Contrary to Hersserl and those phenomenal agents, intension is not centered in some thoughtful subject; it is centered in the object. This is the essence of the meaning of multiplicity. There is no origination of thought in a central, unitive subject agent of transcedence. There is only the fullness of imminent existence taking place in an infinite mulitude of objects.
The irony cannot be over nor under determined.
It is not an easy thing to do, whenever, to throw away the ladder, but when the time comes, it turns out to be the easiest thing. I am sure Neitchze or Witgenstein had quite a different meaning than this amended version I am putting here, and the ‘passing over in silence’ offers obvious difference. But if one thinks about it, it is then not so different after all. N’s meaning always tends toward some ‘(non-) spiritual’, if you will, overcoming, some ‘inner to outer’ kind of deep superficiality as opposed to the superficial deep. Yet here we must come right out with it and be bold: Throw away the entirety of the philosophical library. That’s right I said it. Of course, though, this statement and call to action is ironic because I can only say it because I have read enough of it, and if one were to do it then they really needn’t my instruction; so the voicing is kind of useless. ‘Enough’ then becomes a highly suspect and enigmatic form because I don’t think I’ll ever get enough of it, but yet somehow I have had quite enough. It is the philosophical maxim that one can never read all the authors and their books so at some point one merely has to take a position and enter the conversation. That is what I have done with Constructive Undoing, as one can go look at the first post of mine; “Entry into Discourse”, I think it is called.
What we find there is an odd sort of invocation. One has to ask of it just what Is involved in the capitulation. Well, if we must be honest, then we can say that Zarathustra must come down from the mountain. But was he up there with all the worlds philosophy books? No, I would say. But yes, the meaning of all the reading could be said to beckon one away from the meaning gained as the reading. But all the same, the meaning gained had nothing to do with the particular philosophical ideas etched in symbols, but had everything to do with the meaning they contained; hence we throw away the ladder. Whether books or no books, the meaning gained was gained by the reading of them and not gained by reading them, but one could not have forgone the reading of them to know that the reading of them brings the throwing away of them.
The point is in the meaning of them, and not the cumulative amassing of particular strings of sayings. So I say that the more I reference and address the particular authors ideas, such as “…in the same way that So and So talks about idea~X, Heem and Haw has a similar idea with idea~O, and these may thus derive and support my idea M — as soon as I use that structure, I am asking everyone to agree with the method of amassing sayings and that this method is the meaning one is supposed to have as a method, as opposed to the gaining of meaning. It is due to this non sequitur meaning of what I see as philosophy to a particular methodology, that I address the throwing away of the ladder.
So it is by this throwing away the ladder I am enacting a couple things. For one, I am granting that what I am saying has already been said somewhere by someone or by a synthesized group of their respective sayings. I am figuring that if indeed I say something that sounds like or is a straight reiteration of something someone else said, then I grant that my idea was not a novel idea. Also, thus I am saying that once the situation has been understood, only certain necessary repercussions arise. These repercussions are the fidelitous suture of event to its subsequent multiple. This situation marks the necessity of throwing away the ladder, because once having understood, the rest follows without much effort; it is the effort of the hardest risk that brings such fidelity to the foreground. Likewise I am saying that the apparent repetition of my thought upon others is a philosophical issue, such that one should notice that the manner by which I proceed assumes as part and parcel that I am not plagiarizing other authors so much as I am conveying my piece of what cannot be plagiarized, as they did the same for their peices, and that the issue, as I just said, unfolds necessarily, each author being but a finite manifestation; just as one cannot read every and all items concerning a subject, one person likewise cannot write about and thus exhaust all the repercussions of what is basically an eternal situation. What is plagiarized is an ownership of phrasings, of ordinations of symbols; so I say that if the meaning I put forth sounds like other authors ideas, then I admit that either those other authors did indeed help me in my phrasings, and or such ideas are necessary to the eternal situation. It is thus that the situation of terms become marked, as well as the designation and construction of history, as well a pronunciation of the capitalistic investment.
Yet if what I say is indeed new, then this too is part of the philosophical issue.
Indeed, in the bibliography I will indeed site those authors and books that contribute to this philosophical enterprise, and even site specific verses, but I feel to note all the authors’ ideas that are reflected in my writing, i would end up footnoting every sentence, and every sentence upon that, such that I would be writing for eternity, in and as eternity, as my book would be essentially the whole of human writing bound by hypothetical hardcover. In essence, the conventional method of rigorous scholarly citation applied to my work would effectively necessitate the removal of my finitude; so it is that which necessitates my throwing away the ladder, and the concession that every philosophical argument that has been made is correct at least in its potential. Where I might rebut any particular argument that I may have not noticed, let it be known that I acknowledge the conventional propriety that may be or have been held such that they might get the street cred for their (now) rebutted and proposed incorrect proposal.
Having thus outlined the situation, that the ladder needs be used in order to throw it away, that the nature of the throwing away has thus been the problem, and that the authors are all correct and have valid points, we are left in this state where everything philosophical is gone anyways. I need not cite any authors because I have already said that my ideas are not new, and in so much as everything has been said I should have nothing to say. Thus we have the nihilism I’m starting to hear people have positions on. So what am I saying? Why am I still writing?
Hence I speak of divergence. Nihilism only arises against the conventional state, so no longer do I rise against it; it is useless to do so, it is nihilistic. Like Jello Biafra of infamed punk band Dead Kennedys said (I paraphrase): there is no effective change that occurs by going against the system; one must change the system from within the system. If I were to continue to rehash and cite and question and repose and rebut and cite, nothing will have occurred. In fact nothing indeed could occur; Badiou appears to call this the nihilistic ethical state [oh kay, here’s a cite: “Ethics”. Badiou], and it is not difficult to correlate Kiekegaard’s ‘ethical/universal’ here, and thus we have ended with the point at which divergence diverges: correlationalism. What confines this or defines this state is exactly the move for reconciliation of categorical imperatives, or rather, the reliance upon that which the categorical pure reason allows as then essential ethical categories; for if there is no choice, we have then the imperative situation. Yet likewise, where there is choice, it is imperative that we choose. This is the problematic that Kierkagaard addresses through all his works. It is the effort to reduce this situation to a solution that defines the correlational arena, and all Western philosophy (should I say to distinguish and say all continental philosophy ? But even the analytics are attempting a one reduction I think) since the Greeks has been the effort to reconcile this apparent difference. Judaism seems the only one that actually keeps that which is Cesar’s with Cesar, so to speak, keeping ‘God’ as entirely unknowable, and the practical manifestation and activity privy to this known-unknown unto itself as Law. But the discussion of religion will follow later.
That which breaks with this historical philosophical effort recognizes difference; not the difference that requires the different element to recognize the universal maxim that we should respect difference, which is the conventional correlational move, but rather the difference that realizes that this idea, or respect for the idea, does not contain that which is different.
By this initial distinction, we can begin to consider truth.
I agree with Malabou’s initial consideration. “Relinquishing transcendentalism”. How tentative. How civilized. But her approach, I must say, just like all subsequent considerations, asks good questions but then never quite gets to any answer what so ever more than a reiteration, a parroting of conventional method. In very short verse: this is correlationalism. The very moment of her critique is correlationalism in situ. The proposal of Miellassoux set as is it in play, as I have said, is prime occasion to speak of the Significant Event; those interested will have to wait for the book, since the development is much larger than the blog format.
Suffice it to get to the issue behind such proposition. We might consider what ‘throwing away the ladder’ means. I am sure there will be the usual preponderance who hang onto the ladder for the use of arguing what one means by throwing away the ladder. And they won’t even see the redundancy and ridiculousness of their position; how indeed they may have thrown away the ladder yet are telling us what Neitzche and so and so mean by this and how they thus might qualify to having already thrown away the ladder, and then give further reason why now having thrown away the ladder, so and so says this and so we argue this and that based upon the meaning of so and so, that we may present the problemitization of throwing away the ladder such that we can the grant our position such that we now are moving beyond the ladder or not.
This little dance reminds me of a jazz artist in the late 1980’s who put out a CD with liner notes that described and made an argument in a quite intellectual fashion, how Jazz is not an intellectual art form or musical expression. I love jazz, but I just had to laugh, and then listen to his non intellectual music that, in my opinion, had with so much obvious talent and expertise so little soul and depth, so much explicit expression and so little inuition and grasp of the reason why, at least I, listen to music.
I draw this analogy to philosophy. The death of philosophy is evidenced exactly in such philosophers talking about the possibility of philosophy relinquishing the transcendent, parting from Kant and such. Obviously the meaning of philosophy has taken a turn, and it hardly hinges upon relinquishing anything, but rather more a hanging on to the well established method working of social lubrication and conceptual capital to make a name and a living. So much for every hobby and career; rarely it seems, if never, do the users of ideas really take to heart what they are talking about or reading about, keeping all meaning at arms length for the sake of quick access and face.
So as I have said of Harman, we have to give these brain users a benefit of doubt, and grant that they do indeed feel and believe with a passion that their involvement and discussion are really involving a type of truth, a type of real working. So it is that we must locate such thinking people in an arena that takes quite seriously their deep ideas, and call it ‘reality’ as a place, space or position, and ‘conventional’ as a method fitting and no larger than the arena, the terms of which holding such a value for investment, the infinity of such an arena, calls to such thinkers to regard it as quite inescapable and indeed thus always accounting for every possibility in its potential; always climbing the ladder, they are, even as they talk about whether it might be thrown away or not.
It is good to be the straw man, because this particular kind of straw man is not allowed in the correlationalist cycle, for it indicts the conventional method, rather, it bases of method. For logic is not a tool; it does not show where truth is located. It is a vehicle, a route by which conclusions may be shown. The idea of a ‘hidden’ truth which by the tool of logic may uncover is a conventional trope, an ideological dogma. Along such conventional lines, such confrontation is rebutted by saying that it defines a nothing, a nihilism, which is why so many authors now are considering and defining what nihilism might ‘really’ mean.
The post just before this one, here in Constructive Undoing, the “reblogg” post, is the example for which we say that we must destroy the transcendent. Miellassoux is being much too kind, much too diplomatic. The reason for this necessity is that the real conventional discourse relies upon the transcendent even as we might want to and in order to posit that we might get rid of it. And if anyone has been reading my blog, it is only in the act of blatant and obstinate denial that an arrangement of terms may effectively do anything, let alone now not have a transcendent involved in what reality may be. In fact, this is also why we must say that reality is the place where discourse determines what is true. We need not reiterate the past year of posts of Constructive Undoing. It is enough to use the “reblogg” to give a concrete and specific example of what it means to destroy the transcendent, what divergence means and why it is necessary. I’m not sure if this post will cover all that right now, but at least it will get to showing what we are up to by distinguishing ‘conventional methodology’.
Thus a throwing away of the ladder really evidences the problem I indicate by referring to the “Reblogg” post. Let’s look there now, the comments and discussion arena after the blog….Heres the link: http://darkecologies.com/2014/12/03/the-battle-in-philosophy-time-substance-and-the-void/
Ok, we’re back. Now keep in mind, I am not rebutting his essay for its content. In fact, D.E. rebukes me for not wanting to discuss within the parameters of what he has presented. Yet, we might say that part of the discussion of the Significant Event concedes the benefit of doubt to the argument in question, that for this case, the author of D.E. (Sorry man, I never got yer name) has indeed read the authors quite thoroughly and is fluent enough in the verses to bring to mind various quotes appropriate to the issue in question, and that such referencings likewise connote a good possible consideration of the matter. We concede that the opinion expressed is a valid opinion, in as much as it most probably sticks to the commonly recognized version of meaning, that this common reading thus laid admits various hazards, that these hazards will surly be rooted out, voiced and problematizing in various ways, etcetera.
My question is always: What does that mean? When I read his essay (as this is the example here), I have a pretty good idea of what he is saying, as well as the problem he suggests or implicates, as well as how an impetus for discussion has been set. Having a pretty good reading of the authors myself, I understand how the stage has been set, why the lights are faced here and there, the actors supposed to enter here, turn there, the music come in here. While I know the play, and the different showings and performances, and casts, that each is slightly different, with different stage sets, different colors, interpretations of phrasings, tempo, mood, timbre, etcetera — the play is the same play. It may be entertaining to see the play every year at different venues, but it always suggests the same meaning even while differing in reference to the moments in which I attend the showing, as my attendance and watching may have different significances to my regular life at the various times.
