical truths, as a defense yield and violence appropriate to maintaining that ideological constant, despite what might be true.

To be responsible, then, is to realize that mental health is found through strategies of confronting this bias, rather than pure philosophical argumentation. For, the argumentation more often yields antagonisms which confirm the ideological bias then it does actual progress for human benefit. 

The Conventional Limit

–from “Re-visioning psychology” by James Hillman.

The modern idea of ownership permeates into every thing that we think. This preoccupation with one’s “owned” ideas manifests world as some thing to be or to have as owned. Hence we have the eternal problem for the modern individual which shows up in one instance as rational subjective opinion in a world of argued relative opinions, and in another instance as mental illness. We might even begin to discern what mental health is by understanding how it seeks to commandeer the problematic modern individual which is — by the plain evidence of all the problem it vomits everywhere by simply being itself — ideologically and institutionally mentally ill, by placing it in a “positive spin”. For I think the most salient and pertinent issue of philosophy and not only psychology is: What exactly is mental health?

We tend to ignore this question as well as ignore the absurdity involved in the object of mental health by trying to reduce it to some physical state of brain or some organizational state of some “pure” mind, by trying to bring about various conceptual apparatuses, or simply talking about “ways” or practices that we can do to thus be mentally healthy by the doing of them. But none of these ever really tells us what mental health is except maybe a sort of stillborn fetus of modern science to poke and prod at.

And the people who are really suffering are the ones who mostly get to remain in a state of suffering overall.

Why do we continue to remain so myopic towards a problem which doesn’t seem to be responding very well to these narrow idealistic methods? 

But this is not really to make any sort of criticism against processes, interventions, and other efforts to help; for sure, we have to try.

 Here, we are taking on the interface or relationship between psychology, activity, and philosophy. 

The most pertinent philosophical discussion of modernity in this regard was made by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in their book “capitalism in schizophrenia”, but indeed their work is saturated with the attempt to come into a plural solution to the problem of the singular self. 

The issue, though, that we find permeating philosophy, or what I call conventional philosophy, can be viewed through the adjective pronoun “we”; for, what those philosophers pronounce in their philosophical works, in their psychoanalysis in one sense, is exactly “not” we, but indeed that group of people which is only able to understand humanity as a generalized and common, modern, “we”: Meaning, not the We that arises as world to form the contours of self, but indeed the modern We which is the presumed isolated self within a world of individual isolated selves “out there”, huddling in cold groups, and indeed only of beings associated with the category that we call human. The We doesn’t think of the We which involves rock formations, buildings and quarks. Anything that lives outside of this, what I call, religious and theological designation, we label and denote as ethically inferior and or in need of correction due to its epistemologically implicit error of cognition.

We might then ponder what indeed the idea of correction is manifesting around in this regard. What is this idealistic calcification attempting to protect?


I’ll stop there.