So it is that when I read philosophy, i am informed to meaning through the question of what does it mean, what is the author saying. Now, the problem I wish to shed light upon. In this effort for meaning, a reader inevitably comes to want to find out what is ‘really’ meant, and so dismisses the meaning that is gained in potential through definitional ‘gaps’ such that now the reader has to look for context that does not seem to appear in the present text, i.e., the reader needs to read other authors and see what they are saying, and so on. What this process amounts to is a storehouse of information that when drawn upon appears to be conveying deep significant meaning, but when stood back from, really just presents a bunch of terms that says nothing in particular; this type of discursive posturing that seems so profound by its educationally privileged layering is what I call metaphysical (in the bad way) because the level that is supposed of its definitional structure is supposed to get at some more real or more true meaning of the issue presented.
It is this kind of philosophical method that is correlational, that which relies upon a transcending aspect of discourse by which to assume or propose an actual truth of the situation. As we might see in D.E.’s talks on Zizek; Zizek himself talks in a way to show this very situation: that there is no subject that has any actual or substantial truth to it, but that we are viewing it in a particular way, in a particular fashion. This is what all the various Zizek talking abouts on this particular issue means: there is nothing there.
Now, philosophers will debate this, but the debate will be based upon the fact that obviously there is something ( but again Zizek accounts for this in various places also, but how he says it is less important that what he means; how he says it is just nice to look at). So the philosophers will bring in their storehouse of authorial knowledge to pose and discuss what Zizek may be saying and what then may be the actual truth of the matter. But never do they stand back and find out what it is such rhetoric actually means. The point which Zizek reiterates all over the place is that such rhetoric is nonsensical, that the discourse itself, a particular discourse that he references capitalistic, sees its elements as substantial capital, actual true real things that are negotiated. But the point I’m making is not to dispute what Zizek is saying; the points of Zizek will be pronounced in the Significant Event. The point I wish to expose is that the various arguments that would rebut or expound upon Zizek often miss what Zizek says over and over.
A most specific and pertinent example of the motion of conventional correlationalist philosophy occurs in relief through the exchange in the comments of D.E. of the link I gave, between him (her? Come to think of it, I don’t really know) and I.
Hopefully my distinction will be made more clear.
I use the term ‘True Object’ in my writings. This usage often gets the best objections in the form of it making no sense. My question is what sense is there not to be made? The philosophers (and I have encountered this over and over in many places) routinely bring argument against ‘truth’ and ‘object’, and are typically repulsed by ‘faith’, at various junctures. My proposal is of a simplicity that is completely missed by the conventionalists that I see is due to their investment in the storehouse of authorial knowledge. I am saying that reality is constituted of True Objects, objects that cannot but be helped to function in reality as true things. Like the car I drive down the road. There is a car. The question of what a car may ‘actually’ be as an object is of no concern; indeed I am, as I drive, driving a car down the road. The ideological or theoretical considerations do not come into play here; much like Harman’s Third Chair, but most like the ‘First’ chair, what ever may be the actual ‘car’ does not come into play in my driving down that road. The car is a True Object. To argue what the car may actually be is entirely a theoretical issue, but more, an issue that is entirely metaphysical, which is also to say, concerning what is more true or more real, which is for all other terms, concerning what is transcendent or for better terms, as a methodological reduction, concerning ‘The’ transcendent.
There is no theory that needs go into this, but the theory is already there in the various authors all over the place. Harman’s difference with Zizek, even as he may say he disagree with Zizek, is in as much as Harman is invested in the truth of the terms he is using, as his terms are stemming from a sort of essential relation of thing to thing (the ‘thing’ that is Harman, and the ‘thing’ that Harman is addressing: object -> object). As I have said, he must argue this because this argument then validates retroactively the position by which he attains his truth of reality. And this next is key to my proposal of the situation of the True Object: his difference with Zizek takes place in reality.
Once this situation is understood, then we can consider the meaning ala Miellassoux, correlationalism and transcendence. Then, once this situation takes hold, the question no longer concerns what the author means, for this routinely beckons conventional method back into its correlation of ideologically ordered (Foucault) and scaffolded (Wittgenstien) terms — and besides, we have already climbed the ladder of this meaning — but rather the question becomes: What does this situation mean? Hence, to question this situation stems from a position that is not real. The real ladder of meaning must be thrown away. The question comes to concern the Significant Event.
We can see this in action in the comments of the linked blog on Dark Ecologies. That the simplicity I propose is countered by recourse to an authorial bank (Freire) of knowledge. The conventional philosopher cannot understand what I am referring to because he is caught in the metaphysical correlational world of ‘real’ discursive method. Hence, divergence.
Again; this is not to say that D.E. essays do not present valid points, but rather that the meaning of the points are routinely missed for the sake of the correlationally (transcendentally) justified arguments that stem from an assertion of identity, from the equivocation of the object and the discourse (terms) about them — but not just any discourse; a particular discourse that can be associated, as Zizek does, with the capitalistic paradigm wherein True things exist because of the metaphysical discourse that supplies the ‘more true’ reason for its objectivity — as if I am not really driving a car down the road. The car is thus a True Object due to the insistence of the metaphysical support.
But to get back to Malabou; the question of ‘why’ should the transcendent be relinquished (I apologize; I have only listened to the first 20 minutes of her talk. My input may change when I hear the rest) is made nearly moot due to the understanding that comes through the simple understanding of what authors such as Badiou, Zizek, and Laruelle, (if not many, more; such as, Kant, Hume, Hegel, Faurbach, Spinoza, Kierkegaard, Nietchze, Wittgenstien, Heidegger, Sartre [my spelling is horrendous] and many, many more, whose names apologetically do not directly come to mind right now — oh, and if not Miellssoux, and Harman) are really saying. The difference between these varied authors concerns the awareness of the following: The transcendent must be destroyed because it is the transcendent that perpetuates the continuance of real confusion. We must not ‘relinquish’ it because, as Malabou also says, to relinquish is more like a kind parting, and such a codependent relationship will never kindly part ways.
“Should humanity be saved?” Laruelle has asked. I say: humanity should not be saved. Because, should humanity be saved it would not even know that it had already been saved, if indeed humanity should have been.
The question is no longer that of Being, for Heidegger has destroyed being, like a forensic analysis of material. Being was viable so long as there was a dialectic whereby reality could be based upon its one vision through the oscillating features held from one another, like a binary star. Hiedegger destroyed the dialectic (for conventional method), encompassing the description of how such an interaction takes place for reality, what the dialectic does, how it works, a description from a distance, in a nice neat package, defining the Trueness of the Object called Dasein, ready for distribution. Hence, the question anymore is not of being, but of truth. The issue with Graham Harman is that he stands upon the dialectic through setting aside the destruction of being, and thereby enacts a deception. He thereby may speak of other than human Daseins through the dialectical vehicle, all the while holding the dialectic out of sight, withdrawn as the Dasein by which other Daseins are possible is likewise set aside for the sake of proposing again a ‘new’ one reality where the dialectic is gone, and the subject likewise dead. He thereby may propose a new ontology of being: Object Ontology.
I must admit, as a read more of Harman I am becoming increasingly disillusioned and bored; I tend to see the rise of Speculative Realism and then it’s Fizzle to have ran along these same lines as I am experiencing and discovering. And I must say that it is because of what has occurred, what was enticed early on as a sort of promise has lead to merely another philosophical system; quite boring, but even more irritating was that it seemed like Harman might be one to be able to pull it off, but then he comes up with another system that proposes a more real version of reality. So conventional; so regular, run of the mill. So it is, the reason for this motion of his that lead to a positing a more real system is explained by the essay of the Significant Event, that such deceptions can no longer stay viable; that is, except in so much as the deception is working, and where it succeeds is exactly in that audience where denial is operative. The deception works because the conventional method is already submerged and distanced in a self imposed deception: the term-object identity.
The boredom of Dasein explained by Harman is symptomatic of the reversal and contrivance we see in Harman’s Ontology. Admitting the short reading, the boredom of Being Dasein in need of some danger is at the heart of why Harman’s seem so boring: because the danger of Object Ontology comes in response to the boredom of being that is, in itself, a preliminary mood, that is, a mood that has not been allowed its maturation, has not been let to risk, and so discusses subsequence. Like a lacuna, this mood that Harman seems to understand is the offense that is the Ontology in its Ontological functioning. Harman is required for his Dasein of many colors to describe as enactment the results of having True Objects as the basis of a reality that is ubiquitous as it is total in its assertion of a universe of only objects. This is to say that he is arguing his identity, an identity that has arisen due to his investment in the State of reality. Here multiple Daseins exist as the evidence of the description of how it’s being is not presence, like an oxymoron, defies and contradicts its own meaning. Beings may exist with a certain facticity of ‘being there’ as an environmental inclusive state, but the being of Dasein thereby includes the fact of other Daseins within its own ‘there being facticity’. The implication here is the point of contention between eternity and progress, between what Badiou calls ‘immortal’ and ‘victim’; Harman is enacting his victimization. The dangerous move apparently seen by Harman is gained by his view of his Dasein as a meaning of meaning, as a Being that is exempt from the situation that Heidegger presents to mean Dasein. The meaning of Dasein for Harman is already a meaning represented as a object of Harman’s presentation. Harman apparently already was viewing the significance of Heidegger’s work as a significance fundamentally different than what the meaning of Dasein would entail, which is to say, the corpus that is the explanation of Dasein was already in the format of meaning that represents as a presentation the True Object (meaning of meaning) as an objective reflection, over the meaning that the corpus presents. Harman already was was viewing the world as a whole constituency of True Objects, already was his faith unquestioned, already his faith not doubted, his naïveté a sham before it could be authentic. Rather than the danger which is the being bored as the boredom that is being, Harman’s risk, what is dangerous for Harman, is by his faith, that his deception might be uncovered.
But in one manner of speaking, he need not be worried, because his faith is vindicated in the power that establishes reality, as he is invested in this reality, as he has faith in this power, he is justified. His risk is entirely of his faith.
Nevertheless, the boredom or disappointment comes because while his categories seem to really get at something, he leaves us flat in a world of intellectual ‘weirdness’; but the weirdness is barely interesting — or maybe as interesting as watching someone solve a Rubic’s cube. I know now that every time he preludes an idea with weird, it’s not going to be weird at all but rather mundane and obvious; but somehow I am sure that it is weird to a certain type of type of reader and author, and this type is probably one who is oriented upon the True Object. For a while I thought Graham was really following the philosophical maxim of looking to oneself, but it’s seems his route for this is more conventionally methodological than it is novel or introspective.
Yet, I should say that we must give Graham the benefit of doubt; I am sure that Graham indeed feels that he is looking to himself and not being conventional (why else would he say that ideas might be ‘new’?). And this is exactly where the discourse of the Significant Event gains its footing; because Graham can not see beyond his faith. Faith makes true. The discursive posturing may appear quite the feat of meaning, but philosophically speaking, while impressive, it risks little.
See that this blog is not so much an assertion of what I believe is so correct, but more a working space where I play with ways to situate discourse and test out the ideas they purport against what I am trying to say (which is why I would like feedback).
Strong words, dare I admit, of that last segment. In fact, I’m feeling I’m getting a little too defensive. The blog format is beginning to yield its limitations and I think I’m trying to plow through it, to demand upon…what? Ultimately, upon myself. Upon my silence. As if I can just yell loud enough I might break the partition. Very few people comment, and while these are valuable and appreciated, they do not constitute the attacks I seek. So I cannot but wonder if it is because I make no sense, or I make too much sense. I don’t know because few people have engaged.
And this blank brings me back to the impetus of this whole thing. To expose. All this so far has been and is preliminary, and I suppose I attempt to address the philosophers that see this foreplay argument and discussion as the primary issue, to get them to see it is really the result, the subsequence of the issue. That the re-present-ational edge of contemporary philosophy is really the dabbling in the whitewash, of subsequent issues.
As a side here, we might venture to suggest that what we have is a world that may be situated opposite to how university philosophy departments like to introduce existentialism. It may be not so much that there is a ‘real world’, and then, how Kiekegaard puts it, there might be a teleological suspension of this ethical real world; rather, we might see that it is the real world that is in suspension.
Thus I have said we recede. We have discussed what is subsequent first because it is represents the barrier to significance, and by approaching in this way come to the point of contention, thereby to be able to discuss what is first instead what is usually seen as last, as the object.
Thus also I have said we diverge from the (as Harman seems to suggest that Heidegger advocates) inadequate philosophical discourse of True Objects.
The issue is one’s orientation upon the object.
So I repeat myself because the format of the blog seems to lend itself to having to reiterate what has already been said in order to say something more. I feel a book is on its way.
As the previous segment: Harman wrote this synopsis of Heidegger, and he even admits in it that he thinks Heidegger is the greatest philosopher of our time. Now, if these statements are true, then we can say that Harman most probably not only understands Heidegger very well, but agrees with him in much of what he is saying, that is, Harman must also see that Heidegger is putting forth a description that is a good description of the issues, good, valid solutions to good and valid problems.
What I am saying is that if Harman does indeed reside well within the situation above there in the previous paragraph, then his first and second objections are forced, derivative not from Heidegger’s meaning; the objections are non sequitur to Heidegger’s ideas. Not ‘objections’ but completely estranged, fabricated. How is this? To put it in Heidegger’s terms, which Harman aptly explains (strangely enough) and to address his second objection: the facticity of being itself contains and accounts for change as part of its historical environment of facticity. If indeed the facticity for Harman is the arising of the question of change in his environment then it is exactly the occasion for which Harman is incorrect in his operation (see below).
Secondly, as to his first objection: Heidegger’s claim that there is only world when Dasein is present is really saying that such world, the work of objects, arise as such only with the instance of the human ‘being there’, that without Dasein, there is nothingness, which ironically is the ‘ground’ of the facticial event. Harman rejects this privilege and allows for the Dasein of podiums and fire and paper and such, but we could see that this rejection is based in the offense against the essential subject of a different privilege, of agency, the individual (see the next segment as well as previous post in the Significant Event). The question that must be asked then has to do with what facticity actually denotes, which then brings to the front the point of the issue with Harman; one of two situations must account for Harman’s mistaken digression from the philosopher he so thoroughly admires and understands:
1) Harman does not understand Heidegger for Heidegger’s meaning, and so is involved in the conventional mistake, as I offer the description by Lacan and Zizek (previous post of the Significant Event);
2) Harman does understand and so is contriving a position that blatantly ignores the meaning of the facticity of being, and so is being deceptive. This is to say one of the subsequent issues:
A). Harman is being deceptive as a strategy;
B). He is lying about his admiration for Heidegger and his scholarship is thereby called into question.
If indeed (1) is the answer, then it is easy to address Harman to the mistake as he is involved in the conventional faith in the True Object. If (2), then we have a marker of the pocket veto and evidence of the opacity of his proposals. (B) can be properly dismissed as a route back into (1).
Next we will address next some particular Object Ontology ideas.
Dealing with Graham Harman and the True Object oriented.
I got a copy of the book series called “Xplained” on Martin Heidegger written by Graham Harman. I thought it was something different, but when I got the book and started reading it I saw that it is more an actual kind of primer of Heidegger. It is very good; it places everything in a nice historical perspective with Heidegger’s personal history and influences, with Husserl and Phenomenology, and brings in the contextual philosophical problems he had and indeed philosophy in general faces, the significance of his proposals and such. One can tell Harman is quite informed, and I am sure one does not place very much weight on a layman such as myself, my opinion, to say that it evidences quite a scholarly understanding of the subject — as if Harman or the institution of philosophy really values, cares or needs my stamp of approval.
Yet is this very ignorance that evidences the exhaustion of institutional philosophy. The vastness of the human world populace as well as our internet availability for exchange of information of all sorts and types marks a coincidence whereby (institutional, academic, conventional) philosophy must now 1) be resolute in denial by closing its blinders to narrow its view, while 2) asserting its relevance for a larger totality, by 3) redoubling its effort to deceive, and 2) be oriented toward reconciliation upon politics and ideology. But, as I’ve said, there is plenty of drama in reality that needs a grand discourse to negotiate; reality demands its big negotiators. I am more concerned that such discourses assume to be talking about what is true outside the grand narrative. We have to ask what such grand narratives are based upon and how it might be possible to actually believe that such narratives are indeed accounting for all of reality. indeed; could they really hear what I’m saying here? I doubt it. It is more that such individuals are involved in a division of labor.
This, what could be called a philosophical ‘turn’ is more like a ‘shift’ but is really a motion of denial based in offense, or an outright deception.
It is true; philosophy, as the discourse that indeed addresses the One reality in its oneness, ends with Heidegger. Whereas prior to and including Heidegger, in one way of viewing, one orientation, philosophers were attempting to inscribe, or otherwise suture the subject and object, the subject into reality, to reconcile the individual and reality, Heidegger does away with the need for suturing. The philosophers since and in the interim until Laruelle and Badiou begin on one hand to describe how this ending manifests for the subject — a phenominalist step for sure but one that, one one hand, enfolds upon the object, involves with it, without reducing the object to subjectivity (Sartre), but on the other, turns the subject out upon the object and removes its more ‘artistic’ interpretations for the sake of ideological and social contingencies, such as gender and race and social justice (sufficient cultural critique). But despite such delineations, philosophy continues upon the same course of attempting to reconcile reality and the subject of conventional power. Heidegger’s meaning is thus set aside as a True historical Object, so what seems should be philosophical effort has not been undertaken but rather has changed its course upon an assertion, as Miellassoux might suggest that the motivating base of previous philosophy was mistaken. The question should be upon how philosophers see themselves enacting anything different than any other period authors.
Laruelle and Badiou thus can be seen to represent an historical ‘fulcrum’. Laruelle transcribes the Heideggarian tool-work into its discursive actuality, such that philosophy can no longer stand on its own for its own, but must unknowingly assert its primacy and importance against the ignorance revealed of it by non-philosophical means. But this is not to say that philosophy becomes useless, but rather a different type of mechanism for dealing in reality has taken place. We propose that this ‘new’ mechanism is denial, for if ever there was a One reality, discourses needed not to deny anything because the assumption of power was de facto the omniscient and effective power (colonialism). Badiou, on the other hand, models the ‘Philosophical scenario’ (called: the Romance; but again, by one orientation) in mathematical schemata, his book “Being and Event” a model and description of said Romantic Event (the Significant Event). Again, another historical marking; here though, one that evidences at once a total understanding and acknowledgment that indeed such Heideggarian Event is not an (small ‘r’) romantic personal experience of caprice and individual interpretation (as conventional philosophy would have it, as it continues to argue for its Object), but rather a specific mapping of the routine transcendental (clausal) consciousness under certain conditions. It is this mapping that the individual invested of the State of reality does not wish to see, such a description that is utterly offensive to the faith in the transcendental clause of conventional discourse that allows for the exploitative capitalistic fetishism.
The latest philosophical (realist) ‘turn’ is founded upon nothing more than an assumption and assertion that discourse presides over what the human being is in its essence; such a position must be asserted as it is denied because of the overwhelming presence of elements that would not inherently conform to the grand narrative except that they must due to the ‘magic’ of capitalistic fetishism demanded upon the human beings as an enforced imperative of divinely inspired progress, denied as such based upon the True Objects of historical discourse. Hence conventional real discourse. For what Heidegger is showing us is that discourse is merely a vehicle.
The problem arises in so much as the precipitate of his ideas shows that Heidegger (at least) was dealing with ‘two sided’ objects; where one side is the Event in its most full meaning, as ‘environment’ but also revealed of the Romantic scenario, and the other side still sees discourse as inherently involved and associated with actual True Objects. To distinguish how we might answer, and the results of answering, the question of side, we have to ask (as Heidegger did of thinking) if philosophy really has any integrity, or if philosophy is now merely another means to an end for various capitalist literary venturers? Is the act of being creative and imagining into logical writing automatically philosophy? How can we discern what is philosophy from creative writing? And if we have to consider such a question ‘philosophically speaking’ then I’m afraid we’ve already found our answer. For it is the ‘two sided’ object that establishes a partition that offers no quarter and no types; a boundary that evidences the move of conventional discursive power.
Therefore it is a strange twist that Harman puts upon the reading of Hiedegger, and indeed upon his readers. For if one is not keen on the reading of this book, Harman’s explanation of Heidegger, it would be easy to see that Harman is merely giving us an easy version of what Martin was saying; but he is not. Harman is giving us a loaded explanation of Heidegger. It is not difficult to feel a strangeness in this reading; the explanation is interspersed with interpretation in the guise of explanation that lends itself to give itself to Harman’s argument and project, which is Object Oriented Ontology, so by the end of the book it appears the ‘first and second’ objections come naturally of course, but it is after all the course that Harman has laid for its outcome. When we begin to see what is occurring, it is not His OOO that then seems weird; it is weird that his deception would be taken as honesty.
His first objection: Dasein is not only human. That is; it is not the human ‘being there’ that causes things to come into play. Rather, Dasein may be other things too; ‘being there’ rocks; ‘being there’ podiums; etcetera.
Harman’s second objection. Change is not accounted for; and, “how can there be multiple simultaneous perspectives on the same entity” (pg. 163).
I’ll just come right out and say it: Harman’s objections are non sequitur to Heidegger’s proposal. And I do not need to go and site argument by argument. This is to say that Harman’s objections are derived, or maybe better said, contrived, through a misdirection implemented by Harman. For, if Harman does indeed understand Heidegger as he seems to, then he should see that his objections to Heidegger are non sequitur to Heidegger’s meaning, that the meaning Harman is using to formulate his objections do not correlate with the Event by which Heidegger brings philosophy to its end. Therefore, Harman derives an argument based upon a structure of argument that is assumed to be able to be made of Heidegger, and thereby appears to ignore the meaning of the argument in its place as the Event.
In other words, one can say that if indeed Harman has understood Heidegger, then Harman should have been allowed to be able to come upon the Significant Event. But ironically, two contingencies yield for us the same result for Harman’s proposals. For if Harman was come upon by the Significant Event, then it is in so much that he gained inspiration from this encounter that he may move to say something new of reality; but most probably, due to his orientation upon Heidegger and his ideas as True Objects, as indicative within the term-object identity, Harmans’ reading was an occasion by which to deny the said Event as some True Object (term-object identity) for the purpose of establishing his real identity. Either way, Harman thereby can be said to have enacted a pocket veto; a veto that has held in the pocket until such a time when it was needed to retain real identity.
Hence it is highly ironic but unfortunately conventional that Harman is involved in an act of deception by presenting ‘Object Oriented Ontology’, as we will describe more thoroughly in the next segments.
I suppose the question left is a trick question because one cannot dismiss the link already established between philosophy and ideology and politics; there is indeed reality to be dealt with. The question behind philosophical learning has to do with if it has already been or is being dealt with by the historical discourse, if there is a progress of the human being itself, if the philosophical discourse is actually moving the individual human being to better ‘know thyself’, if a record of historical discourse allowing the human being a better purchase upon what it is to be a human being and what occurs in this process? Or, does conventional philosophy perpetually lure the human being away from itself? Or to be even more crass; Does the conventional route present a deception of itself, for itself, so that it can move upon a platform of substantial belief such that human beings are gaining some sort of solution? And then of course the pivotal issue of this forum: What is education?
The trick is seen inso much as such a question may be voiced from a valid position, because then the proof that would put philosophy in bed with politics and such, and thus deflate what otherwise would be a ‘good use’ for philosophy to a ‘well esteemed and well paid methods for engineering maintenance’ and would elevate the lowly conventionally methodological philosopher to have to drop his broom for a gun in the effort to defend that identity thus created by ideological faith — but this is reality. The trick in this discussing types or routes for learning is in so much as one sees that they are being deceived; a trick of mirrors; it is not that there is no mirror, but that the mirror into which philosophy most often looks shows its identical reflection, that is, the right hand in the reflection still is the right hand from the reference of the reflection; the left, the left…
The notice made by Negarestani (essay link in part A) might give rise to the construction of meaning that will show how the terms themselves allow only particular formations of concepts, that the structure of a given situation allows for and recalls to itself necessary arrangements of meaning and thus offers what might be called a ‘lexicontology’, amoung other transformations, a type of argument for determinism. Our situation thus asks into the excess, the ‘world’ that is the haphazard method of finding the necessary arrangements, what can be called the conventional bias. Notwithstanding this problem, his can be seen as further evidence of discourse coming to terms with itself, as the (engineering, of Negaresanti’s essay) discourse is seen as not arising from some unitive structure toward some systematic resolution (revolution), but rather that the structure is the object in correspondence with discourse at various functional junctures; a quite deconstructivist approach. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to see how such offer-recall of objects locates the imperative of faith to disjoin from the object and deny its recall (distance). Presently such an ontology is not part of the real discursive structure-function (it grants no reflection), but there again, the Significant Event suggests that in so much as we are already and always human, such an ontology would be merely another real scheme of faith, yet one which in respect of the position that would recognize such ontology would bring about a repetition of history, a reinstatement of beginning such that a much longer period of knowledge would have to be allowed to rebuild the subsequence of discourse to the point that such a repetition could be recognized. Of course, the usual arguments against determinism will always apply, for the significant feature of an effective ontology of determinism, one that functions as such, must relinquish the position that determinism proposes, which is also the relinquishing of its counter argument, contingency, which only happens in the conventional human reality; this is what is meant by, with Zizek for one, but others, forgetting, and its repercussions, a (re-)instatement of repetition (Kierkegaard), as well as the mistake denied of redundancy.
The purpose of any revolutionary discourse is to jolt the human being from its individual sleep of reactionary default. So, it may not be too far a stretch here to completely offend the reader by saying that the human being does not change through history, but reality does. The default linkage is that which informs the offense inherent to the rebuttal because the rejection stems from a particular direction, or vector, of linkage; the dismissal of such a statement comes from the individual that is invested in the state of reality determined by the term-object identity, where the subject is held against the object in a directional mode, subject-> object, as an imperative, the conventional method. For reality, where discourse is able to come about through the inversion of this relationship, there we have Harman’s Object Oriented Ontology, object->object, but where this is really a motion of object->subject, the situation implied of this essay, but ironically, of a determinism as determinism, the route that is always denied in effective reality despite its conventional appropriation. It is the Significant Event that allows for this effective determination.
Of the second type of student from Part A we mean to suggest that such humanity and the world is not questioned but is rather taken as a platform upon which to wonder and ask upon the objects of its view. Thus all discourses are merely information about objects, even as the object in question is the human being. Mythology and history offer stories of past humans and insights into the nature of humanity and what it means to be a human being. Scientific books tell of methods of analysis that were correct and incorrect, answers that were correct and incorrect and why they were so. The whole range of possible information grants this student a picture and a palette, and a canvas upon which she can create and add to the wondrous and vast compendium of personal, social, useful and not useful items of the human plate.
Tangental to such neutrality, the issue brought up in part A about the move students may make into gathering more discursive information indicates a particular priority of vector for knowledge. For the implication of such a movement does not necessitate any particular discourse to be revealing to the student, rather it presents the possible repercussions of the route. It is just as sensible, along these lines, that a person would venture into ‘spiritual’ discourses as well as strictly philosophical notions and begin to see the elements of those routes as truely true. For example; there are many many people who like to offer us a vision of ‘planes of existence’ where there is a ‘Godhead’ of consciousness, and this Godhead thus can be disseminated along certain logical lines to bring various states of Being that thus serve to explain the human participation in the universe. We might call this a type of New Age conflation of a further variety of philo-spiritual systems, one that arises from the ancient Hindu, Buddhist and or Kabalist ideas, but also modern theoretical physics. One could also read Alastair Crowley and describe the truth of how the universe disseminates along Magickal lines. Pagan or Wiccan cosmology offers a route as well to tell of the truth. Likewise, modern science offers its own meaning for its research in its own right, of non-locality and complexity and such, often removing from its discourse the spiritual voice but all the while telling us of this Truth of the universe and our true place in it. Philosophers, oddly enough, appear to be the most stubborn, for as soon as one brings of a term that has possibility to be unclear or is already attached to certain authorial matrices, such as ‘phenomenon’ and ‘discourse’ and ‘transcendence’, and ‘metaphysics’, these students will route the discussion to the potential of truth that such philosophical discourses hold, so when one speaks they must automatically resolve themselves by their speaking to ‘idealist’, ‘realist’, ‘materialist, etcetera… domains of truth that, as a part of the philosophical truth, are held in suspension for the discussion that arises simultaneously toward and upon the philosophical truth. But these are more than just speaking; somehow, for all such speakers, they appear to constitute The Actual Truth of the universe.
Here, though, we are addressing specifically philosophical truth, but through this discursive vehicle bringing into question all routes. But not that philosophy as a particular discursive arena thus amounts to The true reduction of all routes, but that any route, if viewed as a particular suspension of meaning as opposed to its being involved with terms that are understood as actually anchored of objective truth, may be reduced to any other route. This is the principle that all discourses are valid and hence contribute to the transformation of that principle; that individual discourses constitute the economy of discourses by which reality is manifested. Hence the query that brings the respective routes of the second and first student to the question of a particular vectorial move that conflates the two students to one route that then presents itself suspended (ironically) in particular assertions of truth: What is occurring that brings the student to assert a particular truth in opposition to another? And, what is that situation that is able to move through such anchored scaffolding to thus be able to make the correlation of all systems? Hence, the question that is brought by my sited essay above (by Negarestani): What is the function of the structure, and the structure of the function? This is not a suggestion to delve into subjective justification per say, but is rather addressing under what conditions does a unitary discourse of reality arise? What does such a unitary discourse as and in its unity suggest of reality?
I shall back up and elaborate, for the question of ideology has to do with that for which it does not account, or otherwise accounts for it by incorporating the (it’s) presented lack into its structure. From where, or how, does, the ideology of reality function as an incorporating structure?
This question involving the first student is: If the student were so interested in the question of existence and her presence on the scene and how the world might be or otherwise present itself, is the historical philosophical discourse necessary to her finding those things the traditional discourse ponders and proposes of questions and answers? This is to ask, is the conventional route the only route? To be more specific: Is it necessary to read Husserl to know about that of which phenomenology speaks? Of course, all those prideful philosophers will have a field day ripping apart this question so much that they will see such a question as hardly reflecting a knowledgable positions of the issue. They will bring such questions as “well, yes, because phenomenology was a system of thought coined by Husserl in which he said this and that and phrases things this and that way… so if anyone were to know about phenomenology, they would necessarily have to have read him or at least spoken to someone about his ideas”. And of course I would have to say that they completely used their over philosophical brain that processes given information to arrive at that answer, just like the second student I just mentioned.
So I shall reiterate: Is it necessary to have read Hesserl to come to a notion (very, very generally speaking) that all phenomena of the world arise in the subject? And again I can just hear it: “the only way one would know there was a subject in which phenomena arises in is to have knowledge of philosophical rhetoric”.
Am I making any head way here?
Again: If a person were so interested, could they come upon the meaning of Husserl’s founding premise without having to have read about it? And I am not asking if they could know that Husserl said this. Along this line, can a student understand Husserl without a primer, without the usual historical and academic philosophical contextual introduction? We suggest, contrary to the conventional assumption, that perhaps Husserl’s idea is not an idea that came about due to Husserl, but that such an idea is innate to the human experience given that one is motivated to plainly look.
Likewise; Is Kant’s notion that knowledge reflects of itself, an idea that can only be gained by knowledge of Kant?
Likewise; Is Fauerbach’s idea of an economy of human knowledge dependent upon Kant’s idea? Is any proposal of authors dependent upon the previous statements of other authors?
Likewise; Is Harman’s idea of Objects (Object Oriented Ontology) due to his pronouncing the idea, or is such an idea innate to reflective human experience? Is Miellassoux’s idea of an object that exists antecedent to the thought about it an idea that he and only he came up with? Was his idea dependent upon other authors’ proposals? Nevermind that if we say ‘yes’ we are setting aside the very method by which we insist upon questioning what the author is really saying.
So; If such ideas do indeed depend upon and are allowed to be generated because of previous authors’ proposals, then we have a proposal of a particular type of human reality. We have the conflation, but conventional discernment, of philosophy as a conspiratorial agent of political and ideological investment.
If not, then we have a completely different situation.
Part of the problem of the point of contention is that if we can say that authors are drawing upon ideas that are innate to the human being, then we can say that it is possible to point to specific notions of respective discourses, certain subsequent conclusions put forth by various authors based upon the innate factor or element, that do not reside innately to human reflection, that is, to all humans who may reflect, proposals that are particular to that author’s presence in the world or experience in knowledge and or their particular method of disseminating the innate experience of knowledge, articles that must be learned through the banking model. We can say that humans are capable of understanding the subsequent moves, but we are also saying that the subsequent moves are sufficient to the necessary premise, that if the premise is innate, we can thereby understand why or how the author might draw such subsequent conclusions, even we might see them as incorrect. It is by this maxim, this discrepancy that is the evidence supporting argument, i.e. I know what you mean here/ I don’t know what you mean there, or, I know what you mean, but the consequence is mis-drawn, is an indication of problem and elicits from this situation the aspect of the discourse on the Significant Event that we have called opacity, where the distinction put out upon the reality implied by discourse reveals faith and its operative mode of the veto, but specifically to those authors who appear to recognize the discrepancy, the pocket veto. Hence also, we set aside the question of conventional reality and its authors, for its method assumes and relies upon such opacity (argument; choice; veto), the space wherein arises impetus for real progress, and instead we address particular philosophical discourses that evidence opacity (the pocket veto) within itself as its presentation reveals opacity between what is innate or necessary, and what is hypothetical or contingent; for what is innate appears through all discourses in one way or another, through various shades and veils, screens and partitions, despite how ‘Pure Reason’ may be located in Kant to be a conventional Western philosophy property. Such propriety is entirely hypothetical and practical.
Now we can get to the clincher, the most offensive proposal of divergence, the caveat that would often buck the philosophical reader. We can also say that what is innate to the human being is only innate to those for whom it is innate. The problem is inherent to the proposal of divergence, for when this is mentioned within a treatise that is called philosophical, whatever the phrasing, the meaning will always be brought back to the conventional philosophical rhetoric, the meaning of meaning. One problem is in the use of the term ‘human being’, and this is used specifically to avoid the term ‘humanity’ for certain contexts. The individual, on the other hand, does refer specifically to the human being invested in reality. So it is that the distinction is commonly and en route seen to divide by which to implicate the whole, and, move for the whole by making distinctions by which the whole there comes. It is thereby (by this method) that divergence will not be understood, for when we speak of the human being we must be speaking of an individual, one that is a single member of a common whole, and a potential that thereby is available to the whole. In this case, if there is an idea that is innate of the human being, then we are also saying that any and every human being may have access to it. Yet, the question must be, if every human being has access to this innate idea, why do they not express as an idea innate to themselves that they apprehend this idea? But not only this; if there is an innate idea found merely through the looking at that which is innate to the human being, why do people require it being described by others for them to understand the innate idea? What is it about such innateness that is being aroused un-innately? Yet if such innateness is aroused by a sort of sympathy between (subject-)objects, such that perhaps a type of ‘resonance’ is occurring by which such latent idea thus is apprehended as innate, what is the situation where 1) only particular people are privy or have access to such discourses of the idea? And, 2) even if such discourses are available to people, most people do not or cannot apprehend them? And, 3) even if such discourses are supposed to be apprehended they are not viewed as have arisen innately, but rather comprehended as a unit of information that had not been there prior to the learning it, that is, the gaining of the piece of information that says it is innate amounts thus to it being innate as a price (distance; commodity) of definitional information?
The situation presented by these three instances, which occur at all times in nearly every place one can come across, thus must signal a divergent discourse, one that speaks of humanity but a specific humanity that apprehends the innate idea. We can no longer assume that any sort of revolutionary transformation can or will arise, (for the revolution has de facto already occurred) and neither, without a certain forlorn demeanor, can we settle to treat all production of discourse strictly like a work of art. The category of which we speak no longer compromises itself to a usurpation of multiple perceptions or interpretation of sets of sets, but even sets these conventional term-identities within a different categorical imperative. We thereby speak of divergence in its most full and true sense. This situation is similar, say, to people who know how to program computers. As an analogy; no one will suggest that the skills, language and let alone the perception upon computers that these people have automatically must be able to be reduced to the skills, language and perception of say the users of Microsoft Windows platform, that the programmers must reconcile their ‘computer programming world’, or the code or language they use and the perceptions of problems and solutions of computer programming, to the general user of Windows, the but neither must the Windows users be reconciled in their using to be automatically included in the programmers ‘world’. But this is exactly what is presumed of conventional philosophy for the category of philosophy as a single imperative within which all the -ism’s and -ologies arise. This is to say, that the significance of divergence does not reduce itself nor is required to reconcile itself to what is more real of reality, and, the discussion that considers these facets of knowledge of reality as an all inclusive meaning, while it may use the ‘results’ of such divergence for its varied purposes, likewise is incapable of addressing the divergent discourse beyond such addressing as being material of divergence (face to face).
The ramifications of discourse itself of attempting to describe and thus bring about such a reconciliation has a long history, indeed inscribes as it proscribes history, most significantly and poignantly in the rhetoric of revolution. But the fact remains that even the most recent conventional manifestations evidence the real attempt that still reifies and depends upon a discrepancy that is not being overcome. We propose that this is due to a confusion (mistake) that occurs in the effort to conflate what is inherently divided into a one reality, a confusion that persists due to the effort for reconciliation. The Significant Event thus describes how and why such an effort fails for reality, as well as describing how and why such real effort persists, and thereby exposes conventional philosophy as a play for importance of its namesake, for what could be better called, more legitimately, critical or political theory, cultural anthropology, critical psychology, or just plain ideological negotiation, or what might be for a more correctly identifying term, purely academic sets of conventional analytical methodology.
To put this in a conventional phrasing, “the revolution will not be televised”. The irony of divergence cannot be overestimated. Hence, for its weight in truth, we must discern such a divergent discourse that yet remains philosophical, as not real. There is no line being drawn here, the line is already drawn; reality will continue as it always does, conventionally.
The Significant Event is to be distinguished from an event in reality. The Significant Event involves reality but never occurs in reality; it is the encountering of the point of contention. Significance itself may occur in reality as various events can begin a count of meaning in the arena of pure multiples (reality), from events such as stopping at a stop sign, to having a good workout, to screwing up a business contract, to receiving an award, texting “ball” instead of “call”, accidentally or purposefully injuring someone slightly or seriously, winning the state lottery, being injured, enacting some small altruistic kindness, or reading an essay. All such events may occur at times and have small or large, momentary or lasting impact. Yet to speak about the Significant Event becomes an ironic venture, bringing the proposal of said event to an end that speaks of the last thing it would seem to indicate and by this thereby becomes the first thing; at once included in a description of all events, as well describing how such events belong to what is truly significant, what occurs is that all things come to belong to the Significant Event.
In reality, argument and discussion in general are seen to exclude the position from which its point is made, that is, the position is taken to be the argument. The real method presents the position and the argument as identical, or part of the same identity, and by this method, the Significant Event is never encountered for what it suggests in argument and occurs thereby ‘outside’ the argument; it occurs as a transcending operation of the argument. This is to say that conventional real discourse includes a transcendent clause. The irony of this proposal is that on one hand it can be said to be describing all events in reality under a rubric of potential, and on the other, eliciting from itself a truly exceptional situation. Thus it would seem contradictory to suggest that the Significant Event is not a moment of transformation; such a moment of transformation is to have enacted a pocket veto. Transformation implicates the transcendental clause of conventional faith such that some sort of progress must likewise have occurred, such as the motion that is evident in the expression “now, I understand”. The irony is that if such transformation has occurred, then no transformation was needed for it to occur.
Irony evidences the containment of reality in a universal ontological horizon that cannot be and is never breached, that is, except in reality through the transcendental clause. Hence, ironically, to speak of divergence; and this is to say, that the pocket veto evidences a willingness, a choice of faith, to breach the real ontological horizon, or, the teleo-ontology of reality itself. (Aside: might we propose a contraction of teleo-ontology, if just for the sake of orthographic brevity, and offer the term ‘tontology’ ? Or would the irony of its homonymic similarity to ‘tautology’ be almost to much to bare?) The proposal of such a break, the discourse that issues from and or speaks around such a break as witnessed by various authors, spiritual or religious but specifically philosophical, thus can be a measure of the temporal progress of historicity, the fact or item that is history, unto its ontology (the scheme of meaning’s meaning). But of course, to be able to measure such a bias, we must be able to find a baseline by which the variables of discourse, the terms and phrases, may find their position in such an ontology, as well as what aspect of quality of such variables marks the bias. The degree or manner by which such discourse reifies or maintains the ontology we shall call ‘opacity‘, such that to the extent such discourse leads to and or finds a transparency of reality, and thereby argues what is more real — which is to say, a discourse that proposes to better describe the break as the experience compels one to inscribe its meaning into reality to argue what is more true of reality — there we might then find its opacity.
The common rejection ( from part 8) found in reality against the proposal that everyone appropriates reality through a transcendent, develops into an intellectualized rebuttal. Where the common rejection occurs as a sort of ‘thoughtlessness’ of casual reading, or ‘regular everyday’ experience (what is that?), the more thought full rejection is established upon a well organized and recognized rhetoric. Of course, there is the common real religious or spiritual rejection that rejects that there should even be a rejection, since it is a very common idea that humans may lead spiritual lives and have some sort of contact and or understanding of some effective transcendent element in their lives, and that transformative experiences may occur along these lines. Again, we need not go much further in addressing this feature of human reality than to say that reality holds its potential in such a transcendent clause; the issue follows the same course so far laid in this essay, and proceeds likewise. The skeptics have a real argument to be made with the believers, and vice versa, as they are both subject to the description of the Significant Event. Though both see their activity involved with coming to terms with reality, nevertheless, both are in a process of reality coming to terms with the avoidance of what is not real.
Wait, the rejection might say, we have already delineated what can and might be meant by a transcendent. Foremost, we have elicited valid points to bring in at least an agnostic truth. Based upon the various manifestations of religious and cultural temperaments, the open and equal consideration of all such advocation of God or gods, spirits and such, the probability of the existence of any such God or gods, is equal to the probability that no such entities exist. What transcendent entity may exist tends toward the unknowable, and so we have only to judge upon social and cultural, and likewise materialist affects of such ideals. Likewise, transcendence falls into highly suspect forms; for one, the quality of transcendence as an experience falls often into forms of spirituality, as these tend to connote particular activities and discourses which likewise fall into the previous category. Such experiences, religious or otherwise, are common to humanity, yet are expressed and apprehended again against a common world of human activity wherein the criterion becomes the act, and the feeling of transcendence is a neurophysiological and psychological phenomenon that can be dealt with by science on one hand, and human psychological methods, such as occurs in the very human activity of camaraderie, understanding, consolation, sympathy, empathy and therapy. Even such experiential feelings can bring about drastic and strange events, the extreme examples found though motions of peace and violence, such as the trials and victories of Nelson Mandela, to religious fundamentalism, to that of the like of serial killer David Berkowitz, the ‘Son of Sam’, who said a dog told him to do it. Further, aside from all the subjective transcendent experiences, to say that something transcends various particular occasions, such as, the whole of humanity transcends the possibility of any human individual knowledge, or, adversity can be transcended, says nothing of any common human manner of appropriating the world except that the same forms of a term may be used to address various situations.
Here we have a usual real defense of what is true and real and a reiteration of the proper methodology for coming to such reality. And this is what we don’t want to hear, because it points directly at the reader, at the experience of the human being. It is as if to offer such a proposal that argues that the authors addressed in this essay are staking their claim upon the ability to intuit problems and solutions from what they had read of other philosophers joined with their general education and experience in life, is not merely silly and obvious — a truism — but indeed useless and unneeded. Nevertheless, the sentiment against such a statement, as the reader holds its own possibility sacrosanct and rallies her or his resources to keep that universal perception of a common humanity intact, to maintain the privilege of the reading and production of a subject viable in its appropriation of the object — such an assertion of sentiment appears, as well, overkill, reacting to the obviousness of the statement as one would respond to a threat, overestimating the meaning of the statement because the reporting of such material is felt to be a private matter — a private yet universal matter, perhaps like the reaction to a dissection of a cadaver, or surgical operation, or even a discussion about particular personal gastro-intestinal issues, is to many people — the imposition incurred as an offense to one’s essential being. It is no wonder that we can locate a particular manner of objective reckoning as conventional, based in an offense, and that, of faith. The reader is confronted with what philosophy says (of True Objects) against what it means. When we attempt to find and tell what the meaning means (what is meant from what is said), such as may be involved with the basis of many critiques and rebuttals of works, but also even some editorial summaries of works, as opposed to mere description of what is taking place, we are thereby saying something about what has been said, and where this is taken as an identity, enact a redundancy that is denied to produce conventional theory. We enact a distance between ‘meanings’, one meaning that identifies the Object and the other that identifies the meaning of the Object, and by this distance what is said enacts transcendence as a ‘hidden’ meaning of what is said by frankly excluding the experience, as well as enacting a proposal of method for how one is to attain the experience, such transcendence, which is for all purposes, a real transformation. This is the conventional method. Yet what is meant can be described (removed from its quality of presentation as a True Object) without enacting a distance, and this venture is ironic; it is offensive to one’s identity, or in other words, the identity of the One. So long as here remains a potential hidden in the proposition, we have an opaque position of argument.
So also it is in philosophical discourse that when a description is taken as what is being said of a True Object, as a meaning of the meaning of the Object, the description is taken as an argument instead of as a kind of forensic appraisal. The description is rebutted, and the argument that arises for a defense of the description to redress the rebuttal steps from its proper domain in the attempt to convince ‘its material’ of its veracity, which is quite noticeably silly if not plain non sequitur, but what occurs is no communication, or, the perpetuation of the real conventional methodology that posits transcendence as part of its route (en route). What occurs, or what should occur, is that the forensic description is left to its discipline describing the material, left not involved with the suggestion that the material is any different than what it is, which is the effort for meaning of the meaning of the True Object that is real.
The effort of the contemporary ‘realist turn’, of the most recently notable ‘Speculative Realism’ (if ever there was) is based in a foreclosing of previous historical discursive misappropriation to a present asserted truth. We have already begun to address this redundancy earlier. But to reiterate, the motion that concerns us is how this is done; it is very simple: It ignores the presence of the human being on the scene for the sake of a manifestation of discourse; that is, it assumes a common humanity as a categorical imperative. But for its sake it does not take mere discourse, but rather adiscourse that is presumed to have a static or universal ability to reflect the same thing; its method as the only imperative and the only method argues itself as a truism, a distinction within itself that is moot. This discourse that is presumed as all powerful, omniscient and ubiquitous in its potential, is a particular scheme of meaning that contains and pronounces upon all real things, and by this presumption ‘realism’ is permitted to have credence for what reality is through a potential transformation, a conversion of terms; i.e. If all there is is reality, then reality is constituted by real things, objects, but in fact, True Objects. Idealism, on the other hand, proposes that there is a (encompassing or bigger) reality over (regular) reality for which reality needs be reconciled, as if reality needs to dispel an illusion it has formatted of itself. Hence we can begin to see how realism and idealism merely dance around the point of contention regardless of their arguments. The partitions that are erected are called a ‘turn’ because some phrases of discourse will be left going ‘straight’ in meaning with the ‘previous reality’, but also because the human being on the scene is ignored and already accounted for by its (the propositional arenas located by the ‘turns’) discourse, and the difference that is proposed to be reconciled is reinstated in the course of the encompassing real-true method. To be fair; realism may address what is ‘really real’, but it gets nowhere further than that. Hence, this really real discourse is based in the offense of identity that cannot achieve its transcendental clause, the ‘grand’ transformation that is the posed culmination inherent of real discourse; realism thereby puts the fault not upon their human effort, not upon willingness itself, but upon the discourse, ‘The’ discourse, such that one merely needs to find the fault of the past to argue and thus produce the ‘now more real’ reality. Hence the conventional discourse achieves its Object, real transformation, through denial.
There are repercussions of this type of move that will have to serve as a topic for a latter essay.
We propose a partition that is indeed a boundary, and this is the hard correlational limit. The boundary is marked by the Significant Event and is viable by the pocket veto, whereby this mark reveals the opacity evidenced in various real discourses. The pocket veto is a signal of faith that identity is being challenged, so the iteration of this Event, the discourse that follows from it, can be registered as to the opacity that manifests due to the limit that such faith has inscribed as real or in reality; the discourse can be viewed upon its opacity as to what we might call its ‘saturation’ of meaning. A saturated discourse can be open, such as seen with Francois Laruelle and non-philosophy, or maybe even Levi Bryant and his ‘machine-object’ (but I tend to think Bryant is a ‘nonphilosopher’- qualified but thus ‘non-qualified’), where distinct principles are defined so as to relieve its dictates from such principality, or it can be closed, such as occurs with religious dogma. Other various discourses are opaque by their evidencing various internal vectors of meaning that are open, for example discussion that follows along in ‘proper’ understanding of the discourse, and others that are closed discussion that is moot due to objections that show misunderstanding. Nevertheless, opacity can be a measure or an indicator that something is being withheld as well as what is being withheld due to the offense of the Significant Event upon faith. In all cases, what is being withheld is the transcendent factor involved with the assertion for real solution.
End part 10a.
We have encountered a description of divergence and how an arm of such motion remains conventional despite itself. On one side of things, conventional discourse functions to perpetuate its method by subsuming and sublating contradiction in real meaningful negation, exposing the contradiction as a form of negation that itself is negated but not reinserted as positive. Disputes have arisen concerning this, infamously around Hegel and his dialectic; venture to say that the argument is due to its want for inclusion in reality. Then on the other, this is all to say that the conventional method re-inserts or otherwise asserts its (hypothetical and practical) imperative, the True Object that compels through faith the downplaying of ‘mere’ intuition, so as to allow for contradiction as part of reality. The former can be said to identify basic movements of continental philosophy, the latter, analytic philosophy. We can discuss the significance of this apparent historical irony elsewhere. Suffice it for now that conventional philosophy can be categorized in this way; continental philosophy at least considers irony regardless of its analytical tendency for method which commonly reifies the more overt assertion of the primacy and ubiquity of the One reality.
It Is sufficient to argue backwards, to work from, as away from, the point of contention into a unitary discourse of inclusive reality, to take through intuition or inspiration of the term-object’s real-truth as a means to argue, as many authors do, a theory of simultaneousness, a theory whereby the terms coalesce or otherwise represent (albeit as an extended philosophical culturally relevant effort) an identical situation of reality (Zizek; Kair – myself, author of “Constructive Undoing”), or where real objects exert distances and effects in the same manner as humans do with objects, such that humans are also objects (Harman; Kair). It is sufficient for reality to argue through logic that there is no separation between, for terms, the experiencer and the experience, the subject human being and the object of its experience, the sayer and the said, the viewed and the seen (scene), or even the indication of overdetermined terms, such as ‘larger humanity’ or ‘society’, to the limit that expresses such idea, and then to suggest that such a situation may be realized and actualized into a sort of ‘new praxis’. Likewise it is sufficient to argue that objects are separate but ‘vicariously causal’ in their relation to each other. It is sufficient for the discourse of reality involved in the investigation of objects and subject-objects to reach a point when the saturation of meaningful terms allows for a redundancy of segregate categories to develop multiple Objects, or ‘multi-‘ universes, each overlapping universe holding the potential for truth by the nature of the necessary discursive ‘universal’ categories, categories that posit their segregation based within the intuited identity of term and object, that then may negotiate with other ‘universes’ toward a better ‘world’, and then propose a ‘new’ discourse that accounts for this. This is what discourse does in, or for, reality. When this occurs, though, that is, to reach the argument that makes the move for this deliberate (as maybe opposed to ‘organic’) — not over-determination, but its encompassment, the assertion implied by the unreflected intuition — designation or adamant removal of ‘sign’ for the sake of (faith in, intuition of) truth-reality, the terms of reality now must reflect themselves in relief, such that every term is the position-expression (matter, object) of a particular moment-space (energy, potential, kinetic), at once informing and being informed by reality in discourse — but without the inclusion of the position by which such a situation may arise; the True Object oriented clause of transcendence. That is, unless we posit that what is excluded is indeed not. This is then the opposite; imminence posited as reality, which is for no other terms, in definition, and in so much as terms are taken to indicate or otherwise show the truth (the true object), we have thus a return to what was just argued in the previous segment, redundancy and repetition.
What we have just come across is a real ironic moment. But this detachment, real individuals in a negotiated world, comes in the same course by which reality is always come by, choice, through the distancing of the object from the subject, through denial of that which offends ones faith, such that one universe can ‘no longer contain’ the meaning conveyed in the eminence (prestige, grandeur) of colluding meaning, the ‘singularity’ gained by the investigation into the (True) intuited object term — and ‘another’ universe is gained, another discourse. In fact, admitting the breaking of such singular activity, it is the revolt from this ‘meaningful’ abyss by which a real ‘multitude’ of universes arise. The real universe itself is thus not brought into question, rather, reality is now understood to involve a potential for many universes. Where once was the One, that which enjoined all terms’ meaning, that was (is?) impetus for which contradiction showed the route, now the same method has shown that the One is actually multiple (the pure multiple, ala Alain Badiou) which is the point behind the explication of conventional reality, the effect of contradiction being an indicator of what is ‘truly false’.
It is by this feat of consciousness that we can then begin to suggest that such intuition does not gain its footing from some ‘inspiring’ ethereal unknown, compelling the individual to act as an assertion towards some completion as yet unformed if not for the instruction of inspirational transcending element, but rather draws from what is already completed because what is completed is immanent; which is to say, the act, aside from the True Object-term identity, cannot manifest except that it is and does precisely as it does and is. Immanence, in this way, is what then allows for the multitude, of objects in a level playing field of universal operation, but more significantly, of individuals with their own ‘sense’ of truth, in a common arena of negotiation. But what is this sense? What is happening if everything is happening immanently? Is not such immanence merely another argument for and or relying upon a transcendental aspect or element? Have we not merely repeated the same arguments that want to decide upon what is immanence and transcendence?
Here then we have in action the evidence of the true power of reality. The limit come upon by the foreclosing of the transcendental ‘One’ universe, by the methodological reducing of what is or was transcendent of thinking to a True Object of such thought, reveals that what is or was otherwise transcendent has been usurped of its power by the real method, thus transforming this True Object, transcendence, into immanence that, again, proposes to be of some essential truth of reality. Radical or not, and irony aside, such a position gains little but a reification of the real method for establishing truth, as if the transcendent or now immanent aspect has inspired the individual to ‘bring down’ the knowledge of itself for reality, so that now all human beings fall under this rubric of truth. Then the Big or, this is not ‘really’ happening and everyone is really just doing what they do, and there is no encompassing true discourse; but then how are they doing that and how are we able to talk about there being none? What is the discussion about if it is really just the motion of immanent existence? This is hardly ridiculous, it is ironic. Because nothing occurs for the truth of reality without an inspiring transcendental agent. We have argued this elsewhere; whether or not we define terms such as to exclude a ‘transcendent’ clause, where maybe the human being is generating meaning by itself as a sort of ‘meaning machine’ but inclusive of all ‘other’ meaning that may be had, still, the effect is that consciousness operates so as to include and exclude as an imperative of real meaning. The issue of the point of contention, or the suggestion enacted by this point, is that consciousness, itself an effect of the human physiological being of the universe, functions to supply reality but resists at all costs the exposure that shows that reality does not present the truth of itself through inspired agency, that is to say, through an ability to have intuition of universally True Objects, except in as much as one has faith in the terms of discourse to define categories in particular manners so as to identify True Objects, and, only in reality can the agent be inspired by an intuition of the True Object. The limitation inscribed and described by this set thus implicates an exception to reality. Such descriptions (discursive schemes) that propose a grand explanation of the truth of reality thus proscribe a faith, and such faiths account for their trueness by default clauses that define the exclusions by which the system gains its stature for truth; and we may use Harman idea: anything that falls outside such an addressing is ‘accidental’. Such real schemes make so much sense to particular individuals that one can no longer get around them, discourse and discussion can offer no purchase for entry because every statement and every proposal has been accounted for by the tenants of inclusionary and exclusionary caveats. Hence, faith makes true.
To bring a most pertinent example of such faith in action is of course religious fundamentalism. Zizek describes the interactions of real faith in a recent article for the New York Times [http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/author/slavoj-zizek/]. Fundamentalism can be understood as such a discourse of reality that sets inclusionary and exclusionary aspects in a meaningful saturation of True categories; faith. What we deal with from a Western perspective is that there is such extremism, for the example of Zizek’s article, ISIS, the self proclaimed ‘Islamic State’, and how to breach such faith so as to mitigate violence. The discussion about such violence toward peace is taken up elsewhere. The significance that Zizek points out is not that there is an essential difference, but rather they ‘are already like us (the West)’, and the way they are like us, for the point if this essay, is that we and them are not only part of reality (Zizek categorizes this ‘reality’ as Capitalism, a category I tend to agree with), but, and most significantly, oriented upon True Objects. If this is indeed the case, then we should rather look at how such ‘Western view’ holds the object out away from itself, that is, how the perspective that we have, that gains fundamentalism as a category, is likewise a fundamentalism, if that albeit a ‘non-fundamentalism’, a fundamentalism that on one hand denies its being such, but on the other proclaims its (admitted) fundamentalism as a more correct, true and real basis of reality. The Christian fundamentalism of the West has already included the democratic-capitalistic discourse in its faith, already incorporated the secular inclusions and exclusions into its designation for truth, such that its faith, again, likewise merely shows the power of faith in reality. By this reduction, we should then consider then how reality itself is manifested in a particular manner, and that this manner, by virtue of its method that has choice as an integral and indeed innate if not fundamental tenant for all that may be true, cannot be ‘opt out’ of, which is to say, cannot be decided upon based upon an arrangement of discursive meanings.
The suggestion offered then, which is and was already the enjoining of real method unto itself to reveal itself, due to the logic of the explication put forth in the previous paragraphs, is never taken, whether it was not actually of transcendence or is now of immanence; such placements, the truth of such discursive formulations, are considered but never actualized in reality because it is in itself contradiction of the method. The method is real because it functions to hold the object out from the subject; yet while this method is founded in discrepancy, it operates effectively because it represents what is presented at once as an immanent and attainable goal: the True Object. Such contradiction of said method is offensive to the individual invested in reality, and so elicits from this offense “nihilism” as a ground of reductive reason that serves as a Biblical cherubim, securing the individual in its real position of willful inspired agency. Hence we can begin to understand the issue that Miellassoux and Harman bring for their proposal, but also the situation that is already enacted by maybe Miellassoux, but at least Harman, Badiou, Zizek, and Laruelle bytheir presentation. In this way we can also begin to understand how the veto and the pocket veto might come into play for the discourses of these authors in the discussion of reality — and their methodological dependence for their offering of solution — as to what is being framed as not real.
A side note: An operative question, when for example one reads Zizek [Please see Agent Swarm’s post that makes an argument that concerns this same feature: http://terenceblake.wordpress.com/2014/09/04/16-traits-of-continental-philosophy/%5D, is, how then are such observations brought? For, there is nothing evident nor inherent to his arguments that describe how it is he is able to bring such a discussion, nor even, really, besides the social commentaries that read like edicts for action, what he is talking about. Zizek, for all his apparent eccentricity and genius, gives us no insight as to why what he is saying has any relevant meaning for us. His social historical anecdotes appear to give his writings substance, and we are to assume his draws from a well reading, excellent education and grand synthesis of big ideas, but then, when one actually listens to the meaning of his arguments, one can only see that his whole parade cannot have the substance we think it holds, that if one takes to heart the meaning of his philosophy, aside from yet implicit to the directly implied call to action of the social commentary, one can only see that the very act of reading and understanding Zizek is itself a motion of contradiction, irony; and this is to say, for such an experience, not real.
The only respectable move in this situation, then, is to ask into this doubt.
Reality, in this way represented by discussion and argument, is sufficient unto itself, which is to argue by the extrapolation of method that a free individual is self sufficient, that is, in the ideal utopia that is the society of free agents. The discourse of freedom (social justice) thus promotes this maxim. But when we look around at the apparent social situation and if we can trust what is said of history, never is there a time when such ideology can ‘hold all the eggs’. The mythology of progress thus holds out its activity against itself to gain a purpose, with all the usual disclaimers, ‘we tried’ being the most basic one, but in the context of this essay, more ‘we are simply doing what is to be done’, whether we want to call it the solution to the discrepancy between the 1st and 3rd Worlds, the haves and the have nots, the rich and the poor, oppressor and oppressed, security and terrorism, environmentalism and the human effect towards Earth’s destruction, or the discrepancy that the institution of philosophy holds within itself. The world thereby may present itself as a current unitary discourse that can be viewed in a manner that Zizek describes in his book, “Living in the End Times“, for it seems apparent, according to the analysis of ideology that reflects unto itself, that there would be an ‘end’ and that this end is evidenced in the very motion that it has ultimately promoted by its method of seeking into the terms for their objects’ essential in-itself truth. In short, denial in this sense is the discourse of reality failing. The redundancy involved in such an undertaking is seen to be revealing itself, but due to the nature of the operation of consciousness for having true objects, it (reality) resists its uncovering, and this resistance can be understood, so Zizek suggests, as an historical analysis of ideology through the ‘five stages of grief’.
Indeed, following our argument of the Significant Event, there is only one ‘stage’ effective here: denial, for there will only be an end in as much as there is always an end in sight and presented in history through the present, just as there was an ‘end’ of the various ancient empires, as well an ‘end’ to the Romantic Era, to Modernism, Postmodernism, an ‘end’ of Y2K, an ‘end’ of history and or philosophy — in the extended analysis oriented upon Objects, such historical progress appears then to argue a ‘great culmination’ that ushers in a ‘new era’. To be fair, perhaps there is a real motion of this sort, but the proposal to be considered is that such reckoning never occurs, or more precisely, it only occurs through the particular condition of knowledge as an indicator of true reality for the individual. It is this condition that expresses the power of reality in the manner of Paulo Freire’s deliberation upon the game of oppression (both the oppressor and the oppressed are oppressed in the game of oppression); i.e. a human being attains its individual identity through joining in the discursive determination of reality, by appropriating the discourse of power, which we may call the ‘priority discourse’, which is to say, by becoming the oppressor. It is all too common to see the how the priority discourse usurps such ‘existential’ meaning for its own ideological purposes, locating specific arenas of oppression where such game occurs in the world while excluding itself (the analysis, as well as the effort to counter it) from such a category of world-state. It is not too difficult from a historical view to see where such free agency has gotten us. But this is reality, as Zizek aptly confirms, explicates and reiterates through his whole repertoire. With this in mind, we can easily see how Freud’s notion of the ‘death drive’ is significant, only now, the denied redundancy has taken the form of desparate solution; this too is a feature of the ‘end times’ the Zizek addresses in his recent book.
To explain how or why reality in its truth does not present any essential segregation of elements, to rely upon the identity posed of logic to the meaning of a phrasing of terms, simply reifies that such duality is not being overcome in the discursive re-presentation of Objects, but rather is only seen to be being overcome by individuals invested in the intrinsic mythology that is denying its end as its end is taking place because of the denial inherent of the orientation upon the scheme for itself that is positing its own ending. This is a discursive situation of historicity, the fact of history as an object, the result of discourse having power of dominion over reality, a presentation of affairs that misses the reflection of itself due to itself operating to maintain real progress. But this is not so much ideology as a hegemonic assertion of power, not that discourse itself has power, because ideology is a real situation of discourse; it is reality itself, as a designation of ubiquitous power by which ideology can be said to be the vehicle of power as opposed to other marginalized ideologies. Likewise, this is not a situation of an actual temporal movie of static objects, of reality ‘before’ having some different quality in itself such that the discourse then was manifesting reality (powerfully) differently than now; reality then was the same as reality now: it was reality. Reality was not behaving any differently than it does now for the human beings living in those times; and this is to say emphatically that the human being is not segregate from the operating universe, but complicit with its operation. If there was a reality that was different due to the hegemonic power of discourse, then it was exactly reflecting the condition of the universe in reality as human discursive power, as said, within the scheme of meaningful terms by which such discourse can be said to assert power as a hegemony. Sure, manifestation of things in the universe presented different conditions, but the effect of what is real was exactly the same; what was different is that now we have an idea of discourse asserting a power of primacy over what reality is and means for all of history as a True Object, whereas before what we now situate as discourse was seen and or defined through another discursive operation. This is redundancy in your face; this is the condition of knowledge now. This is the limit denied as limit, even to its understanding in its discursive formulation. Such notions are entirely ideological, absolutely Idea, absolutely real discourses about what is and was true for all time: the hard correlational limit; mythology functioning intrinsically. The fact is that no historical end ever occurs except in as much that ‘history’ is an object in-itself; the individual investment in reality will not allow it. This is consistent with another argument Quentin Miellasoix presents in his “Beyond Finitude“, that of another arch-fossil that occurs due to death, and evident in Zizek also; if an end were to occur, its ending would have no basis, but only the basis that arrives through there being no end — and if there is an end, then it is the indication of limit as what lay beyond the limit and antecedent to thought-reason; that which is not real. So to repeat; such a break prescribed by such knowledge never occurs in reality, except so much as an individual may be inspired through intuition of a ‘more true and real’ Object, that is always transcendent to the discursive operation. So it is: no break ever occurs.
In this manner, by this conventional method, the meaning of the phrase that describes this real situation approaches but never breaches the point of contention, and thus is never realized — understood but never actualized for real human living and experience — for the meaning that is supposed to be conveyed. Such conventional method can be said then, again, to be one of Bad Faith. Such logic of identity is not sufficient for the purposes of coming to any truth, but only sufficient for reifying and reestablishing that what is true is real and that such unitary reality is found through the terms themselves, the method of such terminology, as terms are understood to be gaining the truth of the grand Object of universal reality. So to reiterate in Quentin Miellasoux’s formulation, such method arrives through contingency that itself is necessary, but does little in this way to reveal what the facticity of necessity actually is or how it is indeed necessary beyond the reinscription that contingency is the actual truth of reality. In other words, the discourse of the real that proposes to have found itself through its method only serves to reify that faith makes true. Irony confounds such necessary contingency.
What is revolutionary in the context of our extended analysis is what can be inferred in ‘transformation’, or for another term, ‘conversion’. Such change never occurs in reality, neither outside of reality. Again, Zizek accounts for this. Categories do not change, but are converted in real discourse. But such a conversion is itself a category that attempts to convince or otherwise describe the route one may take to come upon the revolutionary experience. Yet, once having this situation, we can then discern the issue of the point of contention as a starting point that begins the real count as an arbitrary moment in reality as an event of the pure multiple (Alain Badiou). Where then such multiple is seen by the individual to have elicited from itself an inspiration, an intuited true problem of reality, the multiple is thereby reified by the inspired agent in reality, and the proposal continues to assert its correction in different forms, through the varied categories, as real progress, now the issue of transformation being seen as sufficiently described so as to be able to bring about the revolutionary experience. Yet inso much as this may occur upon the organization of real meaningful categories, the experience does not connote what it proposes, but simply shows that reality is all there is, that the priority discourse is indeed omnipotent and ubiquitous.
For this essay, what we have then in this description of reality is not a proposal for such transformation; such a transformation is ultimately real in its potential. What we have here is an exposure of how such real determinations themselves rely upon categorical disseminations of the True Object. The issue of the Significant Event thus posits through the veto that such proposals of transformation are themselves based upon temporal categorical manifestations of such Objects; and further, that such inspired agency thus moves to its argument by appropriating and converting real historical categories (schemes; phrase universes, Lyotard) as they are seen to indicate significant moments of reality, i.e. events of the multiple. Thus when such multiples are taken in themselves to indicate that set which is not included in another set and even its own set, we can no longer be talking about the real intuitive individual negotiating the world, some solution for the conscious individual navigating Life; there is a plenitude of such real suggestions for living. On the contrary, we must address then that category that contains all categories but itself.
Hence the irony of the discussion of the Significant Event.
In future essays (I figure my doing so) I will show how such conventional methodology conveniently avoids its own fault of representation. I will show how the discourse of reality assumes that the logic of an arrangement of terms is supposed to present an actual truth, and how this presumption of faith thereby redirects the telling to consequences of faith. I most likely will begin with Slavoj Zizek’s writing (we will see; many authors can serve as an occasion for this showing) because he appears to recognize and address in a certain way, the ‘gap’; his ‘parallax gap’ is a phenomenon located in the particular phrasing of conventional logic. He seems to notice this fault, but because he cannot or will not address the gap itself, he suits himself to describe the conventional ramifications (social contingencies) of having the gap. He is a master in this, and I even venture to say that he is the exemplar conventionalist, the ‘pope’ of conventional faith and its dogmatics. And indeed, one could see in his mastery the impetus for his discussions lay in his not being able to address the gap itself; thus Zizek can also be used as an example of how the veto, but particularly the pocket veto, is put in play, and thus he also can become a site by which to reach in the heart of the point of contention. In short, through the occasioning of various authors, I will show a ‘hack’ for conventional philosophy.
Similar to this, also in the future I will probably put forth a discussion concerning Francois Laruelle’s ‘active linguistics’, which is, I feel, the basis of his whole non philosophical enterprise.
For now, for “The Significant Event”, I leave the argumentation that proposes to lead one to the truth of reality to those authors more thoroughly invested in conventional reality. It is necessary that the ‘concrete’ social situation of individuals be handled and addressed. So conceding to their efforts and that their efforts rely upon such a faith, and that such faith only is posited as exclusionary, that is it asserts the inclusion of all that is allowed to be counted as true, whereas such instance of faith belongs to a larger situation where such faith does indeed operate, we move to speak more upon divergence.
End Part 9.
Nonsense! Ridiculousness! The usual suspects rage.
So now we need to try and reel it in. If the fish has been snagged by the line, then we need to start to bring it back away from the fish of mere ideas, back from objectival discourse that sees authors and their ideas as True Things to be apprehended in their in-itself-ness, where the fish was swimming around looking for food and found it on the end of a hook and decided (whether it be of ‘natural’ instinct or not) to bite — we need to bring back the fish that has been snagged by the line.
See that this is not a rebuttal of Object Oriented Ontology; rather the distinction that finds OOO accordant with the divergent move is an occasion to speak about the Significant Event. To say that our issue concerns one’s orientation upon the object, and to further delineate that reality concerns a faith in the True Object, is actually the converse of Harman’s Object Oriented Ontology, and not its ‘opposite’ that would be then the ‘subject orientation’ necessarily.
To explain: Our thesis involving the pocket veto has implicated the Speculative Realists as dealing with reality in reality. If we have not been explicit, theirs (but Graham Harman in particular) is concerned with closing the ‘gap’ that appears to separate the subject and object in an extended discursive analysis based in traditional Western Philosophy, the gap that appears poignantly with Kant; Harman speaks about “how two objects touch”. Yet we should see that the primary concern that appears shaded if not explicitly avoided there is how to bring the subject individual human being into direct relation (contact) with the object. Harman moves for a leveling of the playing field by categorizing all real things, including the human being, as objects. The notice enacted here is that there was a previous discursive situation that presented a conceptual structure for reality that allowed for the gap. Thus SR divergence in this first sense, a real divergence.
What we should then see is that it is the subject-centered ‘reason’, ala Quentin Miellassoux, by which we may come to an idea of how one in reality is oriented upon objects, because it is by such subjective centrality that objects may be presented as such. The issue is put forth in the essays of Constructive Undoing as having to do with subjects, human beings, that are oriented upon True Objects. This is to mean that the individual of reality sees and references itself by and through Objects, and because such Objects cannot be known in-themselves, i.e. known as True in the sense of giving to us information about them that has nothing to do with our (subjective) perceiving or comprehending them, neutral data, so to speak, their Truth, the Truth about objects that we take and behave with as if they indeed are absolutely True is an act of faith. Such it is that reality in itself is a manifestation of faith. Hence, a divergence in a second sense that distinguishes what is True from what is real, that is, what is ironic from the faith in the True Object.
As shown in part 7 of this essay, the significance which links these two senses of divergence is the show of power. Specifically, it is the basic real assumption of post, but at least, post-post modernist assertion, that discourse determines reality. We have outlined how Miellasoux frames this in his ‘Correlationalism’, the weak and the strong forms. What is divisive (if we can follow the same type of categorizing for divergence) in the weak sense, is that such reality, if we may use this in the strong as well as weak correlational sense, already assumes that discourse does indeed reside as the omnipotent power for reality, so much though, that it is assumed and proposed given to include even our ‘innermost’ person, the makings and structures of our thoughts, such that there is no human being that is not determined in its manifestation as well as its moves (read: choices, options for movement) by discourse, that indeed discourse had and has determined what reality is. It is by this correlation that we have discussed the ‘individual of reality’ that is the individual of faith in the the True Object, and have thereby offered the strong divergence that succeeds from what we have called the ‘hard’ correlational limit.
It is by this designation that we argue the SRs are dealing with reality in reality; they are subject to the hard correlational limit, and thereby diverge from the previous determination of reality, the ‘subject orientation’ to the proposed new determination, ‘object orientation’. Due to the hard correlationalist model, because they were are already invested in reality, where the weak and strong correlationalism functions, they were already dealing in their being oriented upon the True Object. Hence the irony involved with Harman, at least, noticing this limit and finding his vector back in the limit to find and discuss what this True Object is, how it manifests in reality as reality. He is discussing the ‘subject as object’ and the real ramifications of this move. So it is also that what he is finding and what he is saying evidences the significance of divergence; both its weak and strong moves evidence the pocket veto.
We have come to an odd point that is in fact so odd that the fast reader might even miss it; I say ‘fast’ and immediately indicate the point of contention. Either this odd point is not so odd but is noticed as capable of being odd, or it is rejected. What is really odd though is if it has been rejected, we can account for it: the rejection is based in the assumption of (a prior posterior maxim, an experience of which is given prior to the experience) the real common humanity of individuals of whom the reader is part and in which the reader is invested through his her identity. The rejection is so commonplace of reality that the fast reader misses it, and often misses that a rejection has even been called for, and this is because the rejection is based in the maxim that all individual human beings have available the resource of intuition; so to say, as the previous segment Part 7, that Miellassoux has come by his argument by intuition is to say nothing more than he is a human being. Yes; this is true. But the point here, as we discuss the point of contention, is to say that which everyone assumes as true, out loud, to their face. It is to point to what it is we say is real and to elicit a reaction where what is revolutionary has been missed. The point is to expose that upon which the assertion of a unitary discourse of the real gains its stature, and thus be able to begin to speak that which historically remains silent; to indicate that what is missed cannot be ‘re-placed’ as another discourse of method that says it is now ‘practice’; to indicate not merely that while what is missed is indeed missed by its objectival understanding — even as what is ‘radical’ poses as this space, or the revolution that is proposed by this space, this ‘missing’, this ‘indivisible remainder’ (Zizek) — and is indeed the ideology functioning as ideology, is the discourse ‘working’ (Heidegger, the Work of Art) as it is supposed to as the condition of reality as knowledge, but more significantly, that such ‘indivisible space’ is in the ‘pocket’ of real discourse, in one case as potential but in the other rather as completely missed; and this is to say, again, the rejection is the evidence of consciousness functioning to supply reality, of distancing the individual from its object through identity, consciousness ‘denying’ that the True Object is not just true-real.
While the conventional (real) discourse may evidence its own saturation of meaning in terminology and thereby be able to slice and mash, dissect and describe, deconstruct and recombine term-object singular identities so to bring about a sufficiently dense description of the picture of reality and to thereby gain purchase upon a new solution to the old, this method of process never gains its object beyond the mere Kantian intuition of true meaning gained by the terms that are poised in faith to avoid their own objectivity; at best, such a method succeeds in describing the ‘reality of the moment’. What this means is that the same discourse of reality that discounts any real ‘god’ through its argumentation is allowing for its ability to grant or convey truth by relying upon a transcendent yet unspeakable power that is denied in the asserted and apparent power of discourse to convey its truth (God does not exist/ there is no God and the atheist position in general). It thus becomes obvious why there have been arguments made as to a particular definition of ‘existence’ that excludes some ‘actuality’ of God, to justify why we can thus say ‘God does not exist’ and be truthful in as much as there is a ‘truth in God’. The ‘speculative’ only gains its (Aquinas) stature as such by virtue of the ‘practical’; by virtue of the speculative itself, it is not speculative, but rather indicates what is not practical except that it has to be distinguished because what is practical is ubiquitous to (common) sense, or for another word, reality. Hence, we can begin to speak again of — not merely duality, but more so, dual bases of power that do not combine but instead evidence the limitation of a discourse that proposes itself in the human act as the One omnipotent and ubiquitous truth.
One world is necessary. The problem is what this world is, but if we have more than one world then what is the ‘whole’? Many are already discounting such a question; so let Reality be said to account for the one world; for all the problems that arise whether mental, social, psychic, material, physical, etcetera, all the scenes and issues are dealt with through a reductive method that finds a solution for the question of what we are to do, so that every solution is a momentary manifestation that defines for humans their place of activity — this ‘one place’ where a reduction of meaningful categories amounts, is reality, and the argument that would attempt to displace or discount this proposal, a real argument. This necessary situation of humanity is thus contingency, every situation is contingent upon another situation. This place is ultimately a place that settles for consciousness its own operation in its operating. There is no manner of thinking upon things that can remove the fact of thinking about them (as far as we can think we know of thinking), so let us grant that to offer any notion whether subjective or objective or any of the proposed philosophical turns and solutions is always a notion of consciousness in the attempt to place itself in the real world; it is the same with thought. The only way to avoid this feature of consciousness is to deny this feature, and this is also a feature of consciousness; what is reductive, as to method, is based in denial, and the place where reduction occurs to find solution as to what to do is called reality. That method which relies upon such a denial of operation for the sake of the reliance is what we call conventional, since it is the appearance of the world that takes what is presented as the common arena of human effort for the sake of the One thing to be addressed and solved. Every proposal of how such reality is manifested is a discursive strategy for approach based upon meaning and significance. Hence, to argue that the world is constituted through objects, and only objects, is a particular solution for how consciousness has been placed and is being placed in the world for the moment. This argument then is ironic, for it begs its own question of how it is able to come to such a conclusion for all argument, which is to say, for all reality; it is the expression of contradiction as meaning, as opposed to contradiction indicating limit.
It is this feature of human process that now arrives in a necessary divergence. For within such a framing, which is a real historical discursive framing whereby various proposals have been offered and challenged through the method of determining truth by the criterion of contradiction, the world as we know it or have argued has brought us to the place where our ability to offer solution is seen to be merely a vanity, merely consciousness doing its universal operation — and this is denied. What has occurred here then is consciousness through its own function of creating meaning has come upon its own process as transparent, that is, the meaning is that it only makes meaning and this meaning has no true basis beyond the establishing of true objects (identity), regardless of any necessary objectival in-itself point of reference, and distanced itself from this meaning. This issue then is called the point of contention’, for the issue concerns not only reality and how it functions — the contradiction is overcome by faith –but also reality as such that it is distinguished now as another object in itself.
Reality is conventional; divergence ironic. The former sees progress instilled and innate in the meaning of every statement, whether it be for or against, the stasis of term-object identity in an historical temporal discursive movement of and toward the One truth, whether it proposes to be gainable or not (for the assertion that it cannot be gained is likewise an assertion upon the progressive nature and ability of humanity, that we have through trial and error found that this is the case). The latter sees the ‘control’ of terms, subjects and objects, to be in the terms and objects themselves, as objects in themselves. Hence we have (again, inevitably, perpetually), in consideration of the SRs, a dual divergence; Graham Harman who steps into the object (objects is all there is) finds a reality that though logically consistent is nevertheless somewhat difficult if not contrary to any common human sense, which is of course what he would find (what is an object divorced from a subject? What is a subject if it is only an object?). Yet he asserts such true object as actually and really true, as if he is privy to a more true reality that everyone should now understand (the ‘thought police’ assertion). Then we have aphilosophy, which upon reflection might be better termed as “philosophy-A”, as there is supposedly already a ‘philosophy-X’ which seems (maybe) already still conventional. Here discourse is all there is and because of this all terms, their meanings and or definitions, are objects. This latter does not privilege the subject, nor attempts to arrive at the object by denying the historical formulation of the subject, but instead speaks of effects of consciousness. On one hand, the effect of consciousness comfortably distanced from its own operations (in denial so it “Don’t Even Know I Am Lying”) so it can operate effectively with the tool of logic develops conventional reality in general as a primary base upon which the subsequent base may take form in the fantastical extreme of ‘logically real’ nonsense, for which we can probably begin see the evidence of faith at work (Speculative Realism, and Object Ontology). On the other hand, the effect of consciousness that compromises the distance consciousness would impose for itself in reality arrives with the meaning of contradiction as meaning (irony, and — wink, wink — philosophy-A). But nevertheless such Objects must necessarily exist given the conventional allowance for plausibility in negotiation coupled with the capitalized identity. One can only wonder if the people in Liberia who raided an Ebola treatment center based upon their belief that no such disease exists, that it is a Western capitalistic conspiracy, needed some thought police.
Yet I leave such real conventional possibilities to their proper domain; the ontological description of objects that are not merely terms, real objects, grants a description of the interrelating of terms as an objective field. Yet this field comes about in the holding out from the subject, because it will collapse in the subject.
I thereby suggest the divergence that has a more substantial propositional base, even if, indeed, such a proposition is admittedly not real. For what is collapsing is in the tension that develops by the holding apart that which is natively indigenous. When there is no tension, then the subject may be breached as to how the object manifests reality. Hence, the dual nature of the divergence of which we speak.
I agree with Graham Harman’s assessment of the Kantian failure, that Western philosophy is caught and spends its time now reiterating the same arguments, the faults and merits of ideas that stem from a human subject center attempting to mitigate an apparent gap between the cogito and the object. Divergence thus takes two forms. We argue that Harman and Miellasosux and the ‘speculative’ sort lack in their approach, i.e. they are found in what we see is the hard correlationalist limit, and it is this limit that justifies their route into the object through the conventional Sartean existential revolt (from the limit back into the limit), the (Kantian) subject and its route having been played out is now retreading its own ground through different terms, so invested in the state of reality conventional philosophy is, and they are in effect missing — or perhaps not missing it; this is the significance of the pocket veto — the fault of the object-term identity which is the Kantian thesis; which is to say, they flat out do not recognize it, in denial through plain ignorance or in denial in the face of the contradiction.
This situation unfolds in the following manner: They are either relying fully upon the true object of faith, and if so are at once accepting their (Kantian) intuitive faculty as a common faculty of human consciousness, and so read Kant’s ideas as a true (historical) object to be discerned and built upon in the progress of human knowledge, thereby missing the significant feature of at least “The Critique of Pure Reason”; or, they are being deceptive in that the intuition they have had is a particularly significant inspiration such that the degree of such inspiration would impose an offense upon the audience in which they engage, that is, the philosophical audience, by suggesting a privilege that is not available to everyone but which nevertheless they have due to the very intuition that is common among real humans, but ‘specialized’ in them. But the discourse of the Significant Event offers that to suggest that they are merely very educated or intelligent or have an otherwise unique view but without the intuited transcendental operation is to flat out deny the very aspect of their being human as being human; that is, unless they were indeed inspired by a transcendental and undisclosed aspect or influence. The progress that they thereby propose as a ‘new’ route upon the given discourse suggests that humanity might move out of a particular paradigm of thought, but not move out from being human, and thereby tells and reifies the conventional route: that discourse defines what and how human beings are as real human beings, and this is to say that somehow human beings are being not only influenced but indeed controlled by a power for which humans have no control except that they use discourse, and further this is to propose the greatest offense: such ‘special’ philosophers are especially privy to coming upon ‘inspired ideas’ (that are — nod, nod, wink, wink– not ‘transcendentally inspired’) that somehow allow them to gain purchase upon the center of power of discourse. This assertion through denial is exactly the Kantian proposal: that we can intuit an object’s truth due to the very nature of human consciousness being limited in its functioning. But the Speculative Realists deny this is true.
The problem of divergence remains as I have indicated; Harman and Miellassoux are still dealing with reality in reality. By my own definition, they are working along the conventional route, so we have then to distinguish what divergence means, and this is the work we have before us concerning the Significant Event. Obviously, The Speculative Realists’ divergence is from the type of philosophy just mentioned above. They diverge from ‘subject oriented’ to ‘object oriented’; this is plain. Yet the significance of their speculative divergence misses what should be seen as the true statement of Kant, to wit, there is no knowable object in-itself that can be gained outside of intuition and that to have achieved a ‘non-intuitive’ position one must be presented in a categorical imperative that then situates the ‘practical reason’ in a manner that is able to distinguish the two in a ‘non-practical’ way. In contrast, the overdetermined and common (mis-)interpretation of Kant allows for Kant’s real meaning that has been appropriated by Harman. Thus, to repeat, in so much as Harman, at least, concerns himself with the Object now, in the same way as described of Miellassoux in the previous segment, his (Harman) presentation seems to be and or otherwise must also be relying upon an undisclosed aspect (the state of categorical imperative that behaves so as to allow practical reason as a categorical precipitate, a hypothetical imperative) that informs his ability to offer a discussion about real-true objects, and so therefore can have no veracity so far as truth beyond what is real (realism), as he admits. But he denies Kant, and so either must derive the categorical and hypothetical reasons as further objects already true, that is, the facticity of their being a part of the philosophical series opens them to their possibility of being false, which is how he seems to see it; or, he is relying upon that very situation that Kant describes, and so is being dishonest. So we have argued that reality relies upon — reality is a function of consciousness, a thing, for the argument is of effects and not so much about describing what an ‘actual’ real object is; that is Harman’s job (or maybe all of conventional philosophy) — a distancing of consciousness from the object of its real involvement or consideration of reality. Harman denies the ‘subject’ philosophical rhetoric and uses another true object by which to gain his stature to be able to say that such subject-oriented ideas are done with; that is, he relies upon the truth of the series of discourse (the true object located of historical argument) to come to his divergence. If I have not been clear, this is saying that his first proposal is that only objects (an object oriented ontology) contain or reflect truth, and so he grants an unimpeachable premise that the historical series is true, by which to make his statement about objects, a statement that denies that the ability to know true objects can only be intuited. This is redundancy in its finest and the mark of the repetition of real argument; this is discursive slight of hand and is indicative of how Slavoj Zizek involves the 5 stages of grief (see a later segment). Thus, the discourse of the Significant Event suggests that Harman (and M) has enacted a ‘pocket veto’ that places the transcendent clause ‘in his pocket’, such that it is already ‘had’, and by this is able to venture out into the world an ‘inspired agent’ of transcendence, motivated by a unspoken of aspect that in other days and discourses would be called ‘God’.
Oh shit. I didn’t just say that. Wait wait wait — aren’t we attempting to remove the transcendent?
Harman’s only saving grace is then by the real divergent move. Two objects touch vicariously and in sincerity. He has thereby re-instated the identity of the basic duality in essential reality, a reality that includes the individual vicariously, that is to say, reality includes the individual in place of the human being; he closes the gap by exchanging real identical categorical imperatives. This is ironic: Harman is arguing a removal of the subject by placing it in the position of the object sincerely, truly, and thus is he able to describe the True Object of the Subject; that is, nothing that is attainable through real tangible sensibility, except real contingency (as an Object), which is a system that defines itself in such a way so as to exclude that which is ‘accidental’. This appears to be the weight of his whole argument (though the jury is still out). Hence, by contrast, what is attainable is to describe the subject of the object, and this (sorry to keep dangling the carrot) is to introduce the significant event.
The odd thing is that hardly anyone will be able to see themselves beyond the terms by which they identify themselves in reality and so they will miss their own veto — if they ever had one — and and the description of the significant event will likely be just as nonsensical, but even more so. Yet if you are ready for more then the fish might not have broken the line.
End Part 8.
* * *
Whew! this essay is really developing.
Next we take up the ramifications of this dilemma I have shown of the Speculators of Reality and bring in some more Slavoj Zizek.
Maybe one day I’ll get back to Heidegger (sorry; I lied earlier).
But for sure, I will eventually get back to the matter at hand, and stop wading in the philosophical pool; but there are some ends that should be tied first.
It would be cool if a few people would comment.
Really End part 8.